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Introduction
In many ways, the erstwhile European colonial powers are still living in thepostcolonial age, in spite of indications that a new era is coming into place. They
remain profoundly marked by the lasting impact of their imperialist adventures, as
do those whose lands were brought under imperial control, though to varying
degrees and in different ways. Their economies and societies, their cultures and
values, their relations with other countries, even their present demographic make-up,
all bear the imprint of the colonial past. 
However, while Britain, France, Spain, the Netherlands and Portugal share many
of the main traits of their history and its legacy, there are also clear differences
between them. France is not living through the postcolonial experience in exactly the
same way as its neighbours. Similarly, its former colonies and protectorates bear the
distinct marks of their specific experiences of French rule, influence and culture.
Whether one attributes the rise of the European empires to an almost absent-
minded process of chance development, to a systemic and determined set of
structural processes or to the triumph of the will, born out of a sense of mission,
there are certainly pronounced differences with regard to the ideologies and
discourses, through which the different powers rationalised their imperialist
enterprises, as well as the systems of rule and administration they set in place. These
differences are also reflected in the counter-discourses that developed to challenge the
imperial hegemony of the various colonial empires. Moreover, these ideological
differences have continued beyond the formal end of empire, assuming new forms
appropriate to the changing global context.
It is the specificity of the French dimension of postcoloniality that forms the
main object of this book, which in no way intends to provide a comprehensive
history of all aspects of French imperialism. It will become clear, however, that this
specificity cannot be equated with autonomy. In the first place, the French
imperialist dynamic has been from the outset part and parcel of the global
phenomenon of imperialism that has by now affected practically all areas of the
planet. Furthermore, the interrelations and interactions have not been confined to
the economic, political and military domain, but have also operated in the domain
of culture and ideas. The imperial powers have never hesitated to borrow certain
concepts or values from each other when it was opportune to do so. This is just as
true in the case of the anti-imperialist struggles, where the common dimension to the
struggle was often grasped through recourse to an internationalist perspective. 
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In the case of all the European imperial powers, there had developed, at more or
less the same time, the same underlying processes that made these countries look
beyond their own borders for wealth acquisition, trade and later territory. Similarly,
the formal end of each empire did not occur in a vacuum, but was part of a global
process of decolonisation and restructuring of power relations. 
Nonetheless, the hegemonic discourse of French imperialism assumed specific
distinctive forms, as did the counter-hegemonic discourses, which arose to challenge
it. This specific distinctiveness has persisted into the contemporary period.
The early voyages of discovery and opportunities for enrichment through trade
and plunder were intimately linked with the development of capitalism in Europe
and provided the wealth and capital that were to serve as the engine of this
development, transforming the economies of the countries concerned in an
irreversible historical process. Thereafter, the development of mercantile and then
industrial and finance capitalism was inextricably intertwined with the drive to gain
control of the resources of as much of the rest of the globe as was feasible.
This was a process that was unlike any imperial endeavour humanity had seen
before. As such, it bears only tenuous and superficial comparison to the earlier
empires of antiquity, in spite of the spurious comparisons that have been made from
time to time, especially with the Roman Empire, particularly in the triumphalist
heyday of the British Empire. These were normally made with the aim of magnifying
its grandeur, and stressing the benefits of civilisation, which, as in the case of the
Romans, are always felt to outweigh the brutalities of conquest. Andrew Wallace-
Hadrill, for instance, points to the extent to which the Pax Romana was a role model
for the ideologues of British imperialism:
A century ago, for imperialist Britain (and for other European states with
imperial ambitions), the Roman Empire represented a success story. Rome's
story of conquest, at least in Europe and around the Mediterranean, was
imitated, but never matched, by leaders from Charlemagne to Napoleon.
The dream that one could not only conquer, but in so doing create a Pax
Romana, a vast area of peace, prosperity and unity of ideas, was a genuine
inspiration. (Wallace-Hadrill 2001: 1)
This is not to say that this analogy was always applied uncritically. A famous instance
of the use of the analogy between the two empires is found in Joseph Conrad’s Heart
of Darkness, where in the first few pages Marlow reflects on the Romans’ empire in
Britain. He concludes of the Romans that ‘they were no colonists; their administration
was merely a squeeze, and nothing more, I suspect. They were conquerors, and for
that you want only brute force’ (Conrad (1902)/2002: 7), unlike the modern-day
imperialists, who were inspired by the ‘idea’ of the colonial mission and, first and
foremost, the devotion to ‘efficiency’. As P.J. Marshall has pointed out, the extent to
which Britain ever had the means or the will to impose a Pax Britannica was in fact
limited in practice (Marshall 1996: 33). Moreover, in the case of France, although
references to antiquity had figured large at the time of the French Revolution and the
x | Postcoloniality
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First (Napoleonic) Empire, French ideologues of later imperialist expansion were
more likely to appropriate the garb of a modernising, Enlightenment-inspired project,
rather than focusing on examples from the past empires of antiquity.
Such attempts, successful or otherwise, to conquer overseas territories in
antiquity and the Middle Ages were of quite a different order from the modern
imperialist endeavours, notwithstanding the lasting resonance of Alexander’s
conquests throughout Asia and his transcendence into myth in parts of India, or the
lasting legacy of the crusades in the mindsets of both Europeans and Arabs. It has
also become a feature of the ‘postcolonial’ period for some to cast a shroud of
relativism over the imperialist past and relegate it to the dustbin of history, like a
burnt-out firework, with no further capacity to impact on the contemporary world.
Yet the processes that were set in train and were to become the first steps in the
creation of an integrated global capitalist economy are very far from running out of
steam, even if, as with steam-power, their original forms have been superseded by
new and ever more powerful ones.
The use of the term ‘postcolonial’ to refer to the latest stage in this process
requires some discussion here. It has become common currency to use this as a
blanket term, incorporating widely different domains of discourse. On the one hand,
it is used to characterise the contemporary historical phase in global economic and
political relations. It is also used to characterise the diasporic forces that have led to
the displacement of groups of people from the former colonies. In the theoretical
domain, it has come to be associated with a particular body of critical theory,
especially, although not exclusively, in the field of literary and cultural studies.
Moreover, if the term is considered appropriate for a very large number of different
fields, it is, at the same time, notoriously ambiguous. This is the case even if we leave
aside the loose use of the term as a synonym or substitute for its frequent partner, the
‘postmodern’. The prefix ‘post’, itself, is given different semantic interpretations by
those who care to make these distinctions. Thus, even when ‘postcolonial’ is interpreted
in a strictly chronological sense, there are ambiguities. Does it mean only the period
after decolonisation, or the whole period, beginning with the first instances of
colonisation and possibly including its present ongoing effects?
This is perhaps symptomatic of a wider terminological difficulty, relating to the
common confusion around the term ‘colonial’ itself and its derivatives. The term
‘colonialism’ has come to be preferred to that of ‘imperialism’, or even ‘empire’, to
characterise the European empires. Indeed, this is particularly true of much, if not most,
of French discourse, including that which has as its content an anti-imperialist critique.
One of the reasons for this can no doubt be traced back to the primary use of
the term ‘empire’ to denote the various Napoleonic regimes in France itself. A
reference to the ‘Empire’ more often than not relates to the First Empire of Napoleon
Bonaparte and, secondarily, to the Second Empire of Louis Napoleon. This certainly
provides a partial explanation for the favoured use of ‘colonialism’ or ‘the colonial
empire’ to make clear the distinction between these two supposedly different entities,
though it is clear that there are interrelations and overlap between the two that have
often been ignored or insufficiently developed.  
Introduction | xi
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Yet the substitution of colonialism for imperialism does raise considerable
difficulties, for colonialism is not synonymous with imperialism. It relates rather to
a specific territorial stage of the latter phenomenon, when the earlier trading and
looting stage had given way to the conquest, acquisition and/or control of land and
political power in the colonies, with or without settler colonisation. This stage is now
largely superseded, as a result of decolonisation, although significant vestiges remain,
both in terms of a number of colonies still directly controlled by a colonial power, as
in the case of the French DOM-TOM (overseas départements or territories), or in the
ongoing, permanent settler presence in former colonies of settlement, in North and
South America, Southern Africa and Australasia.
Imperialism began its development with the emergence of capitalism in Europe.
The booty derived from trade, plunder and enslavement provided the capital for
industrialisation at home. The export of labour to the new colonial territories, most
notably through the forcible transportation of enslaved Africans, but also of bonded
and convict labour from Europe itself and parts of Asia, enabled the establishment
of plantation economies, in which the capitalist mode of production found its most
brutal mode of expression. The subsequent export of capital overseas carried further
the export of capitalism as an economic system. The momentum of imperialism is
provided by the intrinsic expansionist economic forces driving capitalism forwards
into a globalising system, operating at many different and unequal stages of
development throughout the territories that have come under its sway.
Thus, although there are clear distinctions to be made between the different
stages of diachronic development, as well as different synchronic variations in the
operation of this process worldwide, capitalism and imperialism cannot be
distinguished as two separate processes that just happen to occur simultaneously.
They are integral to each other, as part of the same process, primarily a process of the
economy, although developing also its characteristic political and military aspects,
with their own particular institutions and ideologies, which then often acquired a
semi-autonomous life, sometimes even in contradiction with the short-, medium- or
long-term requirements of the development of the economy.
Thus, colonialism was only a particular stage in the overall development of the
global capitalist imperialist economy, which since decolonisation has gone on from
strength to strength. The end of European colonialism did not signal the end of
capitalist imperialism, nor did it necessarily signify the end of the form of
colonialism per se, which could reassert itself as and when required. Not only did the
former colonial powers continue to keep up the momentum of the development of
capitalist imperialism, without having to maintain the expensive baggage of a
colonial state administrative and military apparatus – a process that was inadequately
theorised in the immediate aftermath of decolonisation as ‘neocolonialism’
(Nkrumah 1965). Other powers, which had a record untarnished by colonial blight
or which were even able to cloak themselves in the mantle of anticolonialism, such
as the USA, were able to join in the process and take it forward to a new stage. The
growing economic presence of China in contemporary Africa and elsewhere is also
instructive in this respect.
xii | Postcoloniality
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However, it is not just the nature of the whole historical process of capitalist
imperialism that is distorted through the isolation of this one part of it, European
colonialism, and the substitution of this part for the whole. The privileging of the
notion of colonialism also has the effect of exempting or exonerating key players in
the capitalist imperialist process, as well as limiting its spatial effects, for colonialism
deals only with the relations of power between the European metropolis and the
colonised territories in Africa, America, Asia and Australasia. To characterise these
relations, the favoured image is that of the wheel, with the metropolitan hub or
centre from which radiate the spokes connecting it to the periphery. The lines are
simple, direct; it is a simple bilateral process, in which direction comes from the
centre and tribute returns from the periphery. As such, however, it is totally
inadequate as a representation of the complex, multidimensional set of relations that
come into play as a result of the tentacular spread of capitalist imperialism and its
unequal levels of development, involving a multiplicity of sub-forms. Even in its
direct colonial form, the process brings into being a number of mediating factors at
different levels; local participants are engaged at various points in the process and are
thus tied into the system, which works not just for the interests of the colonising
power, but for all sorts of different median interests too. 
It is obviously too simplistic to assume that the casting off of the metropolitan
colonial yoke would in itself suffice to break the inexorable progress of capitalist
imperialism. A clear case in point is the American colonial experience, where internal
colonialism and genocide persisted, indeed intensified, after the end of the British
dominion, not to mention the external expansion of American power at a later stage,
without the overt trappings of colonialism to begin with, though this was to come later.
For all these reasons, I have chosen to use the global expression of capitalist
imperialism to describe the ongoing phenomenon with which we are dealing here.
This is a process that arose at a specific moment in history, with particular economic,
political, military and cultural characteristics, and was clearly linked with the
development of knowledge, science, technology and finance, as well as with new
ways of organising the economy along capitalist lines. Accompanying this process
was the associated development of new ways of perceiving and representing the
world and relations between its peoples, along with new discourses for their
articulation. All of these aspects would change in an ongoing process of
development, transforming themselves to meet new challenges, to solve new
problems, to exploit new opportunities. And just as knowledge, science and
technology adapted, refined and developed new theoretical and practical knowledge,
so too would the cultural and ideological representations be transformed over the
course of these developments. In the latter case, however, as we shall see, some of
these forms were to prove strikingly resilient. Having come into being in particular
historical circumstances, they acquired a life of their own and have tended to remain
on the shelf, even if in a state of ossification, alongside more modern versions.
It is the survival and the transformation of these old ideological and cultural
forms, as well as the development of new forms of discourse in what has come to be
known as the ‘postcolonial’ world that form the major object of this study. As such,
Introduction | xiii
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we shall be looking at ways in which those discourses have retained their power
under new conditions, as well as the ways in which they have had to adapt to retain
their appeal and capacity to act as vehicles for interpreting the world. Integral to this
will be an examination of the counter-discourses that come into being to articulate
challenges to the dominant discourse and also contribute to the process of forcing it
to adapt. Neither can be considered in a vacuum, but they work upon each other in
a process of mutual interrelation, as is the case with the other processes at stake in
the domains of the economy, politics and so on. 
At this stage, it is perhaps opportune to stress that this discussion is mainly
concerned with those discourses that are intimately connected with the question of
power, even if the connection sometimes appears to be indirect. In other words, what
is ultimately at stake is the issue of discourse as ideology, rather than discourse per
se. Secondly, it is taken as axiomatic that ideological discourse cannot be separated
from economic and political relations, which will inevitably impinge during the
course of the argument, but cannot be fully treated in the space of this text. 
However, this book is not simply concerned with discourse/ideology as such,
although, as it will emerge, discourse has a very special role to play in the sphere of
French ‘postcoloniality’. The question of theory is very much at the heart of the
matter, with all the problems the definition of theory and its differentiation from
ideology entail. The problem of truth, or the objectivity of knowledge, cannot be
ducked, however. It is crucial to an understanding of the world and to our ability to
change it. It is best therefore to face this issue head-on at the outset and set out the
assumptions that will be operative.
The first assumption is that there is such a thing as history. The world as it affects
human beings is not changeless, or an endless repetition, without any intrinsic meaning.
On the contrary, historical processes derive their meaning from, and for, human beings. 
Moreover, historical reality at any given time is the totality of the processes,
relations, institutions and ideas that operate in the economic, social, political,
cultural, ideological and theoretical domains. These different domains exist in
complex interactions, in which each domain may assume a greater relative
importance in any particular historical conjuncture. However, the economic
processes in which human beings engage in the production of the basic material
necessities of life and their development in the course of history, together with the
economic relations that govern their organisation, remain of prime importance as a
factor in the development of the other historical processes. 
The final set of assumptions concerns the nature and role of ideas in the
historical process. Ideas, representations and meanings are seen as developing, not in
a vacuum, but in an intimate relation with material processes, albeit with a life and
a variable systemic logic of their own. It is taken as a basic premise that knowledge
is possible, if never absolute. Following on from this, it is considered that ideas,
articulated through discourses, have different levels of validity and that there are
criteria against which this validity can be measured. 
It will be clear that these premises are at variance with much of what comes
under the blanket headings of poststructuralist, postmodernist and postcolonialist
xiv | Postcoloniality
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thought. The intention here is not to engage in a systematic critique of these bodies
of discourse, but to deal with particular issues as they arise.
There will be two areas of particular focus. The first concerns the particular
status of counter-discourses that arise to challenge dominant forms of hegemonic
discourse and ideology. The second involves the question of the validity of ideas,
representations and meanings, whether they explicitly aspire to the status of theory
or not, and how this validity is to be judged. 
At the end of the day, it is assumed that while there is no absolute truth or
knowledge, fixed for all time, there are nonetheless distinctions to be made between
theories that satisfy certain criteria of validity better than others. The choice of
criteria is, of course, ultimately a matter of personal choice. The choices that are
made will nonetheless clearly be influenced to a very large extent by objective factors
related to one’s particular position in a particular society at a particular time and
subjective factors, in which political choices play an important role. These choices
involve identification or non-identification with particular social groups, genders,
generations and classes, as well as a conscious or passive inclination to accept the
status quo or to work towards change, partial or global. 
Underlying all of what follows are two basic criteria: first, objectivity and,
secondly, critique. Neither of these criteria is considered to be value-free, but they are
based on certain assumptions of value. In the first case, objectivity is grounded in the
value of knowledge itself, implicit in working towards an ever-closer understanding
of the real world in all its aspects. Objectivity is thus understood not just in terms of
the rationality of a scientific proof, but also in terms of real practical knowledge,
which can be tested through its effects. The second criterion relates to the critical
value of ideas, or, in other words, their capacity to challenge assumptions and assist
in the process of social change. 
Further problematic issues will be dealt with as they arise. The remainder of this
introduction will explore further the impact of the development of global capitalist
imperialism in the specific domains of land, space and time and the way in which notions
and conceptions were reconfigured and transformed through this historical process. 
The Land Issue
Within the time frame of the inception and expansion of the process of global
dissemination of the capitalist mode of production, or imperialism, to use the
shorthand expression, the actual occupation of overseas territory by the imperial
powers could be considered to represent no more than a stage in the process, albeit
a significant one, except in the cases of settler colonies, such as Algeria, Kenya, South
Africa, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, in Africa, most of North and South America and
Australasia, where the settlement became permanent. In the first stages of
imperialism, the acquisition of wealth through trade and plunder was seen as the
prime goal and reward of the voyages of trade and expansion. It went hand in hand
with the battle for the control of the seas, essential to the continuation of the
freedom to venture to new parts of the globe to extract new sources of riches.
Introduction | xv
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The takeover of land, with or without colonial settlement, eventually took place
for a number of reasons. In some cases, it was necessary to secure trading and other
economic interests, to ensure that these activities could proceed without hindrance.
In the case of colonial settlement, a combination of problems at home – including
the break-up of feudalism, resulting in the loss of livelihood and access to land, as
well as religious and political persecution – and the apparent opportunities to make
a living from the cultivation of the land made emigration to the colonies an attractive
proposition for some. For others, it did not represent a choice: taken into slavery or
other forms of bondage, transported as criminals or as political detainees, these
unwilling transportees were to form the labour force needed for large-scale plantation
agriculture, organised along capitalist lines. 
In Algeria, opportunities for settlement were seized as part of a number of forays
into social engineering and social experimentation. Followers of Saint-Simon and
Prosper Enfantin saw the possibilities it offered to put their ideas for economic and
social progress into action (Spillmann 1981; Adamson 2002). The French
government also saw the potential. In the early years following the conquest, orphans
were shipped out from Toulon to provide wives for the new settlers, made up of army
veterans, in the so-called ‘military colonies’ (Girardet 1993). After the loss of Alsace-
Lorraine, their populations were encouraged to settle in Algeria to escape German
control. Other colonists made their own way from many different European
countries. In 1840, there were 28,000 Europeans in Algeria. By 1848, this figure had
increased to 110,000. In 1846 alone, 46,000 had arrived (Girardet 1993). 
Control of the land became necessary at a certain stage of development of
imperialism, as part of its general logic of forcing through the transformation of the
economic mode of production and globalising the spread of capitalism. In specific
terms, it allowed for the development of large-scale capitalist agriculture and primary
commodity production to take place unfettered by the restraints of feudalism and,
subsequently, permitted the conditions to be created for the introduction of
industrial capitalism with the export of capital. 
Yet control of the soil itself at the microeconomic level was not the prime
purpose in the non-settler colonies. The striking depiction of the slicing up of the
globe and the colouring in of vast tracts of the surface of the earth on maps and in
drawings represent to a far greater extent the push for control at the level of
macroeconomics and politics. 
In the colonies of settlement, on the other hand, the appropriation of land by
the colonists was direct and often brutal, though cloaked in ideological
rationalisations of one kind and another. As Jomo Kenyatta summed up the process:
‘When the white man came to Africa, he had the Bible and we had the land. And
now? We have the Bible and he has the land’ (quoted in Mazrui 1990: 6).
In Algeria, over the period of French control, the major part of the land passed
into state or private settler ownership, dispossessing the Algerian population. The
fictional character of Mahmoud, in Kateb Yacine’s Nedjma, illustrates this process
well. His ancestors’ land has been whittled down to a mere two hectares, as though
with each new generation the ground just melted away: ‘Mahmoud may well be
xvi | Postcoloniality
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seventy or eighty years old – his age doesn’t really matter. He has lost too many of his
children. He has managed to save these two hectares of land beyond the clearing,
whereas his forefathers owned sixty hectares. It seems as though the land of his
fathers melts beneath the feet of the newborn generation’ (Kateb Yacine
(1956)/1981: 196).
As Sartre pointed out, the appropriation of Algerian land was the clearest case of
theft in the history of French colonialism. This expropriation was rationalised in a
number of ways. Following the practice in other colonies, military campaigns could
serve as a cover for the occupation of uncultivated land, in the guise of operational
requirements for pacification purposes. Indeed, Bugeaud, during his time as
governor from 1840 to 1847, envisaged settlement of the land by former soldiers
who had finished their term of service, to produce colonies militaires (Girardet 1993),
although these were not ultimately successful. 
In addition to this military rationale, an often-heard argument employed in the
discourse making the case for settler control of the colonised land was that of the
mise en valeur, or the value added to the soil by the input of the settler’s labour and
technical expertise, in order to achieve its full potential in terms of production and
profit. The logic behind the mise en valeur notion was that this could only be
achieved with the injection of European expertise. However, it was not in fact the
uncultivated or underused land that was of interest to those seeking to transform
Algeria into a settler colony; rather it was the fertile land, all of which was already
under cultivation at the time of the Algerian conquest, making Algeria largely self-
sufficient in food. Moreover, much of the land taken into state control was promptly
taken over by speculators, who proceeded to sell it at a large profit straight away,
without any input or improvement to the soil (Girardet 1993). Although the
argument of the mise en valeur was characteristic of the attempt to justify the
continuation of the rights of settler ownership in the case of Algeria, it was not of
course specific to French colonial discourse, but was very typical of other settler
discourses, for instance in the context of the colonies of southern Africa.
In fact, the concentration of land in the hands of the European settlers could only
be achieved at the expense of the Algerians who had previously farmed it. All methods
were deemed acceptable to further this objective (Sartre 1956: 1374–75). According
to figures given by Sartre, the Algerians lost two-thirds of their land within a century
(Sartre 1956: 1376). In 1850, twenty years after the conquest, 115,000 hectares were
held by colonial settlers. This figure had increased to 1,000,600 in 1900 and
2,703,000 hectares in 1950.1 In addition, the French state held eleven million hectares
in its own right, compared with seven million hectares left to the Algerians. 
Much of this land had been confiscated from Muslim religious bodies in the
early stages of colonisation (Girardet 1993). The policy of cantonnement of nomadic
tribes resulted in the further appropriation of tribal common land, which had
previously been used for passage or pasture (Girardet 1993). The confiscation of land
as part of the punishment for resistance and rebellion was also a familiar method.
Following the Kabyle Revolt of 1871, 446,000 hectares were appropriated in
reprisals, along with a fine of eleven million francs (Girardet 1993).
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In the non-settler colonies, ownership of land in itself was not the key issue,
although the transformation of the legal framework for ownership of land appears to
have been crucial. Capitalism institutionalised private property in land and imposed
a variety of legal frameworks on the different colonies to eliminate previous
collectivised ownership of land, organised either through a notional central power or
in smaller operational units. Thus, the process of transforming land into a market
commodity, making it the object of buying and selling, and removing the labourers
from the land, sometimes forcibly, broke organic/ancestral links, permanently
transforming the relationship to the land. 
This was a common feature of colonial occupation in the case of the various
colonial powers, even though the methods and the rationalisations of the practices
might have differed significantly. In India, for example, in the northern and eastern
regions of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, UP and so on, the British, for instance, through
Cornwallis’s 1793 Act on Permanent Zemindari, created an intermediary class of
landowners, with the function of collecting taxes from the peasantry, from whom
their interests naturally became divorced. The ryotwari system, introduced early in
the nineteenth century in the Madras and Bombay presidencies, made the peasantry
into proprietary holders of government land, with the obligation of paying a rent-tax
fixed at such a high level that non-payment and consequent loss of the land often
ensued (Marx, ‘The Future Results of the British Rule in India’ (1853), in Marx and
Engels (1959)/1975: 30). These transformations of the traditional landholding
structures were brought about, not least, to enable the effective taxation of the
peasantry, in a system in which a sizeable proportion of the revenue derived from the
land tax. For instance, H. Palmer quoted a figure of £20 million in land tax revenue,
out of a total of £64 million collected by provincial governments in India in 1937
(Palmer 1942). 
The need to increase revenue, in the face of the British East India Company’s
financial difficulties, had also been the prime motive for the direct annexation of
land, as set out in a minute in council in 1848, in which, according to Marx
commenting on Disraeli’s speech to Parliament of 27 July 1857 in an article
published in the New York Daily Tribune, ‘was laid down the principle, almost
without disguise, that the only mode by which an increased revenue could be
obtained was by enlarging the British territories at the expense of the native princes’
(Marx, ‘The Indian Question’ in Marx and Engels (1959)/1975: 46). This was
achieved through the setting aside of the principle of adoption, in the absence of
natural heirs, giving the Company and later the state the right of annexation of
property in such cases, as well as by the calling into question of title and the right to
exemption from land tax. None other than Disraeli himself was to call this practice
into question, no doubt in defence of the sacred rights of private and especially
landed property, making it clear that revenue was the prime consideration for the
government ‘to disturb the settlement of property’, in a country where the land tax
was ‘the whole taxation of the state’ (quoted in Marx and Engels (1959)/1975: 47).
After the retaking of Lucknow in 1858, there was a wholesale confiscation of the
lands of Oudh by the British government, by way of reprisals for involvement in the
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uprising, variously known as the Indian Mutiny or the First Indian War of
Independence (Marx and Engels (1959)/1975: 132–43). 
The discourse that articulated this process from the point of view of the
coloniser, as well as the feelings of dispossession on the part of the colonised or
enslaved that resulted from it, had little to do with the actual irreversible nature of
the changes effected, which affected not just actual ownership and ownership rights,
but the qualitative use to which the land was put, as Edward Said has pointed out
(Said 1993: 271–73). The capitalisation of land was the essential basis for the
transformation of the whole economy along capitalist lines. However, the discourse
used to justify it emphasised due legal process; the rule of law and administrative
rationality were portrayed as major contributions to progress. 
While this was a common theme in the discourses of the imperial powers, there were
nonetheless significant differences in the forms that these discourses assumed. In Algeria,
although much of the land was acquired through the unsubtle method of confiscation as
a punishment for resistance activity, the principle of equality was also brought into
service. This was done through the aberrant use of the inheritance provisions set down in
the Napoleonic code civil, enshrining the principle of equal inheritance of family property. 
This code ensured the fragmentation of the traditionally collective tribal
property and thus its gradual purchase by speculators. In 1873, commissioners were
given the task of transforming large tracts of undivided property into a jigsaw of
individual lots, at the time of inheritance, some of which bore little relation to reality.
In the douar of Harrar, the commissioner in charge discovered fifty-five joint owners
of a total amount of eight hectares of land. It only needed one of these to be
‘persuaded’ to ask for redistribution for the complexities of the ensuing procedure to
bring the whole lot on to the market, where it could be snapped up for next to
nothing by European speculators. Thus, the introduction of the code civil had the
effect of deliberately destroying the landownership system and consequently much of
the social structure in Algeria, but it was nonetheless presented as one of the benefits
of French civilisation (Sartre 1956: 1375).
Ownership and control of the land were not just about inheritance and property
rights. There was a whole important ideological dimension to the way in which the
relationship to the land was perceived. Issues concerning the relationship to the land
were also articulated through various types of narrative discourses and, in particular,
the modern novel, of which Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe is a prime example. As Edward
Said has put it: ‘The main battle in imperialism is over land, of course; but when it
came to who owned the land, who had the right to settle and work on it, who kept
it going, who won it back, and who now plans its future – these issues were reflected,
contested, and even for a time decided in narrative’ (Said 1993: xiii).
To what extent these matters of control over the land were ever actually decided
in narratives, even when these were constituted as the political ideologies of
nationhood, is certainly open to question. Yet there is no denying the importance of
historical, fictional and other narratives in mapping, in the cultural consciousness,
the differential positions of territorial entities in a hierarchy of controlled spaces that
existed for the benefit of the metropolitan homeland:
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the geographical notation, the theoretical mapping and charting of territory
that underlies Western fiction, historical writing, and philosophical
discourse of the time. There is first the authority of the European observer
– traveller, merchant, scholar, historian, novelist. Then there is the hierarchy
of spaces by which the metropolitan centre and, gradually, the metropolitan
economy are seen as dependent upon an overseas system of territorial
control, economic exploitation, and a socio-cultural vision; without these
stability and prosperity at home – ‘home’ being a word with extremely
potent resonances – would not be possible. (Said 1993: 69)
Said has eloquently described the different social spaces of imperialism as they are
articulated through the colonial literature of writers such as Kipling, Conrad,
Haggard, Loti, Gide, Malraux and Camus, though, surprisingly, he leaves Hugo out
of the frame. He has also described what he calls ‘the actual geographical
underpinnings’ of the imperial relation, concluding that ‘the actual geographical
possession of land is what empire in the final analysis is all about’ (Said 1993: 93).
Indeed, for him, the geographical element is primary; he considers imperialism as ‘an
act of geographical violence through which virtually every space in the world is
explored, charted, and finally brought under control’ (Said 1993: 271): ‘At the
moment when a coincidence occurs between real control and power, the idea of what
a given place was (could be, might become), and an actual place – at that moment
the struggle for empire is launched. This coincidence is the logic both for Westerners
taking possession of land and, during decolonization, for resisting natives reclaiming
it’ (Said 1993: 93). 
It is no surprise that the anticolonial struggles seized on the land issue as a
primary concern. The recovery of the land of the nation was to be a key objective,
whether this was expressed through the struggle to drive the coloniser from the
territory or through movements to return to the land of exile. The reality, however,
was that the relationship to the land had been permanently altered and there was to
be no going back. In the final analysis, imperialism was not primarily about land, but
about a global economic dynamic, which is still evolving in the present day.
The Reconfiguration of Global Geographical Space
In the same way as the expansion of global capitalism had brought in its train a
characteristic view of world history, in which Europe dominated as the motor of
human history, there had also been an effect on the way in which the geographical
space in which imperialist relations were set was reconfigured. The world had been
recentred with its focus now situated in Western Europe. In a quite literal way, the
centre of the post-imperial world was shifted to Greenwich, where it was fixed and
marked by the meridian dividing the east from the west. 
In one sense, this was in line with previous civilisations, which had perceived
their own sites to be at the hub of the universe, or at least that part which was known
to them. For the ancient Greeks, it was at Delphi, marked by the omphalos, or navel
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stone, to record the spot where the two eagles released by Zeus to find the centre of
the world were reputed to have met with their beaks touching. In Roman times, all
parts of the known world were conceived in relation to Rome, their distances marked
on a pillar near the Arch of Severus, described as the navel of the world. Cuzco, the
last capital of the Incas, has also been described as the navel of the world, as, indeed,
have Easter Island and other places, including Iraq.2 The thirteenth-century mappa
mundi places Jerusalem at the centre of the world of Christendom and the very name
of the Mediterranean Sea evokes the belief of those living on its shores that they were
indeed at the centre of the earth. 
Similarly, attempts to trace lines of reference across the world’s surface to assist
navigation go back to the world of antiquity. Eratosthenes, based in Alexandria, is
credited with having made a surprisingly accurate measurement of the earth’s
circumference in approximately 240 BCE. In time, many countries drew up a line in
reference to which they were able to pinpoint locations and prepare maps of their
countries, such as those known as the Rome or the Washington meridians. The
meridians mapped by France and Britain were, however, of another order. Both
countries had aspirations for the universal status of their meridians and both were
subsequently to engage in a battle to establish which of these meridians was to be the
‘prime’ meridian, not just for their own countries, but for the entire globe. This
mapping of the globe in a uniform fashion marked a significant new departure and
was closely connected to the development of universal systems governing both time
and space. It was, of course, not just a matter that concerned national pride. The
increasingly national and international dimensions of both the French and the
British economies made it an eminently practical concern.
It was the French astronomer Abbé Jean Picard (1620–82) who had first
measured the length of a degree of longitude, using this to develop work on the
measurement of the earth. Building on this work, the Paris Observatory, constructed
in 1667 by the architect Claude Perrault, acting for Colbert, was sited so that the Paris
meridian ran exactly through the centre of the site.3 The building was designed in such
a way that each of its four sides faces directly north, south, east and west. The latitude
upon which the south façade was set (48°50'11") marks the official latitude of Paris.
The building can thus be said to mark the precise location of the centre of Paris. 
However, the impetus for determining the precise location and measurement of
the Paris meridian, from pole to pole, was provided by the quest for a more rational
system of measurement, inspired by the French Revolution, which, in this area, as in
others dominated by the vagaries of traditional ways of perceiving and doing things,
wished to make a clean sweep. It was thus that the process to introduce the decimal
metric system was initiated (Decree of 1 August 1793). It was intended as a
universally applicable system, providing uniform, standard weights and measures,
designed in accordance with more rational criteria than the mishmash of different
units used under the Ancien Régime. In the Decree of 18 Germinal Year III – 7 April
1795 – (Article V), it was explicitly stated that the new units of measurement, e.g.
metre, litre, franc, were to be described as ‘Republican’. At the same time, it was
hoped that other countries would be persuaded to join in and adopt the new
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measures, which could serve as a universal system. The Provisional Agency for
Weights and Measures made this clear, in an ‘Adresse aux artistes’, published on 11
Floréal, Year III, when it spoke of the uniformity, as a demand of the people ‘in all
times and in all places’.4 In 1790, envoys had been sent to Spain, Britain and America
to argue the merits of the system, and Thomas Jefferson showed interest in the new
scheme (Quid 2000). 
In keeping with the favoured decimal system, the metre was defined as one ten-
millionth of the distance from the North Pole to the Equator.5 So, in order to be able
to determine and produce the standard metre, it was necessary to calculate the
accurate measurement of the length of the Paris meridian. Surveys were undertaken
from 1792 to 1799 by two astronomers, Jean-Baptiste Delambre and Pierre
Méchain, whose adventures are documented in Denis Guedj’s La Méridienne and Le
Mètre du monde (Guedj 1987, 2000),6 and then from 1806 to 1808, during the
Napoleonic era, by the astronomer and politician François Arago, who was later to
play a role in the abolition of slavery, and fellow scientist Jean-Baptiste Biot. The line
extended across France, from Dunkirk in the north to Prats de Mollo in the south,
just west of Perpignan, before crossing into Spain, via Barcelona, and across the
Mediterranean via the Ballearics, into Africa, where it bisected Algeria into two
roughly equal halves. The Paris meridian ran along a line that was 2°20'14" east of
Greenwich, where the Royal Observatory had been created by Charles II in 1675, a
few years after the Paris Observatory, and where the prime meridian was ultimately
to be established.7
However, until the end of the nineteenth century, each country continued to
choose for itself the system it would use for determining the zero reference point for
longitude. Thus France used the Paris meridian for both maritime navigational
purposes and land-based map making. Portugal used the Lisbon meridian. Some
countries used different reference systems for land and sea, such as the United States,
which adopted Greenwich for its sea charts and Washington for its land maps. 
The need for a common standard at sea was pushed strongly at the first
International Geographical Congress in Antwerp in 1871. However, there was no
agreement. France was not prepared to give up without a fight its aspirations to have
the Paris meridian recognised as the prime meridian, especially given its pioneering
work in this field. If this could not be achieved, it hoped to persuade Britain to adopt
the metric system as a quid pro quo for recognition of Greenwich. The bargaining
continued until 1884, when, at the International Meridian Conference held in
Washington, the Greenwich meridian was chosen as the compulsory reference for
zero degree longitude, with only Brazil and San Domingo backing Paris’s claim (San
Domingo voted against, France and Brazil abstained). 
The implications of a move to a universal standard were not limited to
navigational questions and space; it also involved the growing need for the adoption
of universal standards in time. Previously, there had been no agreement on how time
should be measured. The de facto reference to the sun’s position in the sky meant
that there were great local and seasonal variations, both internationally and within
individual nations, affecting such matters as the length of an hour and the length of
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the day and night. In Britain, the standardisation of time nationally in the 1840s was
directly related to the development of the railways and the need to be able to draw
up a consistent timetable across the nation. This need was not restricted to Britain.
The development of an increasingly internationalised economy, involving
transnational transport and communications, made a universal time system essential,
based on the recognition of a prime meridian at zero longitude. The Greenwich
meridian was the favourite, since it was already used as the basis for the bulk of the
navigational sea charts, used in maritime commerce, and also because the US railway
system had already anticipated the agreement by opting for Greenwich as the basis
of its own time-zone system in 1883, although the USA was not officially to bring
in standard time until 1918.8
However, although Greenwich Mean Time was adopted as the universal basis for
the world’s time-zone system in Washington in 1884, the Paris meridian was not
abandoned by France until 1911 for timekeeping and 1914 for navigational
purposes. Even after 1911, this standard time was referred to as ‘Paris Mean Time
minus 9 minutes 21 seconds’, rather than Greenwich Mean Time. The Paris
meridian was also not abandoned altogether. French land maps, for instance,
continue to use the Paris meridian as their reference point. 
In fact, the pill was sugared by the establishment of the International Time
Bureau (Bureau International de l’Heure – BIH) in Paris in 1912, which had the task
of determining Universal Time in the basement of the Paris Observatory. With the
replacement of Universal Time in the 1980s by Universal Coordinated Time, now
more accurately determined by atomic clocks, it is now the International Bureau of
Weights and Measures (Bureau International des Poids et Mesures) in Sèvres that
establishes what this should be. Indeed, France remains today the overseer of the
measuring systems, based on the international metric system of weights and
measures, which has been widely adopted throughout the world, partly as a legacy of
the Napoleonic influence throughout Europe as a result of conquest, but also because
of its inherent rational practicality. 
It had less success with the decimal time proposal, also thrown up by the
Revolution. This was part of the move to introduce a new Revolutionary calendar to
mark the beginning of a new era for the French people, l’ère républicaine. A decree of
the Convention, dated 5 October 1793 (old-style), marks the establishment of this
new era thus: ‘L’ère des Français compte de la fondation de la république, qui a eu
lieu le 22 septembre 1792 de l’ère vulgaire’ (Article I).9
The institution of the Revolutionary calendar was a political move and had more
to do with establishing a new Republican tradition, rather than a strictly rational
approach. The decree stated that, since it had taken four years from the beginning of
the Revolution to establish Republican government in France, each four-year period
was henceforth to be known as a Franciade, the end of which was to be marked by a
special jour de la Révolution (Article X), which would be celebrated with ‘Republican
games’ (Article XVI). While the Revolutionary calendar based the new year on the
solar cycle, divided into twelve months of thirty days each, with five extra days to
complete the year, called ‘jours complémentaires’, there was an attempt to introduce
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an element of decimalisation, through the division of each month into three ten-day
‘décades’, which had previously been used in ancient times in Egypt. There was also
a clause (Article XI) that aimed to standardise the measurement of time in decimal
style, with the division of each day into ten hours, in their turn divided into ten and
so on down to the lowest measurable unit, although this measure was not intended
for immediate implementation.10 This was subsequently revised, in a later decree of
4 Frimaire, Year II of the Republic, to ten hours, divided into 100 decimal minutes,
divided into 100 decimal seconds.11
The proposed decimalisation of time not only attempted to do away with local
variations in the calculation of the time of day, which had hitherto been mainly based
on the observation of the noonday sun, the ‘meridian’ in its other sense; it also
attempted to standardise the length of a single hour, which previously had been
variable depending on the solar cycle and the seasons. The standardisation of the
length of the hour was not in fact properly put into practice in France until the
approval of Paris Mean Time in 1816.12 It was not until 1891 that Paris Mean Time
applied to the whole of France, before being replaced by Universal Time in 1911.
Interest in the Paris meridian has been revived in recent years. Since 1995, the
line of the meridian across Paris has been marked by 135 bronze plaques set in the
ground along its route, created by the Dutch artist Jean Dibbets and known as the
Arago markers. The rivalry between France and Britain was also reignited at the time
of the second millennium celebrations, when the significance of Greenwich, as the
zero point of the new millennium, was highlighted, especially with the creation of
the Millennium Dome. Paris responded with plans to revitalise the Paris meridian by
planting trees along its route in order to create a permanent rambling path and then
organising a gigantic, fraternal picnic, with the table, decked with a bistro check
tablecloth, stretching 700km from north to south, on 14 July 2000 (Guardian, 28
June 1999). 
Interestingly, for something that had its origins in the development of modern
science and the need for more accurate mapping of both France and the wider world,
the celebrations surrounding the millennium in France based on the meridian, have
aroused a whole new interest in the occult, based on the symbolism of this so-called
‘Red Line’, also known as the ‘Axis Mundi’. Much has been made of the links to
Christianity: the Paris Observatory was situated on the land of the Abbey of Port-
Royal; a black Virgin was placed in the underground Oratory of the Observatory; the
meridian passes through the Church of Saint Sulpice. The links to astrology and the
occult have also been stressed. Claude Perrault, the Observatory’s architect, was, with
his brother Charles Perrault, author of fairy tales, credited with membership of a
secret society; the basement was linked to the catacombs, supposedly used for various
occult activities. At its southern end, the meridian is also associated with various
myths, linking Mary Magdalene, the Holy Grail, the Cathars, the Templars, the
Prieuré de Sion and the lost Merovingian dynasty, as well as to the mystery
surrounding events at Rennes-le-Château and the artistic and literary output of
figures such as Nicolas Poussin and Jules Verne. All of this has been given a new lease
of life by the amazing popularity of Dan Brown’s novel, The Da Vinci Code (Brown
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2003). Moreover, linked to this esoteric hotchpotch of fact and, mainly, fiction are
various scientific theories, including that of geophysicist Alphonse Berger, who in
1912 pinpointed the centre of the continental surface of the planet on the Ile
Dumet, off the Breton coast, leading to claims that this was indeed the ‘navel’ of the
world and the lost Atlantis. 
Whatever the merits of these different, more or less far-fetched theories, the fact
remains that the development of global capitalism was accompanied by a significant
reconfiguration of global space in a number of ways. The European colonial powers
were placed firmly at the centre of the globe, as far as the peoples of their respective
empires were concerned. Relations were henceforth concentrated along the single
dominant axis tying the periphery to the centre (Amin 1989: 8–9). The only relation
that now mattered was the one that tied the dominated colonised peoples to the
dominant metropolitan power. Just as previous strengths in the colonised lands were
no longer acknowledged, so too were blotted out of the memory external links that
had previously existed in the form of trading relations, cultural exchanges and
political alliances. The real cooperation, collaboration and partnerships of the past
were written out of history, as in the case of the obscuring of trading and other links
that existed between the Mediterranean countries and the East.13 The achievements
of indigenous peoples, their cultures and rights to the land were most often ignored
or denied, as was, in some cases, the very existence of the indigenous peoples. 
France’s position at the centre was crystallised even more intensely in the
dominant role allotted to its capital. The figure of Paris as a beacon, radiating light
to the far-flung ends of the earth, was reinforced with the building of the Eiffel
Tower, which, along with the Paris meridian, was the focus of the millennium
celebrations. Yet again, the enduring strength of this figure, of the centre towering
over its periphery, was demonstrated, as the symbol of the relationship that France
still entertained with its colonies and former colonies elsewhere in the world. 
There is another figure that was used to characterise the very particular character
of the spatial relations operating between France and its key North African colony,
Algeria, and the challenge to them through the anticolonial struggle. As far as the
delineation of space is concerned, it is notable that the relationship between France
and Algeria was defined both in terms of the clear binary divide characteristic of
imperial relations, and through the denial of this differentiation. Algeria was not just
a French territory, like other colonies. It had actually been incorporated into the
territory of metropolitan France itself in 1881, thus reducing the Mediterranean Sea
to nothing more than an internal waterway in the ideological discourse of supporters
of Algérie française, who claimed that ‘the Mediterranean flowed through France, just
like the Seine flowed through Paris’. The division of Paris into left and right banks
was thus paralleled by the division of France into the two banks or shores of the
Mediterranean – the north bank and the south bank. 
The incorporation of Algerian territory into metropolitan France was, in fact,
the clearest concrete instance of assimilation in the history of French imperialism,
which, as we shall see, whilst it was held out as an ever-receding goal for the colonised
people themselves, in reality was only ever applied to territory. As Nicolas Bancel and
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Pascal Blanchard have pointed out, ‘assimilation applied to land, not to people’
(Bancel and Blanchard 1997: 18). 
The articulation of the spatial relation between France and Algeria contributes
not a little to the specificity of Algeria amongst the French colonies, where the only
parallel that comes anywhere close in British terms is the relation with Ireland, not
only through its incorporation into the territorial realm of the United Kingdom, but
also through the importance of the ownership of the land by the colonising power
via extensive English landlordism. When Said criticised Conor Cruise O’Brien for
his notion of Camus as someone who ‘belonged to the frontier of Europe’ (Said
1993: 209), he was right, given that there was, in reality, a clear divide between the
colonised land of Algeria and the land of the colonising power. Nonetheless, in terms
of what remained the dominant French discourse in Camus’s time, the land of
Algeria was perceived in a very real way as the frontier, the outpost of Europe on the
southern shores of the Mediterranean.
Notes
1. Girardet also gives figures pointing to an increase of approximately one million hectares
between 1871 and 1898 (Girardet 1993).
2. See the exhibition, ‘Iraq, Navel of the World’, Ashmolean Museum, Oxford, April
2003–March 2004.
3. See http://www.obspm.fr. 
4. ‘L'uniformité des poids et des mesures, demandée par le peuple dans tous les temps et
tous les lieux, va enfin être établie dans toute l'étendue de la République française.’
Agence temporaire des poids et mesures, ‘Adresse aux artistes’, 11 Floréal An III,
published at http://smdsi.quartier-rural.org/histoire/11flor-3.htm. 
5. The kilogram was originally defined as the mass of a cubic decimetre of water at
maximum density. 
6. It has been claimed that Méchain in fact made an error, which was subsequently covered
up by both him and Delambre, leaving the metre actually 0.2 mm short (Alder 2002;
Guardian, 27 August 2002), though this was hardly surprising given the variations that
arose naturally.
7. See http://www.nmm.ac.uk. 
8. See http://www.astrodatabank.com/DCH/70timechanges.htm.
9. Text published at http://webexhibits.org/calendars/calendar-french.html. 
10. ‘Le jour, de minuit à minuit, est divisé en dix parties; chaque partie en dix autres, ainsi
de suite jusqu’à la plus petite portion commensurable de la durée’ (Article XI). 
11. Text also published at http://webexhibits.org/calendars/calendar-french.html. 
12. The transition from sun time to mean time had already taken place in Geneva in 1780,
Britain in 1792 and Berlin in 1810 – see http://www.astrodatabank.com/DCH/
70timechanges.htm.
13. These links are vividly portrayed not only in the European Marco Polo’s account of his
travels, but also in the earlier writings of the Moroccan traveller Ibn Battutah, who
arrived in India in 1333 (Dalrymple 1993: 253; Ibn Battutah 2002).
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Chapter 1
French Discourses of Empire
The particular shape and characteristics of French postcolonial discourse todaycannot be understood without an exploration of the specific historical legacy of
French imperialism and colonialism and the discourses or ideologies through which
these processes were articulated and rationalised. This chapter will highlight a
number of key issues and contradictions, some of which still have a bearing on
present difficulties.
The French Empire did not develop in a steady linear progression, but passed
through a number of distinct stages in its history, or rather we should say their
histories, in which each stage was marked by a clear setback, a defeat or loss, which,
temporarily at least, put a brake on the process of expansion. One can distinguish,
broadly speaking, three distinct phases: (1) from the early sixteenth century to the
end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815; (2) from 1830 (the conquest of Algiers) to 1870
(the fall of the Second Empire); and (3) the period of imperialist expansion under
the Third Republic from 1875 to the culmination of the decolonisation process with
Algerian independence in 1962. Each of these phases had its own specific features,
in terms of the nature of the economic, political and military forces at play and the
relations within which they operated. The different historical stages were also
characterised by very different rationalisations of the whole imperial undertaking.
Thus each phase was characterised by a specific set of discourses or ideologies, which
had developed in tune with the times and historical conditions and which were used
in the different stages to rationalise, or indeed to oppose, the process of colonial
expansion (Girardet 1972; Ruscio 2002). 
However, just as there was also an underlying continuum in the historical
processes involved in the development of imperialism, in spite of the discontinuities,
so too was there a strong element of continuity at the level of the ideas and
discourses, in which earlier forms retained their power to influence and shape the
new forms of later periods.   
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The First Phase of Modern French Imperialism 
(Early Sixteenth Century to 1815)
The first stage coincided with similar attempts by other European powers at the
beginning of the modern period to expand beyond their own borders into the so-
called ‘New World’, Africa and the East, to bring back gold, silver, spices and other
riches (Ferro 1996). The acquisition of natural resources, extracted minerals,
agricultural produce and artefacts through various forms of trade and plunder,
characterised by a greater or lesser use of force and deception, soon developed into
new forms of agricultural production overseas in some of the territories, particularly
in the Americas and the Caribbean. Colonial entrepreneurs of a new type thus took
over from the older seafaring adventurers and privateers, with the intention of
getting involved in the production process itself and developing it along new lines,
through the establishment of vast plantations for the production of tropical or semi-
tropical produce, often of new products that would become crucial for mass
consumption back home, such as sugar, cotton and coffee. These new operations in
the Americas and the Caribbean depended on the development of the slave trade
into an operation of hitherto unheard-of scale and the transportation of slave labour
to work the plantations. At the same time, colonial settlement by European settlers
was taking place in what were sometimes known as ‘virgin territories’, and therefore
seen as ripe opportunities for the enterprising settlers, willing to leave their
homeland, often under the pressures of poverty and persecution, to start anew in a
strange and foreign land. In this way, vast tracts of the North American continent
were colonised by French settlers in what came to be known as ‘New France’.   
All of these endeavours were inspired by the sense of opportunities for making
money or a better life, opportunities that were there for the taking or creating. There
was no shortage of arguments for the validation of such enterprises. In the case of
France, the conquests had been carried out in the name of the greater glory of the
French king and the development of the earthly reign of Christendom. It was the
French king François I who sent the Italian sailor Giovanni da Verrazano, to North
America to attempt to find a route through to the Pacific in 1524/25. He also sent
off the Breton sailor Jacques Cartier in 1534 to search for the north-west passage to
Asia and explore the opportunities for riches in the Americas. Cartier is credited with
‘discovering’ much of Canada, claiming possession of the islands of Saint-Pierre-et-
Miquelon in the name of the French Crown in 1535, for instance. However,
attempts in 1555 to establish French settlements in Brazil, at Rio de Janeiro and
elsewhere were strongly resisted by the Spanish and Portuguese, and it was not until
1605 with the founding of Port Royal in the territory of Acadia (present-day Nova
Scotia), followed by the founding of Quebec in 1608 by Samuel de Champlain, with
the support of the king, Henri IV, subsequently to become the capital of French
Canada, or ‘New France’, that the French really developed a foothold. Further
territory was claimed in what is now the southern United States. The former Jesuit,
explorer Robert Cavelier de La Salle, famously named Louisiana after Louis XIV in
1682, and a colony was established there in 1699 by Pierre Le Moyne d’Iberville,
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born in ‘New France’, but serving as an officer in the French navy. Settlement began
on the South American coast, in what is now French Guiana, from 1624 and
colonies were founded on the Caribbean islands of Saint Kitts (1627), Martinique
and Guadeloupe (1635), Saint Lucia (1650) and Saint-Domingue (1664). In Africa,
the French set up trading posts along the Senegalese coast from 1624. 
Yet, from the outset, there were certain features that distinguished the form that
French overseas expansion was to take from that of other European powers, especially
its arch-rival, England. Not least of these was the role that the state, the Church and
the armed forces were to play in the colonial enterprise. Where the driving force of
British expansion overseas had been the mercantile activity of its entrepreneurs, in
France’s case the interests of state and the extension of its political and military
battles with other European powers on the European continent and especially with
its island neighbour were to prove at least an equally potent factor and possibly
reflected in part the relative lack of political influence of the merchant class in pre-
Revolutionary France. It was Louis XIV’s minister, Colbert, who founded the French
East India Company (Compagnie des Indes Orientales) in 1664, which was to set up
colonies on the Indian Ocean islands of the Ile de Bourbon (Réunion) (1664), Ile
Royale (Ile de France, now Mauritius) (1718) and the Seychelles (1756), as well as
on the Indian mainland, beginning with Chandernagore in Bengal in 1673. Further
colonies were established at Pondicherry in 1674, Yanam in 1723, Mahe in 1725 and
Karikal in 1739. Missionaries, such as Père Labat, played an active part in the
acquisition of territory in Canada, Louisiana and the Caribbean, and the Church
worked closely with the organs of state. 
The role of the Church in the formulation of the Code Noir by Colbert for
Louis XIV in 1685 (later renewed in a second version under Louis XV in 1724) was
especially significant.1 The Code set out the regulatory framework for the institution
of slavery and the slave trade, down to the finest detail (Sala-Molins 1987). It
claimed in the Preamble, that it was motivated by the need to maintain the authority
of the king and the ‘discipline of the Catholic Church’, as well as the welfare of the
slaves. The Code Noir proclaimed that all slaves should be baptised and instructed
in the Catholic religion (Article 2) and that no other religion would be tolerated
(Article 3). Indeed, the very first article orders the expulsion of all Jews from the
island colonies. At the same time, it institutionalised the status of the slaves as the
property of their masters.
The role of soldier-adventurers in India was also especially significant. Thus,
while both British and French attempts to expand were driven forward by the need
to establish new trading posts and settlements, the political imperative to score
points against their rivals and defeat them in military battles assumed perhaps an
even greater significance in the case of the French. The military exploits of La
Bourdonnais, a French naval officer and administrator from Saint Malo, who
operated in India and the Indian Ocean islands, rivalled those of the man he came
to perceive as his enemy, Joseph François Dupleix. As Governor of Chandernagore
from 1731, then Governor-General of India from 1742 until his recall to France in
1754, Dupleix vied with the British for control of India, particularly through a
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policy of local alliances, political manoeuvring and intrigue and scored significant
military success in the south. 
In spite of their efforts, however, the French did not come out of these various
overseas wars well. Acadia was lost to the English and became Nova Scotia, as a result
of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, resulting in the traumatic displacement of more
than 10,000 French-Acadians, the ‘Cajuns’, to Louisiana in 1755, still a vivid part of
the folk memory, although many subsequently returned (Maillet et al. 1984). The
French finally lost the battle with the British for the control of India and Canada, as
a result of the Seven Years War, which ended in 1763, also the year of the death of
Dupleix, who had ultimately been beaten at his own game by Robert Clive. This year
also saw the cession of Louisiana to the Spanish, although it was briefly returned to
France in 1800. In 1803, however, Napoleon sold Louisiana to the United States.  
The loss of territory in the ‘New France’ of North America, as well as the loss of
India were both felt keenly, though in different ways. There were attempts to find new
ways for French colonialism to proceed. Yves Bénot, for instance, has argued that the
Abbé Raynal’s Histoire philosophique et politique des deux Indes was probably written to
order, commissioned by the Choiseul ministry to assemble a body of knowledge in
support of this policy (Raynal (1770)/1981). It is interesting that a section of this
work, attributed to Diderot, argued notably for the civilising power of trade: 
It was there that, finally, seeing spread out before me these beautiful lands
in which science and the arts now flourish, where the darkness of barbarism
had for so long held sway, I asked myself: who dug these canals? 
Who drained these plains? Who founded these towns? Who brought
together, clothed and civilised these peoples? Upon which all the
enlightened men in their midst replied with one voice: it is trade, it is trade.
(Raynal (1770)/1981: 15)
In the case of India, French nostalgia for a mostly mythical paradise lost was to
become a long-standing feature of the relationship between France and India, down
to the present day (see Chapter 8). Moreover, the subversive character of much of
French activity in India, aimed at undermining British power, was to continue to
mark a particular kind of French discourse, which presented France as the champion
of the colonised underdog and still has its echoes today.
In the North American context, the linchpin was provided by the American
Revolution, in which France naturally took the side of the American colonists against
the British. Its own Revolution in 1789 was to have an even greater impact on what
was left of France’s colonial empire. First, it provided the impetus for the successful
revolt of the black slaves in the 1790s in France’s most profitable colony of the time,
Saint-Domingue, which went on to become the independent state of Haiti. Secondly,
it led directly to the takeover of power by the military leader Napoleon and the
establishment of an empire in mainland France itself, which, apart from the Egyptian
expeditions and other unfulfilled ambitions, was primarily preoccupied with
extending its conquests to other European territories, unlike its British rival, which,
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as an island power, necessarily focused on the domination of overseas territories, and,
moreover, overseas territories that, with the exception of Ireland, were outside Europe.
The importance of the Napoleonic system of government and the impact of the First
Empire on the overseas colonies, in terms of historical events and processes, but also
in terms of the colonial systems of governance and long-lasting ideological effects,
have not received sufficient attention to date. We shall return to this question later, as
well as to the ideological conflicts that arose during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic
periods in respect of the colonies and, particularly, the institution of slavery – conflicts
that were fought through in desperate struggles.
For the moment, suffice it to say that, by the end of the First Empire and
Napoleonic period in 1815, the territory and trading posts that France had acquired
all over the world had largely been lost, as a result of rivalry and wars, particularly
with the British. Napoleon’s defeat on the European continent led to a settlement,
with the Treaties of Paris of 1814 and 1815, following on from the Congress of
Vienna, in which a small number of its former colonies were restored to France,
though this amounted to nothing more than the Caribbean islands of Martinique
and Guadeloupe, Guiana, the Ile de Bourbon (Réunion) and trading posts in
Senegal. Henceforth, these would be referred to as the ‘old colonies’. All that
remained of the French presence in India were the five trading posts, ‘les comptoirs de
l’Inde’: Chandernagore in Bengal on the river Hooghly, about 30 km north of
Calcutta, Pondicherry on the Coromandel coast, 160 km south of Chennai
(Madras), Karikal, just south of Pondicherry, Yanam (Yanaoun), further north on the
Andhra Pradesh coast, and Mahe, on the western Malabar coast (Sen 1971; Annasse
1975; Association Les Comptoirs de l’Inde/CHEAM 1994; Le Tréguilly and Morazé
1995; Vincent 1995; Weber 1996). 
The Second Wave (1830–70)
The second wave began in 1830 with the key conquest of Algiers, leading to the take-
over of much of the North African territory. The reasons for the invasion appear to
have been fairly ad hoc, to provide something of a diversion for a monarchy in
trouble, though a short-term pretext was provided when the Dey of Algiers struck
the French consul with a fly-whisk and a longer-term one by the wish to curtail the
activities of pirates operating out of Algiers. 
Moreover, the brief interlude of the Second Republic (1848–1852) brought the
political dimension of the debates once more to the fore, culminating in the second
abolition of slavery in 1848, with Victor Schœlcher as Under-Secretary for Colonies,
and the institution of universal manhood suffrage in the colonies. These measures,
which included representation in the national assemblies of metropolitan France for
the colonies, meant that the ‘old colonies’ had been brought into the logic of a
process of assimilation, although representation of the colonies did not necessarily
mean representation of the colonised for many years to come.2 In any event, there
were setbacks in the actual implementation of these measures, as a result of the coup
d’état of Louis Napoleon and the establishment of the Second Empire. 
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This led to a resurgence of militaristic colonial ambitions, leading to some
further territorial gains, with Cochin China added to the list of conquests. It also led
to some notable failures, such as the ill-fated attempt to install a puppet regime in
Mexico (1861–67). Under the Second Empire, there was also a reversal of policy on
some issues relating to colonialism and modifications to the accompanying
discourse. Some of the tensions between the two strands of colonial policy, which
were later to develop into the opposition of ‘assimilation’ and ‘association’, have their
roots in this period, although in reality it was never a case of either/or, but a recourse
to different approaches depending on the particular circumstances.
The new colonial conquests, particularly those in North Africa, opened up the
way for new approaches to the administration of these peoples and territories. If
there were attempts at the beginning to use traditional structures in a more indirect
form of control, these pragmatic arrangements were replaced by the system put into
place in 1845, under the Governor, Marshal Bugeaud. The system set up a threefold
division of the territory into civil, mixed and military authorities. A key element was
the ‘Arab bureaux’, which, under the aegis of the army, devolved a whole slice of
administration and tax collection to local functionaries of one type or another. These
were abandoned in 1856, largely because of problems of corruption, and the civil
authority took over (Girardet 1993). Military authority and influence remained a
key element in the governance of Algeria, however. Louis-Napoleon himself
harboured ambitions to rule Algeria as an Arab kingdom, in which the Arabs would
have the right to their own autonomous territory, from which European settlers
would be excluded. In this scenario, he would be Emperor of the Arabs, as well as of
the French. These proposals were strongly opposed by the colonial settlers and very
little came of the emperor’s attempts to cast himself in the role of ‘friend of the Arabs’
(Spillmann 1981). In any event, the measures that were taken were soon to be
overturned by the Third Republic, which took up the policy of assimilation with
enthusiastic vigour (Girardet 1993) and implemented measures to give the old
colonies representation in France, as well as through local government, though not
without retaining their status as colonies.
The Third Phase (1875–1962)
The real expansion took place much later in the nineteenth century, from the 1870s
onward, when Britain and France practically carved up Africa between them in a
division of spoils sanctioned by the Berlin Conference of 1885. France also increased
its hold over Indochina, although it never recovered its earlier influence in India or
other parts of the globe. This third stage, which lasted until the decolonisation of the
post-war period and early 1960s, marks the real heyday of the French Empire (Andrew
and Kanya-Forstner 1981). By 1914, there were sixty million people under French
imperial control and over ten million square miles of territory. There were further gains
at the end of the First World War, when the French gained League of Nations mandates
over the former Turkish territories of Syria and Lebanon, and also acquired African
territory, previously controlled by the Germans, in Togo and Cameroon.
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The arguments and debates about the empire were not restricted to the realm of
politics (Chafer and Sackur 2001). During the course of the nineteenth century, with
the development of the modern nation-state and modern forms of French
nationalism, the cultural realm became increasingly important, as the notion of the
superiority of French culture and civilisation became more and more widespread.
Economic arguments also had their part to play. In particular, following the loss of
the first overseas territories, one of the main arguments against any further colonial
adventures had been their ruinous cost (Spillmann 1981). Voltaire himself had earlier
used this argument in Candide, bemoaning the expense of the war over possession of
Acadia, ‘a few acres of snow’, which exceeded what all of Canada was worth, though
this has often been misquoted (Voltaire (1759)/2003). Moreover, after France’s
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, the
anticolonial camp found new force in the case for concentrating resources on
building up the home front, against their powerful enemy across the Rhine.
However, the economic arguments that were to prevail were those put forward, not
against, but in support of the necessity of colonial expansion to provide a safety valve
for the economy, as the Third Republic minister Jules Ferry was to put it, most
notably in his speech to the Chambre des députés of 28 March 1884. Colonial policy
was the daughter of industrial policy, he said. France needed colonies to provide new
and expanding markets, as well as to act as a source of cheap raw materials and labour
power.3 Paul Leroy-Beaulieu also made the economic case for colonial expansion, as
in his book De la colonisation chez les peuples modernes (Leroy-Beaulieu 1874). He saw
the colonies as an outlet for surplus population, products and capital. Léon
Gambetta, amongst others, also argued that colonial expansion could be seen as
compensation for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine (Ager 1996). 
These were some of the arguments with which opponents and supporters of the
expansion of empire carried out the debates. Once the empire had established itself
with a firm foothold in North and Equatorial Africa and in Indochina, in addition
to the outposts of the Caribbean and the islands of the Indian and Pacific Oceans,
the dominant discourse became more political. After all, the heyday of the French
Empire coincided with the entrenchment of the Republic in mainland France, in the
form of the Third Republic, which still remains the longest-lasting Republic that
France has yet seen. If the earlier explorers, priests, merchant- and soldier-
adventurers had carried out their conquests to the greater glory of God and King, the
more modern radicals and Republicans of this period raised the French flag all over
the globe to the greater glory of the Republic. 
The common premise underlying all the discourses of empire was a fundamental
redefinition of the relations between the countries involved, in which the realities of
the precolonial past were obfuscated. Thus, all previous achievements of the
colonised countries were overlooked, played down or distorted. Economic
development, scientific discoveries, mastery of technology, cultural diversity, political
and military might – all disappear from accounts of these countries’ histories to date.
They were to appear henceforth as backward outposts, on the fringes of the new
historical narrative of the planet’s development. 
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The colonising power was presented as marking a new stage in the development
of the countries concerned. As such, it was the harbinger of technological, economic,
political and cultural progress, the agent of change for the salvation of the peoples
concerned, who had previously been wallowing in their backwardness and
obscurantist ways. Hope lay only through the advent of modernism, and the imperial
powers had a monopoly on modernity. Henceforth the only value would be that
added through imports. The whole enterprise was of course couched in high-
sounding rhetoric. If the British forte was to present itself at the forefront of economic
and technological development, with the construction of railways as its major trump
card, it did not hesitate also to promote its own particular brand of paternalistic
moralism. The French, on the other hand, drew on their own characteristic source of
political modernity, with the trumpeting of the values of the Revolution and the
Republic, the universalism of which suited the enterprise very nicely.  
French colonial discourse was not a monolithic entity, but was characterised by
different strands and tendencies (Roberts 1963), such as the ‘associationism’ linked
to Lyautey and strongest in the protectorates, like Tunisia (established in 1881) and
Morocco (established in 1911), where the French used existing administrative
structures to rule indirectly. This ‘associationism’ differentiated itself from the
dominant tendency proclaiming the virtues of ‘assimilation’, while the latter enjoyed
an almost hegemonic status in the full colonies, at least in theory. As Gambetta said
in a speech at the Palais-Bourbon on 10 February 1878, ‘the principle which has
primacy in all our work, which should rule our decisions and govern all our thinking,
is the principle of assimilation’ (Gambetta 1883: 102).
It was in the name of the Republic that the French colonialists were bringing the
universal values of the Enlightenment to the colonised peoples they ruled. The
Rights of Man were trumpeted as universally applicable, as were the Republican
principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. There is perhaps no better example of
the fervour with which the doctrine of assimilation was promoted than the speech
made by Gambetta at a banquet commemorating the abolition of slavery, held on 5
May 1881, in the presence of Victor Schœlcher, in which he claimed that ‘France will
never be big enough nor its population sufficient’. Any increase in the number of its
citizens was a way of increasing the grandeur of France. The abolition of slavery itself
was seen in this light: ‘The fact that Frenchmen were created on this day, which we
now commemorate, is sufficient cause for its memory to be a supreme cause for
rejoicing and reparation.’ (Gambetta 1910: 166). He proposed a toast to the
‘Français d’outre-mer’:
without distinction of colour, class or caste; the Declaration of the Rights of
Man – and this is our Gospel – did not distinguish between people according
to the colour or the rank, where they have been placed by fate on the social
ladder. This is what gave it its solemn, sovereign character, even as it extended
the scope of our national regeneration: instead of saying ‘the rights of the
Frenchman and the citizen’, it said ‘the rights of man and the citizen’, thereby
signifying that whoever should claim membership of the human family, by
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dint of his organic body and conformity as part of the closely linked series of
beings, had, by right of birth and similarity, to be admitted to participation
in human freedom and dignity. (Gambetta 1910: 166)
Indeed, he also saluted the ‘overseas French’ for their contribution to ensuring the
victory of the Republic, adding to the number of Republican supporters in the
National Assembly (Gambetta 1910: 167). He then ended by encouraging them to
demand ever more ‘assimilation’: 
ever closer assimilation to the mother country, assimilation which will not
much longer be denied to you … You are in possession of the same
freedoms as France, you may perhaps think that they are not sufficiently
complete, I believe that, for the moment, they are enough to be able to
prepare the rest, and they will shortly receive their necessary complement.
The assimilation that you demanded, you have already obtained most of
what you asked for; one more effort, one more vote, one more
representation, and I am sure that between France overseas and mainland
France there will no longer be any disparity: there will only be one France,
the true, the only France, and there will only be one flag, the one to which
I raise my glass, gentlemen, the national flag. (Gambetta 1910: 168)  
We shall see that everyone in the Republican camp was not in fact in agreement that
the Rights of Man covered the colonised; for some, there were limits to how far their
universality could be stretched. Moreover, we shall see that the division of France
into two Frances did not disappear with the triumph of the Third Republic, but
would re-emerge through the following years. This did not mean, however, that there
were no differences between the British and French brands of empire. In a speech to
the Chambre des députés the following year, 18 July 1882, Gambetta made the case
for cooperation with Britain with regard to Egypt, in spite of (or because of ) the
rivalry that existed between the two powers and, in particular, their different
conceptions of the nation and the colonies:
remember that the English have the habit of differentiating between peoples.
On the one hand, there are those peoples, which they consider to be nations
of a race similar to their own and able to benefit from the institutions of free
England; Australia and Canada are countries where there really is a people with
successive generations and social strata, with its own traditions, its own
language and its already constituted aptitudes. To these, the English give
institutions, which gradually lead to the emancipation of these races and make
of them, as it were, the younger sisters of England. But there are other races, it
would appear, which, in the eyes of England, have always had the characteristic
of being dominated, of living under the crack of the whip, and which are only
capable of becoming a people, provided that they are not exposed to all types
of demands and pressures coming from outside. (Gambetta 1910: 268) 
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For the French, on the other hand, there was only one nation; it was this nation
that had the right to act in Egypt, to maintain European influence and keep it away
from ‘Muslim fanaticism and the chimera of revolution’ (Gambetta 1910: 272). 
As a further, concrete illustration of the difference between the approaches of the
French and the British, the gateway still stands that used to separate the French
colony of Chandernagore in Bengal from British India; it still bears the motto of the
French Republic: Liberté, égalité, fraternité. It is worth comparing this with the
inscription carved by Lutyens on the gateway of the Secretariats in New Delhi
(quoted in Dalrymple 1993: 83):
Liberty will not descend to a people;
A people must raise themselves to liberty;
It is a blessing which must be earned
Before it can be enjoyed.
The contrast between the two discourses is neatly illustrated. However, did this then
mean that the French colonies represented a Republican’s vision of paradise on earth
for the colonised peoples?  
The French Republican Discourse of Empire
The reality existed in what was more akin to a schizophrenic relationship to the
dominant colonial discourse. For, if all could aspire to be equal citizens of the
Republic, with full political rights, in practice most remained colonial subjects, with
only duties and few, if any, rights (Suret-Canale 2001). Moreover, this was not just a
contradiction between discourse and reality; the contradiction was also integral to
the discourse itself, which maintained the same essential dualism, that had
characterised earlier differentiations between Christians and heathen, freemen and
chattel slaves, whites and blacks, Europeans and ‘natives’, civilisation and barbary.
Indeed, these forms of the binary divide did not go away; they were subsumed
beneath new layers of discourse.
Thus, the distinction between citizen and subject did not go unacknowledged in
the heyday of empire; in fact, it was clearly spelled out, as fundamental to the
constitutional theory of the Third Republic. As Etienne Balibar has pointed out
(Balibar 1992), a clear distinction was made between French citizens and those who
were not members of the national collective, whether as foreigners residing on
French soil or as ‘natives’ in the colonies and protectorates. Not only were the latter
defined as subject to the power of the French state, but this power was defined as
external to them, since they were not part of the collective body that constituted its
sovereignty.4 Moreover, this distinction was paralleled by a clear divide between the
law as such, la Loi, over which all citizens had the right to exercise control through
their representative bodies, and legislative authority outside the law, le pouvoir
réglementaire, which concerned the day-to-day management of the state’s function of
maintaining public order, as well as the administration of the colonies. While these
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categories were, and still are, also applicable to metropolitan France, the latter played
a particularly important role in the administration of the colonies.5 Indeed, as Jean
Suret-Canale has pointed out, the constitutional position of the colonies was, under
the Third Republic and until 1946, largely what it had been under the Second
Empire, since the ‘Senatus-Consulte’ of 3 May 1854, which decreed that the colonies
should be governed by imperial decree until further legislation, never forthcoming,
was passed (Suret-Canale 2001). 
The reality of the situation of the colonial ‘subject’ was thus far removed from
what appeared to be the premises of the discourse of assimilation. However, the
discourse of assimilation should also not be confused with a belief in the
fundamental equality of races and peoples. Indeed, it will become clear that even the
most vociferous proponents of assimilation sometimes had strongly held convictions
based on the premise of the inequality of races. We should note here that Jules Ferry
and Léon Blum have both been cited by Jean-Marie Le Pen in support of his own
view of the inequality of the races (Taguieff 1997). 
There are, thus, a number of misapprehensions with regard to the doctrine of
assimilation. Basically, it was, first and foremost, a policy option for administering
the colonised peoples, not a philosophical or political theory of colonialism. This
meant, on the one hand, that it could coexist as part of a world view based on diverse
assumptions regarding the scope of universalism or the extent of the applicability of
equality and human rights. Moreover, in spite of the fact that assimilationism formed
an important strand of colonial doctrine, it was neither the only strand, nor did it,
in fact, correspond that often to actual practice. 
More representative of this reality was the ‘Code de l’indigénat’, developed in
Algeria in 1881 and then extended elsewhere, which made the ‘natives’ subject to
summary administrative justice for a whole range of offences, including failure to
show respect to the representatives of French authority (Suret-Canale 2001). A clear
illustration of the continuity of the forms governing colonial relations, this was a
latter-day version of the Code Noir. 
Very few of the colonised subjects could actually attain the rank of citizen, which
was limited to a small elite who had successfully negotiated the successive hurdles of
the French education system and passed the assimilation test. In Algeria, which was
not even considered a colony but an integral part of France,6 the Arab or Berber
population could only acquire full citizenship rights if they renounced the Muslim
statut personnel, which in effect meant giving up their religion.7 Even when the
limited right to vote was conceded after the Second World War in a dual college
system, one European vote was made the equivalent of eight Algerian votes. As
Benjamin Stora (1992: 19), among others, has pointed out, the Republican principle
of equality, encapsulated in the notion of ‘one man, one vote’, was not respected.
Yet, even in the case of those who appeared to have sincerely held beliefs in an
assimilationist universalism based on equality of rights, the discourse showed clear
symptoms of schizophrenia. This comes out through two contradictions, which do
not have merely historical interest, but are at the root of some of the most
contentious ideological debates of our own time. 
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The first is the contradiction between the universalist discourse and its use by
the particular nation-state of France, together with its embeddedness in a national
political culture, with a specific national language. Indeed, Antoine de Rivarol, in his
Discours sur l’universalité de la langue française of 1784, had already made it clear that
the universality of the French language was based on very particular, national
characteristics, such as its political institutions, its climate, the particular
characteristics of its people and, above all, its image in the world.8
This contradiction came out very clearly in debates around assimilation.
Gambetta, one of the principal advocates of colonial assimilation, as we have seen,
could insist, at the same time, when talking about assimilation, on the absolute
‘Frenchness’ of the task at hand (‘nous venons faire ici une œuvre absolument française’
(Gambetta 1883: 102). 
The fortunes of the reputation of the seventeenth-century French philosopher,
Descartes, his ratings and image over the last four hundred years, could serve as a
concrete illustration of the ambiguity at the heart of the universalist world view. On
the one hand, Descartes has come to symbolise the French nation itself; thus André
Glucksmann could publish his book on the philosopher under the title, Descartes,
c’est la France (1987). Yet, in 1765, the Academicians were already vying with each
other to prove that Descartes did not belong to France alone, but was the gift of
France to the universe. Little by little, a view of Descartes took shape from the end
of the eighteenth century as the real founder of modern freedom, with his doctrine
of radical doubt and fundamental reliance on the sole power of human reason. As
such, he became the bogeyman of the anti-Republican and ultra-Catholic Right, one
of the key symbols of the franco-français struggles and synonymous with France,
whether as an idealised figure or as the target of abuse. While Victor Cousin could
eulogise the profound Frenchness of Cartesianism as ‘a fruit of the soil, a profoundly
and exclusively French œuvre in both its form and content’ (quoted in Le Monde des
livres, 29 March 1996: VI), its repudiation by the end of the nineteenth century and
the beginning of the twentieth, both by the radical Right for its subversive
undermining of authority and by some parts of the revolutionary Left for a petty
preoccupation with order and abstraction, did little to detract from its incarnation as
the symbol of French universalism. In 1946, the year in which Sartre was to
rehabilitate Descartes as the apostle of existential freedom in his anthology of his
texts (Sartre 1946a), Maurice Thorez was to portray him, in the name of the French
Communist Party, as one of the factors inextricably linked to Frenchness and,
furthermore, a pioneer of socialism and Marxism! 9
The second characteristic feature of the ambiguity of the Republican discourse
was the fact that the subsequent national liberation struggles tended to be articulated
in terms of the same modernist discourse as that used by the colonial oppressor.
Imperialism couched in the discourse of modernity produced its own ideological, if
not political, gravediggers. The first generation of leaders of the newly independent
states were, indeed, to be found amongst the small elite who had been thoroughly
schooled in the ideas of the French Enlightenment and steeped in the discourse of
the French Republic. It is thus no surprise that the development of what has come
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to be known as La Francophonie built on this legacy, though not in a straightforward,
linear fashion. 
The remainder of this chapter will develop further a general overview of the way
in which French Republican discourse overlaid the realities of empire. In particular,
some of the following questions will be addressed: how far this discourse corresponded
to earlier discourses of the Revolutionary period; whether any of the contradictions
already apparent at the time of the Revolution were resolved, or apparently resolved,
by the time of Third Republic imperialist expansion; and what the new elements were
that developed over time and specifically into the postcolonial period.
Revolution, Republic and Nation
The key notions underpinning the French Republic derive, of course, from the ideas
that were developed in theoretical form during the prologue to the French
Revolution and then concretised and given practical content during the course of
that revolution. 
At the heart of the Republican world view is the notion of national sovereignty,
the nation as the sole source of the legitimacy of political power. Also known as
sovereignty of the people, souveraineté populaire, this is a fundamental principle of
the democratic world view, that political power is only legitimate when it derives
from the people and is used for the people’s benefit. It is a notion in which the people
and the nation are one and the same. Yet how are they defined? How is it determined
who constitutes the nation/people – who is to be included and who excluded? These
issues had already been debated by the Enlightenment philosophers, reflecting on the
principles and practices of antiquity. Rousseau discussed the Greek practices of
exclusion and even the practice of killing any foreigner found in the political
assemblies of the people, deemed necessary to ensure that the will of the people could
be accurately expressed (Rousseau 1762).
The rise of nationalism and the nation-state began with the growth of capitalism
at the beginning of the modern period and reached its apogee in the course of the
nineteenth century, as far as Europe is concerned. There was no one model of the
nation-state. The French Revolution instituted a new model of the nation, alongside
an exclusivist, ethnically defined one, with its roots in the Ancien Régime. For all the
similarities in basic ideology, the new American nation was profoundly different in
character from the modernist conception that came to the fore in France. Britain had
its own particular, synthetic model. Germany’s again would be different, hovering
between an attraction on the part of some progressive nationalists to the French
Republic, but ultimately surrendering to the siren call of romantic ties to the blood of
the race and an almost ethnic symbiosis with the soil, forests and rivers of the territory.
In the definition of German nationality, the ties of blood were the sole criterion; only
ethnic Germans, wherever their place of birth, were eligible for German nationality.
This notion has only recently been challenged (Le Monde, 16 October 1998). 
The striking new characteristic of the French conception of the nation and the
people that developed at the time of the Revolution as the practical expression of the
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Enlightenment vision of thinkers like Rousseau was its representation as a political
union. In its pure Republican essence, the nation was conceived as the union of
citizens. In other words, the nation was not the sum total of the individuals living on
a particular territory and linked by historical, family, racial or other ethnic ties.
Family ties, leading to birthrights, were seen as a particular source of inequality by
Enlightenment thinkers.10 The nation was rather a political body, in which citizens
with the same political rights and duties coexisted in absolute equality. This equality
could only be conceived by the exclusion of real inequalities and differences from this
public, political domain into a separate private domain. It was to the latter that the
real differences between individuals were relegated, including differences based on
family origins, economic disparities, geographical, cultural, religious and other
factors. This implied a high level of abstraction, particularly with regard to the
concept of the citizen, who existed only in his political capacity, in respect of his
political rights and duties. 
The French Republic does not allow for difference amongst its citizens. This
abhorrence of difference is still a guiding principle of political debates in France
today. One recent example was the controversy that arose in the spring of 1999
surrounding the revision of Article 3 of the Constitution to specify that there should
be equality of men and women in the area of political representation (‘la loi favorise
l’égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats électoraux et aux functions électives’)
and the introduction into Article 4 of financial penalties for those parties that did
not make efforts to achieve this. There was serious opposition to this, not so much
by diehard defenders of male prerogatives, but by some stalwart Republicans, on the
grounds that it introduced divisions into the sovereign people.11
The question of gender difference and its relationship to Republicanism has
been a problematic one from the beginning. Other manifestations of particularity
and difference have been more straightforward. Thus, the irrelevance of kinship and
territorial links to the Republican concept of the nation meant that, in theory, it was
open to all. Indeed, in the early days of the French Revolution, it was possible for
‘foreigners’, such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine, to become citizens of the
French Republic. This open, assimilationist principle was to remain a dominant
theme of the Republican discourse of nationhood to this day, although, as we shall
see, exclusion is the inevitable counterpart of assimilation. The one cannot exist
without the other.
In any event, the Republican view implied rather more than opening the doors
of the French nation-state to all comers. Of even wider significance was the
universalism upon which the whole Enlightenment discourse of the Republic and
the nation had been founded. This meant essentially that the principles of the French
Revolution were not applicable solely to the French. Liberty, equality and fraternity
were proclaimed as the birthright of the whole human race and the Declaration of
the Rights of Man was presented as a universal charter for all humankind. The
differences that existed between real human individuals had no political significance. 
Moreover, the notion of homogeneity was central to this concept of the nation,
constituted by the union of citizens. The nation as unity of the people represented
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not a consensus or majority view, resulting from the working out of the differences
between individuals and interest groups, but was the expression of the will of the
whole people, the ‘general will’ in Rousseau’s terms (Rousseau 1762). At its most
extreme, this view of the nation had, as its corollary, the position that the nation, as
representative of the general will, could speak only with one voice, implying the need
for unanimity as an outcome of all political debate by the representatives of the
nation. Difference per se was excluded from the realm of a politics that was
diametrically opposed to other theories of politics based on conflict and struggle
between individuals, groups or classes. Quite how the single will of the nation was
to emerge in unanimity was always problematic, and has, at various moments in the
history of the French Republic, led to faith in what could almost be characterised as
a form of mystical vision, such as that expressed by General de Gaulle in his famous
speech at Bayeux in June 1946. Often this type of thinking has culminated in a single
charismatic figure, such as de Gaulle himself, being endowed with the capacity to
represent the whole nation.
Indeed, much of the current constitution is based on ideas such as these, which
were at the root of the Gaullian vision. The role of the head of the French state was
crucially defined by his role in representing the unity and will of the whole nation.
Even the deputies of the National Assembly are each considered to be representatives
of the whole nation, rather than of their particular constituencies; their mandate is a
national one and involves no responsibility to their particular constituents.12
In practice, however, the unanimity required by this theory of the nation could
rarely, if ever, be applied concretely and remained on the level of abstraction. The
modern French Fifth Republic is itself a hybrid: de Gaulle’s principles, which gave
primacy to national unity, had to give way to accommodate the party-political conflicts
inherent in the parliamentary aspects of the system. Moreover, the Republican
conception of the nation, and particularly its inevitable embodiment in a strong,
central state, was contested even in its origins by more liberal strains of Enlightenment
thinking. These stressed the paramount importance of individual freedom over the
national interest and saw the state as a necessary evil, whose power needed to be
contained through a system of controls, as in Montesquieu’s theory of the separation
of powers, set out in De l’esprit des lois (1748), where one power checks another power.13
In spite of these reservations, however, the basic elements of the Republican
conception of the nation remain enshrined in the constitution. It still constitutes one
essential element of the theoretical underpinning of the French Republic, even if it
has always been contested by actual political practice. 
Those looking for theoretical backing for a different view of the nation can, of
course, refer to a much earlier political tradition, whose antecedents pre-date the
Revolution. In Ancien Régime thinking, the nation was loosely defined in relation to
the two terms of kinship and territory. This conception of the nation was built on
local and regional identities, which do not stand in opposition to the national identity
but are rather constitutive of it, providing the geographical and cultural heritage in
which ancestral links to a particular piece of land are central. In other words, one’s
Frenchness is mediated through one’s regional identity; one needs to be a Gascon or
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a Breton and so on before one can be French. Thus, the French national community
evolved over time along with the consolidation of a national, central power, which was
prepared to go to war and fight to defend certain perceived ‘national’ interests. This
French nation was defined as much by those it excluded, as by those who were
included, unlike the Revolutionary concept, in which the nation was posited as
inclusive and assimilationist, open to all potential political citizens of the Republic. 
The importance of this earlier conception of the nation is not to be
underestimated and, certainly, the theorists of the counter-revolution, such as Joseph
de Maistre, with his Considérations sur la France (1797), Du Pape (1819) and Soirées
de Saint-Pétersbourg (1821), sought to develop the exclusivist concept of the nation in
the post-Revolutionary period. The conflict between the modernist notion of the
nation and the traditionalist one of ethnic and territorial ties, linked to the ideology
of blood and soil, was to continue throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The importance of these two linked notions of blood and soil came increasingly
to the fore, with the development of notions of racial purity and the importance of
the bloodline and kinship ties on the one hand, as in Joseph-Arthur de Gobineau’s
Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines (1853–55), and long-established, ancestral roots
in a given territory on the other. This latter aspect was developed in the specific
brand of nationalism promoted by Maurice Barrès, with its emphasis on the
importance of enracinement, notably his Les Déracinés (1897). According to this
version of nationhood, newcomers and itinerants were permanently excluded from
the national community. The prime focus, however, was the exclusion of the Jews, as
these ideas developed into a xenophobic anti-Semitism throughout the nineteenth
century, culminating in the polarisation arising from the Dreyfus Affair. With the
development of the empire, the same ideological tendencies developed into a
chauvinistic racism, directed against the colonised peoples. 
Some people have characterised the two types of nationalism, set out above, as
either ‘maternal’ or ‘paternal’. Paradoxically, Jean-Louis Lévy, in his essay on Dreyfus,
attributes the maternal variety to Dreyfus himself, while claiming that most French
Jews subscribed to the paternal variety, similar to that of the young Bonaparte, and
one that looked to the future, to the abstract principles of the Revolution, rather than
the visceral attachment to a nationalism with its roots in tradition and the past,
characteristic of the maternal variety.14
The dichotomy between the two conceptions of nationhood was, of course, just
one aspect of a broader conflict that counterpoised the Republican and the anti-
Republican forces throughout the nineteenth century, with Vercingetorix and Clovis
as the respective champions of the opposing camps.15 Yet, just as this conflict was not
a simple bipolar opposition, but was punctuated by a series of compromises and
attempts at creating hybrid forms of the political system, so also the question of
nationhood should be viewed in all its complexity. There are internal issues and
contradictions to be explored within the different conceptions, as well as changes and
developments that were to take place under the impact of historical circumstances.
Our concern here is with the problems associated with the modernist, political
conception of the nation, associated with the Republican viewpoint.
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The Fault-lines of the Revolutionary Principles
The universalism of the first Republican principles was always an ideological
construct, with limited real practical application. For all the noble aspirations of
inclusiveness and openness, the new French Republican model of the nation was
flawed from the start. The pure, abstract notion of the nation as the union of the
citizens was very soon tainted by such particularist and historically contingent
considerations as the association with a specific language, a specific territory, specific
national traditions and culture.16 Indeed, Balibar has gone further to suggest that these
flaws are not unique to the French model, but that all historical forms of citizenship
have been based on the principle of exclusion – of women, of slaves or, indeed, of
partly ‘naturalised’ foreigners, since the political community is constituted as a state
and also linked to a society (Balibar 1992: 113). Thus, the first-flush universalist
idealism of the early Revolutionaries soon gave way to real restrictions. Indeed, some
were already present from the outset in the flawed conception of the universal Rights
of Man, which limited these political rights to the male half of the human species. 
This should not be construed as a retrospective critique in the light of later
feminist concerns. No sooner had the Declaration of the Rights of Man been
published than the challenge to its pseudo-universalist scope was mounted with the
publication in 1791 of Olympe de Gouges’s Rights of Women. The movement to
extend political rights to women did not, of course, succeed; indeed, it was ruthlessly
repressed (Godineau 1988). Olympe de Gouges was sent to the guillotine. Théroïgne
de Méricourt’s campaign for women to have their voice in the Revolution ended with
her public humiliation and descent into madness. 
The universality of political rights also came under challenge by the
introduction of a property-based division of the citizen body into the two categories
of active and passive citizens, the former enjoying full political rights as well as duties,
the latter burdened only with duties. 
In both these cases, the restrictions on the universalist principle were dictated not
by logical flaws within the principle itself, which had served as a powerful slogan to
mobilise the forces of the whole people as part of the Revolutionary struggle. It was
rather the clash between the ideological principle and the reality of the historical balance
of class forces and gender groups within the economy and society of the time. In both
cases, alternative solutions that maintained the universalist principle were put forward
by the movement for women’s rights, on the one hand, and the egalitarian wings of the
Revolutionary movement, on the other, though not all members of these two
movements necessarily supported the other’s case. Thus, the limitations referred to may
be seen as failures to apply the principle in a given historical context, rather than as
inherent flaws in the principle itself. In both cases, the challenges to the actual exclusions
were doomed to repression and failure. This was not so with the most significant
challenge to the French Revolutionary state, which took place not in mainland France
itself, but in her richest colony of the time, Saint-Domingue (see Chapter 2). 
The obfuscation in the name of universalist principles of the particular genesis of the
Revolution and the Republic was convincing only if confined to the realm of the abstract
ideal. In reality, the Revolution and the Republic came into being under the ideological
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banner of universalism but in the specific local context of the French nation-state. This
led inevitably to a sometimes dangerous conflation of the two, with the contingent
circumstances of the birth of the modern universalist Republic in France seen as the
justification for the imposition by France of this model on other peoples, from the
Napoleonic conquests through to the expansion of empire under the flag of the Third
Republic. Most seriously, the failure to recognise openly the actual particularism of their
own French nation could lead to a refusal to acknowledge the particular claims of other
peoples to national status. The Rights of Man did not extend to the Rights of Nations. 
We shall have occasion to return to this key contradiction which is at the heart
of one of the main French discourses of empire and which has left a continuing
legacy of ideological ambivalence for the contemporary, ‘postcolonial’ world. Reality,
however, always has a tendency to reassert its supremacy over ideology and discourse
throughout the course of history. In the face of the abstract, universalist, all-inclusive
political concept of the Republican nation, the concrete issue of the unity and
defence of the particular national territory of France against attack by the enemies of
the Revolution was soon one to be reckoned with. The imposition of the particular
French language as the national language was similarly dictated by the practical need
to unify a people speaking a number of different local and regional languages and
dialects (Rickard 1989; Battye and Hintze 1992). Thus, the abstract political nation
was never actually experienced in its pure, ideal form, but was linked from the outset
with a really existing, concrete territorial and linguistic community. 
Therefore, it was perhaps inevitable that the Republican model of nationhood
would in reality be influenced by elements of the exclusionist model based on
territory and kinship. This interaction and partial fusion were to become accentuated
at the end of the nineteenth century with the establishment of the Third Republic,
which took place formally in 1875.
The Evolution and Fusion of the Main Strands of 
Nineteenth–century Nationalism
The Third Republic adopted as its official ideology the political, inclusive model of
the nation as the union of its citizens and reinforced the differentiation between the
public domain of political life and public service, on the one hand, and the private
domain of individual and family life, on the other. At the same time, it developed a
more specifically French orientation, in which the self-definition of the French
nation increasingly depended on the differences that were articulated in respect of
other non-French nations. Thus it was that territorial, ethnic and cultural factors
came to assume increasing importance in the nation’s view of itself.
In no small measure, these developments were due to the French defeat in the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870–71, culminating in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and the continuing
perception of the German neighbour as the most menacing threat to the French nation,
as the significant Other in opposition to which French nationhood was defined. 
Even so, the terms of the new self-identity retained a decidedly Republican form,
in which the key positive concept of national unity was paramount. What was new
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was the extension of this notion beyond the strictly political domain to encompass
cultural elements in the formation of a new notion of national identity. This national
identity assumed the existence of a homogeneous national culture, which the
establishment of compulsory, free and secular public schooling by the National
Education Minister Jules Ferry in 1881 was set to make a reality. The French language
had been the official judicial and administrative language since the Ordonnances de
Villers-Cotteret of 1539 and there had been significant efforts during the Revolution,
most notably by Barrère and the Abbé Grégoire, to make French the truly national
language of the Republic, culminating in the decrees of 1793 concerning the
compulsory use of French in schools and then the decree of 20 July 1794 forbidding
the use of other languages in all written documents. However, the reality had been
somewhat different for the bulk of the population, who still spoke their own regional
language or dialect at the beginning of the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The
public schooling system was to change this decisively, by enforcing the use of the
standard French language in all its schools and ruthlessly punishing all miscreants who
continued to speak in other tongues while on school premises.
Thus, there was a concerted attempt to eliminate all regional linguistic and
cultural difference through the uniformity imposed by the education system. No
longer was it enough to banish such difference to the private domain; language and
culture were incorporated into the public domain and, as such, politicised. This was
achieved by the full-scale integration into the public domain of an education system
that had hitherto been largely left as the preserve of the family, the Church and its
orders. Although parts of the system had been conceived as public institutions in the
service of the state from their origins – such as the Napoleonic lycées created for the
training of an elite civil and military service – the creation of a mass-level, public
service was unprecedented.
Not only was the organisation of the system, including the curriculum, directly
controlled by the central state, but the teachers were also made state employees, with
the same status as other fonctionnaires, or civil servants. The function and purpose of
schooling were defined explicitly, not in terms of individual fulfilment but as the
preparation of the future citizens for useful public service to the Republic. The whole
curriculum, and particularly the instruction civique classes, was geared to inculcating
the values of citizenship based on equality of rights and duties, as well as to
propagating the newly homogeneous national culture.
The abstract political equality of all citizens now became transformed into
cultural uniformity, and thus the main vehicle for the assimilation of all future
citizens into the homogeneous national body. At its most messianic, the system
sought to propagate the ideals of a meritocracy, in which real social, economic and
financial inequality could be left behind at the school gate, in which all pupils would
be treated the same in their identical school overalls, in which they would all imbibe
the same version of the nation’s history, the same national cultural heritage of great
authors and their works, the same set of intellectual, moral and political values. 
The real limitations to this uniform utopia probably do not need to be dwelt on
at length, at least as far as metropolitan France was concerned. Not least, the
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continued existence of a parallel and almost wholly religious system of private
schooling ensured that some French children continued to receive a very different
account of the French national heritage, through the mainly Catholic private
schools. Nor can it be said that the public school system was successful in achieving
real social equality, since so many extra-curricular factors were involved. Its record on
cultural assimilation was rather more impressive, particularly in respect of children
of non-French origin, whose parents had come to settle in France from countries
such as Italy and Poland, and who became transformed into fully fledged French
citizens within the space of a generation. 
It is within the context of the huge expansion of the French Empire that these
developments take on their full significance, for the purpose of the argument that is
being developed here. As Balibar has pointed out, the development of the empire
constituted one of the key defining elements of the French nation: 
What is France? … I suggest an answer to this question, which without
making any absurd claim to be comprehensive or definitive, aims to begin
to face up to the most powerful taboo in our history. The question of what
is France is inextricably bound up with French colonisation, which is the
last in a long line of great social, political and cultural ‘revolutions’, which
have made the French nation what it is. (Balibar 1992: 57) 
The uneasy marriage of a homogeneous national identity and culture with
Republican universalist idealism at home, mirrored the contradictions within the
discourses of French imperialism. The latter rationalised its colonial enterprise in the
name of its universal mission, at the same time as it excluded the vast majority of its
colonial subjects from participation as citizens of the empire. Ironically, it was the
export of the French public school system that came to the rescue. A system that had
been the vehicle for promoting equality in the widest sense at home took on instead
in the colonies a much more ambivalent role.
Specificity and Contradictions of the Republican Discourse of Empire
Although the realities of the imperialist relation precluded the possibility of an
empire-wide citizenship, the school nonetheless held out the prospect of assimilation
to all those who passed through the French education system, with full French
citizenship as the ultimate prize. As the main vehicle for the inculcation of
Republican ideology amongst the colonised peoples, it could create aspirations to
equal treatment, which only a small minority could transform into reality if the
empire were to survive. The reality, therefore, was that access to education itself was
also restricted. Albert Sarraut, Governor-General of Indochina from 1911 to 1916,
then several times Minister for Colonies and Prime Minister, as well as author of
Grandeur et servitude coloniales, published in 1931, was one of those who defended
the restriction of higher education to a tiny minority of colonial ‘subjects’, on the
grounds of hereditary and intellectual factors.17 In French West Africa in 1945, only
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5 per cent of the population attended school. In Algeria in 1939–40, out of a
‘Muslim’ population of seven million, there were only 114,000 children attending
primary school, 1,500 in secondary schools and only 94 students at the University
of Algiers (Suret-Canale 2001). For this elite group, the school could just possibly
open the door to assimilation. At the same time, by peddling the same version of the
homogeneous national culture throughout the schools of the empire, it ensured that
the real relations of domination remained in place, so that even those who
constituted the small elite and were allowed a measure of assimilation would
continue to know their place. Any child forced to learn by heart and recite passages
about ‘Our ancestors the Gauls ...’, ‘who were mighty and strong ...’, as recounted,
for instance, in the semi-autobiographical novel by the Tunisian writer Hachemi
Baccouche, Ma foi demeure (1958: 16), and by numerous other writers (Kessous
1994), would understand that they would always remain alienated at least in some
measure and never able to participate fully in the French national community. 
Thus, in most cases, the education system acted as an effective barrier to
progression towards full assimilation, both in the cultural and, perhaps more
importantly, in the political sense. One of the qualifications for the acquisition of
French citizenship was a certain level of educational attainment, involving,
sometimes explicitly, the repudiation of any other cultural inheritance. As we have
seen, in Algeria, full French citizenship was dependent upon renunciation of the
statut personnel – effectively a repudiation of the Muslim religion. 
The dual college system introduced into Algeria after the Second World War,
was, in fact, based on the differentiation of particular religious communities,
notwithstanding the fact that this notion ran counter to the secular principles
underpinning the Republic, in which religion, along with other particular,
differentiating features, is assumed to have no role in the political domain and
certainly not as a qualification for citizenship. Benjamin Stora has drawn out the
implications of this contradiction in the case of colonial Algeria, where: 
Citizenship was determined in accordance with the community of origin (as
defined by religion). This was a denial of the principles of the Republic, in
a territory which was nonetheless considered to be a mere extension of
France. The principles of 1789 in fact dissociated the existence of people
from their function, caste, ethnic origin, or religion for the granting of their
civic rights. (Stora 1992: 22–23)
Moreover, the image of the colonial Other as ‘native’, indigène, which had been
incorporated into colonial propaganda under the regime of Albert Sarraut at the
Colonial Ministry in the 1920s and 1930s, was not only based on the stereotypes of
race, colour and geographical origin, but also on the notion of religious difference.
Indeed, this was a deep-rooted perception that took on new life during the Algerian
conflict. As Jean-Luc Einaudi has pointed out, Michel Debré explicitly referred to
the need to launch a crusade of Christianity against Islam in an article in the Courrier
de la Nation of September 1958 (Einaudi 1991: 25).
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From the point of view of the colonised peoples, then, the Republican discourse
of empire clearly had its limitations, as well as its partial and, indeed, remarkable
successes. Moreover, discourse and ideology were not the only means available for the
governance of the empire. The actual or threatened use of the forces of repression was
never absent and had provided the main bastion for the perpetuation of colonial rule
from the outset. 
In 1843, Lieutenant-Colonel de Montagnac suggested in one of his letters from
Algeria that: 
Any part of the population which does not accept our conditions must be
wiped out. Everything must be taken and pillaged, with no consideration
for age or sex: grass must not be allowed to grow, wherever the French army
treads. Whoever wants the end result must also be prepared to accept the
means, whatever our philosophers may say. All the good soldiers whom I
have the honour of commanding have been warned by me that if they
should happen to bring me an Arab alive, they will get a thrashing with the
blade of my sabre … this is the way to wage war against the Arabs; kill all
the men over fifteen years of age, take all the women and children and ship
them out to the Marquesas or somewhere else. In other words, annihilate
anything which refuses to crawl at our feet like a dog. (Montagnac 1885)
In the event, Montagnac himself was killed by the forces of the Emir Abdelkader two
years later, in 1845. However, similar views were still being expressed throughout the
period of French rule. None other than Alexis de Tocqueville, author of De la
démocratie en Amérique, justified a policy of total warfare and laying waste to the
countryside throughout the 1840s in a series of writings and reports as a result of
several visits to Algeria (Le Cour Grandmaison 2005). This was a vision of the
opportunities presented by France’s trans-Mediterranean frontier, inspired by those
of the American frontier and the conquest of the West, with all that implied for the
extermination of the native American peoples. In 1882, one could read in Le
Courrier d’Oran (24 May) that ‘we know of no better policy than the one adopted
by Moses in respect of the Midianites. He exterminated all the males, only sparing
females who were virgins, who were given to the soldiers. This practice may seem
cruel to the short-sighted, but in fact it was the only intelligent thing to do.’
French army archives, recently opened to the public, have shown that the French
authorities were aware of the practice of torture by the security forces in Algeria from
at least 1949, even before the war of independence had begun. In 1999, it was noted
in Le Monde that two of Algeria’s governors-general had condemned the practice of
torture, which was later to become systematic in the war itself (Le Monde, 5 February
1999). When necessary, violence would also be deployed in mainland France itself,
as with the savage repression and killings of demonstrating Algerians in Paris on 17
October 1961 (Einaudi 1991). 
The discourse deployed to rationalise imperial rule was undoubtedly much more
convincing when it acted as a means to justify the imperial undertaking to the home-
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grown public in metropolitan France. One of the key elements of this rationalisation
was the notion of the mission civilisatrice, the ‘civilising mission’, of the colonial
power. Jules Ferry famously claimed in his speech to the Chambre des députés of 28
July 1885 that the civilisation by the ‘superior races’ of the ‘inferior races’ was not
just a ‘right’ but also a ‘duty’; indeed, it was a right because it was a duty. There was
no question, in his mind, that the Rights of Man did not apply to Africans in their
present state of non-civilisation. This was the rationalisation of colonial conquest,
not for pleasure or to exploit the weak but to raise them to the level of civilisation.
The Freemasons also concurred, affirming that ‘the work of colonisation of the Third
Republic is fundamentally one of civilisation’ (quoted in Ager 1996: 12 – his
translation). This view did not, however, go unchallenged. Clemenceau, in
particular, drew attention to the dangers of such an approach in the country of the
Rights of Man (Chambre des députés, 30 July 1885), and the unacceptability of such
a rationalisation of conquest. 
The notion of the ‘civilising mission’ was not an invention of Third Republic
imperialism; it had come into currency before. Victor Hugo, for example, in a
conversation with Bugeaud, described in rapturous terms the conquest of Algeria as
the march of civilisation against barbarism, with the French fulfilling their mission
to bring light to a benighted people, taking over from the Greeks this mission to
enlighten the planet.18 Edouard Alletz, writing in 1837, also described the civilising
mission that had fallen to France, making it clear that civilisation would be imposed
by force of arms if necessary: ‘There is one aim that in its essence befits our country:
this aim is the civilisation of the globe. France is unable to keep things to herself. She
runs, she flies to communicate light and life to all peoples: she will even compel
them, by force of arms, to bear the full burden of the gifts that she bestows’ (quoted
in Kessous 1994: 78).
Although this can be seen, to some extent, as the French version of the notion
of the ‘white man’s burden’, which was common currency in the British Empire, its
ideological underpinning and political outcomes were rather different. However, like
the ‘white man’s burden’, the mission civilisatrice was conceived as the duty of a
people supposed superior in terms of physical, intellectual and moral attributes to the
inferior races that they had conquered. Indeed, it was this very superiority that had
rendered the imperial conquests possible, and even necessary or inevitable. It was also
this superiority that had enabled the white man to progress to a higher level of
civilisation, defined in terms of educational attainment and knowledge, economic
and technological development and high moral qualities. It was often linked with the
suppression of barbaric practices, supposedly only indulged in by the non-civilised.
This was notably the case with the ideology which, by masquerading as a crusade
against Arab and African slave traders operating in the Congo, managed to draw a
cloak over the brutal realities actually perpetrated in the Belgian King Leopold’s
personal colonial fiefdom (Hochschild 1999). 
At the time of the 1885 Berlin Conference, Bismarck formulated the notion thus:
‘associate the African native with civilisation by opening up the interior of the Continent
to commerce; provide the inhabitants with the means of instruction and education by
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encouraging Missions and enterprises which will encourage useful knowledge; and
ensure the suppression of slavery’ (quoted in Ager 1996: 13 – his translation).
Whatever the grounds for the belief in racial superiority, either within a God-
given hierarchy of inherent essentialist ranking of racial categories, or stamped with
the credentials of scientific theory as a contingent product of the historico-
evolutionary process, the burden of duty was articulated essentially as a moral one.
This could assume disinterested forms in the shape of the ideology of selfless
commitment to public service, characteristic of the more idealistic colonial
administrator, or the missionary’s calling to raise the moral and spiritual level of the
‘heathen’ and convert them to the Christian faith. However, in all cases, it assumed
the notion of racial superiority, aligned with greater power. Sarraut notably defined
the mission civilisatrice as ‘le droit du plus fort d’aider le plus faible’ (‘the right of the
strongest to help the weakest’), in which the notion of ‘duty’ was eclipsed by the
notion of ‘right’ associated with might. Ernest Renan, a favourite of the Third
Republic for his anticlericalism, made no bones about his belief in the inequality of
races. In his Dialogues philosophiques (1876), he justified colonisation through the
argument of the rightful subordination of the lower to the higher races.19
There is no doubt that a significant body of French colonial opinion shared
much the same kind of ideas as these. Léon Blum made this explicit, in an
intervention to the Chambre des députés on 9 July 1925, when he said, ‘We love our
country too much to dissociate ourselves from the expansion of French thought and
civilisation. We recognise that there is a right, and even a duty, for superior races to
draw to them those races that have not attained the same level of culture and to
summon them to progress.’ 
In the French case, however, the mission civilisatrice, as taken up by the
Republican champions of empire, was not just defined in terms of race; the universal
values of the Enlightenment also formed an essential reference point. At any rate,
they had to be taken into account. Thus, while the applicability of the universal
Rights of Man to the colonised and ‘native’ peoples remained something of a grey
area for most, and seen explicitly in black and white terms by some, the archetypal
colonist in the French Enlightenment mould took upon himself the mission to bring
the light of reason and science to the dark regions of the planet, where primitiveness,
obscurantism and barbarism held sway. It was when, and only when, the ‘natives’ had
been sufficiently educated that they could aspire to the full enjoyment of the political
rights associated with the Rights of Man. This could be postponed indefinitely,
mainly by restricting access to educational advancement to a small elite, and indeed
the justification of the continuing presence of the French colonial power relied on
this indefinite postponement. 
At the root of the difficulties was the contradiction between the universalism
associated with the Rights of Man and the dualism of conceptions of the peoples of the
earth, in which they were variously divided between Christians and heathens, men and
savages, humans and non-humans, civilised and barbarians, superior and inferior races.
Some of these categories implied an absolute, qualitative opposition; others were framed
in more relative or quantitative terms, such as the distinction between the plus évolués
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and the moins évolués. In the early phases of imperialism, the dualism took the form of
a religious divide, between the Christians and the heathens. Indeed, this divide provided
the justification for the domination by Christians of the non-Christian peoples. The
notion of Christendom had developed as a system of order in Europe, in which spiritual
and temporal authorities derived their legitimacy from God through a well-defined,
stratified hierarchy, in which rights and duties were clearly defined, and where the
common faith implied the observance of certain common values. This order did not
extend to the non-Christians, who were outside the frame of the moral and legal rights
and duties set out under this system. Thus, the Lateran Council of 1139 had decreed
that Christians should not use the crossbow against other Christians, although its use
against ‘heathens’ and ‘heretics’ was permitted (Mazrui 1990: 11). However, in spite of
the supposed community existing between those who professed the same faith, fighting
between Christians was not unknown, along with the use of the crossbow. 
One of the problems with later, secular notions rationalising imperialism was
that they had not entirely broken with this dualism characteristic of the earlier
ideology. In fact, the supposed universality of the human race had been and
remained a matter of some debate, and the division between Christians and heathens
was often articulated in terms of the division between men and savages, humans and
non-humans. Even when the old dualism based on religion was considered
inappropriate, and the humanity of all peoples was accepted, the division was often
simply replaced by new forms, in which relative, quantitative terms became more
familiar – civilised and barbarians, superior and inferior, plus évolués and moins
évolués. If the humanity of all peoples was accepted, then it became possible to
envisage a new type of conversion, in which the conquered were not simply
converted more or less against their will, to facilitate their control by the conquerors,
but one that envisaged the uplifting of people in the inferior category to a higher
stage. The process might take time, but was not ruled out as impossible. 
No imperial power could survive long without offering its colonial subjects a
vision of a free future. This was the case with both the British and French Empires.
The differences between them lay not in any different conception regarding the
superiority of the coloniser over the colonised, but in the different strategic goals they
held out to the colonised.
The British tended to hold out the ultimate goal of self-government and thus
disengagement when the colonised peoples had progressed and become sufficiently
civilised and capable. In theory, this implied a staged process of development and
preparation for ever greater involvement in their own representation, administration
and government. This was not to mean representation in the metropolitan
institutions. In spite of Queen Victoria’s proclamation in 1858, in which she
defended the principle of equality of all those in the empire, following the imposition
of the direct rule of the British Crown over India after the Mutiny of 1857, this was
not translated into representation in the British Parliament. This is hardly surprising,
as the promise of equality remained essentially without effect. Moreover, at this time,
only a minority of the British population was represented in Parliament. Unlike the
(male) populations of the ‘old’ French colonies, British colonial subjects were not to
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be offered representation in the British Parliament. Indeed, when the first non-white
MP, Dadabhai Naoroji, entered the House of Commons in 1892, it was as the
Member of Parliament for the London constituency of Finsbury Central.  
The French, on the other hand, offered the prospect of eventual assimilation of
all the colonised peoples as full citizens of the French Republic. In spite of its overt
secularism, what was proposed by the most fervent advocates of assimilationism was
in many respects a process, very similar to a religious conversion. As such, it was also
based on a dualistic conception, like that which had operated in conversions to
Christianity, or indeed to Islam. Thus, not only was the ‘pure’, assimilationist model
influenced by the accretions of centuries of ideological history, but it was also
inevitably marked by the realities of imperial power.
In reality, the political status of the different colonised peoples differed widely
according to their historical and geographical circumstances. This was true not only for
their administrative status, whether under the tutelage of the Ministry for Colonies, the
Ministry of Home Affairs or the Foreign Ministry, depending on how they were viewed
in relation to the metropole. It was also true of the eventual prospects for their future
evolution, particularly as far as those in the protectorates were concerned, for whom
the different ideology of ‘associationism’ had been preferred.  
Racism, Empire and Further Contradictions within Republican Ideology
It is clear that the Republican discourse of empire was not the only perspective on
offer. From its origins, the imperial expansion of all the European powers involved was
accompanied by the development of an ideology of racism, sometimes justified in the
name of religion, which established a racial hierarchy of exclusion from the true faith.
At the time of the first conquests of the New World in the sixteenth century, there
were debates as to whether the native Americans were human beings at all, with the
celebrated defence of their humanity by Bartolomeo de Las Casas (see Chapter 3).
The growth of slavery as an economic system and the consequent dehumanisation of
the slave through his or her reduction to the status of a chattel led to the
entrenchment of racism for the rationalisation it provided for such a system.
Indeed, racism appears not just as an ideological option but as an integral part
of the ideology that accompanied the development of capitalism. As Samir Amin has
pointed out, it became a necessary part of the ‘European’ ideology, which took shape
through a number of different phases: 
This European ideology is constructed in stages from the Renaissance
through the Enlightenment up until the nineteenth century by the
invention of the eternal truths required for this legitimation. The
‘Christianophile’ myth, the myth of Greek ancestry, and the artificial,
antithetical construct of Orientalism define the new European and
Eurocentric culturalism, thereby condemning it irremediably to consort
with its damned soul: ineradicable racism. (Amin 1989: 77)
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Far from promoting universalism in fact, the European imperialist conquest of
much of the world did not bring about the homogenisation of societies, but
accentuated polarisation, crystallising the centre/periphery relation: ‘On the
contrary, this conquest progressively created a growing polarization at the heart of
the system, crystallizing the capitalist world into fully developed centres and
peripheries incapable of closing the ever widening gap, making this contradiction
within ‘actually existing’ capitalism – a contradiction insurmountable within the
framework of our capitalist system – the major and most explosive contradiction of
our time’ (Amin 1989: 75).
France had also had its share of racist ideologues, promoting notions of racial
superiority both at home and abroad. Indeed, the new form of pseudoscientific ideas
of race and politics that were to flourish in the course of the nineteenth century had
in fact taken root in France in the aftermath of the Revolution and as part of the
reaction against it, with Gobineau and others of his ilk pioneering an ideological
strain that was to end in the extermination camps of Auschwitz. The sociologist,
Gustave Le Bon, renowned for his work on the psychology of the crowd (De la
psychologie des foules (1895)), proposed a model more along the lines of the British
model, separate development, no mixing of races, etc., in opposition to the French
(and Portuguese) assimilationist model. He warned against educating or assimilating
the natives, as this would not change their nature, but only give them the means to
rise up against the Europeans. His views also extended to the intrinsic inferiority of
women and the reckless foolishness of those who would educate them. 
However, the major rationalisation of the notion of French superiority related to
the domain of civilisation and culture, where a belief in cultural superiority was
linked with the notion of a duty to convey this culture to the world. As Ager says: ‘A
strong influence on those who supported colonial expansion in the nineteenth
century was the belief in the indefinably superior nature of French civilisation and
culture, and particularly the belief that France had a special role to play in bringing
her culture to the world’ (Ager 1996: 60–61). That the superiority was ‘indefinable’
indicates strongly the ideological nature of the belief. In this vision of France’s
mission, it is most frequently compared to the sun, with the natural quality of
beaming its brilliance to the rest of the globe, expressed most evocatively in the
French expression ‘rayonnement de la culture’.
It is hardly surprising that there were contradictions in the discourse of those
appointed to govern and educate the colonised peoples. One of the key
contradictions was at the heart of the notion of the mission civilisatrice itself. The
public education system was one of the major vehicles for bringing the uncivilised
into civilisation, and one of the key values that it was supposed to inculcate was the
ideal of the secular Republic. However, public education and schooling as applied in
the colonies were not so completely dissociated from the religious evangelising of the
Catholic orders and lay missionaries. It appears that the colonies did not experience
the same, clear dichotomy between public/secular and private/Catholic schooling
that continued to exist in mainland France, at least until the Fifth Republic, when
the two began to be brought into a closer working relationship, in particular through
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the 1959 Debré law, which encouraged cooperation between private education and
the state and permitted a measure of state funding for the Catholic schools. 
Indeed, given that, in the colonies, state public education was reserved only for
the elite and the obligation of compulsory schooling did not exist for the whole
population, it was usually left to the religious foundations, both Christian, such as
the Missionnaires d’Afrique (the Order of White Fathers – Pères Blancs – and the
Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of Africa – Soeurs Blanches), and Muslim, to provide
basic education for the rest. 
Abroad, in the colonies, the distinctions were fudged and the old conflict between
secularism and clericalism was muted in the name of a common sense of nationhood
on behalf of the colonial power. Colonial administrators working for the Third
Republic, public school teachers, priests, missionaries and Catholic educators were
united by a common sense of their colonial mission. In the same way as Clemenceau
characterised the French Revolution as a bloc, the French abroad formed a bloc in the
service of the empire, in which their ideological differences counted for less than they
would have done at home. A simple but striking illustration of this is the physical
proximity of the headquarters of the French Republic’s administrative headquarters in
the Indian colony of Chandernagore and the Catholic church, schools and convent.
We shall be looking further at some of these contradictions in the Republican
discourse of empire, together with the basic contradiction, which we have already
touched on and which contained the seed of the empire’s own downfall. For, if the
colonised peoples learned their lessons well, they also learned that the Revolutionary
discourse of modern democracy gave them the ideas and concepts that they needed
to turn the tables against the colonial oppressors and achieve their liberation,
although this notion of a lineage with Western ideology has not gone without
challenge, as we shall see. 
There is one further contradiction in French Republican ideology that needs to
be tabled at this stage. This concerns the contradiction within the notion of history
itself, which has assumed such importance in the legitimisation of the French state.
History, usually written with a capital H in French, provides the material for the
foundation of the French Republic. As such, it relies heavily on the notion of
tradition; la tradition républicaine (‘the Republican tradition’) is one of the stock-in-
trade phrases of French political discourse. Yet, at the heart of this ‘tradition’, indeed
as its founding principle, one finds a basic discontinuity, a rupture with the past,
dramatised in the French Revolution. On the one hand, this is the modernist notion
of history as progress, looking to the future; on the other, the historical legitimacy of
the French state relies on its roots in the past. The ambivalence implicit in the notion
of history has been further accentuated in recent years by an increased importance
given to the notions of memory and heritage, particularly in connection with issues
of national identity. The future project contained in the Revolutionary view of
history has largely disappeared from mainstream political discourse.
It is thus hardly surprising that this ideological framework is now increasingly
perceived as inadequate in the postcolonial age. However, the ‘end of modernity’
remains problematic as far as post-colonial relations are concerned.
28 | Postcoloniality
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 28
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
Notes
1. The text of the Code Noir may be consulted at http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/amsudant/
guyanefr1685.htm (retrieved 26 December 2004) or http://www.afcam.org/
Doc_illustration/CodeNoir/LECODENOIR.htm  (retrieved 16 February 2005).
2.   Blaise Diagne (1872–1934), from Senegal, was the first black député in the Chambre des
députés, from 1914 to 1934, and Junior Minister for the Colonies in 1931. He was
followed by others, including the Guianese Gaston Monnerville (1897–1991), first
elected in 1932 and President of the Senate from 1958 to 1968. However, it was only
after the Second World War, that there was any significant measure of representation,
including Lamine Gueye (1891–1968), elected in 1945, Félix Houphouët-Boigny
(1905–93), member of the Assemblée nationale from 1945, then Minister in various
governments from 1956, until he became President of the Ivory Coast in 1960 until his
death, amongst many others. 
3. See Thomson (1968: 308–10), for Ferry’s speech on the economic necessity of
imperialism.
4.   In particular, Balibar (1992: 61–62) quotes the following passage from R. Carré de
Malberg, Contribution à la théorie générale de l’Etat (1920)/1962, Vol. 1, pp. 243 ff.: 
il suffit de comparer le cas du citoyen avec celui de l’étranger se trouvant sur le sol
français: en ce qui concerne l’individu qui n’est pas membre de la collectivité française,
la notion de puissance se dégage pleinement; cet étranger est vraiment soumis à une
puissance extérieure de domination. Voir dans le même sens ce que dit M. Duguit ...
des indigènes des colonies ou des habitants des pays de protectorat, qui sont sujets de
la puissance française sans être français ou en tout cas sans être citoyens français. Les
nationaux, au contraire, dans la mesure où ils ont été ‘représentés’ (Décl. de 1789, art.
6) à la confection des lois par les organes de la collectivité, n’apparaissent pas, dans leur
subordination à ces lois, comme les sujets d’une puissance supérieure, mais on peut
dire qu’en se conformant à la loi ils observent leur propre volonté ... les citoyens, en
tant que membres constitutifs de la collectivité souveraine, ne peuvent être considérés
comme étrangers aux actes de souveraineté qu’accomplit la collectivité par
l’intermédiaire de ses organes; ils y participent en ce sens et pour ce motif que la
nation ... n’est pas autre chose que l’universalité des citoyens.  
This passage also clearly shows the limitations of the concept of ‘universality’.
5. Cette distinction est inextricablement liée à l’articulation des pouvoirs de l’Etat en
pouvoir de la loi et pouvoir réglementaire: le premier impliquant en dernière instance
un contrôle de ceux qui incarnent la souveraineté nationale et constituent (par leur
vote) les organes de l’Etat (ou du moins sont censés en être à leur origine); le second
ayant pour champ d’exercice la gestion quotidienne des problèmes d’ordre public non
maîtrisables par la loi, mais aussi et surtout la gestion des territoires et des populations
coloniales.  (Balibar 1992: 60)
6.   See Gambetta in a speech in 1878: ‘L’Algérie doit être conduite comme le reste de la
France, parce qu’elle est une terre française par excellence’ (Gambetta 1883: 101). Jules
Favre, on the same occasion, made this unwittingly ironic statement: ‘nous n’avons
qu’une pensée: faire de l’Algérie une terre vraiment française; par le cœur, elle l’est; par le
droit, c’est la conquête qui nous reste à faire, et nous y travaillerons de toute notre énergie’
(Gambetta 1883: 103).
7.   This was stipulated in a Sénatus Consulte of 14 July 1865.
8.   ‘Cette universalité de la langue française … tient à des causes si délicates et si puissantes à
la fois que, pour les démêler, il s’agit de montrer jusqu’à quel point tant de causes diverses
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ont pu se combiner et s’unir pour faire à cette langue une fortune si prodigieuse’ (Rivarol,
quoted at http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/francophonie/citations.html). 
9.   In his speech of 2 May 1946 at the Sorbonne, on the occasion of Descartes’s 350th
anniversary, Thorez claimed that: ‘Le monde aime la France parce que, dans la France, il
reconnaît Descartes et ceux qui l’ont continué … A travers les tempêtes qui se sont
abattues sur les hommes, c’est Descartes qui, de son pas allègre, nous conduit vers les
lendemains qui chantent’ (quoted in Le Monde des livres, 29 March 1996, p. VI).
10. Family ties or filiation was also a problematic preoccupation at the level of personal
identity; see Simon During, ‘Rousseau’s Patrimony: Primitivism, Romance and
Becoming Other’, in Barker, Hulme and Iversen 1994: 47–71.
11. See Raphaëlle Bacqué, ‘La droite sénatoriale accepte la parité approuvée par Jacques
Chirac’, Le Monde, 5 March 1999.
12. The status of the members of the Assemblée nationale is defined as follows: ‘Les députés
sont investis d’un mandat national. Bien que chacun d’eux soit l’élu d’une seule
circonscription, il représente la nation tout entière. Ils se déterminent librement dans
l’exercice de leur mandat, n’étant juridiquement liés par aucun engagement. Tout mandat
impératif est en effet nul.’ For further information, consult http://www.assemblee-
nat.fr/connaissance/election-depute.asp.
13. This theory was ironically used to support the weakening of legislative power in the
Gaullist constitution of the Fifth Republic.
14. Quel paradoxe, plus apparent que réel! C'est un juif français et assimilé, pétri d’un
patriotisme maternel (‘Juste ou injuste, c'est ma patrie’) qui donne le coup d’envoi au
sionisme ... Alors que le patriotisme de la plupart des juifs nationaux est de type
‘paternel’, qu’il s’apparente plutôt – du moins à la première génération  – à celui du
jeune Bonaparte: ‘Brusquement la Révolution le convertit au patriotisme français le
plus ardent. Mais prenons garde. Conversion avant tout cérébrale en même temps que
passionnelle. Ce n’est pas à la tradition de France, ce n’est pas à l’immense passé
français qu’il se rallie, c’est à l’avenir français tel qu’il peut le comprendre, c’est aux
principes abstraits que la Révolution vient de se donner ou plutôt de donner au
monde comme décalogue universel.’ (René Grousset, Figures de Proue, Plon, 1949)
Or le patriotisme de Dreyfus est plus viscéral que cérébral, plus proche de Barrès ou
Mauriac que de Valéry. Il n’est pas de conversion ... Sa voix ne fait-elle pas, par instants,
écho à celle de Du Bellay: ‘Je fixe l’horizon les yeux tournés vers la France, dans l’espoir
que ce sera enfin le jour où ma patrie me rappellera à elle.’ (Lévy 1982: 256)
15.  This whole conflict came to the fore once again at the time of the celebrations of the
1,500th anniversary of the baptism of Clovis in 1996 (Le Monde, 26 July 1996).
16.  ‘Le terme de nation change de sens: ce n’est plus l’ensemble des citoyens, c’est l’idée d’une
appartenance historique, centrée sur l’Etat. A l’extrême, à travers la mythification de la
langue, de la culture et des traditions nationales, ce sera la variante française du
nationalisme, l’idée d’une communauté morale et culturelle fondée sur les traditions
institutionnelles’ (Balibar 1992: 142).
17. ‘l’enseignement supérieur suppose, avec une hérédité préparatoire, un équilibre des
facultés réceptives, un jugement, dont seule une faible minorité de nos sujets et protégés
est encore capable’ (Sarraut 1931: 152).
18. Voilà ce qu’est devenu ce que l’on appelait le grenier des Romains! Mais, en serait-il
ce que vous dites, je crois que notre nouvelle conquête est chose heureuse et grande.
C’est la civilisation qui marche sur la barbarie. C’est un peuple éclairé qui va trouver
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un peuple dans la nuit. Nous sommes les Grecs du monde: c’est à nous d’illuminer le
monde. Notre mission s’accomplit, je ne chante qu’hosanna. (Hugo 1841: 52) 
19.  ‘Les hommes ne sont pas égaux, les races ne sont pas égales. Le nègre, par exemple, est fait pour
servir aux grandes choses voulues et conçues par le Blanc’ (quoted by Taguieff 1997: 95).
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Chapter 2
The European Legacy
This chapter will begin the discussion of the counter-discourses or dissidentideologies that were to come into being as a direct response to the experience of
imperialism and colonialism. The discourses that will figure here are primarily those
that challenge the political and military power of the imperialist rulers, as well as
those that bring the whole economic and social basis of imperialism into question,
although there will also be examples of aspects of more conciliatory types of thinking
that attempted to find compromise solutions or even engage in outright
collaboration. 
Indeed, the term ‘counter-discourse’ has to be used with great circumspection,
as it could be interpreted as a response to a dominant discourse and thus operative
entirely within a presumed self-contained domain of discourse or ideology. This
interpretation is not applicable to the kinds of ideas that were developed to articulate
the historical challenge to dominant systems of economic and political power in the
context of real political and ideological struggles. Thus, whilst it is necessary to
analyse the way in which they challenge, subvert or destroy the premises of the
dominant ideology and prepare a counter-statement to it, it also needs to be stressed
that they have to be looked at in their wider context. After all, anti-imperialist and
anticolonialist ideas did not come into being simply to counter the imperialist and
racist ideologies that were brought into use to give credence to the various imperial
enterprises. Although the discrediting and demolition of the dominant ideology
might be accomplished as a secondary feature, the primary purpose was to legitimise
and rationalise the challenge to the imperial structures of power, on the economic,
social, political, military and cultural levels, as well as the ideological. This is ideology
functioning as a mobilising tool for those social forces that could counter the
dominant power at all these levels. 
Resistance to imperialism and colonialism is at least as old as imperialism itself.
From the first conquests, the military incursion into another people’s territory
tended to provoke military resistance on the part of the indigenous inhabitants, with
a greater or lesser degree of success on their part. There had also been rejection of the
other aspects of colonisation, including the ideological and the cultural, as well as the
political and economic domination of France and the other imperialist powers,
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throughout the colonised world. Anti-imperialism is therefore not a comparatively
recent phenomenon, confined to a historical stage of ‘anticolonialism’, linked to the
development of nationalist movements mostly dating from the early part of the
twentieth century, but has been an integral part of the history of empire from the
start. The anticolonial and national liberation struggles that were ultimately to lead
to the end of formal political control, in the decolonisation process of the mid-
twentieth century are clearly a crucial part of the fight back against imperialism.
However, we shall also need to consider other important struggles and the ideological
forms that the resistance assumed at earlier stages in the historical process. In this
light, the successful revolt of the slaves of Saint-Domingue and the subsequent
establishment of the state of Haiti will be seen as events of primary significance,
which brought into relief, at an early stage and in stark fashion, some of the
fundamental contradictions of Enlightenment discourse. 
Although the catalyst for the revolt in Saint-Domingue was the radically new
development constituted by the French Revolution, the ideological debates that it
produced can also be situated as the culmination of the long-standing confrontation
between those who accepted the basic humanity of those who were colonised or
enslaved and those for whom the latter were not to be included within the human
species. The Declaration of the Rights of Man in France in 1789, with its universalist
pretensions to equality and proclaimed rejection of hierarchies within the human race,
was to bring this issue to the point of crisis, at which it had to be faced head-on. 
The Ambiguities of Enlightenment Discourse
Some of the ambiguities of the discourses associated with the Enlightenment have
already been suggested in Chapter 1 of this book. This chapter will explore further
the issue of their subversive potential. In other words, what is at stake here is the
extent to which these ideas have been used to challenge the dominant power relations
of imperialism and the limits within which they may operate as counter-discourses. 
The fact that the French bourgeoisie’s political challenge to feudalism and
absolutism took such a radical form in the French Revolution, for specific historical
reasons which we cannot dwell on here, was to have an impact that long outlived the
particular historical events that took place at the cusp of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. Its significance was also to penetrate well beyond the
boundaries of France itself and also beyond those parts of the globe that were already
bound to France in privileged relations of power and domination at the time. 
There has already been some discussion of the contradictions that were
inherent from the outset within this ideological corpus, especially the contradiction
between the universalism of the principles enunciated and the particular
contingency of the circumstances of their birth and applicability, as well as the
related contradiction between the ideal theory and the reality of its application in
practice. This analysis will now be taken further and related to the use and, some
would say, abuse of this ideology by those looking for instruments with which to
challenge French imperial power. 
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The Saint-Domingue slave rebellion provides an obvious starting point for this
discussion, given the wholehearted embrace of the universalist principles of the
Rights of Man by its leaders, such as Toussaint L’Ouverture, whose objective was to
claim, in the first instance, liberty, equality and full citizenship as part of the new
political nation (James (1938)/1980; Césaire (1961)/1981; Geggus 1982; Bénot
1988). Yet, for many years, this successful revolt, which led eventually to the creation
of the independent state of Haiti, was treated as marginal to the main accounts of
the French Revolution, and it was largely due to the efforts of black Caribbeans that
its importance began to be recognised. The groundbreaking study by C.L.R. James,
The Black Jacobins. Toussaint Louverture and the San Domingo Revolution (1938), was
crucial in giving it due recognition, as was the work of Aimé Césaire, with his
Toussaint Louverture. La Révolution française et le problème colonial (1961) and his
fictionalised and dramatic account, La Tragédie du roi Christophe (1963). 
The Saint-Domingue Revolution was, in fact, absolutely central to the whole
Revolutionary process, on both the economic and the political levels, and crystallised
the key issues and contradictions, some of which have still to be resolved. These will
be dealt with in depth in a number of chapters in this book. For the moment, let it
suffice to say that the issues raised by Saint-Domingue went beyond the questions of
restriction and exclusion. 
Of course, the slaves and the ‘mulattos’ were, to varying degrees, according to
the lights of the different parties, excluded from the brotherhood of man, by virtue
of their condition as blacks or part-blacks. In the case of the slaves, they were not
considered as human beings at all, but as chattels to be bought and sold; the defence
of slavery was intimately bound up with the defence of the inalienable right to
private property. Indeed, plantation owners, slave masters and merchants, operating
in the lucrative trade between France and its Caribbean colony, some of whom were
grouped together in the influential Club Massiac, were amongst the most vociferous
supporters of the early Revolutionary cause. Many of them had little interest in, or
enthusiasm for, the abolition of slavery itself and, although there were some elements
within the ranks of the French Revolutionary political ideologues and activists who
accepted the slaves’ case, there were others who did not. Even the Société des Amis
des Noirs, founded in 1788, argued mainly for the abolition of the slave trade, rather
than slavery itself, and then a staged emancipation for the slaves. Its founder, Brissot,
argued for the Saint-Domingue revolt to be put down. 
Nonetheless, on 24 March 1792, the Legislative Assembly had extended to free
blacks the right to elect representatives to the Assembly in Paris, as it had earlier to
whites and those of mixed race. Slavery was abolished in Saint-Domingue in August
1793 and then, on 4 February 1794, supported by the Abbé Grégoire and Danton,
but with a large measure of indifference on the part of other members, the
Convention decreed the abolition of slavery in all the French colonies (Spillmann
1981; Blackburn 1988). This was in spite of Robespierre’s reservations (Césaire
(1961)/1981: 186), which were shared by others and, according to Sala-Molins, were
more because of rivalry with the British and the political wish to safeguard the
colonies (Sala-Molins 1987). It is no surprise that many of those with reservations or
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objections were to be found amongst the mercantile capitalist class, heavily involved
with the colonial trade, who wanted freedom from feudal restrictions and an entry
into power, but were also determined to defend and promote their own economic
and financial interests, founded on the slave economy. 
However, it would be inaccurate to restrict the material interest to the limited group
of people who were directly involved in this trade. The colony of Saint-Domingue and
the riches it generated were quite central to the burgeoning capitalist economy of France,
which from the outset had extended beyond the borders of the Hexagon.1 As C.L.R.
James has pointed out (1938/1980: 47): ‘The slave-trade and slavery were the economic
basis of the French Revolution. “Sad irony of human history,” comments Jaurès. “The
fortunes created at Bordeaux, at Nantes, by the slave-trade, gave to the bourgeoisie the
pride which needed liberty and contributed to human emancipation.”’
Yet, whilst the opposition to the demands of the Black Jacobins was founded
primarily on economic, rather than political, grounds, the arguments through which
it was articulated had to be credible in terms of the current Revolutionary political
consensus of liberty, equality and fraternity. It was, then, a question of finding
arguments that would support the denial of rights to the black slaves, while not
calling into question the fundamentals of the Revolution.
The denial of the black slaves’ humanity, with the corollary of their exclusion
from the human species, was the simple solution that had served in the past.
However, more sophisticated arguments now needed to be sought. Some of these
were ready to hand in the doctrine of private property rights, which had come into
its own as one of the key strands of the discourse of the French Revolution. The
slaves could not be freed, as this would impinge on the now sacred property rights
of their owners. Moreover, although it is assumed that most of the philosophers of
the Enlightenment had tended to view slavery as aberrant and abhorrent, there was
no shortage of arguments, even amongst the philosophes, to justify slavery as a natural
phenomenon, in terms that harked back to Aristotle’s notion of ‘natural slavery’. The
novelty of these arguments related to their subtle adaptation in line with the
burgeoning development of a worldwide imperialism, as their proponents took pains
to hedge the validity of the notion with reservations about the types of people and
the parts of the globe where it might be acceptable. As in many other cases, the
‘natural order of things’ gambit can be pressed into service to justify practically
anything, even the excesses of Sadean libertarianism, though it is usually used to
shore up the status quo, or those aspects of it that are most convenient. 
The Enlightenment philosopher, Montesquieu, for instance, in De l’esprit des lois,
blames the heat and torpor of certain climes for the existence of slavery, as a necessary
means of coercing people to work. He is very clear that slavery is necessary in the
Americas for economic reasons and to keep the price of sugar down. In such climates:
slavery is therefore less shocking to Reason … However, as all men are born
equal, it must be said that slavery is against nature, notwithstanding that in
some countries, it is based on a natural Reason. (Montesquieu (1748)/1995
Book XV, Chapter VII: ‘Autre origine du droit de l’esclavage’) 
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It is thus necessary to restrict natural slavery to certain particular countries
of the world. (Book XV, Chapter VIII: ‘Inutilité de l’esclavage parmi nous’) 
Moreover, Montesquieu is quite explicit that it is because of the colour of their skin
that it is inconceivable that the black slaves have a soul. ‘It is impossible’, he says,
‘that we could suppose these people to be human; because, if we supposed them to
be human, we would begin to believe that we ourselves are not Christians’ (Book XV,
Chapter V: ‘De l’esclavage des nègres’)
Even the assumptions about Rousseau’s opposition to slavery should not be
taken for granted. His tirades against tyranny and servitude were based on abuses
directed against Europeans, and there is no reference to black slavery in the colonies
in the Contrat social (Rousseau 1762; Sala-Molins 1987). Of the philosophes, it was
the Abbé Raynal who came out with what was the clearest critique of ‘black’ slavery
and the slave trade in his Histoire philosophique et politique des deux Indes (Raynal
(1770)/1981). 
Clearly, the debates about slavery were complex, if not convoluted, not least
because those engaged in these debates were doubtless aware of the contradictions
inherent in their reasoning. Furthermore, various aspects were highlighted and
different arguments assumed the ascendancy, in line with the actual progress and
regression made by the struggles themselves and the dominance of particular socio-
economic interests at key moments in the process. 
In Saint-Domingue, the struggle for full political rights was a bloody one, with
many setbacks on the way. If it seemed, for a moment, that the demands for full
equality by the Black Jacobins could be met, with the abolition of slavery a
significant milestone on the way, the illusion was soon to be shattered. Under the
regime of Napoleon, there was a clear step back. Napoleon could not envisage the
former slaves in the colonies having the same rights as Frenchmen and made the
colonies subject to special legal provisions. Not only were slavery and the slave trade
re-established by the law of 20 May 1802, but he also attempted to prevent the entry
into France of black people and to impose customs duties on products coming from
the colonies (James (1938)/1980; Spillmann 1981; Blackburn 1988). Troops were
sent to Saint-Domingue to ensure the implementation of these measures and put
down the revolt. Toussaint L’Ouverture was captured and shipped to France, where
he died in imprisonment at the Fortress of Joux in 1803. Although the question of
slavery was settled, temporarily and only in part of the French-controlled Caribbean,
as a result of its brutal reimposition by Napoleon, the fiction of the political nation
was irredeemably fractured in the process of the struggle. The possibility of achieving
liberation as part of the French nation was dealt a severe blow, though not, as we shall
see, a death blow. What had begun as a struggle for inclusion in the French Republic
was transformed into the triumphant national liberation struggle of a whole people
against France, an emergent nation pitting itself against a colonial power and
emerging, at least partially, victorious with the establishment of the independent
state of Haiti in 1804, under the leadership of Dessalines, who promptly declared
himself Emperor.
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Not only were the universalist limitations of the Revolutionary ideology of the
Rights of Man exposed in the process, but it also put on the agenda the Rights of
Nations and laid bare the barrenness of the Revolution’s capacity to respond to this
fundamental issue. This was a founding event in the anti-imperialist struggle and
marks the emergence of a historically new phenomenon, the national liberation
struggle, which was to provide an inspirational beacon for freedom fighters,
particularly in the Caribbean and the Americas. In Haiti itself, the doors were
opened to the development of a new type of national culture, deriving from links
with the African past of the former slaves, evolving into new forms peculiar to the
island, not least in the form of its own brand of voodoo. 
It was not, of course, the first struggle for freedom against a colonial power. The
American colonies had already waged their war of independence from England and
achieved victory. One might therefore be tempted to conclude that there is a clear
parallel here and that the two struggles fall into the same category. However, the
American anticolonial struggle was a phenomenon of a fundamentally different
order, in which the colonial settlers themselves asserted their independence from the
metropolitan homeland and their freedom to continue the colonial enterprise, free
from the tutelary hand of the mother country. Imperialism as such was not
challenged in its essence; it was more like a change of personnel in the boardroom,
as a result of the subsidiary asserting its independence of the parent company. The
basic operations thereafter remained the same. Imperialism continued to flourish; the
territory continued to be appropriated and the indigenous population wiped out; the
slaves who had been transported to the North American continent to work the
plantations remained enslaved as before. 
If the French settlers in Saint-Domingue shared similar concerns with their
American counterparts, as a result of their frustrations with the French Government
bureaucracy and the economic restrictions created by what was known as the
Exclusive, giving the monopoly of trade to and from the colony to the French
mercantile bourgeoisie, their economic and political power was to be measured on a
different scale from that of the American settlers. In any event, French ‘settlers’ in the
Caribbean often maintained a dual existence, or were absentee plantation-owners,
based in France for much of the time (James (1938)/1980: 29), or with interests
straddling the Atlantic. Moreover, the divisions in Saint-Domingue society, with the
big white planters at odds with other whites occupying various positions in the social
hierarchy, and both groups at odds with the ‘mulattos’ and freed black slaves, many
of whom, like Toussaint L’Ouverture himself, had acquired considerable property
themselves, and, of course, all the former against the slaves, meant that, when the
French Revolution erupted, these differences were to come to the fore and assume
even more importance than any movement on the part of the settlers to assert their
independence (James (1938)/1980: 62–84). The revolt of the slaves was to take the
colony down a different route, beginning with the demand for freedom and only
ultimately leading to independence. 
This is not, then, to downplay the impact of the ideas that developed in the
course of the American Revolution, particularly as a source of inspiration for
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subsequent anticolonial struggles in the South American continent and elsewhere. As
Ali Mazrui puts it: ‘Curiously enough, the Americans became the pioneers of
modern anti-imperialism. The American Declaration of Independence remains one
of the landmarks of the history of decolonization in the modern world’ (Mazrui
1990: 45). Indeed, Marat was to use the example of the American Revolution to
justify his support for the Saint-Domingue rebellion, asking: ‘if the inhabitants of
our colonies have declared themselves free, how could we have the gall to dare to
condemn them for following the example of the English colonies?’ (quoted by
Césaire (1961)/1981: 189–190). 
In many ways, an argument can be made that due importance has not been
given to this impact on countries within the orbit of France and her empire. It is clear
that the American Revolution had a profound impact on the thinking leading to the
French Revolution itself and its success undoubtedly served as an inspirational
model. In content, however, it was as a bourgeois democratic revolution, in which
the colonists wished to sever themselves from a feudal-tributary relationship with the
parent country, whilst maintaining the imperialist relations that operated within the
colonies themselves.
From all of the above, it will be clear that the use of the term ‘anticolonial’ in
relation to the American Revolution can lead to significant confusion. The mantle of
anticolonialism has provided a convenient ideological cloak for America’s own
evolution into an imperialist power, with external as well as internal pretensions, in
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Ironically, one of the countries to succumb
to occupation by the USA was Haiti itself, which was taken over by the Americans
from 1915 to 1934. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson had imposed a trade embargo on
Haiti from the beginnings of its independence in 1806. 
However, the force of this ideological perception of American anticolonialism
can be demonstrated when even such a leader as Ho Chi Minh could, at least
temporarily, be convinced of American anti-imperialist credentials. When he
proclaimed Vietnam’s independence from France in 1945, he borrowed the words of
Thomas Jefferson and the American Declaration of Independence. Moreover, the
French archives at Chandernagore show that when René Madec, the Breton soldier-
adventurer, reported back to France in the 1770s on the possibilities of fomenting
‘revolution’ amongst the population of Bengal, so that they would rebel against the
English (Barbé 1894; Meyer 1993), he was clearly inspired by the example of the
American Revolution.
The attractions of the French Revolution to the colonised were also apparent at the
time, as is clear in the case of Saint-Domingue. It was also the case that, when news of
the French Revolution reached India in 1790 (Annuaire des Etablissements français dans
l’Inde 1943: 22), it proved a powerful inspiration, not least to the Indian leader, Tipu
Sultan, in his resistance to the British. Not only did he ally himself with the French
from 1795, but he also took over many of the democratic features of the Revolution,
calling himself ‘Citizen Tipu’, planting a tree of liberty, saluting the tricolour and
attending the Jacobin Club that was set up in Seringapatam, before he was killed in
battle in 1799. The impact of the French Revolution was, however, of a different order.
The European Legacy | 39
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 39
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
Although Revolutionary France did not promote anticolonialism as such, except
as an incidental feature of its rivalry with Britain, the universal significance of the
Revolution was assumed. If anything, this notion has not diminished over time, but
has in fact become even more pronounced. Perhaps the most striking recent
illustration of this was the choice of theme for the bicentennial celebrations of the
Revolution in 1989, which focused on its role and universal significance for the
world at large, whereas the centenary of 1889 had concentrated more on a
celebration of the Republic, still fighting for survival in the face of challenges by
counter-Revolutionary, anti-Republican forces in France at the time.
Republican Utopianism
For many of the colonised elite, who had been educated in French schools to believe
in the Republican ideals, the discourse of the universal Rights of Man could provide
an attractive framework of reference. This is hardly surprising, for it remained a
powerful expression of the desire for liberty, equality and fraternity, and an
intellectual foundation of the case for universal justice. 
The Senegalese poet and statesman, Léopold Sédar Senghor, for instance, was
apt to take a particularly rosy view of the matter, as here in his reflections on the
Revolution of 1848 and the abolition of slavery under the Second Republic: 
It is in this way that men of colour, and Negroes in particular, have been able
to attain not only the liberty of the citizen, but also and above all a personal
life which is only made possible by culture; it is in this way that they have
been able, in spite of the regression constituted by the Second Empire and
the Third Republic, to bring their own contribution to modern-day French
humanism, which is making itself truly universal, because it is fertilised by
the sap of all races on the planet. (Senghor 1948: 1)
Even in more critical approaches, the challenge to the colonial power was often first
articulated, not as a rejection of the official doctrine as such, but as a questioning
of the gulf between the theory and its actual application in colonial practice. The
confrontation between these ideas in the abstract and their utilitarian
transformation into a particularist ideology justifying French colonial power, as well
as the contradiction between the idealism of the discourse and the reality of the
colonial experience as lived by the colonised, might be a source of alienation on the
part of those who were educated in these values. For, when they took the
universalist pretensions at face value, they were nonetheless excluded from full
participation in a non-existent Republic of equal citizens. However, the position
was often taken that things would be all right if the French authorities actually put
into operation a political and administrative system that conformed to their
proclaimed ideals. In a very direct way, then, the dominant discourse itself provided
a frame of reference for a challenge to French power, in terms of the universal
humanism that it proclaimed. 
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What is more, the key concept of the political, sovereign nation, so important
in French Republican ideology, was also available for ready transformation into a
weapon of the anti-imperialist struggle, providing the legitimacy for national
liberation struggles. In both these cases, therefore, on the fronts of universal
humanism and national sovereignty, the dominant discourse itself provided key
concepts for its own subversion. 
At the same time, it would be wrong to underestimate the input of ideas and
concepts that owed their origins to non-European sources. Indeed, the concept of
national liberation itself is not just a variant on the theme of nationalism, but an
original development, which came into its own outside the European sphere. 
In spite of this radically new development, the French Revolution remained a
key source for the development of revolutionary thought throughout the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. This was not solely a European phenomenon. Indeed, the
French Revolution and its ideas were to provide some of the ideological armoury for
the waging of the anticolonial struggles themselves, going right back to the
Revolutionary period. Moreover, the brief interlude of the Second Republic was to
add a further dimension to the inspirational capacity of Revolutionary Republican
discourse, through its symbolic importance as a constitutional model for other
societies (and indeed for French Republicans) and, with the institution of universal
manhood suffrage and the abolition of slavery, as the incarnation of French
egalitarian and libertarian principles. 
Thus, in spite of the contradictions within the French Republican discourse, as
well as those to which colonial practice gave rise, it remained remarkably resilient as
a source of inspiration, particularly for the colonised. In the 1920s and 1930s, it
proved a key source for the embryonic anticolonialist nationalisms developing in the
French colonies. One of numerous examples of this can be found in the account of
a Tunisian poet, M’hamed Férid Ghazi, writing about the anticolonial movement in
Tunisia in 1938 and stressing the key reference of the French Revolution for that
struggle: ‘It was time to act: to live in freedom or die! A century and a half after the
French Revolution, its immortal rallying cry also belonged to us’ (Ghazi 1956:
1356). He was fully aware of the ambiguous relationship that existed with France:
The French Revolution took place a century and a half ago, but ours was still
waiting to be carried out. We were determined to do it. For us, France was
at one and the same time a tyranny that ruled us by force of bayonets, as well
as the great ideals of liberty, human fraternity and social justice. Just like an
open wound, we felt the pangs of the divorce between what we were taught
and the reality to which we were subject and in which we had to live our lives
– it was like a brazen challenge to the high ideals! Everything was so attractive
in the books we read, but down on the street, nothing but horrors: the worst
kind of atrocities, unprovoked harassment and abuse. Behind the gates of our
school, the unforgettable Sadiki School, brotherhood and human kindness
were the order of the day. Yet outside, there was nothing but the cold
humiliation of systematic contempt. We were caught between the two. Torn
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apart, but full of determination. One day, terrorism would bring about the
liberation of us young people. Those who were ground down would rise up
to face their torturers. They would respond to the humiliation with hatred.
To oppression, with terror. And the infernal cycle would cast the shadow of
the apocalypse to all four corners of the Maghreb. The tortured and
tormented would see armed fellaghas coming to them in their dreams and
spring back to life to the sound of their gunfire. They will haunt the plains
and the villages. Dealing justice, they will cause the thieves and murderers
with hands dripping with the blood of our martyrs to tremble. Nothing will
be able to smash them. Should ten die, then soon one hundred will arise to
replace them! Legions of fighters will spring up from the bruised earth to the
cry of ‘Freedom’! (Ghazi 1956: 1365) 
However, history had not come to an end with the French Revolution. Not only did
the fortunes of Republicanism wax and wane throughout the nineteenth century, but
also the development of capitalism in Europe and the ensuing contradictions
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat had led to economic and political
struggles that found their expression in the growth of socialist and communist ideas
and movements, through which these struggles were articulated. These new ideas did
not, of course, develop in a vacuum, but were built on the political aspects of
Enlightenment ideology, adding an analysis and critique of the capitalist economy
and class society. While this dissident ideology thus introduced fundamentally new
notions, such as class difference and contradiction, as a necessary counterweight to
the notions of abstract political equality, it nonetheless did not break utterly with the
Enlightenment tradition. 
This is particularly true in the retention and indeed further development of the idea of
historical progress, in which humanity was moving to an ever higher stage of development.
This was to lead to a complex position with regard to the nature of capitalism itself within
this historical process, and, as a corollary, to that of capitalist imperialism. 
These ambiguities are there implicitly in the whole range of anticapitalist
ideology, which comes under the different headings of various types of socialism and
communism. It is perhaps best discussed first in the very explicit form that it took in
the work of Marx and Engels.
Marxism as Critique and Continuation of Enlightenment Discourse
While Marx and Engels developed a global critique of capitalism, prioritising its
economic mode of operation, founded on exploitation and oppression, it is, at the
same time, a fundamental tenet of their thought that capitalism, with all its faults
and negative features, represents a progressive force and stage in human history. As
they state in the Communist Manifesto:
The bourgeoisie, historically, has played a most revolutionary part.
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to
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all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the
motley feudal ties that bound man to his ‘natural superiors,’ and has left
remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest,
than callous ‘cash payment.’
... It has been the first to show what man’s activity can bring about. It
has accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman
aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that put in
the shade all former Exoduses of nations and crusades. 
The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionising the
instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, and
with them the whole relations of society ... Constant revolutionising of
production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting
uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier
ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and
venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones
become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all
that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober
senses, his real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind. (Marx and
Engels (1848)/1970: 37–38)
Bourgeois capitalism nonetheless carried the seeds of its own destruction, through
the working out of the contradictions that were inherent within it, as Marx tells us
in the Preface to The Critique of Political Economy: 
In broad outlines Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of
production can be designated as progressive epochs in the economic
formation of society. The bourgeois relations of production are the last
antagonistic form of the social process of production – antagonistic not in
the sense of individual antagonism, but of one arising from the social
conditions of life of the individuals; at the same time the productive forces
developing in the womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions
for the solution of that antagonism. This social formation brings, therefore,
the prehistory of human society to a close. (Marx (1859)/1970: 182) 
Or again in the words of the Communist Manifesto:
The weapons with which the bourgeoisie felled feudalism to the ground are
now turned against the bourgeoisie itself.
But not only has the bourgeoisie forged the weapons that bring death
to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those
weapons – the modern working class – the proletarians ... 
The advance of industry, whose involuntary promoter is the
bourgeoisie, replaces the isolation of the labourers, due to competition, by
their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of
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Modern Industry, therefore, cuts from under its feet the very foundation on
which the bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. What the
bourgeoisie, therefore, produces, above all, is its own grave-diggers. (Marx
and Engels (1848)/1970: 41, 46)
The perception of capitalism as a progressive force, albeit beset with contradictions,
also extended to capitalist imperialism, which was seen as both a negative and a
positive force, bringing into the historical process, defined as a progress towards ever
higher stages of civilisation, those societies that had hitherto been outside history.
This involved bringing them into the orbit of the global capitalist economy.
Referring to India, in an article for the New York Daily Tribune of 8 August 1853
(‘The Future Results of the British Rule in India’), Marx writes the following:
The bourgeois period of modern history has to create the material basis of
the new world – on the one hand the universal intercourse founded upon
the mutual dependency of mankind, and the means of that intercourse; on
the other hand the development of the productive powers of man and the
transformation of material production into a scientific domination of
natural agencies. Bourgeois industry and commerce create these material
conditions of a new world in the same way as geological revolutions have
created the surface of the earth. When a great social revolution shall have
mastered the results of the bourgeois epoch, the market of the world and the
modern powers of production, and subjected them to the common control
of the most advanced peoples, then only will human progress cease to
resemble that hideous pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but from
the skulls of the slain. (Marx and Engels (1959)/1975: 34–35)
As we see, Marx and Engels describe this process in ambivalent terms, stressing the
negative aspects involved in the forcible disruption of the economies and societies of
other countries at the same time as they interpret this process as one that will bring
‘barbarians’ into the realm of civilisation. This is explicitly stated in the Communist
Manifesto:
The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of
production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws
all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilisation. The cheap prices of
its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all
Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred
of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to
adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them to introduce
what it calls civilisation into their midst, i.e., to become bourgeois
themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. 
... Just as it has made the country dependent on the towns, so it has
made barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilised
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ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West.
(Marx and Engels (1848)/1970: 39)
Whilst the notion of civilisation is itself subject to their critique, there is no getting
away from the fact that it is viewed as a higher stage in the historical process, in line
with much of contemporary thinking on historical progress, such as that of Lewis H.
Morgan, who built on evolutionary theory in his Ancient Society, or Researches in the
Lines of Human Progress from Savagery Through Barbarism to Civilisation (1877),
which was such an influence on Engels’s Origin of the Family, Private Property and the
State (Engels (1884)/1970). 
It is clear that one of the main criteria that Marx uses to define the level a
civilisation has reached is the distance a society has travelled away from purely
natural processes and relations. The development of control over nature in the
techniques of economic production and the degree of development of
communications both figure as essential factors in determining the relative advance
of some societies over others. He also considers that these more advanced peoples
have a crucial, if unconscious, role in effecting progress as part of a universal,
historical project for the entire human species, at the same time as he registers the
inevitable downside of this project, in bringing destruction, violence and
impoverishment in its wake.
Marx made this abundantly clear in his writings on India, as when he discusses
the British role in bringing about a social revolution in India:
Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of
industrious patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized
and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their
individual members losing at the same time their ancient form of
civilization and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget
that these idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear,
had always been the solid foundation of Oriental despotism, that they
restrained the human mind within the smallest possible compass, making it
the unresisting tool of suspicion, enslaving it beneath traditional rules,
depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies. We must not forget the
barbarian egotism which, concentrating on some miserable patch of land,
had quietly witnessed the ruin of empires, the perpetration of unspeakable
cruelties, the massacre of the population of large towns, with no other
consideration bestowed upon them than on natural events, itself the
helpless prey of any aggressor who deigned to notice it at all. We must not
forget that this undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life, that this passive
sort of existence evoked on the other part, in contradistinction, wild,
aimless, unbounded forces of destruction, and rendered murder itself a
religious rite in Hindustan. We must not forget that these little
communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that
they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating man to
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be the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing
social state into never changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a
brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that
man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of
Hanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow. 
England, it is true, in causing a social revolution in Hindustan, was
actuated only by the vilest interests, and was stupid in her manner of
enforcing them. But that is not the question. The question is, can mankind
fulfil its destiny without a fundamental revolution in the social state of Asia?
If not, whatever may have been the crimes of England she was the
unconscious tool of history in bringing about the revolution. (Marx and
Engels, 1959/1975: 18–19)
The introduction of modern industry into India, via the railway system, will have the
effect of ‘dissolving the hereditary divisions of labour’ and thus the caste system,
which act as ‘decisive impediments to Indian progress and power’. In doing so, the
English bourgeoisie is laying down the ‘material premises’ for economic and social
progress in India, whilst causing immeasurable misery to millions. ‘Has the
bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected a progress without dragging
individuals and peoples through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation?’
(Marx and Engels (1959)/1975: 33).
This is inherent in what Marx calls England’s ‘double mission in India: one
destructive, the other regenerating – the annihilation of old Asiatic society, and the
laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia,’ (Marx and Engels
(1959)/1975: 30) through the political unification of the country, aided by telegraphy
and other means of communication and travel, the building of the Indian army, the
free press, the institution of private property in land, the development of education and
science. The negative aspects to be eliminated included a social system that, reified as
a natural destiny, served as a bulwark of despotism, caste and slavery; the passivity of a
vegetative state, in which human beings were subjugated to external forces and not in
charge of their destinies; superstition and traditional obscurantism, which put people
in thrall to nature and restricted the development of the human mind.
The net effect of the British intervention in India, therefore, is seen as the
positive one of bringing India into the orbit of universal human history, from its
previous position as a society outside history: ‘Indian society has no history at all, at
least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of the successive
intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and
unchanging society’ (Marx and Engels (1959)/1975: 29).
Writing about the opium trade, Marx puts China into the same category of
societies without history, though again this does not put its British adversary into a
morally superior position, but rather the contrary.
While the semi-barbarian stood on the principle of morality, the civilized
opposed the principle of pelf. That a giant empire, containing almost one-
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third of the human race, vegetating in the teeth of time, insulated by the
forced exclusion of general intercourse, and thus contriving to dupe itself
with illusions of Celestial perfection – that such an empire should at last be
overtaken by fate on occasion of a deadly duel, in which the representative
of the antiquated world appears prompted by ethical motives, while the
representative of overwhelming modern society fights for the privilege of
buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest markets – this, indeed, is a
sort of tragical couplet, stranger than any poet would ever have dared to
fancy. (Marx and Engels 1968: 211–12)
The notion of societies outside history comes to Marx and Engels, of course, from
Hegel’s Philosophy of History. Hegel is categorical about the status of Africa, in
particular, as unhistorical:
We shall therefore leave Africa at this point, and it need not be mentioned
again. For it is an unhistorical continent, with no movement or
development of its own. And such events as have occurred in it – i.e. in its
northern part – belong to the Asiatic and European Worlds. Carthage, while
it lasted, represented an important phase; but as a Phoenician colony, it
belongs to Asia. Egypt will be considered as a stage in the movement of the
human spirit from east to west, but it has no part in the spirit of Africa.
What we understand as Africa proper is that unhistorical and
underdeveloped land which is still emmeshed in the natural spirit, and
which had to be mentioned here before we cross the threshold of world
history. (Hegel (1822–30)/1975: 190) 
Marx and Engels allow greater scope than Hegel for the so-called non-historical
societies to enter the world historical process, while, at the same time, not sharing
the more positive view of Asia as part of the motor, indeed the origin, of universal
development that appears in Hegel. The leading role of Europe is not in dispute.
Moreover, if examples in Marx and Engels’s writings relating to the progressive role
of the French imperial endeavour are necessarily limited by its relatively undeveloped
character at this stage, the capture of the Emir Abdelkader was nonetheless greeted
with approval by Engels, who used the familiar justification of the necessity of
imperialism for the global progress of civilisation, in an article in the English Chartist
newspaper, the Northern Star, in 1848. 
Upon the whole it is, in our opinion, very fortunate that the Arabian chief
has been taken. The struggle of the Bedouins was a hopeless one, and
though the manner in which brutal soldiers, like Bugeaud, have carried on
the war is highly blameable, the conquest of Algeria is an important and
fortunate fact for the progress of civilisation. The piracies of the Barbaresque
states ... could not be put down but by the conquest of one of these states.
And the conquest of Algeria has already forced the Beys of Tunis and
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Tripoli, and even the Emperor of Morocco, to enter upon the road of
civilisation. They were obliged to find other employment for their people
than piracy, and other means of filling their exchequer than tributes paid to
them by the smaller states of Europe. And if we may regret that the liberty
of the Bedouins of the desert has been destroyed, we must not forget that
these same Bedouins were a nation of robbers, – whose principal means of
living consisted of making excursions either upon each other, or upon the
settled villagers, taking what they found, slaughtering all those who resisted,
and selling the remaining prisoners as slaves. All these nations of free
barbarians look very proud, noble and glorious at a distance, but only come
near them and you will find that they, as well as the more civilised nations,
are ruled by the lust of gain, and only employ ruder and more cruel means.
And after all, the modern bourgeois, with civilisation, industry, order, and
at least relative enlightenment following him, is preferable to the feudal lord
or to the marauding robber, with the barbarian state of society to which they
belong. (Engels (1848)/1976: 471)
Yet, ten years later, in his entry on ‘Algeria’ for the New American Cyclopaedia, Engels was
to give greater prominence to the brutality and bloodshed of the French military
conquest and occupation of Algeria, with none of the admiration that he had been wont
to express for European organisation in his writing on the British army, particularly at
the time of the Indian uprising of 1857 (Marx and Engels 1968: 156–61).
The considerable writings of both Marx and Engels on issues relating to
imperialism and colonialism are varied in scope and present a more extensive range
of positions, sometimes ostensibly contradictory ones, than it has been possible to go
into here. Summing up, however, it can probably be said that the positive effects of
capitalist imperialism have to be seen in the context of the global, universal progress
of humankind, rather more than on particular colonised societies. Indeed, the
advantages of capitalist imperialism to the subject peoples themselves are presented
as double-edged and are quite likely to entail considerable suffering. Nonetheless, the
movement towards a higher stage of history is not seen as a mere option, but a
necessary step for all societies to take if humanity as a whole is to move forward. 
The use of Marxist tools of analysis and critique to further the cause of anti-
imperialist struggles has thus been beset by the tensions which this dual position has
tended to provoke. These tensions have been exacerbated by the actual process of
history, involving societies at very different levels of development and the real
processes brought about by imperialism, which did not always or necessarily lead to
the economic and social progress that Marx and Engels had envisaged on the general
plane of human history. Indeed, in many cases, and this too is recognised by them,
they led to real regression in concrete terms, with the destruction of economic
resources, including particular industries, such as textiles in India, irrigation facilities
and other public works, and a reversal of social progress, with, in some cases, the
destruction of embryonic, home-grown capitalist developments that had already
been taking place before the imperial conquests. 
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On the one hand, anti-imperialist movements have seized on the Marxist
theorisation of the processes of social transformation and applied it as an aid in their
revolutionary struggles. At the same time, elements of Marxist thought have also
been used to shore up the position of European and other advanced capitalist
societies at the supposed vanguard of historical development. When used in this way,
it is not surprising that Marxism has often been the object of critique by those who
see it contaminated by a fundamental Eurocentrism, in which the division between
advanced, mainly European, societies and backward, mainly non-European, societies
has been perpetuated.
It is certainly true that, when Marx talks about the social revolution in Asia,
what he has in mind is the move to the bourgeois, capitalist stage of history.
Nonetheless, there are also references to the possibility of socialism in Asia.
Commenting in 1850 on the claims of a German missionary by the name of Gützlaff
that the Chinese were on the verge of revolution and preaching ideas akin to
socialism, Marx and Engels have this to say:
Chinese socialism may stand in the same relation to the European variety as
Chinese philosophy stands to the Hegelian. Yet it is a gratifying fact that the
bales of calico of the English bourgeoisie have in eight years brought the
oldest and most imperturbable empire on earth to the threshold of a social
upheaval, one which will in any case hold most significant consequences for
civilization. When in their imminent flight across Asia our European
reactionaries will ultimately arrive at the Wall of China, at the gates that lead
to the stronghold of arch-reaction and arch-conservatism, who knows if
they will not find there the inscription: République Chinoise, Liberté,
Egalité, Fraternité. (Marx and Engels, ‘First International Review’, Neue
Rheinische Zeitung, 31 January 1850, in Marx and Engels 1968: 17–18)
This passage clearly envisages something more akin to a radical bourgeois revolution
than a socialist one. What is more, there is a clear expectation that any such
bourgeois nationalist revolution in China, as in India, would bring about the
‘explosion of the long-prepared general crisis’ in Britain and Europe (Marx,
‘Revolution in China and in Europe’, in Marx and Engels 1968: 21–23).
Some years later, in 1882, Engels makes this thinking explicit in a letter to
Kautsky, where he spells out his view on colonial policy. Here he states that, while in
his view the settler colonies will undoubtedly become independent, those colonies
that are ‘inhabited by a native population’ and are ‘simply subjugated’ (into which
category he includes Algeria) ‘must be taken over for the time being by the
[metropolitan] proletariat and led as rapidly as possible towards independence’.
However, it is likely that at least some of the latter will have a revolution, by which
he clearly means a bourgeois national revolution, which will be ‘the best thing for us’.
Although it is likely that they will proceed to follow the example of the by then
successful European and North American proletariats, he declines to speculate on the
processes by which they will proceed to a socialist transformation:
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Once Europe is reorganised, and North America, that will furnish such
colossal power and such an example that the semi-civilised countries will of
themselves follow in their wake; economic needs, if anything, will see to that.
But as to what social and political phases these countries will then have to
pass through before they likewise arrive at socialist organisation, I think we
today can advance only rather idle hypotheses. (Engels (1882)/1970: 678)
Lenin’s Theory of Imperialism
Lenin’s contribution to the theory of imperialism was crucial in the working out of
some of the tensions implicit in the thinking of Marx and Engels on imperialism.
This may be due in no small measure to the fact that he was working out his theory
in the context of Russia, which at the beginning of the twentieth century was
positioned at the cusp of the divide between the advanced capitalist imperialist
societies of Europe, especially Western Europe, and the non-metropolitan, non-
European countries at the receiving end of imperialism. 
Lenin played an important role in developing the theory of capitalism as a global
process, in which imperialism, as he defined it, is but the latest stage in its
development. This definition of imperialism was characterised by its link to
fundamental changes in the economic nature of capitalism in the last quarter of the
nineteenth century and into the early part of the twentieth, which led to political
changes too. The changes that differentiated this stage of capitalism were summed up
in the five key features that he enumerates as follows: 
1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high
stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic
life; 2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, and the creation,
on the basis of this ‘finance capital’, of a financial oligarchy; 3) the export
of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires
exceptional importance; 4) the formation of international monopolist
capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and 5) the
territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is
completed. (Lenin (1917b)/1970: 737)
This analytical part of his theory fits readily with earlier Marxist theories of
capitalism as a global historical process, although it also marks a real departure, in
restricting the definition of imperialism to a particular phase in global capitalism,
linked exclusively to the export of capital. 
However, there is a further aspect to Lenin’s theory that we need to highlight
here: the theory of unequal development (Lenin (1917b)/1970).2 This theory was to
play an important part in explaining the complexity of the development processes of
capitalist imperialism and introducing important factors of differentiation into what
had tended to be viewed as a unilinear progress through stages. In stressing that
capitalism developed at different rates and in different forms, depending on the
50 | Postcoloniality
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 50
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
specific concrete conditions that applied to different societies, Lenin set out the
framework for a theory that could be more readily applicable to other societies that
fell outside the parameters of Western European capitalism, as well as highlighting
the divisions between the imperialist countries themselves. Not least, it was to
provide a foundation for the analysis of the differentiation of the working class itself
and the unequal incidence of exploitation and oppression to which different sectors
were exposed, leading to the recognition of the existence of subproletarian groups,
both within metropolitan societies and on the world plane. All of these
considerations were to have profound implications for the future of both the theory
and the practice of anti-imperialist struggles. 
Moreover, the crucial new elements that he laid bare invalidated any previous
historicist optimism that some Marxists might have had: that the development of
capitalism would of itself tend to lead to a higher, more progressive type of society,
socialist and then communist, through a progressive evolution, albeit worked out
through contradiction and conflict. For, in Lenin’s theory, imperialism represented
capitalism in its regressive phase, in which the non-productive, parasitical elements
had become dominant in the metropolitan heartlands themselves. The super-profits
derived from imperialism had given the metropolitan economies at least a temporary
respite from the innate tendencies to crisis. Moreover, the parasitical nature of the
metropolitan imperialist economies was not simply a feature of the economy; it had
also had a profound effect on the metropolitan working-class movements, corrupting
them through economic benefits and ideological co-optation into the system and
thus leading to a stagnation in their aptitude to bring about social change (Lenin
(1917b)/1970: 745–52).
One of the corollaries of Lenin’s theory was that the vanguard of social
transformation was displaced from the most advanced sectors of the most advanced
capitalist societies. Thereafter, he would argue that the socialist revolution would
occur not at the point of highest development, but at the weakest link in the chain
of the global capitalist system (Lenin (1923)/1970: 767–70).3 This was not only to
provide a theoretical foundation for the Bolshevik Revolution, but also to have a
profound impact on the theory and practice of anti-imperialist struggles, through the
legitimising of the struggles of the weakest, rather than the strongest. 
It would, however, be wrong to conclude that this lesson was accepted by the
whole of the socialist/communist movement. The belief in the inherent right to the
leadership of the struggle by the most economically advanced continued to form part
of the ideological baggage of socialists and communists both in Europe and beyond.
Louis Althusser, for instance, stressed the leading role of the most advanced sector of
‘productive’ workers in his Réponse à John Lewis (Althusser 1973b: 25–26) and
dismissed any role for the subproletariat as a force for change in his correspondence
with Maria-Antonietta Macciocchi (Althusser 1973a: 27–28, 52, 297). This issue
was to provoke tensions right into the modern period.
These tensions were aggravated by a further set of contradictions, which derived
from the clash between, on the one hand, the development of new forms of
nationalism, as with Lenin’s own articulation of the right of nations to self-
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determination (Lenin (1914)/1970: 595–647), and, on the other hand, the
internationalism promoted by the socialist and communist movement. The impact of
these movements created the basis for an internationalist approach to the struggle,
which was viewed as a global struggle, in which identity of class interest and
international class solidarity counted for more than national difference. Whilst there
is no doubt that internationalism could provide welcome support for those fighting
against imperialism, nonetheless, it could also prove to be at odds with their aims and
objectives, especially when applied in a unilateralist way by the European Left. In this
approach, the struggle against imperialism was, to a greater or lesser extent, subsumed
into the international class struggle. Liberation would occur with the global
transformation of capitalism into socialism, in which the colonised would play their
role as part of the international proletariat. The implications were often that this
would only happen in due course; the needs of the colonised were not prioritised. 
The Ambiguities of the French Inheritance – Aimé Césaire
This chapter will end with an initial discussion of some of the tensions provoked by
this scenario in the career and thought of a politician and writer who was not only
inspired by the attractions of the French Republican discourse and the international
communist movement but also compelled to react against both. Aimé Césaire’s
critique of the false universalism of the Republican and communist discourse and, at
best, the hypocrisy and, at worst, the cynicism of its application to the colonial
sphere led to his espousal of the notion of négritude from the 1930s and ultimately
to his departure from the Communist Party in 1956. 
We have to look no further than the title page of Césaire’s version of
Shakespeare’s play, The Tempest, published as Une Tempête in 1969, to encounter a
glaring example of some of the contradictions at work. 
In a sentence giving a short résumé of Césaire’s biography, we read that he is a
key figure in Caribbean political debates because of his position as Mayor and
Parliamentary Deputy for Fort-de-France in Martinique – a position he had
occupied ‘since the Liberation’. The Liberation in question is, of course, the 1944
liberation of metropolitan France; Martinique remains an Overseas Department of
France (DOM). Yet, this sentence is written, to all appearances, quite without irony.
No one expects the reader to raise the question: whose liberation is referred to here?
It is assumed that the particular liberation of France at the end of the Second World
War is a universal reference point. 
This is all the more remarkable, since not only does Martinique remain a colony
of France, but the play in question has liberty as its major theme. It is all about the
freedom that is still to be achieved, how that freedom is to be gained and how the
very notion of freedom is inseparable from the founding event of modern French
history, the French Revolution, and the modernist discourse associated with it.
We do not need to dwell at any greater length on the reference to the Liberation
in this brief note on Césaire’s life. However, it would be difficult to ignore the
founding importance of the Revolution, as it underpins the discourse of liberty and
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liberation, on the one hand, and the rationalisation of the colonial enterprise, on the
other. As we have already seen, a key distinguishing feature of the mission civilisatrice,
French-style, was the duty to spread the universal values of the Enlightenment to the
benighted regions of the globe, including the Rights of Man and, in particular, the
rights to knowledge and science. The true colonial hero was thus seen as the man of
reason, shedding the light of civilisation on to the darkness and obscurantism of
primitive barbarism, not so much converting the heathen to the one and only true
faith, but assisting their passage into the modern world of rational thought and
scientific progress.
There is no doubt that this type of rationalisation carried a considerable amount
of conviction and ideological weight. Yet it was flawed by an inherent contradiction
– between the universalism it sought to convey and the need to maintain the
fundamental difference of the colonial Other. The justification of the civilising
mission could only last as long as the basic opposition remained between the civilised
parties, on the one hand, and the primitive barbarians, on the other. If the process
of bringing civilisation to the natives was too successful, then the whole raison d’être
of the empire would be gone. 
This Machiavellian reasoning could provide the basis of a cynical explanation of
the limitations of colonial educational policy, which, in practice, only permitted a
small elite group to attain the highest level of educational qualifications and thus
become assimilated to the ranks of the civilised. Césaire, however, does not leave it at
that rather simplistic level of argument. The civilising mission is doomed to failure,
but not through any lack of will on the colonisers’ part to put it into effect or any
reluctance to practise what they preach. The trouble with the processes involved in
colonisation and imperial domination is that, far from bringing about the civilisation
of the barbarian, their effect is rather to bring about the de-civilisation of the
colonisers themselves, turning them into primitive brutes. For Césaire, there is a direct
line between the brutality of imperialism in the colonies and the fruit that it bears on
the European continent itself, with the emergence of fascism and Nazism and the
transformation of some of the most ‘civilised’ nations in Europe into lands where the
ideology of blood, brute force and racial power could hold sway. Hitler is
differentiated from his imperialist precursors, not by the scale of his crimes, but by the
fact that his victims are themselves Europeans (Césaire (1955)/1970: 10–11). From
this perspective, the Liberation is likely to appear in a very different light. 
Yet, as we have seen, the contradictions were already present at the time of the
French Revolution and, as Césaire claimed in his Discourse upon Colonialism two
centuries later, European (or Western) civilisation, as shaped by two centuries of
bourgeois rule, has still not been able to solve the two main problems that were
caused by its birth: the problem of the proletariat and the colonial problem (Césaire
(1955)/1970: 5). Or, in other words: 
Anyone who expected the abolition of slavery to occur as a spontaneous
gesture on the part of the French bourgeoisie, on the grounds that this
abolition was a logical consequence of the Revolution and more specifically
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of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, was labouring under an illusion,
since the bourgeoisie had only carried out their own historical purpose, i.e.
the bourgeois revolution itself, when goaded and prodded into action by the
armed revolt of the people. (Césaire (1961)/1981: 171) 
Class conflict in France was not eliminated by the Revolution; it merely changed its
form. Thus, the Revolution soon spawned its ideological progeny – socialism, then
Marxism – to come to terms with the contradictions between the proletariat and the
bourgeoisie. Similarly, the Revolution failed to bring about even a formal end to the
domination of men over women; the Declaration of the Rights of Man remained the
Declaration of the Rights of Men. 
This is not to say that these questions were not raised during the Revolutionary
period. As we have seen, there were those prepared to fight, albeit unsuccessfully, on
behalf of the proletariat, as there were fighters for women’s equality with men. In the
same way, the problem of the rights of the colonised, enslaved peoples was raised at
the very outset of the Revolutionary process. As Césaire saw it, this issue went
beyond the formal recognition, or denial, of the right of individuals to equality. It
concerned the recognition of the rights of nations and the freedom of nations to
decide their own destiny. In the universalising euphoria of the Revolution, the
national question seems to have been almost totally neglected and the foundations
were laid for the ongoing contradiction between the universal Rights of Man and the
rights of particular nations. 
This seemed to be the case even for the Americans, who had nonetheless just
waged a war for their own national liberation. Césaire quotes from the speech of the
leader of a delegation of ‘free Americans’, waxing lyrical in the Convention, in praise
of the universal mission of the French nation to bring all the peoples of the world as
one people under its single banner of liberty.4
Amongst the French Revolutionary leaders, only Marat is credited by Césaire
with the insight to recognise the national implications of the colonial question, as it
was raised at the time, and to declare the right of the colonies to secede.5 Indeed, he
quotes Marat writing in L’Ami du Peuple in 1791 that it would be ‘absurd and
senseless for a people to govern itself through laws emanating from a legislative body
based 2,000 leagues away’ and claiming that the only ‘foolishness committed by the
inhabitants of our colonies’ was ‘agreeing to send députés to the French National
Assembly’, although he claims that only the white colonists were guilty of such
foolishness (Césaire (1961)/1981: 189–90).6 Yet Césaire also acknowledged that one
of the achievements of the Revolution was to be the formal declaration in 1795 of
the inalienable sovereign rights of all nations to freedom and independence, whatever
the size of their population or territory.7 The problem was in its application, as well
as in the interpretation of the declaration. Césaire remained profoundly unconvinced
of its genuine universalism. In his view, it was inconceivable that the authors of the
declaration were thinking of the rights of the colonised peoples and in particular the
blacks; their universalism was, in fact, limited to the European peoples alone and, as
such, was a ‘false universalism’.8
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Whatever the intentions of the legislators at that time, it is with the later
expansion of empire under the Third Republic at the end of the nineteenth century
and the subjection of the colonial peoples in the name of liberty, equality and
fraternity that the contradictions implicit in universalist ideology were to come to the
fore in a manner that left no room for doubt. Moreover, neither the anticolonial
struggles nor the subsequent wholesale decolonisation of the 1960s has managed to
lay this problem to rest. The development of the universal ideology of the
international socialist and communist movement likewise simply meant a change in
the form of the contradiction. When the metropolitan socialists and communists
were not simply reproducing the colonial logic of empire, their ideology and
organisational structures either ignored the anticolonial struggles or made them
subservient to the universal goals of the international working class: the replacement
of world capitalism by a worldwide socialism or communism. 
With the establishment of the Comintern in 1919 and particularly after the
adoption of the twenty-one conditions of affiliation to the Third International in
1920 (Kriegel 1964; Fauvet 1965), the subordination of the interests of each national
party to the wider international strategy was completed. This applied not only to the
different parties in Europe and America, but also to the parties which were to
establish themselves in the colonies. The latter came not only under the ultimate
jurisdiction of the international communist movement, represented in the
Comintern, but also under the direct control of the communist party of the relevant
metropolis. Indeed, the European communist parties perpetuated colonial relations
throughout the Stalinist period, through the insistence that all communist
organisations set up in the colonies were regarded as offshoots of the metropolitan
parties and thus under the control of the party in the relevant ‘mother country’. 
Thus, in the French colonies, the locally based communists were under the wing
and authority of the French Communist Party (PCF), even if the latter was itself
subservient to the Comintern and Moscow. This was to have particular consequences
for the PCA (the Algerian Communist Party), for instance, and its relationship to the
national struggle. Under these circumstances, the PCF was itself deeply marked by
colonialist attitudes and ideology, even when it was engaging in anticolonialist
activity, as Césaire was not slow to point out, in his open letter to Maurice Thorez,
when he broke from the Party (Césaire 1957: 13).9
His own response was to develop the concept of négritude to highlight the
specificity of the situation and struggle of black people within the context of a
universal liberation movement. He would have no truck with what he describes as
‘false universalism’, in other words, an empty abstraction with no real content. What
he would accept was a universalism made up of the sum of all existing particularisms,
a universalism in which each particular culture is explored in all its depth and
richness, abandoning nothing of its own character, but contributing to the overall
richness and variety of the whole (Césaire 1957: 15). What he had in mind was not
an abstract universalism but the universal concrete. 
We may relate this to Marx and Engels’s critique in The Holy Family, or Critique
of Critical Criticism, of the neo-Hegelians’ abstraction of the universal ideal fruit,
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progenitor of all particular fruit. What interested Césaire was not any ideal common
essence, or common denominator of ‘fruit-ness’, the ideal fruit, in abstraction from
all apples, pears, oranges or whatever, existing in the real world, but the rich diversity
of all these particular fruit, which together makes up the synthetic concept of ‘fruit’.
Or, as Marx and Engels put it: 
Thus ‘the Fruit’ is no longer an empty undifferentiated unity: it is oneness
as allness, as ‘totality’ of fruits, which constitute an ‘organically linked series
of members’. In every member of that series ‘the Fruit’ gives itself a more
developed, more explicit existence, until finally, as the ‘summary’ of all
fruits, it is at the same time the living unity which contains all those fruits
dissolved in itself just as it produces them from within itself, just as, for
instance, all the limbs of the body are constantly dissolved in and constantly
produced out of the blood. (Marx and Engels (1844)/1975: 69–70)
The same with human beings: what made up the universality of the human race was
not some ideal, abstract, monolithic essence which all have in common, but the real,
concrete particularities of human beings in all their pluralistic diversity and
specificity.
This was not an uncontroversial position, implying, as it did, the
demystification of the classic rationalist universalism of the Enlightenment and the
French Revolution, revealing it for the real, historically situated particularism, which
it actually was when imposed on others as the triumphant and triumphalist ideology
of the French Republican state. Paradoxically, this fact was often recognised
implicitly or explicitly by those who proclaimed the universal mission of France.
Indeed, one of Césaire’s targets in the Discours sur le colonialisme, Yves Florenne of Le
Monde, is quoted by him, writing: ‘It is not by losing herself, merging her blood and
spirit in the universe of humanity that France will achieve universality; it is by
remaining herself ’ (Césaire (1955)/1970: 45).
The European intellectual legacy remains thus, in terms of its content, a source
of paradox and mystification, as well as a source of inspiration for those attempting
to struggle against imperial domination. We should not leave this theme behind
before stressing that, where it was influential, it was not only because of or even, at
times, in spite of its content, but also because of the theory and practice of a
particular form of struggle, the notion of Revolution itself. Theorisations of the
American and French Revolutions, not to mention the English Revolution that
preceded them and the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, provided the legitimacy for
the total political and social upheavals that they produced, but also for the
subsequent political systems that emerged. They also played an exemplary role, in
both theoretical and practical terms, for those seeking to engage in appropriate forms
of struggle against imperialism. Thus, irrespective of the precise economic, political
and social content of the revolutionary manifestos, the overriding impact was to
show to the oppressed that change – fundamental, totalising change – was possible. 
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Notes
1. The French commonly refer to mainland, metropolitan France as the Hexagon.
2. See also Lenin (1915a)/1970: 664; (1919)/1977: 308.
3. On these issues, see Westoby 1989: 163–72.
4. ‘[Il] rappelle aux représentants qu’ils ont été appelés pour faire le bonheur d’une grande
nation, pour jeter les fondements de la liberté du monde et pour faire que de tous les
peuples il n’y en ait plus qu’un’, official record of the Convention session of 4 June 1793
(quoted by Césaire in (1961)/1981: 187).
5. je ne vois qu’un homme de l’époque à avoir assumé l’anticolonialisme dans toutes ses
exigences, tenant sous un seul regard le double aspect du problème colonial, son aspect
social comme son aspect national. Et c’est Marat. Un seul homme à avoir proclamé le
droit des colonies à la sécession. Et c’est Marat.
Plus exactement, ainsi qu’on peut le lire dans le numéro 624 de L’Ami du Peuple, le
droit qu’ont les colonies de secouer le joug tyrannique de la métropole. (L’Ami du Peuple,
12 décembre 1791). (Césaire (1961)/1981: 188). 
Césaire also credits Marat with a recognition of the persistence of class inequality in
the French Revolution.
6. Yet, ironically, Césaire himself had accepted this as the way forward for Martinique, most
notably at the time of its départementalisation in 1946.
7. La déclaration des droits de 1795, toute thermidorienne pourtant, est formelle: les
peuples sont respectivement indépendants et souverains, quel que soit le nombre des
individus qui les composent et l’étendue du territoire qu’ils occupent; cette
souveraineté est inaliénable. Chaque peuple a le droit d’organiser et de changer les
formes de son gouvernement. Les entreprises contre la liberté d’un peuple sont un
attentat contre les autres peuples. (Césaire (1961)/1981: 343).
8. Sans doute le droit était-il décrété; mais encore fallait-il l’appliquer aux peuples. Et à
quels peuples?  Aux peuples d’Europe? A tous les peuples? Aux peuples coloniaux? Le
faux universalisme nous a habitués à tant de faux-fuyants, les droits de l’homme se
sont si souvent rétrécis à n’être que les droits de l’homme européen, que la question
n’est pas superflue. Il est hors d’apparence qu’en proclamant le droit de l’homme à la
nation, le droit des peuples à la patrie, le législateur français ait pensé aux colonies.
Sans apparence aucune qu’il ait pensé aux peuples noirs. On peut même assurer qu’il
n’est pas un révolutionnaire français qui ait songé qu’un jour les nègres formeraient un
état. (Césaire (1961)/1981: 343).
9. See also Joly 1991.
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Chapter 3
Race and Resistance
The account so far of some of the key features of imperialist discourse would seemto suggest that only one of the sides involved was able to articulate their
perception of the relation. It is indeed true that the whole weight of the imperial state
machine and the particular practices and messages of its ideologues were geared to
produce a message or messages that reflected and bolstered the dominance of the
Western imperialists. Often, this meant that the ‘natives’ were simply silenced, by use
of a variety of means, ranging from outright physical repression, through censorship
of different types, to a range of methods of co-optation into the ideological realm of
their colonial masters. In addition to these sustained and deliberate efforts to deprive
the colonised of their voice, there were other more subtle ways of achieving the same
result. However it was done, the silencing of the natives was an inherent corollary of
the logic of maintaining colonial rule.
Yet the domination and hegemony of imperialism were never absolute. In addition
to ongoing direct resistance to imperial rule, there was also the survival of elements of
former modes of production. There were also vestiges, sometimes substantial, of
previous forms of discourse and culture, as well as the emergence of new counter-
discourses, which increasingly came into being to challenge the imperialists’
prerogatives and right to rule. Expressing themselves in any possible format, including
newspaper journalism, political speeches and pamphlets, literature, songs, legal
challenges and other forms, these would also take the form of developed theories,
borrowing in some cases from the intellectual resources of the oppressor country.
We have seen that the revolt of the Black Jacobins of Saint-Domingue was
bolstered by the ideas in which the French Revolution was being fought out, as well
as drawing on other, equally important, strands of non-European origin, including
the practices and beliefs known as voodoo, which formed the web of ideas and
practices through which the revolt expressed itself. However, resistance was not a new
phenomenon. Resistance to attack and invasion and, subsequently, revolt against the
occupying forces and the condition of slavery were an ongoing feature of the
imperialist experience. 
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Algeria by the French in 1830,
fierce resistance by Algerian tribal warriors was waged from the beginning, under the
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leadership of the totemic figure of the Emir Abdelkader, who still carries a
tremendous symbolic power for his significance to Algerian nationhood even today.
He was a spiritual as well as a military leader, a Sufi disciple of Ibn Arabi, and drew
on Islam as a powerful mobilising force. Although Abdelkader surrendered to the
Duc d’Aumale in 1847 and was imprisoned in France, before ending his days in exile
in Damascus, the resistance was not eliminated but continued in a variety of forms,
some under the surface (Djebar 1985), until the war of liberation brought
independence in 1962. 
In Morocco in the 1920s, a determined and initially successful resistance was put
up against both the Spanish and the French by Abd el-Krim in the Rif War, until his
deportation in 1927. In the French West and Central African territories, such as
Senegal, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast and Guinea, there was strong resistance to French
colonialism. This resistance was particularly determined where there was a
predominance of concessionary companies in control, subjecting the colonised to
brutal treatment and forced labour (Londres (1929)/1998; Suret-Canale 2001). The
Kongo-Wara War, which lasted from 1928 to 1935 in the colony formerly named
Oubangui-Chari (now Central African Republic), is one example of such resistance.
Resistance in Madagascar was met with savage repression in 1947. There was also
strong resistance in Asia. The French occupation of Indochina was met with
uninterrupted resistance from its beginnings in the nineteenth century. 
The sources of inspiration for these expressions of resistance were multiple. In
addition to the spontaneous gut reaction of revolt against conquest and brutality, the
articulation of revolt in terms of ideas and ideology drew on a range of thought and
belief systems, linked to a diverse set of experiences and cultures. These currents
developed in new directions, as a result of experience and cross-fertilisation with
other influences throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. There is no
doubt that European socialism and communism developed a powerful attraction for
those outside Europe, who were looking for tools of analysis of their oppression and
strategies for their liberation. This was perhaps most notable in the case of
Indochina, where the Vietnamese resistance, culminating in the declaration of
independence in 1945, was very largely inspired by Marxist ideas, though it has to
be said that, although leaders such as Ho Chi Minh spent time in France in their
youth, these were mostly filtered through their Chinese and Soviet versions. If the
Vietnam struggle, both against the French and then against the Americans, was fully
integrated into the international communist movement and the wider international
Left, it nonetheless retained a specifically Asian dimension. In other instances,
socialist ideas were almost always even more clearly mixed in with, or set alongside,
others that owed their origins to other sources. 
Moreover, as the Black Jacobins had soon been confronted with the limitations
of the humanism of the French Revolutionary project, so too did subsequent
generations of the colonised and enslaved come to see the inadequacy of universal
communism alone, as it was articulated in practice, and looked to alternative, or
complementary, ideas through which to articulate their experience and struggle for
freedom. 
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Although it is possible to tease out the elements of the different discourses and
classify them according to their European or non-European sources, the fact is that,
as an almost inevitable by-product of the processes of capitalist imperialism, these
elements were in a close interrelationship and fed off each other to a large extent.
There were a number of historical factors that gave an impetus to this cross-
fertilisation, amongst which the involvement of troops from the colonies in both
world wars, alongside, if not on a par with, metropolitan French soldiers, was highly
significant in raising awareness of the predicament of the colonised and the
possibility of struggle (Miller 1999). This awareness was heightened even further
when the troops returned home to share their consciousness of their own humiliation
and ill-treatment, but also to bring home the new ideas they had encountered
regarding what struggle could and should be. These processes of exposure to and
dissemination of European ideologies of struggle were reinforced by the increased
migration of workers, students and intellectuals from the colonies to metropolitan
France, which was given such a boost by the First World War. The coming together
of people from Indochina, Africa and the Caribbean provided fertile conditions for
the development of an anticolonial movement with an international dimension. It
was enormously influential in building a common anticolonial consciousness,
inspired by the ideas of the Marxist Left, but also developing its own concepts of
analysis and struggle. 
The 1920s were a time when, as well as intellectuals with Marxist and socialist
ideas, such as Ho Chi Minh, radical, proletarian anticolonialist movements were
being developed by Africans in Paris, such as Lamine Senghor and Tovalou Houénou
(Miller 1999). Their voices were already raised in support of the specificity of the
struggles of the colonised, particularly those of African origin, who had to endure the
additional burdens of extreme exploitation and racism. Their ideas were expressed in
newspapers such as La Voix des Nègres, La Race Nègre and Le Cri des Nègres, which
acted as organs for debating questions of politics and strategy, but also cultural issues
relating to self-identity, language and terminology. The Negritude movement,
associated with Léopold Sédar Senghor, Aimé Césaire, Léon Damas and many others
in the 1930s, further developed this cultural dimension and built on contacts and
connections that had already been made with Parisian intellectuals and artists, such
as the surrealists, particularly in the opposition to the Colonial Exhibition of 1931,
organised by Lyautey. This is reflected in the work of Senegalese writer Ousmane
Socé Diop, who collaborated with Césaire, Damas and Senghor on the student
newspaper, L’Etudiant noir. His Mirages de Paris (Socé 1937) deals with the
perceptions of Africans based in Paris when they were confronted with the depictions
and representations of Africans at the Exhibition. 
What was at issue here was the notion of ‘difference’ and how this was defined.
Class was certainly one signifier of difference in a class society, but one that had
proved inadequate to explain the situation of the colonised African, who had to deal
with the extra dimension of exploitation and oppression, rationalised, overtly or
covertly, on the grounds of racial difference. Negritude developed as a movement
with the aim of proclaiming this difference as a positive attribute, glorifying in
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blackness and using race itself to turn the tables on the racist oppressors. Thus, while
the passage via the French Communist Party was practically de rigueur for those
developing anticolonial struggles, the unidimensional focus on class as the sole tool
of analysis and the founding principle of the struggle was rejected to a greater or
lesser extent by those associated with the Negritude movement. Their inspiration
came from elsewhere, but as much from American-based movements, such as the
Harlem Renaissance and other struggles against racial oppression (Dewitte 1985), as
their own African roots. Césaire, in particular, built on the work of the Martiniquan
group, Légitime Défense, associated with Etienne Lero, as well as taking inspiration
from the black American W.E.B. Du Bois.
Sometimes the interrelationship with the communist movement was
conceptualised as part of a historical dialectic, in which, for instance, Negritude
constituted a moment of essential opposition to an abstract universalism, before
being re-synthesised into a fully concrete universal. This diachronic model was by no
means the only form of interaction envisaged and, at times, the synchronic notion of
a more complex web of reciprocal and countervailing influences would be more
appropriate. These two models could be combined in the thought of the same
individual or movement. 
We shall now turn our attention to some of these non-European counter-
discourses, and their relationship and evolution in respect of the European ideas with
which they interacted. These have not been restricted to the political sphere. Indeed,
their development and expression has often taken place in the cultural domain. In the
literary sphere, for instance, one of the key sites of confrontation for European and
non-European ideas of the colonised or enslaved Other has involved the re-creation
and reworking of the Shakespearean figure of Caliban. The following section explores
the dynamics of this confrontation, through a discussion of Aimé Césaire’s version of
Shakespeare’s Tempest, Une Tempête (1969) to which allusion has already been made.
Césaire is not the only non-European writer to have attempted a rewriting of the
Tempest. For instance, there has recently been the Creole version by the Mauritian
writer Dev Virahsawmy, which goes under the title, Toufann, and has been translated
into English and was performed in London in 1999 (Virahsawmy 1991). 
The Myth of Caliban
Unlike Shakespeare’s original text, Césaire’s version is resolutely modernist in scope,
in which the primary reference point is the Enlightenment discourse that
underpinned the French Revolution. As we have seen, the ideological legacy of the
French Revolution was not without its contradictions. However, this was not merely
of historical interest to Césaire. In 1969, when he wrote his version of the Tempest,
his inspiration came from the topical reality of the black liberation struggles, which
were then at their height in the United States, with a resonance in other countries
with black populations.1 This is not, however, a play about the United States. We are
left in no doubt that the island in question is clearly located in the Caribbean, thus
breaking with the indeterminate location of Shakespeare’s original and explicitly
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linking the subject of the play to Césaire’s own experience in Martinique and to the
struggle for black liberation worldwide.
Why, then, did he choose to deal with this subject in this particular way, through
a rewriting of the Shakespearean text? 
In an earlier play, La Tragédie du roi Christophe (1963), Césaire had used the
historical framework of the events that took place in post-independence Haiti at the
beginning of the nineteenth century to raise contemporary problems and issues
confronting African countries on the threshold of their own independence.2 It seems
that he is using a similar technique here to engage with contemporary political
debates, except that the overall framework is provided by the literary text The Tempest. 
Shakespeare’s Tempest evokes the power of the word to create a complete
theatrical universe, where the imagination reigns supreme. In this magical world,
human beings as well as the elemental forces of nature are controlled through
knowledge of the powers of the occult, which are unleashed through the incantatory
might of the word. Thus, the writer can summon up and control the spirit world of
his imagination through his text. Should he choose to do so, he may also abdicate
from his creative endeavours, like Prospero, who consigns his book to the waves and
thus gives up his magic powers (The Tempest, Act V, Scene i). Indeed, The Tempest is
Shakespeare’s own parting gift to the theatre; he uses the Epilogue to say his own
farewell to the stage, even though he may then have gone on to write Henry VIII. In
leaving, he gives up his power to create a magical world out of his imagination, albeit
a dream world, which is a metaphor for the brief passage of each human life on earth.
We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep (Act IV, Scene i)3
In short, what Shakespeare believed to be his swansong text could not appear further
removed from the political concerns of Aimé Césaire in 1969 and his understanding
of the material reality. Yet, in Césaire’s text too, it is a question of the power of the
word, not so much in the general sense, but in the particular shape and form of the
discourses pertaining to French Republican ideology. The tempest itself has become
transformed into a metaphor of the Revolution, thus allowing Césaire to explore the
contradictory dialectic at play between the various ideological strands that form part
of its legacy and still impinge on the liberation struggles in the French colonial and
postcolonial context. 
What appears to be clear is that Césaire did not go directly to Shakespeare’s text.
It seems that he approached Shakespeare by way of a reading of Ernest Renan and,
in particular, his ‘philosophical drama’ of 1878, Caliban, suite de La Tempête de
Shakespeare.4 Renan was an unlikely intermediary, whose writings date from the
period of mid-nineteenth-century French imperial expansionism; indeed, Edward
Said traces the origins of the phenomenon of orientalism to the work of Renan,
whom he characterises as a ‘realistic racist’ (Said 1978: 6, 170).5 He had already
made his appearance in Césaire’s oeuvre, albeit as a target for criticism in the Discours
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sur le colonialisme. In this essay, Césaire had made a point of comparing Renan’s ideas
with those of Hitler (Césaire (1955)/1970: 12). 
According to Roger Toumson, Césaire’s interest in Renan’s play was likely to
have been aroused by the racial overtones the latter had given to the master-slave
dialectic, in line with his ideas on the inequality and hierarchy of the races, in which
France owed its position to the superior racial composition of the French nation. Not
only was Caliban, as a Negro, assigned to an inferior race, he also represented the
people, who overthrow Prospero’s civilised aristocratic regime in a display of
barbarism and ingratitude upon the return to Milan (Toumson 1981: 576–81).
Clearly, Césaire would not have had any sympathy with the ideas expressed in
Renan’s text, with the sole exception of his anticlericalism. This may explain the
responsibility which Césaire attibutes to the Inquisition for Prospero’s exile
(Toumson 1981: 615–17). 
He is, however, able to extract from Renan’s text the tools that he needs to
deconstruct the rhetoric of French Republican discourse. Thus he is able to demonstrate
to what extent the Republican conception of the nation as the political union of equal
citizens has been penetrated by the genetic variant espoused by Renan, in which the
nation is linked to its roots in the French soil, but even more to the ethnic, blood ties
that constitute its organic unity and are the foundation of its racial superiority. 
In Renan’s text, there is no ambiguity: it is by dint of his race that Caliban is an
inferior being and justly enslaved. We shall see that this does not represent the
position of Shakespeare, which is far more complex. Nonetheless, regardless of the
subtleties of the actual Shakespearean text, there is no doubt that the myth of
Caliban has been portrayed as one of the founding myths of the colonial age. It is
thus not surprising that the revolt of Caliban should be seen as the apt symbol of the
overthrow of colonialism in modern times. 
We must now look a little more closely at Shakespeare’s own text, not least
because parts of Césaire’s own text are so closely related to the original, but also to
be in a position to be able to measure the distance between the two.
The Caliban of Shakespeare
In 1611, when Shakespeare wrote The Tempest, the European world was still in the
early stages of the modern imperialist adventure. Of course, the voyages of discovery
that had set Europe on this course had already taken place, along with the conquests
of peoples and territories in the ‘New World’, the resultant plunder and the
persecutions, most often in the name of religion. Over the previous century and a
half, the European conception of the world had been totally transformed; even the
size and shape of the planet had assumed completely different dimensions. Moreover,
the European world view was still in a state of flux, with competing versions of the
real geography of the planet contending to become the new consensus. 
Although it is a reasonable assumption that Shakespeare was aware of these
developments, there is nonetheless some debate as to the extent to which his own
view of the world had been influenced by the ‘new geography’.6 Moreover, it would
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be reckless to assume that his play was, either in intention or in effect, an accurate
reflection of the contemporary geographical and political reality of the colonisation
of the Americas. The Tempest remains primarily a work of the literary imagination, a
work of fiction; its relationship to historical reality remains open to interpretation.
This is not true, to anything like the same extent, of the work of Aimé Césaire, who
is keen to dispel all such ambiguity regarding the relationship of his fictions to
contemporary politico-historical questions. 
Having thus taken due precautions, it is possible to say that the imaginary
universe of The Tempest has its roots firmly planted in the Old World, rather more
than in the New. The island itself is a magical space, belonging to the author’s fantasy
rather than the physical world of geographers’ maps. Nonetheless, this fictitious place
takes shape against the familiar background of the microcosm of the Mediterranean,
considered the heart of the ancient world and united by a shared, albeit conflictual,
history and culture. This is a world that has been thrown topsy-turvy by the
discovery of a ‘New World’, but one that still has its feet firmly set in the culture of
the Renaissance, drawing inspiration for its new ideas from the ancient sources on
both sides of the Mediterranean from which they are derived. The birth pangs of
modernity have only just begun; its travails will be long. It is only eleven years since
Giordano Bruno was burnt at the stake in Rome in 1600 for his newfangled
scientific notions. He will not be the last. 
We do not have to involve ourselves in the controversy surrounding the precise
location of the island. To a large extent, this may seem irrelevant, in the sense that it
represents an imaginary space, much like the lost world of Atlantis, the golden land
of Eldorado or the Utopia of Thomas More. Shakespeare would, of course, have been
familiar with these earlier mythical utopias, and indeed takes the opportunity to
satirise such idealist constructions, as expressed through the vision of Gonzalo, who
would like to recreate the golden age on the island through the establishment of his
ideal commonwealth (The Tempest, Act II, Scene i). 
Just as the inventors of other such imaginary spaces, including the more modern
spinners of space-based fantasies, are usually keen to establish some links with real,
known, geographical locations, while maintaining a necessary imprecision, so
Shakespeare is no exception. While never informing us specifically where his
‘uninhabited’ island is situated, his text nonetheless tells us that the shipwrecked
travellers were returning from Tunis to Naples, where they had been celebrating the
marriage of the daughter of the King of Naples to the King of Tunis. They had not
embarked on a voyage of colonial conquest. The purpose of the journey was to seal
an alliance between one Mediterranean country and another, which, in spite of its
location on the further shore, was an integral part of the same world, the Carthage
of antiquity. The sea still acts as a link, rather than a barrier, the unifying factor in
this Mediterranean world, where the oppositions between Europe and Africa,
between Europe and the Orient, have yet to develop the meaning that they will
acquire in the age of imperialism. 
It is true that Sebastian blames the marriage between the European and the
African for being the cause of their misfortunes. 
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Sir, you may thank yourself for this great loss.
That would not bless our Europe with your daughter,
But rather lose her to an African; (The Tempest, Act II, Scene i)
However, there is no necessary implication that it is because of any racial
miscegenation involved. Certainly, the African in question is the foreign Other.
However, there is no textual basis for suggesting that he is thereby inferior and we
should be wary of reading this passage retrospectively from the standpoint of a
knowledge of subsequent developments in colonial history, with the notions of
superiority/inferiority integral to a fully developed dialectic of racism. Sebastian’s
reasoning could be based on a greater or lesser degree of xenophobia, or even on a
feeling that allowing the princess to marry a foreigner has disturbed the normal order
of things. Clearly, on a practical level, he is right: if she had married a European, no
sea voyage would have been required and therefore there would have been 
no shipwreck. 
This is not to suggest that ideas and theories about race were unheard of in
Shakespeare’s time. On the contrary, the ‘discovery’ and colonisation of the New
World had given rise to an ongoing debate about the status of the conquered peoples,
as well as attempts to draw up a hierarchy of races, influenced by Aristotle’s Politics.
One of the most striking examples of this type of philosophising was the debate on
the status of the American Indian, which took place in Valladolid in 1550 between
Juan Ginès de Supúlveda, who spoke in favour of slavery based on the Aristotelian
doctrine of ‘natural inferiority’, and Bartolomé de Las Casas, who argued that the
Indians were part of the human race (Gillies 1994: 151). Montaigne’s essay, Des
Cannibales (1580), had just been published in English in 1603, and it has been
suggested that the name of Shakespeare’s character derives from the word ‘cannibal’.
There would nonetheless be a quantum leap from the type of reasoning based
on rationalisations of the models of slavery practised in antiquity, to the full-blown
ideological apparatus developed in the modern imperialist age, which called on the
whole paraphernalia of pseudoscientific theories of biology and genetics to construct
an all-embracing categorisation and hierarchy of the races with which to justify
chattel slavery, the slave trade and the subjugation of the colonised peoples. 
To discover what Shakespeare really thought about race, we would have to scrape
away these accretions and examine the available evidence. However, this is not our
primary purpose here, which is rather to look at the figure of Caliban and the various
interpretations that this ambiguous character has endured, not just for his
importance to an understanding of literary history, but for his status as a mythical
political figure in the representations of modern imperialism. 
For all the ambiguity that surrounds the shadowy figure of the King of Tunis,
one thing is clear and that is that Caliban is not in the same league; he is in a different
category altogether. The difficulty lies in deciding in which category to place him.
Variously portrayed as the first New World representative of a colonised people to
appear in English literature, as an ignoble savage who deserves enslavement, as the
ignoble part (the Id) of Prospero’s psyche, as a trailblazing critic of the American
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dream – ‘the brave new world’ (The Tempest, Act V, Scene i), as the modern
champion of a new Caribbean identity, as the true emblematic postcolonial hero, or
as a completely fictional literary invention with no political significance whatsoever,
Caliban remains one of the most discussed figures of our time. This suggests that
there are major issues of topical relevance at stake.7
The web of Shakespeare’s dramatic universe is constituted, on the one hand, by
the relations of human beings with the elements of nature – fire, wind, earth and
water – and, on the other hand, by the relationships between human beings
themselves, engaged in struggles for the commanding heights of power in societies
that are based entirely on the hierarchical mode. 
Often resorting to force of arms in these power struggles, the protagonists may
also invoke a weapon that is every bit as mighty – the power of the word. Prospero’s
brother, for instance, uses the rhetoric of his propaganda speeches to consolidate the
power he has usurped, to such an extent that he ends up believing it himself.
He being thus lorded,
Not only with what my revenue yielded,
But what my power might else exact, like one
Who having into truth, by telling of it,
Made such a sinner of his memory,
To credit his own lie – he did believe
He was indeed the Duke. (The Tempest, Act I, Scene ii)
Yet the princes of this world, with all their might, cannot escape from the overriding
power of the elemental forces of nature. The power of the human word is strictly
limited in this domain and only rarely, through the intervention of prayer or magic,
can human beings manage to control these natural forces. Prospero is one of these rare
beings who attains mastery of fire, water and the wind of the tempest, through his
spirit Ariel. He controls the earth, which occupies the lowest rank in the hierarchy of
the elements, in the shape of Caliban, portrayed as an ignoble savage, who is destined
only for manual labour as a slave. Caliban is literally equated with the earth: ‘What
ho! slave! Caliban! / Thou earth, thou! (The Tempest, Act I, Scene ii). The lowly status
of the earth is also borne out by Antonio telling Sebastian: ‘Here lies your brother, /
No better than the earth he lies upon’ (The Tempest, Act II, Scene i). 
The source of Prospero’s power lies in the texts that he has studied, which have
given him the knowledge of the secrets of magic. Caliban is well aware of this and
urges his allies to burn Prospero’s books and thus destroy his magical powers.
Remember
First to possess his books: for without them
He’s but a sot, as I am, nor hath not
One spirit to command; they all do hate him
As rootedly as I. Burn but his books. (The Tempest, Act III, Scene ii)
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The pure ethereal spirit, Ariel, shares this power, which is also the power of poetry;
for it is through his poetical incantations that Ariel creates his magic spells. The
power of the word can take on many different forms. 
Caliban, however, is at the nether end of the spectrum. He, too, has acquired the
power of speech, thanks to the efforts of Prospero and, in particular, his daughter
Miranda, who undertook his education. She sums up thus its primary aim, which was to
permit him access to language and thus to the possibility of communicating his purpose.
Abhorred slave,
Which any print of goodness wilt not take,
Being capable of all ill! I pitied thee,
Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour
One thing or other. When thou didst not, savage,
Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like
A thing most brutish, I endow’d thy purposes
With words that made them known. (The Tempest, Act I, Scene ii)
He has learned his master and mistress’s language, though the purpose to which he
puts it is not that intended by them. As he says, if he has become fluent, it is all the
better to curse them.
You taught me language, and my profit on’t
Is, I know how to curse. The red plague rid you
For learning me your language! (The Tempest, Act I, Scene ii)
Learning the language has allowed him to articulate his awareness of his lot and his
wretchedness with it, although it has not equipped him with the capability to
transcend his natural condition. In Shakespeare’s hierarchical conception, only Ariel’s
desire for freedom is worthy and noble. Caliban’s desire for freedom is severely
limited in scope; he wishes to free himself from his master Prospero, but is quite
prepared to bow down before new lords, even at the feet of the unlikely pair Trinculo
and Stephano, whom he worships as gods dropped from the sky (The Tempest, Act
II, Scene ii). His freedom will be only to exchange one master for another. He is a
hopeless case, whose devilish nature condemns him for ever to his lot as a slave. It is
because of his nature that the efforts of Prospero and Miranda have been doomed to
failure; in their efforts to educate him, they were well intentioned but misguided. As
Prospero sees him, he is:
A devil, a born devil, on whose nature
Nurture can never stick; on whom my pains,
Humanely taken, all, all lost, quite lost ... (The Tempest, Act IV, Scene i)
We have already seen some of the problems associated with a retrospective reading of
Shakespeare and the inevitable anachronisms to which it may give rise. Nonetheless,
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in line with the development of colonial and postcolonial history, these readings have
taken place, they have acquired their own reality and the Prospero/Caliban
relationship has acquired new significance as it has been reinterpreted by subsequent
generations. In real historical terms, this type of reinterpretation or reinvention of
historical fictions has as one of its most significant examples the rewriting and
propagation of the Tudor version of British history, in which the figure of the
necromancer/scholar/cartographer and finally Prospero-like Dr John Dee played a
not insignificant part, not least through the coining of the term ‘the British Empire’
and the propagation of the tale of the Welsh Prince Madoc, pre-Columbian
‘discoverer’ of America in 1170, with which to counter Spanish imperial ambitions
in the Americas (Williams 1987).8
We shall be returning to a discussion of these issues. For the moment, let us
venture to suggest that, were the educational efforts of Prospero and Miranda to be
equated with the notion of a civilising mission, it would have to be construed as a
complete failure, in this case at least. This is also true of Aimé Césaire’s version of the
Tempest, where the master’s attempts to put his civilising mission into practice
through the education of Caliban must likewise be viewed as a failure.
Césaire’s Caliban
Just as in Shakespeare’s play, Césaire’s slave Caliban acquires his master’s language
and uses it to the same end – to hurl insults against him. However, here he is no
longer confined to the rantings and ravings of an impotent verbal rage. In the first
place, unlike the Caliban of Shakespeare, who only accedes to the world of language
through the acquisition of his master’s language, Césaire’s Caliban remains in
possession of his own original language, his mother tongue, derided by Prospero as
a primitive, barbarous tongue. He does not simply have to speak with his master’s
voice and, indeed, he uses his own language to articulate his demand for freedom,
‘Uhuru!’ (Une Tempête, p. 24). Secondly, he has learned to see the education that he
has received for what it is. Prospero has trained him to do the practical tasks that are
required of him; it is for this reason that he has taught him French, so that he can
understand his master’s orders, all the better to do his bidding.9 Césaire had already
dismissed the pragmatic, utilitarian aims and outcomes of colonial educational
policy and practice in his Discours sur le colonialisme, describing it as a ‘parody of
cultural education’.10 In the play, it is evident that Prospero has refused to share his
knowledge of science; it remains his monopoly and prerogative – ‘enfermée dans les
gros livres que voilà’ (Une Tempête, p. 25). If Prospero’s books are now the repository
of scientific knowledge, rather than the secrets of the magical arts, access to them is
still denied to Caliban. 
We are clearly now in a different world from that of Shakespeare. Whereas, as
we have seen, Shakespeare’s island occupied an imaginary space, reminiscent of the
mythical islands of antiquity or Renaissance utopias, Césaire’s island is firmly set
within the frame of the historical reality of imperialism and contemporary politics.
It is a world that has witnessed the unfolding of the whole history of modern
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imperialism, in the name of European superiority over the primitive Other,
including, in its most absolute form, the enslavement and trading of black people
and the denial of human status that these entailed. Thus, there is no doubt about the
location of Césaire’s island; it is located with geographical precision in the Caribbean.
This precision extends to the ethnic status of his version of Ariel, characterised as a
‘slave, ethnically a mulatto’, and his Caliban as a ‘Negro slave’. In the case of Caliban,
however, the epithet may vary to reflect other ethnic strands, in addition to his
origins as a black African; he is also referred to as an ‘Indien’, i.e. indigenous
Amerindian, as well as a ‘Zindien’, the creole term for an Indian originating in India
or the East Indies and usually transported to the Caribbean as a bonded or
indentured labourer. In this way, Caliban’s composite racial and national origins
make him into a representative of all three ethnic groups who have suffered from
colonial servitude and oppression in the course of Caribbean history (Toumson
1981: 416–18). The subject of Césaire’s play has become the legacy of colonialism. 
However, the differences with Shakespeare’s original Tempest do not arise merely
as a result of the wedge of history that has come to pass in the intervening three and
a half centuries, producing fundamentally different world views, although this
obviously constitutes an important determining set of factors. There are also quite
different conceptions of literature and the theatre at play here. 
Thus, Shakespeare’s avowed aim was quite simply to please his audience with his
art, as he makes clear in the Epilogue to the play, spoken by Prospero. 
Gentle breath of yours my sails
Must fill, or else my project fails,
Which was to please. (The Tempest, Epilogue)
Of course, his texts themselves have their own resonance and effects, which extend into
the political domain, independent of their author’s creative purpose. However, Césaire’s
political purpose is unambiguous; his conception of the relation between literature and
politics belongs to the Sartrean school of littérature engagée. His play is thus a cry for
freedom, articulating demands that have their equivalent in the real political world,
and, in particular here, the preoccupations and concerns of contemporary American
politics of race – the obsession with sexuality and rape (Une Tempête, p. 27), the reality
of the ghetto (p. 26) and the slogan ‘Freedom now!’ (p. 36). 
In line with the political thrust of this Tempest, the focus has shifted. The
conflicts between the whites are given cursory treatment, for they are of merely
superficial interest as compared with the primary struggle between the colonisers and
the colonised. Yet, in this shortened version of the play, Césaire has retained the
theme of the elemental forces of nature, albeit rewritten with a new significance. For,
in his text, these natural forces take on the forms of the deities and devils of African
animism; the whole of the animal and vegetable world is suffused with this spirit
life.11 Sycorax, Shakespeare’s ‘foul witch’ and ‘blue-ey’d hag’, is now reinvented as the
Mother Spirit of the natural world. Moreover, a new god makes his appearance, as
Shango, the mighty god of the tempest, identified by Caliban with his struggle for
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freedom in a world where the hierarchical order has been overturned. In the natural
hierarchy, the earth is no longer the basest element. Caliban, who tills the soil,
respects it as a living thing, just as he respects manual labour itself; the labourer is no
longer the lowest of the low.
you think that the earth is something dead … It’s so much easier! It’s dead,
so you can walk all over it, sully it, trample it underfoot like a conqueror!
But I respect it, for I know that it is a living thing and that Sycorax also is
alive. (Une Tempête, pp. 25–26)
For the Europeans, the island is indeed a wonderland, ‘un pays merveilleux’, no longer
in the sense of a fiction, a product of the imagination, but as the Other of Europe
and perhaps a foretaste of hell itself, ‘un avant-goût de l’enfer’.12 It is no accident that
brought the shipwrecked travellers to the island; they set out to conquer foreign lands
(Une Tempête, p. 22). Like Prospero himself, these people are white colonial invaders,
representing the whole gamut of colonial characters, from the most brutal to the
most enlightened. Gonzalo, for instance, has pretensions to educate the others in the
virtues of the primitive simplicity of the noble savage. In his view, civilisation can
benefit from bathing in the ‘fountain of eternal youth’ of more primitive societies,
which can be a source of revitalisation and a corrective to some of the failings due to
world-weariness and over-sophistication (Une Tempête, p. 41).
Prospero himself claims to be a man of the Enlightenment, hounded from his
homeland by the Inquisition, by ‘beings of the night who fear the light’.13 His ambition
is to hand on a world filled with reason, beauty and harmony, for which he has already
laid the foundations (Une Tempête, p. 67). Yet he is also a man of action, for whom the
ends justify the means (Une Tempête, p. 23); a white man who, in the face of the crisis
caused by Caliban’s revolt, has no difficulty making up his mind to join a common
front, along with the other whites, hitherto considered his enemies, for they are not
only of the same race but also of the right class.14 He is an arbitrary despot who allows
his whims free rein (Une Tempête, pp. 43–44). In short, he is the boss, able to command
the labour of others (Une Tempête, pp. 55–56). Prospero the wizard has become
transformed into Prospero the scientist, using his scientific knowledge to master and
manipulate the processes of nature, creating illusions to maintain his control. His
hostility to nature is opposed by Caliban, who has become the advocate of more
harmonious relations between man and nature (Une Tempête, p. 74). 
Trinculo and Stephano are at the lower end of the social scale and have
swallowed whole all the ideologies of empire and Republic that they have been fed.
In their case, the mission civilisatrice is reduced to a desire to exploit their native find,
to gain the maximum profit from him (Une Tempête, pp. 60–65). As it happens, it is
these two drunkards who let the cat out of the bag, as far as the contradictions of the
Revolutionary/Republican discourse are concerned. Stephano, the ‘vieux
républicain’, with ‘les tripes républicaines’, rejoices at the fact that the tempest will
sweep away a whole host of ‘hurluberlus qui ont toujours empêché le pauvre monde
de vivre’ (Une Tempête, p. 62). However, if he welcomes the revolutionary whirlwind
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that will rid the island of the ruling group, it is only because it gives him the chance
to proclaim himself king in their place. 
Away from the false rhetoric, the reality is that the revolutionary process is well under
way and cannot be halted. So, when Prospero accuses Caliban of undermining the whole
order of things, like the god-devil Eshu, who makes order from disorder and chaos from
order (Une Tempête, pp. 70–71), he is right. Nothing will ever be the same again. 
Where, then, does this leave the ideological problematic of the French
Revolution? What, if any, is its significance for the liberation struggles of the enslaved
and the colonised peoples? Césaire himself saw the historical process of the French
Revolution as a potent force for change in the colonies, in the first instance, because
of the destabilising and disrupting effect that it had on the monolithic class structure
of colonial society, freeing its latent energy.15
In the latter half of the twentieth century, however, the revolutionary struggles of the
oppressed had to first pass through the stage of rejecting the ideology that was shoring up
their oppression. Thus, Caliban, revolutionary fighter on behalf of the colonised peoples,
must first reject the ideology, the discourse, of the colonising power. He does this in the first
instance by asserting the right to refuse the identity imposed on him by the coloniser. He
will no longer accept the name of Caliban; what is more, he will refuse to take any name at
all. In this way, by remaining nameless, he will be for ever aware that his name and, along
with it, his whole identity were stolen from him. He will not allow the colonising power to
redefine him with a new name. Just like Malcolm X, he opts for anonymity: ‘Call me X.
That will be better. Like calling me the man without a name. More exactly, the man, whose
name has been stolen … Each time you call me, it will remind me of the basic fact that you
have robbed me of everything, down to my identity!’ (Une Tempête, p. 28).
This is but the first stage of the revolutionary process. Ariel, who becomes his
brother not just in suffering and oppression but also in the struggle and the hope of
liberty (‘frères dans la souffrance et l’esclavage, frères aussi dans l’espérance’, Une
Tempête, p. 35), gains his freedom by the end of the play. Caliban, though, is still
continuing his struggle. The process has nonetheless become inexorable and the
outcome no longer in doubt. For Caliban has become aware of the lie at the heart of
Prospero’s ideology and so is no longer subject to its power; the weakness of the
colonial master’s position, based as it is on an insoluble contradiction, has been
exposed and his power undermined irredeemably (see Césaire (1955)/1970: 6). 
This liberating change has not just taken place in Caliban; he has managed to
undermine Prospero’s confidence in the validity of his own discourse. As the latter
acknowledges, Caliban has made him doubt himself for the first time in his life.16 At
the end of the play, we are left in no doubt as to the de-civilising effect that colonisation
has on the coloniser himself (Césaire (1955)/1970: 9). Caliban is the one who assumes
a position of moral superiority, rejecting his master’s model of civilised man, as the man
who knows how to kill, who asserts his power through force alone.
(Prospero): Come on! You don’t dare! You know you are nothing but an
animal – incapable of killing.
(Caliban): Defend yourself then! I am not a murderer. (Une Tempête, p. 79)
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Césaire’s Prospero does not leave the island; he cannot bring himself to abandon
his mission to ‘defend civilisation’ (Une Tempête, p. 92). Just as in the case of
Martinique, which remains a French territory, the decolonisation process is not yet
complete; the colonial power remains in place, even if fatally undermined. In the
United States too, where no simple return to the status quo ante was possible, there
has also been no definitive end to the struggle for freedom (Toumson 1981: 466). 
The usefulness of Caliban as an emblematic figure may not, then, have run its
course, in spite of those who point to the irony entailed in the adoption of a
European creation as the symbol of black, anticolonial and postcolonial struggles
(Vaughan and Mason Vaughan 1991: 162). This last point could be shrugged off as
a purely mechanistic, superficial response that ignores the real appropriation and
transformation of the myth of Caliban by non-Europeans into a qualitatively
different figure. However, given the widespread use of similar arguments with regard
to the use of the language of the colonising power by its former colonial subjects, as
well as its ideological constructs, it cannot perhaps be dismissed so easily.
In the case of Caliban, it is not a simple reversal of the meaning or the value
attached to the character, but a complex set of re-figurations and reinventions to match
a new political and literary scenario. Similarly, postcolonial writers using the colonial
language do not take it just as it is, but mould it into their own instrument for their own
ends. Caliban himself rails against his master’s language; however, his response is not
simply to revert to his mother tongue in a simplistic about-turn. Rather, he enriches his
own linguistic armoury through the use of both instruments as appropriate. 
Through the character of Caliban, Césaire thus synthesizes the affirmations of
Negritude together with reflections on the process whereby modernist Enlightenment
ideology, used in part to rationalise French colonial domination, has also provided an
instrument that can be transformed to give the dominated the means to overthrow
their dominators. This has not meant taking over the ideology lock, stock and barrel
in its original form, nor has it meant a simple polar reversal of terms. On the contrary,
it has meant, on the one hand, pursuing the logic of the Revolution to its final
conclusion and yet, at the same time, recognising its limitations and shortcomings
and thus the need to draw on and invent new representations and ideas with which
to articulate the potential for change in an ever-changing political situation. 
This chapter will end with a brief consideration of the work of Albert Memmi.
Albert Memmi and Colonisation
Memmi’s reputation as a major analyst of colonialism, whose work contributed to
the theorisation of the anticolonial struggle, rests mainly on his essays, Portrait du
colonisé, along with the Portrait du colonisateur, which were published in 1957, with
a preface by Jean-Paul Sartre.17 It is a work that was inspired by his universalist,
rationalist humanism. 
Memmi emphasised the reciprocity or interdependence that is integral to the
colonial relationship, as well as its inevitable tendency to disintegrate. The
characteristic features and behaviour of both coloniser and colonised are mutually
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defined and determined by this relationship (Memmi (1957)/1985: 13–14).
Moreover, he also stressed the importance of economic exploitation to the colonial
relation. While this relation could not be reduced to the economic element alone,
this was the essential one and the other elements could be dispensed with provided
that the economic advantage remained (Memmi (1957)/1985: 31–36). Yet in
Memmi’s analysis, it is the relation of people to people that is the important one, and
more important than any class factors (Memmi (1957)/1985: 64). This is why,
ultimately, he believes that those who cross the line, those he calls the transfuges, can
never overcome their objective situation as part of the oppressing people and,
whether they like it or not, will be ‘doomed to share their fate, as they have shared
their good fortune’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 64). Indeed, Memmi himself left his
birthplace and settled in France, conscious that there was no place for such as him in
post-independence Tunisia. His subsequent Portrait du décolonisé, published in 2004,
draws a gloomy picture of the state of the countries of the Maghreb and the
disappointing results of independence so far (Memmi 2004). 
As he put it, the choice for the well-intentioned colonial Leftist is not between
‘le bien et le mal’ (‘good and evil’), but rather between ‘le mal et le malaise’ (Memmi
(1957)/1985: 68). Because of this notion of collective responsibility ‘as a member of
an oppressive national group’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 65), there is only one choice
for the anticolonial European and that is to keep quiet and withdraw (Memmi
1957/1985: 69). 
This was a notion that was certainly open to debate and, even more to the point,
many European militants were prepared to put their commitment to the anticolonial
struggle on the line in active and, at times, life-threatening ways (see Chapter 5). For
someone from Memmi’s background, growing up in a poor family in Tunisia, with a
Jewish father and a Berber mother, whose only language was colloquial Arabic, the
choices may not have been as clear-cut as some of his critics would have it. While he
considered himself one of the colonised and qualified to write about the status of the
colonised from the inside, he was also able to identify with and understand the
mentality of the coloniser, even if he only took from his French education the best
of the rational humanist tradition. 
Some, if not all, of these ambiguities also applied in the case of Albert Camus.
However, for all his empathy with the problems of the Algerian population, as
reflected in his journalism for the communist newspaper Alger Républicain and
political activism with the PCA (Algerian Communist Party), until his expulsion in
1937 for supporting Messali Hadj and his Parti du peuple algérien (PPA), Camus did
not share Memmi’s self-identification as one of the colonised and ultimately drew
different conclusions from his experience. Camus had hoped to avoid the bitterness
and violence of the armed struggle and campaigned for a truce to avoid harm to
civilians, but lost his credibility as a potential arbiter after his off-the-cuff response
to an Algerian student heckler at the Nobel Prize ceremony in Stockholm in 1957,
in which he proclaimed that he would always put his ‘mother’ before ‘justice’. 
Memmi, on the other hand, developed a critique of the European Left for its
lack of comprehension of the nationalist movements (Memmi (1957)/1985: 56). He
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also described its malaise regarding the use of terrorism, as well as the importance
often given to the reactionary or the religious in the ideology of the anticolonial
struggle (Memmi (1957)/1985: 57–69), while, at the same time, raising questions
regarding the universal applicability of socialism and Marxism (Memmi
(1957)/1985: 63). 
Yet, all through the Portrait du colonisé, Memmi draws on the analogy between
the colonised and the proletariat, while making clear the differentiation between the
two. He does this primarily in terms of the specific mystification of the colonised
that has been developed by colonial ideology. According to this mystification, certain
features are assumed to be typical of the colonised, not of any particular individual
or group but of the colonised in general. For Memmi, this is what constitutes the
essence of racism, which he describes as ‘giving substance to a real or imagined
characteristic of the accused, for the benefit of the accuser’ (Memmi (1957)/1985:
103). Thus, the so-called ‘laziness’ of the colonised justifies the low wages they are 
paid (Memmi (1957)/1985: 101). Their ‘feeble-mindedness’ rationalises the need 
for a ‘protectorate’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 103). Their criminal, violent disposition
rationalises the need for a ruthless police force (Memmi (1957)/1985: 104). Their
simplicity, absence of needs, ability to cope with poverty, rejection of progress are all
cited as arguments in favour of their wretched condition. Even their perceived qualities
are translated into failings: for example, hospitality is derided as feckless and wasteful
(Memmi (1957)/1985: 105). With their ‘inscrutability’ and ‘unpredictability’, the
colonised are systematically divested of all the qualities that would make them
human beings. Dehumanised, they are also depersonalised, their individuality
submerged in a collective ‘they’ who behave in the same way (Memmi (1957)/1985:
106). No freedom is allowed to the colonised, who is not able to leave his state.
Unlike the coloniser, the colonised does not have the choice of being colonised or
not and only exists in relation to the coloniser. Ultimately, the relation, in its pure
form, taken to the extreme, ties the very existence of the colonised to the needs of
the coloniser; (s)he only exists in the capacity of colonised – ‘colonisé pur’ (Memmi
(1957)/1985: 107). 
In his own take on the Hegelian master–slave dialectic, Memmi describes the
deformed consciousness necessary to both sides of the relation to ensure the survival
of colonialism. Objective control and mastery are not sufficient; psychological
connivance and reciprocity are also required by both parties. For colonial mastery to
be complete, physical control is not enough, the coloniser must also believe in his
legitimacy. For this legitimacy to be complete, it is not enough that the colonised are
enslaved or subjugated; they must also accept their enslavement or subjugation
through recognition of the coloniser as master.18
When Memmi takes up the theme of the relation of the colonised to history, it
is not to share Marx’s view of the positive input of colonialism in bringing the
colonised into history, but to recognise that colonisation is the primary cause of the
eviction of the colonised from the historical process, as well as from any involvement
in public, political life.19 In no sense are the colonised the subjects of history or of
their own destiny; they have been transformed into objects. At the same time, the
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conditions are slowly being created for the realisation that they have the power to
reverse this relation. 
On the one hand, the developments of history itself undermine the perceived
power of the colonising power. France’s defeat in the Second World War by Germany
in Europe and by Japan in Indochina destroyed any belief that French power was
invincible. Yet, not only were the peoples of the colonised countries influenced by
perceptions of France’s weakness during the war and the occupation, there was also,
as Memmi pointed out, the inspirational value of the Resistance movement and the
defeat of the Axis powers to remind them of the possibility of waging armed struggle
against tyranny, along with the reasonable expectation of achieving freedom by so
doing (Memmi (1957)/1985: 115). The French, who were well aware of this danger,
took steps to ban films about the Resistance in the colonies. 
Nonetheless, Memmi also stresses the slow pace of development of nationalism
amongst the colonised. On the one hand, this was seen by him as a consequence of
colonialism itself, which objectively prevents the colonised from having any
experience of national citizenship, unless it is defined in negative terms – not being
part of the colonising nation.20
Memmi’s analysis thus stresses the negative effects of colonisation. Rather than
speeding up the historical process, it contributed towards the stagnation of colonised
society, especially as far as the institutions were concerned, which were divorced from
the possibility of normal social development. The traditional family was reinforced
and religion reduced to its more rigid formalistic aspects, in a reaction of self-defence
(Memmi (1957)/1985: 118–121). This amounted to the petrification of the
colonised, who were forced to live outside time, unable to plan and build for the
future and limited to a present that was itself an amputated abstraction, whilst at the
same time losing their grip on the past and the memory of the past, in the absence
of real living institutions for the relay of this memory and in the overwhelming
presence of commemorative rites and symbols glorifying the colonial power (Memmi
(1957)/1985: 122). 
There were, of course, ways forward for the colonised peoples. Memmi presents
these as two options: on the one hand, the colonised person may try to become like
the coloniser, ‘become the other’; his other option is to reclaim all the dimensions of
his humanity that colonisation had taken from him.21
The first option entails a process of imitation or mimicry. The role played by
mimicry in Memmi’s analysis needs to be distinguished from a number of other
approaches. Memmi sees it as an aspiration to the elimination of difference, a way in
which the colonised attempts to subsume his/her otherness by becoming as like the
coloniser as possible. For him, the most extreme example of this sort of behaviour is
demonstrated by those who undertake a mixed marriage with a partner belonging to
the colonisers’ camp. 
Others had seen a potential for subversion of the colonial relation through
mimicry, or parody, as it was portrayed, for instance, in the Hauka rituals filmed by
Jean Rouch. In his film, Les Maîtres fous (1955), the participants, immigrants from
Niger who work in Accra, take time out from their colonial situation in the city to
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go off to the countryside on Sundays to engage in a subversive ritual, where they
sacrifice a dog and fall into a trance, during which they are possessed by the spirits
and act out the roles of various members of the colonial hierarchy – the governor
general, the engineer, the doctor’s wife, the corporal of the guard and so on, in a
gross, comic parody of the colonial order. More recently, Homi Bhabha and others
have theorised the subversive potential of mimicry and parody (Bhabha 1994). These
later theorists have also stressed that it is not a one-way appropriation of the
colonisers’ culture, but is usually part of a two-way process of hybridisation
(Braithwaite 1978). On the other hand, Fanon was clear that it was merely a further
factor of alienation for the colonised and called for an end to mimicry of Europe,
proposing as an alternative the creation of a new, ‘total man’, free of alienation.22
Memmi, also, does not see mimetism or mimicry as a means of subversion or as a
potential strategy of resistance. Instead of presenting it as a solution, he criticises the
concept of assimilation that it implies, for this assimilation, so trumpeted in French
colonial ideology, is actually impossible within the colonial context. This is not because
the colonised person will be required to make unacceptable changes and turn his back
on his own community, but because the colonisers will not permit him to join theirs.
He will be subjected, not just to scorn, but also to ridicule by the colonialists, who will
always find the telling sign, the lack of taste, the note that jars. As Memmi says: ‘A
person who sits astride two cultures is rarely in a comfortable position and it is a fact
that he may not always hit the right note’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 141). Nonetheless,
he insists that it was not the colonised who rejected assimilation; it was the coloniser
who refused to allow it. His conclusion is not so much the failure of the vaunted
assimilation policy, but rather its impossibility within a context of colonial relations. It
could, in fact, only have worked if it had been possible not just for individuals but for
the whole people – an impossibility without doing away with colonialism itself.23
Memmi makes clear his sympathy for the ideal of assimilation – in principle and on
the face of its pretensions to universalism and socialism, what he calls ‘un parfum
universaliste et socialiste qui la rend a priori respectable’. Yet the reality is that even the
communists have not shown any particular or precise commitment to the assimilation
project in the colonial context, as it represents ‘the opposite of colonialism’ and thus its
inevitable demise (Memmi (1957)/1985: 161).
The only other route is revolt, a rupture with the colonial power. Yet Memmi does
not see this as an absolute reversal of the previous desire for assimilation. As he says: 
Even at the height of his rebellion, the colonised person still shows the traces
of what he has borrowed and learned from such a long cohabitation … This
gives rise to the paradoxical situation (often cited as decisive proof of lack of
gratitude) whereby the colonised make their demands and carry out their
fight in the name of the very values of the colonisers, using their ways of
thinking and their methods of struggle. (Memmi (1957)/1985: 144)
This is not the whole picture, however. At the same time as the colonised use the
weapons of the colonisers against them, they also develop what Memmi calls a
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‘counter-racism’, in which the deepening divide between colonialist and
anticolonialist is articulated. This entails seeing the differences between the two sides
as a Manichaean division, in which they are absolutely opposed to each other in
terms of black and white. Yet, in fact, Memmi stressed that what he calls the counter-
racism of the colonised is not the mirror image of colonial racism. Unlike the latter,
it is not based on notions of biology or metaphysics, but is social and historical in
character. It is not based on the belief in the inferiority of the hated group but on an
awareness of its aggression and harmfulness, on fear – and also admiration. All in all,
it is defensive, not offensive, and, as such, can be the prelude to a positive movement
forward by way of a reassertion of the colonised’s own selfhood (Memmi
(1957)/1985: 147). This analysis of ‘counter-racism’ as essentially reactive and part
of a positive dynamic of change was taken up by many engaged in ‘black nationalist’
and ‘black power’ struggles. 
In this connection, Memmi has important insights into the ambiguities
surrounding moves by the colonised to reclaim their own identity. The first phase
involves the acknowledgement of their separateness and difference, their ‘otherness’.
This may entail recognition that this difference has, in fact, been defined by the
colonisers, most often in terms of their supposed religious, traditional, non-scientific,
non-technical characteristics. Where it does not, there remains a large part of
mystification (Memmi (1957)/1985: 151–52). In both cases, however, the colonised
define themselves in terms of their negativity – they are not the colonisers. Even
when, in a second phase, they pass to a glorification of their negativity, transforming
it into positive attributes to form a ‘counter-mythology’, they remain defined in
relation to the colonisers and colonialism. In fact, the reactive nature of the
colonised’s perceptions of self and the awareness of their situation provoke a
deepening of the state of alienation, which can only disappear with the elimination
of colonialism (Memmi (1957)/1985: 153–54). 
It was by his analysis of colonialism and the psychological make-up of both
colonised and coloniser that Memmi’s impact was most felt, rather than at the level
of political theory and strategy of the anticolonial struggle. Indeed, as Edward Said
has pointed out, there is little discussion of the strategic options and debates (Said
1993: 328). Moreover, even his analysis of colonialism was criticised by Sartre, who
disagreed with Memmi’s depiction of it as a ‘situation’ with psychological
implications for those involved, rather than as an economic and political ‘system’
(Sartre in Memmi (1957)/1985: 24–25). There are, however, two areas in which he
expressed clearly held views on the politics of anticolonialism. One related to the area
of traditional culture and religion and the role this may play in politics. The other
was the political import of what seems to have been something of a hobby horse –
mixed marriages. 
Thus, he is suspicious of any attempts to revive traditional culture, especially
when it concerned religion or ritual, and points to the dangers of breathing new life
into these ancient rites and myths for political purposes. Indeed, he likens the political
leaders who follow this path to sorcerers’ apprentices, who will be unable to deal with
the consequences of unleashing these forces (Memmi (1957)/1985: 148–49). 
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His position on mixed marriages is more bizarre. His claims that those political
leaders who have European spouses (Habib Bourguiba, Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas
are singled out for mention) are all the more fervent in their nationalism, because
they travelled the furthest towards the colonisers through their marriages and then
found their situations untenable, or ‘unliveable’, as he puts it. Not only does he see
the marriage playing a vital determining role in convincing them of their patriotism,
but he also implies that their commitment to the nationalist struggle (what he calls
a ‘complete submission’ to the cause) is in part an attempt to assuage their guilt and
make amends.24 Although it appears to be making a political point, this cannot be
considered a serious political analysis. Interestingly, Memmi himself married a
European woman. 
Memmi’s analysis of the colonial situation can perhaps best be summed up in
the context of his rational, universal humanism. The way forward he proposed was
simple: the complete end to colonisation, to be achieved by revolution, not by
reforms (bourguibisme is explicitly rejected) (Memmi (1957)/1985: 162). Although
this revolution may not be completed in one fell swoop, but rather in stages, the
ultimate aim was to be the transcending of nationalism, religion, tradition, ethnicity,
all of which were considered to be colonial categories. In his vision of a universal
rationalism, science and technology are exempted from the colonialist taint. In an
echo of the controversy surrounding the French Communist Party’s defence of a
supposed division between the two sciences – bourgeois and proletarian science – in
the 1950s, inspired by the theories propounded by Lysenko in the Soviet Union
(Lecourt 1976; Majumdar 1995), Memmi insists that knowledge cannot be classified
as either Western or Oriental. Knowledge is knowledge; its universal character is not
questioned by him. 
In his preface to the Portrait du colonisé, Sartre summed up well Memmi’s faith
in the redemptive power of reason:
between the racist usurpation of the colonialists and the future nation that
the colonised will build, in which ‘he suspects that there will be no place for
him’, he tries to live his particular situation by transcending it towards the
universal. Not towards a universal Humanity, which does not yet exist, but
towards a rigorous Reason which is incumbent upon everyone. (Memmi
(1957)/1985: 32) 
Memmi, in fact, extended his belief in the universal value of knowledge and reason
to cultural acquisitions also: ‘If oppression has come in the guise of the English or
the French, it is nonetheless true that cultural and technical achievements belong to
all peoples. Science is neither Western nor Oriental, no more than it is bourgeois or
proletarian. There are only two ways to cast concrete – the right way and the wrong
way’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 163). Memmi is, of course, referring to the
achievements of the West for his examples. 
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Notes
1. The source of his inspiration was acknowledged by Césaire himself, according to Roger
Toumson (Toumson 1981: 465).
2. See Jacqueline Sieger’s interview with Césaire in 1961 (quoted by Megevand and Little
1994: 439). 
3. All quotations from Shakespeare’s Tempest are taken from the Tudor Edition of the
complete works, edited by Peter Alexander, first published by Collins in 1951 in London
and Glasgow. 
4. On the intertextual relationship between the plays of Shakespeare, Renan and Césaire, see
Toumson 1981.
5. See also Chapter 1.
6. This whole debate is dealt with in Gillies 1994.
7. On some of the debates around the character of Caliban, see Skura 1989.
8. He has himself been the subject of a reinvention through Peter Ackroyd’s novel The House
of Dr Dee (Ackroyd 1993). 
9. ‘à baragouiner ton langage pour comprendre tes ordres: couper du bois, laver la vaisselle,
pécher le poisson, planter les légumes’, Une Tempête, p. 25.
10. ‘en parodie de la formation culturelle, la fabrication hâtive de quelques milliers de
fonctionnaires subalternes, de boys, d’artisans, d’employés de commerce et d’interprètes
nécessaires à la bonne marche des affaires’ (Césaire (1955)/1970: 18). 
11. Sycorax ma mère!
Serpent! Pluie! Eclairs!
Et je te retrouve partout:
Dans l’oeil de la mare qui me regarde, sans ciller,
à travers les scirpes.
Dans le geste de la racine tordue et son bond qui attend.
Dans la nuit, la toute-voyante aveugle,
la toute-flaireuse sans naseaux!’ (Une Tempête, p. 26).
12. As Gonzalo says: ‘On a bien raison de dire que ce sont des pays merveilleux. Rien de
commun avec nos pays d’Europe’ (Une Tempête, pp. 16–17).
13. ‘êtres de la nuit qui craignent la lumière’ (Une Tempête, p. 21).
14. ‘ce sont gens de ma race, et de haut rang’ (Une Tempête, p. 29).
15. ‘Le premier service – d’ordre temporel – que la Révolution ait rendu aux peuples
colonisés c’est d’avoir existé, d’abord parce que la Révolution désorganisant le pouvoir et
désarticulant le système qui comprimait les classes de la société coloniale, en libérait la
latente énergie’ (Césaire (1961)/1981: 343).
16. ‘tu es celui par qui pour la première fois j’ai douté de moi-même’ (Une Tempête, p. 90).
17. Memmi is also a renowned novelist, whose major novels include La Statue de sel (1953),
Agar (1955) and Le Scorpion (1969).
18. Il existe, assurément – à un point de son évolution – , une certaine adhésion du colonisé
à la colonisation. Mais, cette adhésion est le résultat de la colonisation et non sa cause;
elle naît après et non avant l’occupation coloniale. Pour que le colonisateur soit
complètement le maître, il ne suffit pas qu’il le soit objectivement, il faut encore qu’il
croie à sa légitimité; et, pour que cette légitimité soit entière, il ne suffit pas que le
colonisé soit objectivement esclave, il est nécessaire qu’il s’accepte tel. En somme, le
colonisateur doit être reconnu par le colonisé. (Memmi (1957)/1985: 109).
19. ‘La carence la plus grave subie par le colonisé est d’être placé hors de l’histoire et hors de la
cité. La colonisation lui supprime toute part libre dans la guerre comme dans la paix,
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toute décision qui contribue au destin du monde et du sien, toute responsabilité
historique et sociale’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 112–13).
20. ‘Par suite de la colonisation, le colonisé ne fait presque jamais l’expérience de la
nationalité et de la citoyenneté, sinon privativement: nationalement, civiquement, il n’est
que ce que n’est pas le colonisateur’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 117).
21. ‘Il tente soit de devenir autre, soit de reconquérir toutes ses dimensions, dont l’a amputé la
colonisation’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 137).
22. ‘Décidons de ne pas imiter l’Europe et bandons nos muscles et nos cerveaux dans une
direction nouvelle. Tâchons d’inventer l’homme total que l’Europe a été incapable de
faire triompher’ (Fanon (1961)/1987: 236). See also V.S. Naipaul’s novel, The Mimic
Men, which also used the theme of its alienating effect (Naipaul 1967).
23. In Algeria, another solution was proposed to eradicate the problems of colonial relations,
this time by colonialists of an extreme political hue, who found their home in the
movement for l’Algérie française. Quite simply, this involved exterminating the native
population, through giving each French settler a gun and nine bullets. This is not as far-
fetched as it sounds. A similar policy was carried out elsewhere in the world, notably to
deal with the native American population. The downside, however, as Memmi points
out, is that extermination cannot save colonialism, only hasten its demise, since it would
mean the end of the exploitation of the colonised  (Memmi (1957)/1985: 160–61). 
24. Il est remarquable d’ailleurs qu’il sera d’autant plus ardent dans son affirmation, qu’il
a été plus loin vers le colonisateur. Est-ce une coïncidence si tant de chefs colonisés
ont contracté des mariages mixtes? Si le leader tunisien Bourguiba, les deux leaders
algériens Messali Hadj et Ferhat Abbas, si plusieurs autres nationalistes, qui ont voué
leur vie à guider les leurs, ont épousé parmi les colonisateurs? Ayant poussé
l’expérience du colonisateur jusqu’à ses limites vécues, jusqu’à la trouver invivable, ils
se sont repliés sur leurs bases. Celui qui n’a jamais quitté son pays et les siens ne saura
jamais à quel point il leur est attaché. Eux savent, maintenant, que leur salut coïncide
avec celui de leur peuple, qu’ils doivent se tenir au plus près de lui et de ses traditions.
Il n’est pas interdit d’ajouter le besoin de se justifier, de se racheter par une soumission
complète. (Memmi (1957)/1985: 151).
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Chapter 4
The Subversion of Colonial Ideology:
Jean-Paul Sartre
It is time now to look in greater depth at one of the key French figures in the historyof anticolonialism, Jean-Paul Sartre. There is no denying the importance of Sartre
in the theorisation of colonialism and anticolonialism, as well as in the politics and
practice of the anticolonial struggle, not least for his recognition that this was not a
subsidiary issue, but one that was absolutely central to twentieth-century history. In
many ways, Sartre has to be considered as one of the pioneers in the history of
European thought in this area, and much of the contemporary and subsequent work
that has been done on this question, particularly, though not entirely, in Europe, has
relied heavily on some aspects of his thought and returned to it as an essential
foundation for much that was to follow. There are inevitably aspects with which later
thinkers would disagree, as well as contradictions and limitations that need to be
recognised. However, it is also necessary to give full credit to his courage in
consistently affirming positions that were based on a fundamental commitment.
His most important, most original theoretical contribution consisted in his
philosophical theorisation of the Other and in particular the colonial Other. The
theorisation of the Other rejected and subverted the universalist problematic of the
Republican Enlightenment model that had been promoted as the ideological
rationalisation of the French colonial enterprise. However, it also has to be seen as
part of his preoccupation with formulating a moral anthropology, concerned with
the realisation of Humankind as a species, in the longest-term view of History, both
written with a capital H.
At the same time, his practical political commitment to the anticolonial struggle,
particularly in respect of Algeria, was equally important in the political context of the
time. This work was the product of his engagement with real history in the making
and was characterised by a hard-nosed, practical, political understanding of the
current situation. As well as his own work on this question, however, it is also
important to recognise his role in acting as a conduit for the ideas of others active in
the anticolonial struggles, and his contribution in making their views known and
published through the review Les Temps Modernes and other channels. 
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Although these two facets were often convergent, there is no denying that they
were sometimes at odds. In particular, the political requirement to take a clear-cut
stance to identify with a particular camp in the struggle (in Sartre’s case, the
anticolonial camp), along with the espousal of its ideas, could sometimes lead to
contradictions with his own basic theory. 
There is a third aspect that deserves to be signalled, and that is his analysis of the
specificity of French colonialism, particularly his analysis of the French colonialist
system in Algeria, which was first delivered as a speech to a meeting organised by the
‘Comité d’Action des Intellectuels contre la poursuite de la guerre en Afrique du
Nord’, at the Salle Wagram in Paris on 27 January 1956, and then published in Les
Temps Modernes under the title, ‘Le colonialisme est un système’ (Sartre 1956)  and
reproduced in Situations V (Sartre 1964: 25–48). This analysis of the specific
economic and political features of French colonialism in Algeria is notable on at least
two grounds. First, it makes clear the overriding importance and central role of
Algeria in French imperialism; Sartre’s critique of colonialism is the critique of
French colonialism in Algeria. Secondly, it implicitly calls into question the universal
applicability of Lenin’s theory of imperialism, particularly with regard to the export
of capital. 
In this text, Sartre quotes Jules Ferry as a precursor of Lenin in the theorisation
of the economics of colonialist imperialism:
This time, it is capitalism itself that becomes colonialist. Jules Ferry would
become the theorist of this new colonialism: ‘France has always had an
abundance of capital at her disposal and has exported it abroad in vast
quantities. It is thus in France’s interests to consider the colonial question
from this perspective. What is at stake for countries like ours, which are
destined by the nature of their industry to export on a grand scale, is the
fundamental question of markets … Where you find political predominance,
there you will also find the predominance of products, economic
predominance.’ You see, Lenin was not the first to define colonial
imperialism: it was Jules Ferry, this ‘great man’ of the Third Republic.
(Sartre 1956: 1373)
There are clear political differences between the two. Moreover, Ferry was not
actually arguing for the export of capital to the colonies. The benefits of doing so
were too uncertain and the profits would take too long to return. Sartre was quite
clear on Ferry’s policy, which was to create new industries in France itself, the
products of which were to be sold in the colonies.
What was entailed? Creating industries in the conquered lands? No way: the
capital of which France had such an ‘abundance’ was not going to be
invested in some underdeveloped country; the returns were too uncertain
and the profits would take too long to achieve, as everything would have to
be constructed and equipped. And even if it could be done, what would be
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the point of creating from scratch production facilities that would be in
competition with metropolitan industry? Ferry is very clear: capital will not
leave France; it will  simply be invested in new industries that will sell their
manufactured goods to the colonies. The immediate consequence of this
was the establishment of the Customs Union (Union douanière 1884). This
Customs Union is still in existence. It ensures that French industry, which
is handicapped on the international market by its excessively high prices,
retains a monopoly on the Algerian market. (Sartre 1956: 1373–74) 
Who was going to buy these goods? Not the Algerians, who lacked the resources to
do so, but a new kind of artificially created consumer, in the shape of the French
settler, who was given every advantage and subsidy to enable him to acquire land,
from which to produce foodstuffs and raw materials for the metropolitan market.
Both sides of this trade were thus safeguarded through a rigid protectionist system. 
Sartre does not develop the theoretical implications for a more general analysis
of imperialism and, indeed, the value of his analysis lies in its very specificity, in
explaining some of the very particular parameters of the Algerian case. One might
nonetheless deduce from the above that the relative backwardness of the French
industrial economy, compared with that of Britain, Germany and the United States,
at the time of its imperial expansionism could provide some explanation for its
specificity at the level of economic relations. 
However, the specific issues that are perhaps more interesting here relate to
Sartre’s theorisation of the Other and the significance to the development of his
thought of tensions between the universal and the particular. 
Sartre and the Theorisation of the Colonial Other
It is evident that, in the context of the prevailing consensus of the time, based on the
Enlightenment and Republican ideologies, Sartre’s theorisation of the Other in
general, and of the colonial Other in particular, emerged as a radically original
attempt to break with these dominant perceptions. Indeed, he developed his ideas
outside and in complete disregard of the universalist Enlightenment tradition. One
of the key elements that Sartre developed in his theory of the Other was the
importance of the visual, through the notion of the gaze, le regard. These two aspects
are closely related to each other. 
The gaze, in its simplest form, is the relationship of the subject, the voyeur, to
the object of the gaze. The act of looking at another person transforms this person,
the Other, into an object, a thing, determined and fixed by the gaze of the seeing
subject. So far, this is a one-way process, in which the relationship is simply that of
the subject to its object. And, although that may be the end of the matter, as it is
possible to see without being seen, nonetheless the dialectic of the gaze implies, at
the very least, the possibility of a reciprocity, in which the Other is not only the
object of the subject’s gaze, but also a subject who, in their turn, looks back at the
voyeur, thus constituting the original subject as object.1
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This theory was developed in L’Etre et le néant (Being and Nothingness), above
all in relation to the freedom of the individual subject and the capacity to act without
restriction or a priori determination. In this context, the gaze of the Other was a
constant threat to this freedom, even more so as there was the risk of succumbing to
the temptation to enter into a complicity with the Other, in seeing oneself through
their eyes. This self-determination via the gaze of the Other was a stratagem to escape
one’s own angoisse, amounting to an abnegation of one’s freedom and a complicity in
the process of the transformation of the self into a thing. This scenario, whereby we
‘grasp ourselves from outside, as though we were another person or a thing’, is set out
in the following passage taken from L’Etre et le néant:
Such is the whole set of processes by which we attempt to hide our own
angoisse from ourselves: we grasp our own potentiality while avoiding
consideration of other potentialities, which we ascribe, as their
potentialities, to an undifferentiated other: we do not wish to see this
potentiality as sustained in being by a pure annihilating freedom, but we
attempt to grasp it as though it were brought into being by an object that is
already constituted, which is no other than our Ego, envisaged and
described as the person of the other. Of our primary intuition, we would
like to retain the sense that it gives us of our independence and
responsibility, but it also means that we play down anything in it which is
part of the original annihilation; besides we are always ready to take refuge
in the belief in determinism, if this freedom weighs too heavy upon us or if
we need an excuse. Thus, we take flight from angoisse by trying to grasp
ourselves from outside, as though we were another person or a thing. What
is usually called revelation of the inner sense or primary intuition of our
freedom is not original in any way: it is a process that is already constructed,
expressly designed to hide our angoisse from ourselves, the actual ‘immediate
given’ of our freedom. (Sartre (1943)/1994: 78)
Thus far, it has been a question of the individual. At this stage, Sartre says that any
attempt to turn the gaze back upon the Other is always doomed to failure, although
this assumes that the goal is solely to gain insight into the Other’s subjective
consciousness (Sartre (1943)/1994: 419–20). The possibility that such a reversal may
bring about a change in the Other’s subjectivity, as well as that of the subject, leading
to the possibility of new relations of solidarity or a change in the relations of power,
was largely ignored. It was later that Sartre was to relate his theory of the gaze to the
precise significations with which it was loaded when linked to definite power
relations of domination and subordination, arising from social factors, rather than as
a phenomenon limited to an individual’s consciousness.
When Sartre comes to develop his theory of the collective Other, particularly in
Réflexions sur la question juive (Reflections on the Jewish Question), published in
1946, and then the Critique de la raison dialectique (Critique of Dialectical Reason),
published in 1960, its links with the notion of ideology become more obvious. The
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subsumption of the self beneath the gaze of the Other follows a similar process to
that described in some theories of ideology, including that developed by Louis
Althusser (Althusser 1970, 1976), as the imposition of ready-made ideological
perceptions and values from the outside on more or less willing subjects, who then
appropriate them and identify with them as constituting part and parcel of their own
identity. 
In Réflexions sur la question juive, Sartre recognises that individual freedom and
self-determination are subject to the influence of socio-economic, political and
cultural factors at the level of collective society (Sartre (1946b)/1954: 14–15).
However, the development of his concept of mauvaise foi into a fully developed
theory of ideology is found above all in the Critique de la raison dialectique, where he
explains the genesis of particular ideologies as an effect of a process of generalised
alienation, in which each person becomes Other by taking their opinion from the
Other and thinking it as Other; in which public opinion, or the Idea, has become a
process with an invincible force, not because it is the conscious moment of anybody’s
praxis, since no one actually thinks it, but rather because it is a ‘practico-inert’ object,
not susceptible to verification or modification in this domain of the Other.2 More
specifically, for our purposes, it is in this text that he develops his theory of colonial
ideology (Sartre (1960)/1985: 406, note 1, 798–813), in which, in the form of racial
superiority, it acts as the cement of the ‘serial unity’ of the colonists: 
Colonialism defines the exploited as eternal, because it is itself constituted
as eternal exploitation. In so far as this inert sentence passed on the
colonised becomes the serial unity of the colonists (in its ideological form),
i.e. the link of their otherness, it is the idea as Other or the Other as idea;
it thus remains as Idea of stone but its force comes from its ubiquitous
absence. In the form of this otherness, it becomes racism … In reality,
racism is colonial self-interest lived as the thing that links all the colonists of
the colony through the serial flight of their otherness. (Sartre (1960)/1985:
406, note 1)
It is clear from the above that this position is based on very different premises from
those underpinning the dominant ideological consensus based on Republican
universalism. Indeed, Sartre’s analysis of colonial ideology does not take as its object
the specificity of the ‘official’ colonial ideology, founded on the theories of the
Enlightenment; it bypasses altogether the importance of this ideology in the
imaginary representation of the relations between coloniser and colonised, thus
dismissing it as of no real account. And yet, while not engaging directly with it,
Sartre nonetheless provides a devastating critique of it on the theoretical plane by
bringing to the fore the question of difference. His position is thus based on a very
different foundation from that of the shaky edifice of what might be called a phoney
universalism. Not only does Sartre highlight the difference between coloniser and
colonised, but he also points to Europe’s responsibility in accentuating difference and
division in the colonies. As he writes in his preface to Frantz Fanon’s Les Damnés de
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la terre (The Wretched of the Earth), ‘Europe has multiplied divisions and
oppositions, manufactured classes and various forms of racism, in an attempt to use
every means to instigate and increase the stratification of colonised societies’ (Sartre
in Fanon (1961)/1987: 7–8). 
Sartre’s great merit is to uncover the reality of the colonial relations, which are
experienced in the colonial consciousness through representations that derive from
ethnic and racial conceptions, rather than the universal doctrines of Enlightenment
ideals. His analysis takes as its starting point the exclusion of the Other from the
collective made up of the French colonists. He presents this collective in its stark
particular reality, as it is lived and experienced, without confronting this reality 
with the mythical discourse of Republican ideology. His analysis of the reality of
French colonialism thus strips away the usual ideological forms to target conceptions
that were common currency in the more transparent official ideology of British
imperialism. 
It is significant that the overt racism implicit in the colonial gaze in Sartre’s
analysis and reflecting the reality of the colonial relation is also present in much of
what passes as orientalism. The importance of the visual element of orientalism is
clearly demonstrated, not only and most obviously in the domains of art, but also in
anthropology and literature, as well as in some forms of religion, where the notion
of the gaze and the image play an essential role. Indeed, there is a sense in which
universalism and orientalism form a couplet in French colonial discourse, in which
the orientalist conception of the Other forms the necessary correction to the
universalising discourse of the Republic. Given that there is no space for the notion
of difference or the Other within the discourse of the indivisible French Republic, it
is in these other practices that the visual comes to the fore, with the representation
and/or conceptualisation of the Other through the practice and theory of vision. It
should be remembered that vision depends on the division of subject and object, the
self and the Other. 
Indeed, the nature of the visual relation, as one of fundamental inequality
between the subject and object of the gaze, makes it eminently suitable as a vehicle
for the expression of the relation between coloniser and colonised, in which the
actual reality of this relation can be articulated. This aptness is reinforced by the
possibility of a complete absence of reciprocity in the relation of the voyeur to the
object of the gaze; the latter may indeed be completely unaware even that he/she is
being looked at or spied upon. 
This fundamental inequality which is intrinsic in the form of the gaze is,
moreover, reinforced by the colonial relations of power, where the voyeur is always
the European and the object of the gaze the non-European Other. It is an inequality
based not on difference alone, but on a fundamental opposition between the subject
and the object of the gaze: the object is perceived as the absolute opposite, the
negation of the subject. On the most fundamental level, there is a relation of mutual
dependence between the colonist and the colonised Other, in which the colonist is
defined in his relation with his Other, who represents the negation of everything that
characterises him, as in a mirror reflection. This analysis was later taken up by
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Edward Said, who defined the orientalists’ conception of the Orient as the negation
of the West, but then went on to demonstrate the determining role that this negative
reflection plays in the constitution of European identity, by defining it exclusively in
relation to its Other (Said 1978: 7, 39). 
In this perception of the Other, there is always a value judgement that
determines the Other to be inherently inferior. The power to see and thus,
ultimately, to know and to pass judgement remains the prerogative of the subject of
the gaze, the European voyeur. Within the terms of the colonial perception, it is
inconceivable that the colonised Other may also have the right to gaze upon his/her
master. It is highly significant, in this connection, that in Algeria there was actually
an offence of l’outrage par regard. Indeed, in 1945, an Algerian schoolteacher was
sentenced to two years in prison for this very offence, for looking at the sub-prefect
of Medea and causing him outrage thereby (Suret-Canale 2001).
Nonetheless, this possibility of returning the gaze does exist. It is integral to the
relation and is destined to be subversive of it. 
The notion of the subversion of the gaze is an important one in the context of
the anticolonial struggle and more will be said about it shortly. However, if Sartre’s
theorisation of the gaze and the colonial Other remains probably the most original
element of his contribution to the understanding of colonialism, it nonetheless has
to be seen in the context of his understanding of the role played by the repressive
violence that was a key element of colonial rule.
Colonial Ideology and Repressive Violence
The implicit exposure of colonial ideology in theoretical terms had as its counterpart
the more explicit acknowledgement of the role of force in maintaining the colonial
system. There is a strong case for arguing that there is here an intimate connection
to the emphasis on the visual in Sartre’s analysis of colonial ideology. On the one
hand, his theory of the Other undermines and subverts the ‘official’ discourse of
universalist Republicanism. At the same time, he consistently downplays the
importance of ideology per se in the maintenance of colonial power, with the
argument that the colonial system rests primarily on the foundation of brute force.
The little importance that is given to ideology, and consequently language, is not an
omission but a necessary corollary of his analysis. 
In ‘Le colonialisme est un système’, Sartre laid bare the economic foundations of
the colonial system, as far as Algeria was concerned. He also showed that the system
was only maintained through the use of violence and gave little weight to the role of
ideology in maintaining the status quo. 
For one thing, he pointed to the fact that most Algerians were in fact excluded
from participation in French education and French culture and therefore remained
largely uncontaminated by any ideological indoctrination. ‘As for our famous
culture, who knows whether the Algerians had any great desire to acquire it? But one
thing is for sure and that is the fact that we refused to give it to them’ (Sartre 1956:
1380). With an illiteracy rate of 80 per cent, the extent of any ideological
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indoctrination was in any case bound to remain limited. Not only were the majority
of Algerians denied education in the French language, even literacy in Arabic was not
encouraged and the Arabic language was officially considered to be a foreign
language.3 We shall see that, even with regard to the French language, it is a striking
fact that significantly more Algerians have been taught French since independence
than was ever the case before. For instance, writing in 1983, Xavier Deniau claimed
that there were four times as many French nationals teaching in Algeria than in the
time of colonisation (Deniau 1983: 102). 
Sartre had also pointed out that the secularism that was a major pillar of the
French Republic at home was not a feature of French rule in Algeria, where there was
no real separation of religion and state, with the French authorities endeavouring to
control Islam and to make use of the most backward features of the religion through
the fostering of superstition and obscurantist practices.4 For Sartre, therefore, French
colonial ideology, especially in the form of the ‘civilising mission’, could have no role
to play in maintaining French power; the logic of the system was such that force
increasingly became the only option left for the colonists. As he says in the preface
to Les Damnés de la terre: ‘Our Machiavellianism has little hold over these highly
conscious people who have cottoned on to one after another of our lies. The only
recourse left to the colonist is force, or what remains of it; the only choice for the
native is that between servitude and sovereignty’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 9).
This reliance on force is accentuated by the contradictions of the colonists
themselves. As Sartre pointed out, the colonists were ‘Republicans’ in France, ‘chez
nous’, i.e. within the context of French metropolitan institutions. In Algeria, on the
other hand, they were fascists who hated the Republic and only loved the Republican
army (Sartre 1956: 1384). 
Yet the fact of the military presence itself served to tighten the circle further. As
the repression made the colonists more detestable, so the military presence became
more necessary, along with the necessity for an overthrow of the system by
revolutionary counter-violence. The system thus contained the seeds of its own
inevitable destruction; it prepared its own downfall through its own necessary
intransigence.5
This point was reinforced by the economic implications. As Sartre says, in 1956,
the costs of the war to the French state were estimated at 300 thousand million francs
per year, a sum that was equivalent to the total Algerian revenue. His necessary
conclusion was that the cost of maintaining the colony would outweigh the
economic benefits that it brought and that the struggle would necessarily be
abandoned when the burden became too great (Sartre in Memmi (1957)/1985: 37).
Moreover, any real reform to make assimilation a fact, rather than an ideological
premise, would in fact have destroyed the whole basis on which the colonial system
was founded. 
Yet, if Sartre dismissed the importance of ideology for the maintenance of
colonial power, it was nonetheless given more weight by many of the colonised
themselves, not just as a tool of repression, but also as an essential factor in the
anticolonial struggle. Aimé Césaire, speaking in 1956 at the same meeting of the
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‘Comité d’Action des Intellectuels’, emphasised the point that colonialism was not
just maintained by force, but also through what he terms the ‘confiance’ of the
colonised peoples, a ‘confiance’ that has been betrayed. This is what he had to say:
We have reached the moment, when all over the world peoples who have
hitherto been passive or resigned are now rising up to affirm that the time
is now past for a world founded on the imposition of racial hierarchy and
the oppression of the peoples of the world.
It would be wrong to become blasé about this and say that after all this
is nothing new, that it has always only been by force that empires have been
kept in being and that force will continue to hold sway for a long time yet.
The truth is very different. The truth is that for decades the colonised
peoples have tried to have trust, have believed that they should have trust
and have in fact been trustful. Their conquerors spoke such fine words!
They spoke of the rights of man, of freedom, of justice, of civilisation, and
lord knows what else! They proclaimed their universal mission.
Now, out of the sheaf of dramas that constitute the colonial problem,
the most important drama, the one with the greatest consequences, is
perhaps not the initial drama of colonial conquest, but rather the drama
represented by the betrayal of trust. I mean by that the trust that all colonial
peoples, without exception, have been led to invest in the colonial power
and that has always, inexorably, been betrayed. 
Well! We are now at a moment in history when all the colonial peoples,
without exception, have learnt from bitter experience and are refusing their
trust and are telling the world that they no longer have any trust. (Césaire
1956: 1367)
Sartre had also written about the ideological dimension to colonialism before,
particularly in ‘Orphée noir’ (‘Black Orpheus’), his preface to Senghor’s anthology of
black poetry, published in 1948. Here, he recognised that the black poets had been
through a process of acculturation in white schools, though, in this text, the main
thrust was to bring out the resulting alienation and exile from their own culture: 
The herald of the black soul has been schooled by the whites, according to
the ancient iron law, which denies to the oppressed any weapon other than
those he has stolen himself from his oppressor; it is in this white culture
shock that his negritude moves from the level of immediate lived existence
to become an object of reflection. Yet, at the same time, it also means that
he has, to a greater or lesser extent, stopped living it himself. By choosing to
see what he is, he has become his own double; he no longer coincides with
himself. On the other hand, it is because he was already exiled from his own
self that he felt this duty to speak out. He begins then with exile. A double
exile in which the exile of his body offers a splendid mirror image of the
exile of his heart. (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xv–xvi)
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He sums up this alienation in the physical image of ‘the walls of white culture
that stand between her [Africa] and him [the black], their science, their language,
their customs’ (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xvi).
In the Preface to Les Damnés de la terre, Sartre also dwelt on the ideological
dimension, especially as it affected the manufacture of elite minorities of the colonised
to serve as intermediaries between the colonisers and the colonised, again stressing the
cultural and linguistic alienation that this process brought in its train, making these
intellectuals into mensonges vivants, ‘living lies’. Eschewing the stark realities of the
colonies, the European elite aspired to create a ‘native elite’. From adolescence, the
candidates were singled out, branded on the forehead with the principles of Western
culture, sent off to France to be gagged by fine, cloying words and phrases stuffed
down their throats, and then sent home again in their altered state.6
In the first stage, it was a one-way process, with the Word ‘loaned’ from France
to the colonised,7 serving in effect to deprive them of their own voice, to ‘gag’ them.
But Sartre also talks of the various stages by which this colonised elite began the
process of talking back, at first to criticise the contradictions between the colonists’
own values and their actual practice,8 then to raise the contradictions within the
European discourse, particularly that between the purported universalism of the
humanist ideology and the actual exclusion and stigmatisation entailed in racist ideas
and practices,9 and finally to question the applicability of the European values to the
reality of their own lives. With Fanon and those inspired by similar ideas, this process
would go even further; they would simply turn their backs on the European
discourse, as of no relevance to their situation.
The reprise de parole by the colonised, the regaining of their voice, was an important
element of the anticolonial struggle.10 However, neither the ideological alienation of the
colonised nor their subsequent rediscovery of their own voice figures largely as a central
feature of Sartre’s own theory, although he acknowledges this aspect, especially when
commenting on the work of the colonised intellectuals. The originality of his theoretical
contribution with regard to the colonial question lies elsewhere; it is mainly articulated
through the notion of the gaze, not through the role of language and ideology. 
The Subversion of the Gaze
We have seen that the essential characteristic of the colonial gaze is to deny any
possibility of reciprocity. Yet a constant element in Sartre’s thought is the ever-present
option of refusing the self-definition of the subject, both as individual and as
collective subject, by the Other. This applies equally well to this case. Thus, there is
always the option for the colonised Others to turn the gaze back on to the colonisers,
transforming them, in their turn, into Others, objects of their gaze.
In fact, this reversal of the gaze, which heralds the beginnings of the anticolonial
struggle, forms the second moment in a dialectic of the gaze, which is closely
modelled on that of the Hegelian dialectic of the master and the slave, or more
accurately of the lord and the bonded servant (Hegel (1807)/1977: 111–19). The
reversal of the gaze does not, of course, suffice on its own to eliminate the colonial
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system. For this, the full espousal of counter-violence to meet the violence of the
colonial power was deemed necessary. 
The second moment is a necessary development in this dialectic, in which the
supremacy of the coloniser is doomed in advance. For just as colonial violence could
not be pursued to its conclusion, i.e. to the death of the colonised, whose labour is
essential to the colonist, so too the process of dehumanisation, which is one of the
effects of this violence, cannot be fully completed, because the colonist needs to
acknowledge the colonised as men, in order that they may serve his own ends. Thus,
Sartre dismisses as vain what he calls a ‘petrified ideology’, which attempts to portray
the colonised as ‘talking beasts’. To be able to give them orders, to get them to work,
however brutal the regime, their basic humanity has to be acknowledged; a man
cannot be ‘treated like a dog’ unless he is first held to be a man.11
As if in a mirror image, violence inevitably begets violence; so too, attempts to
dehumanise the ‘native’ lead to the dehumanisation of the colonial master.12 The
counter-violence of the colonised, on the other hand, provoked by the power and the
impotence of the colonist, enables them to realise their own humanity.13
As Sartre said, Fanon showed that violence was not wild savagery reborn or an
outburst of instinctual resentment: it was man reconstituting himself as a human
being, ‘c’est l’homme lui-même se recomposant’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 15).
Thus, Sartre endorsed Fanon’s position that only violence could overcome violence;
only through violence could the colonised overcome his neurosis to become a free man.
For, in the first stages of the revolt, it is necessary to kill: killing  a European
is like killing two birds with one stone, getting rid in one throw of both an
oppressor and one of the oppressed: afterwards there remains a dead man,
but also a free man; the survivor feels he is treading on his own national land
for the very first time. (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 16)
This is still only the second moment of the dialectic of the anticolonial struggle and,
for Sartre, it was also important to recognise the specificity of race as an integral
element of this second stage, which he categorises as the moment of ‘separation’ or
‘negativity’. Already in ‘Orphée noir’, Sartre had made his view clear that what he
called an ‘anti-racist racism’ was an essential phase if differences of race are to be
abolished. It was not sufficient to proclaim the unity of the oppressed in the same
struggle. In the colonies, it was essential for the colonised to first assert their own
specificity and wage their own specific struggle against racist oppression before this
ultimate unity could be achieved (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xiv).
This was a position that Memmi, amongst others, was later to take up with his
notion of ‘counter-racism’.14 However, all credit must be given to Sartre for taking
this position long before it became fashionable to do so and against the dominant
positions of the Left at the time. The European Left, both socialist and communist,
shared the refusal to acknowledge that the specific exploitation and oppression of the
colonised peoples might entail the need for specific struggles against racism and any
talk that smacked of separatism was anathema. 
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Moving on now to the third moment of the dialectic becomes more
problematic, for much of what Sartre posited as the next stage remained at the level
of myth or wishful thinking about some kind of a grand synthesis, in which
humanity would finally realise itself and the previous differences and negations be
subsumed into a fully reciprocal, fraternal vision of a new type of human society.
The notion of the ‘new man’ came into its own, on the one hand, as a
counterweight to that of the old ‘European’ man, who achieved his humanity at the
expense of the colonised and the enslaved.15 Now, in a reversal of the process,
Europeans have ceased to be the subjects of history; they have become its objects.
Europe was portrayed as a sinking ship.16 A ‘new man’, a ‘better-quality’ man was in
the process of being created, out of the violence of the Algerian and other struggles,
which was a necessary part of the birth process.17 And, indeed, this kind of rhetoric,
regarding the creation of a ‘new man’ and a ‘new society’, was common currency in
Algeria in the war years and post-independence period (Benrabah 1999: 93–96; and
see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Ultimately, however, Sartre had in mind a more inclusive conception of the new
human species, which would not just be ‘the sum total of the inhabitants of the
planet but the infinite unity of their reciprocity’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987:
19–20). For Europeans to be part of this, they would have to put aside their
particular garb of European superiority, or as Sartre put it: ‘This is the end for us …
we will only be able to be part of this totality, from which we are banished by the
black gaze, if we tear off the uniforms and badges of our whiteness in an effort simply
to be human (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xi). This was about becoming human, not
superhuman in the Nietzschean sense. Sartre’s vision was akin to that of Marx (at
least that of the early Marx of the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
(Marx 1975)). It looked forward to the first realisation of the humanity of the
species, which had hitherto consisted of subhumans. 
There would be much to say about Sartre’s later views of this anthropological
humanistic goal, as well as his apparent (if contested) disavowal of his unconditional
support for political, revolutionary violence (Sartre and Lévy 1991: 63–64).
However, its relevance is only marginal to the present question, given the importance
and influence of Sartre’s earlier positions, as set out here, and the lack of resonance
that any supposed changes of heart were to have. 
The rest of this chapter will explore other problematical areas of Sartre’s thought
relating to colonialism and the anticolonialist struggle. These include some of the
issues relating to the question of language, issues relating to the dialectic of the
universal and the particular and, finally, the contradictions that may have arisen
because of Sartre’s own position as a Frenchman.
The Word and the Gaze
Some of these problematical issues arise in connection with the primacy of the gaze
in Sartre’s theorisation of the colonial relation, in comparison with the role accorded
to ideology or the Word. 
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In ‘Orphée noir’, Sartre had already talked about the gag being removed from
black people, but, more especially, he concentrated on the notion of the ‘return of
the gaze’. Returning the gaze could only be done once the bowed heads are raised, as
the following passage shows:
Did you think that once these heads, which our forefathers had forced to
bow down to the ground, were raised you would see only adoration in their
eyes? Here are black men standing erect and looking at us and I hope that
you can feel, as I do, the sensation of shock at being seen. For three
thousand years the white man has enjoyed the privilege of seeing without
being seen; he was pure gaze, the light of his eyes drew out everything from
the native obscurity, the whiteness of his skin was still a gaze, made up of
condensed light. The white man, white because he was a man, white like the
day, white like the truth, white like virtue, illuminated creation like a torch
and uncovered the secret, white essence of beings. Today these black men
are looking at us and our gaze is sinking back into our eyes; it is the turn of
black torches to light up the world and our white heads are no more than
little paper lanterns tossing in the wind. (Sartre in Senghor 1948: ix)
Yet, on reading this passage, it has to be said that it is simply not true that blacks had
only now been able to look at whites after 3,000 years. Blacks had always looked at
whites, whenever they were involved in a relation, even if the whites were unable to
see it or were sublimely indifferent to it because of their confidence, reinforced by
racist ideology, that only their gaze counted. The difference is that, in the anti-
imperialist struggles, the blacks were now articulating this reversal of the gaze through
the white man’s language, displaying it to the white man, writing in his language. 
However, Sartre also claimed that the poems of Senghor’s black anthology were
not written for ‘us’; any shame that ‘we’ might feel upon reading them is
unintentional (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xi). He insisted that they were written by
blacks for blacks, and, of course, they were. Yet the fact that they were written in
French and published in France cannot be dismissed so easily, nor can the fact that
the black French-reading public was actually quite limited in number. The prise de
conscience by the black poets was in fact only one step in the process; the next was to
assert themselves to their French colonisers and thus throw the poetry and the
language back in the face of the oppressor. The writing of most of this poetry for a
purely black audience is inconceivable. 
Consonant with Sartre’s concentration on the gaze was his dismissal of ideology
and the little importance he actually gave to the word or to language in his
theorisation of the Other. In this connection, the purely visual approach that he
adopted to the question of whiteness and blackness is also significant. For colour
only acquires its significance through connotations, which are created through
language and ideology; there is no inherent significance in the actual visual
manifestation of colour. Furthermore, the absolute whiteness and blackness, which
feature in language, do not exist in reality, where there are only shades of white, pink,
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yellow, brown and black. Whiteness and blackness acquire their moral, ideological
and political connotations through the signification that they have acquired in the
language of culture and ideology. Moreover, there is nothing absolute about these
meanings: black and white are both used as the colour of death and mourning,
depending on the country concerned; both white and black are considered the colour
of modesty in dress and virtue, again depending on the culture. 
What is perhaps even more problematic is the link that Sartre established
between language and the nation. On the one hand, this was a clear critique of the
much-vaunted universalism of the French language. In Sartre’s view, the French
language was closely linked to the particularity of the French nation and French
national identity. The learning of the national language was a major factor in the
acquisition of a national identity (Sartre (1943)/1994: 558–59). 
This link between language and national identity was brought out very clearly
in ‘Orphée noir’, where Sartre claimed that the independence struggles of most
ethnic minorities in the nineteenth century were also focused on an attempt to
resuscitate their national languages. In addition to belonging to a collective with its
own economic and political autonomy, it was also necessary to think of oneself as
part of this national collective and, for Sartre, this meant thinking in the national
language. He gave the example of Ireland, where he asserted that those who claimed
to be Irish did not just need to belong to an independent economic and political
entity, but also to think Irish, which meant thinking in the Irish language. As he said,
‘the specific characteristics of a society correspond exactly to those expressions in its
language that cannot be translated’. 
The fact that the black poets had to use French to spread the word of their
struggle seemed a major limitation to Sartre. Yet, given the upheavals and dispersal
of the slave trade, amongst other factors, black people did not have a common
language and were thus forced to use the language of the oppressor to call the
oppressed to unite. Within the confines of the French Empire, the use of French
would ensure the widest audience amongst the black peoples. Yet this was not
without its difficulties. The use of French to proclaim their rejection of French
culture meant that the black writers were ‘taking with one hand what they were
pushing aside with the other’. Inevitably, this meant allowing the thought machinery
of the enemy to lodge in their brains. Moreover, the syntax and the vocabulary of the
French language, forged as they were in other times and climes, for different needs
and to denote different objects, were not appropriate tools for the black writers to
speak of themselves and their own concerns, hopes and desires. Following Mallarmé,
Sartre described the French language as ‘goose-fleshed, pale and cold like our skies’,
‘the neutral language par excellence’, in line with the French national spirit, which
required the toning down of loud colours and flamboyance. This was the language
in which the poets of Negritude were to ‘pour the fire of their skies and their hearts’.
As an analytical language, corresponding to the analytical nature of French thought,
the French language might be singularly inapt to articulate black consciousness,
given that the ‘black genius’ was most probably synthetic in character. Although the
term négritude itself was one of the rare black contributions to the lexicon of the
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French language, it remained inadequate to express the other sub-analytical concepts
and perceptions of ‘black consciousness’, for which the words were simply lacking in
French (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xvii–xviii). 
There is much in this, which is open to debate, including the essentialism
implicit in the concept of the ‘Negro’, as set out here. With regard to language, Sartre
went on to state that French was not a foreign language for the ‘Negro’, as he had
been taught it from a very early age (though clearly this could only apply to the elite
minority who went to French schools). He claimed that there was no problem with
using it to talk of matters to do with technology, science or politics; the only problem
was when it comes to speaking of ‘himself ’. Here, there would always be a slight
hiatus ‘separating what he says from what he would like to say’: ‘It seems to him as
though a northern Spirit is stealing his ideas, gently inflecting them to mean more
or less what he intended; it seems as though the white words are soaking up his ideas
like sand soaks up blood’ (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xix). 
In this text, language was seen by Sartre as ‘half signs and half things’ (‘à moitié
signes et choses à demi’). This was a view that clearly saw an important ideological
role for language, in addition to its role as a vehicle of communication, combining a
measure of essentialism with instrumentality. He concluded by saying that, because
of the difficulties of expression through this language, the poetry actually attempted
to make the language disappear; it used it to create silence (Sartre in Senghor 1948:
xx). The black poets were engaged in a process of destruction of the French language,
or rather, as Sartre put it, ‘defrancising’ the language. One of the ways in which they
did this was by breaking down the customary associations of words, particularly
through the reversal of the usual hierarchical order of white and black (Sartre in
Senghor 1948: xx–xxi). 
This was also how he saw Fanon subverting the French language, inverting the
normal subject/object order of discourse, by excluding the erstwhile French subjects
from the dialogue altogether.
A ‘French-speaking’ ex-native bends this language to meet new needs, puts
it to use and addresses his words to the colonised alone: ‘Natives of all the
under-developed countries, unite!’ What a comedown! For their fathers, we
were the only people worth talking to; now the sons no longer think we are
worth talking to at all. We have become the objects of the discourse. (Sartre
in Fanon (1961)/1987: 7)   
There is a clear tension here, between on the one hand the French language as a
particular entity with its own essence and features, constituting an integral part of
the French national identity, and, on the other hand, the potentialities that also exist
to recreate it as an instrument that will suit a variety of multiple purposes.
In ‘Orphée noir’, Sartre had claimed that ‘words are ideas’. However, this was
not to say that he believed that thought was the same thing as language, or that it
was reducible to it. He made this clear in a later interview in Telos, at a time when
he was targeting the structuralist approach to language. Here he said that, for him
Jean-Paul Sartre | 97
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 97
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
‘thought never confounds itself with language. There was a time when thought was
defined as independent of language, as something unknowable and ineffable, existing
before expression. Today we make the opposite error. They wish us to believe that
thought is only language, as if language itself were not spoken’ (Sartre 1971: 111). 
In a plea for a dialectical approach, he went on to propose two levels for
language, a structural level, which he likens to an element of the ‘practico-inert’, and
the other, the level of praxis:
In reality, there are two levels. At the first level, language actually appears as
an autonomous system which reflects social unification. Language is an
element of the ‘practico-inert’, a sonorous matter united by a practical
whole. The linguist takes this totality of relations as an object of study, and
he has a right to do so since it is already constituted. It is the moment of
structure, where totality appears as the thing without man, a network of
oppositions in which each element defines itself by another one, where there
is no term, but only relations of difference. 
Sartre thus concedes that, at one level, language is constituted by its structures. Yet
these structures themselves bear the mark of human activity and intervention: 
at the same time this thing without man is matter worked by man, bearing
the traces of man. In nature you will not find oppositions such as those
described by the linguist. Nature knows only the independence of forces.
Material elements are placed one next to the other and act one over the
other. But the lines of force are always external. It is not a matter of internal
relations, such as that which poses masculine in relation to feminine or
plural in relation to singular: that is, of a system in which the existence of
each element conditions that of all others. If you admit the existence of such
a system, you must also admit that language exists only as spoken, that is,
in action. Each element of the system returns to a whole, but this whole is
dead if every moment does not take it up and make it function. (Sartre
1971: 111)
Thus, there is always a second level to language, the level at which human activity,
or praxis, comes into play. 
At the second level, it can no longer be a question of structures already there
which will exist without us. In the system of language, there are some things
that the inert cannot give alone: the mark of praxis. Structures impose
themselves upon us only to the extent that they are made by others. Thus,
to understand how a structure is made, it is necessary to introduce praxis as
that totalizing process. Structural analysis must pass over to a dialectical
comprehension. 
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The Dialectics of Difference: the Universal and the Particular
This dialectical approach is also evident in his discussion of the tension between the
universal and the particular. One of the key features of Sartre’s contribution in this
domain is his subversion of the universalist discourse that was used in support of the
French colonial project. 
Sartre brought out quite clearly the way in which the economic foundations of
the colonial system in Algeria were in fundamental contradiction with the
universalist ideology of the French Republic, explaining how this led the pied noir
colonists to oppose the political institutions of France and any extension to the
colonised of the democratic rights which they enjoyed as part of the metropolis
(Sartre 1956: 1383). These rights were only for the colonists and were only to be
enjoyed in France, amongst French people. The universality of the metropolitan
institutions, even if only formal, was anathema to the colonists. However, this was
where racism stepped in, ‘to counterbalance the latent universalism of bourgeois
liberalism’ (Sartre 1956: 1384). By relegating the colonised to the category of the
subhuman, they were therefore not entitled to come under the aegis of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man.18
In Algeria, there was no attempt at cloaking the labour relation in the guise of a
free contract between equal human beings. In a situation of forced labour and
military repression, the pretence of universal humanism was rejected. Away from
France, the army rejected metropolitan universalism and worked on the principle
that only a limited number of the world’s population could qualify as part of the
human race. In this way, the colonised were excluded and therefore exempted from
the moral law that prohibited crimes against one’s fellow man.19
This subversion of the universalist discourse, as far as Algeria was concerned, did
not mean, however, that universalism per se had no role to play in Sartre’s thought.
What he was saying was that the universalism of the French political discourse was
not in fact a reality; he was not necessarily opposed to it as a principle, as far as it
went, which, in the context of Sartre’s overall political positions, was not far enough,
given its limitations as a result of its bourgeois character. 
There are other domains in which Sartre was undeniably a universalist,
particularly in his understanding of history and his own anthropological project,
based on the notion of a progress towards the realisation of humanity.20 And,
although he viewed history to date as dominated by the European subjects of that
history, he clearly saw the liberation struggles as an opportunity for the colonised to
enter into history and thus make it truly universal for the first time (Sartre in Fanon
(1961)/1987: 9). 
He also had a clear belief in the universalism of knowledge, with its fundamental
tenet that all human knowledge is available for the whole of the species and also its
counterpart that there are no areas of human experience belonging to particular
cultures or societies that are inherently closed to human knowledge. He was also part
of the body of thinkers who believe that it is possible to explain the evolution of
humanity and human societies through a single conceptual system and to elaborate
a project that embraces humanity as a whole (Amin 1989: xi). 
Jean-Paul Sartre | 99
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 99
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
However, a belief in the universalism of knowledge does not imply uniformity,
especially in the domain of culture, where Sartre had a clear understanding of the
particularity of different cultures. This could at times lead to a tension in his
thought, especially when the assumption of his own and others’ historicity seemed
to involve the adoption of a ready-made essence that seemed to be at odds with his
position that there is no a priori essence. 
Some of these difficulties were evident in his analysis of Negritude in ‘Orphée
noir’, where, at one point, he referred to ‘the irredeemable suffering that is the
universal essence of mankind’ (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xxxv). Yet, Negritude itself
was not seen as an a priori essence, but as ‘devenir’, ‘becoming’, a moment in history,
an enterprise, a future, a mission (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xxxix). Negritude was not
universal in scope. Rather, there was a clear distinction to be made between race and
class, which were not congruent, the former being ‘concrete and particular’, the latter
‘universal and abstract’ (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xl–xli). However, Negritude was a
stage, albeit a particularist one, in a movement towards the universal. 
Sartre spelled out the terms of the dialectic thus: the theoretical and practical
affirmation of white supremacy was the thesis; the assertion of Negritude as an
antithetical value represented the negation of this thesis. However, this negation was
not a sufficient goal in itself. It was merely a stage in the preparation of the synthesis
to come, when humanity would be realised in a society without races. Negritude had
only come into being in order to be destroyed. It was a phase, not the end of the
process, a means to an end, not an end in itself (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xli). 
Thus, Negritude was far more than merely a celebration of atavistic instincts,
looking back to the past. It also entailed the transcending of a situation. As Sartre put
it, it was ‘born from Evil’, but ‘pregnant with a future Good’, existing in a state of
tension between nostalgia for a past to which there is no real return and a future in
which Negritude itself will give way to new values (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xliii).
Sartre quotes a poem by the Haitian poet, Jacques Roumain, who felt obliged,
as a communist, to abandon his African identity to become a member of the
international proletariat: 
Africa, I have kept your memory Africa
you are in me
Like the splinter in the cut
like a fetish standing guard over the village
make of me the stone of the sling
make of my mouth the lips of your wound
make of my knees the broken columns of your degradation
yet
I only want to be part of your race
Workers and peasants of the world (quoted by Sartre in Senghor 1948 :xli)
In this scenario, to become part of the universal, international proletariat, the black
man must ‘tear out his heart’, i.e. his race. Yet this is only one interpretation and one
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that implies a very abstract form of universalism, against which might be set, for
example, Aimé Césaire’s more pluralistic variety of the universal concrete, ‘riche de
tout ce qui est particulier’, in which all existing particularisms could coexist and act
as a source of mutual enrichment (see Chapter 2).21
In Sartre’s view of the dialectic between particularism and universalism, the
black man was ‘one who walked on a crest between the particularism of the past
which he had just climbed and the universalism of the future which would be the
twilight of his negritude; one who lived to the limit his particularism, to discover in
it the dawn of the universal’ (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xiii). This vision of
universalism is one of the future; it has nothing to do with the universalism of the
Republican discourse of the Rights of Man, which is not a project, but a statement
of inherent rights, constituting part of the eternal human essence. 
Sartre’s analysis of Negritude clearly has its limitations, some of which are no
doubt due to the historical form of the phenomenon itself. One can remain
uncomfortable with the essentialising treatment of the black man or the Negro, as
with the (stereo)typical view it presents of the black African male, ignoring
differences amongst black people, not least those between men and women, the latter
only figuring as the object of men’s desire or as mother. However, this chapter will
now move on to a discussion of Sartre’s own position as a Frenchman, in an attempt
to determine how far this particularity impinged on his work in this area.
Sartre the Frenchman
One thing that is striking about the more political of Sartre’s writings is the extent to
which he gives expression to the divide between ‘us’ and ‘them’, characteristic of
writing about colonialism at this time. There are a number of questions that need to
be posed. First of all, who are the ‘we’? Secondly, what is the basis of this identification
and why does it figure so largely in Sartre’s work? And, finally, is it a problem? 
There is no single answer to the question of who ‘we’ are, as the precise
identification of the group in question changes from text to text. However, the basic
collective identity with which Sartre identifies in these texts is as a Frenchman.
Sometimes this French identity is subsumed within a larger European or ‘white’
identity. However, underpinning all this writing is the basic historical fact of Sartre’s
Frenchness and his identification with it.22
Now, this French ‘we’ does not always have precisely the same meaning for Sartre
or cover exactly the same category of people. Sometimes, ‘we’ means the coloniser, as
opposed to the colonised, in an understanding of the complicity of all French people
in the colonial process. At other times, Sartre clearly intends the ‘we’ to exclude the
pied noir colonists; ‘we’ signifies only the metropolitan French. Yet again, at the
height of the opposition to the Algerian War, ‘we’ clearly signifies not even the
metropolitan French as a whole, but the French opponents of this war. 
What is nonetheless striking is that ‘we’ never seems to include the Algerians, or
other colonised people as part of the collective identity. The ‘us’/‘them’ divide
remains integral to Sartre’s discourse, mirroring that of the colonial view of the
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Other. This was not the case with Césaire, whose position may be contrasted with
that of Sartre on the ‘us’/‘them’ binary divide. Not only did Césaire believe that the
French people shared an inherent anticolonialism (Césaire 1956: 1366); he also
believed in a common ‘order’ amongst nations, seeing the epoch of empire as a
departure from this common order, to which Europe should now return (Césaire
1956: 1368).    
The ‘us’/‘them’ problematic comes through strikingly in Sartre’s preface to
Fanon’s Damnés de la terre, a text that breaks completely with the distancing which
Sartre could still achieve in respect of the French colonial administration, in, for
example, ‘Le colonialisme est un système’ (Sartre 1956: 1380). This is particularly so
in the way in which Sartre differentiates his ‘we’ from that of Fanon himself. Sartre,
in his preface, specifically addresses his fellow countrymen – ‘mes chers co-
continentaux’ he calls them at one point (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 6). His
preface has as its objective the enlightenment of his fellows; he wishes to persuade
them that there is something in Fanon’s book that is of relevance to them. 
Fanon, on the other hand, is not addressing the Europeans at all, let alone as part
of a collective identity with which he has any affinity; on the contrary, he is talking
about them to his fellows, his ‘brothers’. He is outside Europe and his view is from
this outside. What is interesting are the terms Sartre uses to describe this ‘scandalous’
aspect of the book: ‘par cette raison, son livre est scandaleux’ (Sartre in Fanon
(1961)/1987: 7). This emotive expression may strike the reader as rather odd. For, if
Fanon is telling it like it is, i.e. the truth, why should this be scandalous to the
rational mind? It implies something in Sartre’s gut reaction to the book, which, by
making the colonised into the subjects and the colonisers the object of the discourse,
threatened the very Frenchness in which he was rooted. 
Throughout the preface, Sartre acts as the voice of the French coloniser, talking
of ‘our notorious crimes’, ‘our Machiavellianism’, ‘our lies’ – no doubt with the
intention of subverting this voice. Fanon, on the other hand, is portrayed as the voice
of the Third World, ‘their’ voice, through which they are discovering themselves and
learning to communicate to each other.23 Its interest for ‘us’, the French, is that, in
showing ‘us’ what ‘we’ have done to ‘them’, we will understand what ‘we’ have done
to ourselves (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 7). Sartre then proceeds to address the
‘Europeans’ this time as ‘vous’ not ‘nous’, urging them to open the book and enter into
it: ‘Européens, ouvrez ce livre, entrez-y.’ Then, in the next paragraph, the ‘nous’
reappears, though it is an oblique ‘nous’ in indirect speech. The ‘nous’ of those whom
he was addressing is not a ‘nous’ in which he includes himself: ‘In that case, you may
say, let’s throw this book out of the window. Why read it since it isn’t written for us?’
(Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 9–10). In the next sentence, he slips back into an
identification, when he gives as one of the two reasons for reading it, the fact that
Fanon ‘explains you to his brothers and exposes for their benefit the way in which
our alienation operates’; Sartre urges the European reader to take advantage of this
to gain self-knowledge as the object of analysis. He then claims that ‘our victims
know us through their suffering and chains; this is what gives their evidence its
credibility’. Thus, ‘it is enough for them to show us what we have made of them, in
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order for us to understand what we have made of ourselves’. Then again he reverts to
the second person, ‘vous’, in an apostrophe, urging the French to become aware and
ashamed of what is done ‘in your name’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 10). Then,
moving to the ‘je’ form, Sartre comes out with what appears as a quite extraordinary
statement, in which he claims, as a European, to be stealing the book of an enemy,
to be able to use it to heal Europe.24
Why is this so extraordinary? The first reason is the fact that Sartre should take
his identification as a European so far as to see Fanon as an ‘enemy’, even if this is
for rhetorical effect. However, more crucial is the fact that what emerges from this
text is not a primary concern with the problems and potentialities of the colonised,
but a concern with the problems of Europe and the Europeans, with ‘our’ problems.
At this point, it might be apposite to quote one sentence from his preface to Albert
Memmi’s Portrait du colonisé, in which he criticised him for not having given equal
weight to the suffocating effect of colonisation on the colonists themselves, who were
also victims of the system.25
While it is undoubtedly true that, as Sartre says, both the colonist and the
colonised were to some extent ‘victims’ of the colonial system, some were undoubtedly
more victims than others. This is something of which Sartre was fully aware, yet in
many of these texts the effect on ‘us’ is promoted to the major concern, and it is true
that his interest in the question of colonialism was inspired as much, if not primarily,
by his concern for its impact on the French people, of which he was part. Indeed, he
claimed that Fanon’s book had no need of a preface, particularly as it was not
addressed to ‘us’. Yet he wrote one, precisely in order to take the dialectic to its logical
outcome: ‘we too, people of Europe, are being decolonised: this means that a bloody
operation is taking place to cut out the colonist that is inside each one of us. Let us
look at ourselves, if we have the courage, to see what is happening to us’ (Sartre in
Fanon (1961)/1987: 18). 
It was nonetheless unusual for Sartre to have any sense of identification with the
colonist settlers in North Africa, and the division between ‘us’ and ‘them’ often comes
across as that between the metropolitan French and the colons – the pieds noirs. In his
preface to Memmi’s book, he had compared the divide between the metropolitan
French and the pieds noirs to the split between the north and the south in the United
States, particularly for the claim by the southerners that only they knew the blacks
and only they were qualified to speak about slavery and other issues related to it
(Sartre in Memmi (1957)/1985: 31). Sartre pitches himself clearly on the
metropolitan French side of the divide. Colonialism is in its last throes and the job
of the French of the Hexagon (‘nous, Français de la métropole’) is to hasten its demise.
The pieds noirs, on the other hand, would stop at nothing to defend their system,
demanding the sacrifice of young Frenchmen for the sake of racist and Nazi values
and even undermining the French law and constitution to establish a fascist regime
in France itself (Sartre 1956: 1386). 
The nous here is the nous of the Français de France, who have the potential to
resist this ‘shame’. Just as there were French to fight against fascism in the Second
World War, there were those, including many prominent artists and intellectuals,
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who became involved in initiatives against the war and called the law into question:
campaigns such as the ‘Appel des 121’, in which 121 intellectuals argued that
desertion and civil disobedience were legitimate courses of action in the face of an
unjust war; legal defence groups to defend those arrested, involving lawyers such as
Jacques Vergès, Gisèle Halimi, Roland Dumas and many others; support networks,
like the réseau Jeanson, or the one later organised by Henri Curiel, or the ‘Nizan
group’, which gave practical help to those involved in the political and armed
struggle (Hamon and Rotman 1979; Evans 1997). 
However, just as the Resistance did not involve all the French, neither did the
opposition to the Algerian War. Thus, Sartre’s nous can sometimes be more restrictive,
including only those French people who were active opponents of the war. In the
1980 conversations with Benny Lévy, where he reviewed his positions regarding the
Algerian War, this was put very clearly, as was Sartre’s deeply felt patriotism:
It was the time when I was seeing a lot of Fanon, who was a profoundly
violent man, and this certainly influenced the way I expressed myself. There
was also the fact that we were in an awkward position, given that, after all,
we were fighting against France and together with Algerians who didn’t
really like us very much, even though we were on their side. This put us in
a rather odd position, which is reflected in this text, in the malaise, the
extreme violence, the rigid stance adopted, because it wasn’t easy at all.
France is something that exists for me. I found it most disagreeable to be
against my own country. (Sartre and Lévy 1991: 64–65)   
In fact, Sartre made a clear differentiation between the Resistance and the opposition
to the Algerian War. Unlike the Resistance, in which the intellectuals and the
saboteurs were the same people, or at least in the same boat and interchangeable, this
was not the case with the Algerian War, where the intellectual opposition in France
was clearly not made up of the same people as those fighting on the ground in
Algeria (Sartre and Lévy 1991: 65). Moreover, while he saw the Resistance’s violence
as a necessary evil, in the case of Algeria he claimed that he felt he had to go even
further to give his support to the violence in order to compensate for the collective
responsibility and guilt that he assumed as a Frenchman.26
There is no doubt that the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide was fully in line with his
philosophical approach to the Self and the Other and in contrast with the position
taken by such as Césaire. The absolute opposition that it implied had the merit of
reflecting the actual reality of the colonial relation; at the same time, it risked
bringing a number of problems in its train. Not least of these was the problematic
role in the anticolonial struggle for the ‘us’ in Sartre’s sense, in which the question of
identification was one of the key issues. 
When Sartre acknowledged the validity of Memmi’s distinction between the
‘colons qui se refusent’ and the ‘colons qui s’acceptent’, this might be interpreted as a
recognition of the freedom to choose not to accept one’s given situation – as one
might expect from him (Sartre in Memmi (1957)/1985: 32). However, he also said
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that there are no good or bad colonialists – only colonialists, even if some refused to
accept their objective reality; there was a collective guilt, which was inescapable.27 Yet
the definition of the collective was complicated by the fact that Sartre’s ‘we’ did not
extend to the pieds noirs. Thus, while he appeared to approve of Memmi’s apparent
solution, which Sartre said was to transcend his own particularity by seeking refuge in
the universality of ‘une Raison rigoureuse’ (Sartre in Memmi (1957)/1985: 32),28 his
own prime concern with the metropolitan French passed through a different
trajectory, in which the notions of shame and then guilt were necessary staging points. 
There are numerous examples in his writings of this sense of shame at being a
Frenchman, a European or a white man, depending on the context, and the gaze of
the colonised Other played a crucial role in producing this shame. For instance, a
reading of the texts of the black poets transformed the European reality for the white
man into something ‘accidental’, no longer the norm, in which the grandeur and
dignity that were formerly found through the European mastery of the blacks and
reflected in their meek, ‘tamed’ subservience was now shattered by the ‘power of their
wild and unbridled gaze which casts a judgement over our land’29 or, put another
way, ‘the force of their calm, caustic gaze pierces us right through to the bone’.30
In Sartre’s own case, however, it has to be said that the return of the gaze
provoked not just the shame of which he spoke, but also a positive desire to
overcompensate for the colonial process. This was evident in his outright
commitment to a violent solution in the anticolonial struggle, as well as statements
such as that when he claimed that ‘black poetry in the French language is the only
great revolutionary poetry today’ (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xii). 
His identification with the nous represented by the French people was essential
to the task of bringing home to the French public the shame of colonialism. He saw
this shame as a necessary stage in the realisation of what the colonial reality was and
why the nous constituted by the French people, in which he included himself, was
the legitimate target of the Algerian Revolution.31 This undoubtedly represented a
moral choice, at the same time as a political choice, implied by his fundamental
anticolonialist stance. For fundamental to his position was the notion of the
collective guilt of the French people, all of whom had benefited from colonial
exploitation and were therefore implicated. Indeed, he went further to say that ‘we
are all exploiters’; ‘we have taken the gold and the minerals, then the oil from the
“new continents” and brought it back to the old metropolitan homelands’ (Sartre in
Fanon (1961)/1987: 18). This included the French Left, and indeed all those whose
talk of humanism masked a core racism. All were in the same collective camp and
would be treated the same by the Algerians fighting for their freedom.32 Sartre saw
no contradiction in the existence of a racist humanism, since ‘the European has only
achieved his humanity by creating slaves and monsters’ (Sartre in Fanon
(1961)/1987: 18–19). 
This notion of collective guilt acquired some of its relevance in connection with
a past that was still very much in the recent memory of the French, the experience
of the Second World War and the moral issues it had raised. However, it also had
implications that carried forward into a future that has become our present. 
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Thus, in spite of the contradictions endemic in the dialectic of universalism and
particularity, especially in respect of Sartre’s own identity and specific historicity as a
Frenchman, the notion of collective guilt, as developed by him, could provide a
starting point for the development of a political analysis of the role of those who have
hitherto benefited from the North/South divide, in a global strategy to bring about
change. As Sartre left it, it remains predominantly a moral concept, whereas what are
at stake are no doubt economic, political and, to a lesser extent, cultural issues, which
require economic, political and cultural solutions. 
Sartre’s major importance to anti-imperialist thought certainly lies elsewhere, in
his theorisation of the colonised Other and the possibilities of subversion of the
colonial relation. On a different plane, his legacy also lies in his exemplary value as a
committed intellectual. His political involvement was, unquestionably, closely tied to
national liberation struggles, yet he himself had no theory of the nation as such.
Indeed, his own national identity as a Frenchman was never seriously questioned, but
was rather taken as a given. Where he talked about it at all, it was largely defined in
terms of his self-identity being mediated through the French language. Thus, in spite
of the great input and influence of Sartre’s theoretical work (even when unrecognised
as such), it was for others to develop the theoretical dimension of the national
liberation struggles themselves.
Notes
1. ‘C’est que, en effet, autrui n’est pas seulement celui que je vois, mais celui qui me voit’
(Sartre (1943)/1994: 266).
2. Les opinions de l’opinion publique se forment à la manière de la Grande Peur, en tant
que chacun se fait Autre par son opinion, c’est-à-dire en la prenant de l’Autre, parce
que l’Autre la pense en tant qu’Autre, et en se faisant informateur des Autres. A ce
niveau, l’Idée est processus; sa force invincible lui vient de ce que personne ne la pense,
c’est-à-dire qu’elle ne se définit pas comme le moment conscient de la praxis – c’est-à-
dire comme dévoilement unifiant des objets dans la temporalisation dialectique de
l’action – mais comme un objet pratico-inerte dont l’évidence s’identifie pour moi à
ma double incapacité de la vérifier et de la transformer chez les Autres. (Sartre
(1960)/1985: 406).
3. On compte aujourd’hui encore 80% d’illettrés en Algérie. Passe encore si nous ne leur
avions interdit que l’usage de notre langue. Mais il entre nécessairement dans le
système colonialiste qu’il tente de barrer la route de l’histoire aux colonisés; comme les
revendications nationales, en Europe, se sont toujours appuyées sur l’unité de la
langue, on a refusé aux Musulmans l’usage de leur propre langue. Depuis 1830, la
langue arabe est considérée en Algérie comme une langue étrangère; on la parle
encore, mais elle n’est plus langue écrite que virtuellement. (Sartre 1956: 1380).
4. pour maintenir les Arabes dans l’émiettement, l’administration française leur a
confisqué leur religion; elle recrute les desservants du culte islamique parmi les
créatures à sa solde. Elle a maintenu les superstitions les plus basses, parce qu’elles
désunissaient. La séparation de l’Eglise et de l’Etat, c’est un privilège républicain, un
luxe bon pour la Métropole. En Algérie, la république française ne peut se permettre
d’être républicaine. Elle maintient l’inculture et les croyances de la féodalité, mais en
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supprimant les structures et les coutumes qui permettent à une féodalité vivante d’être
malgré tout une société humaine; elle impose un code individualiste et libéral pour
ruiner les cadres et les essors de la collectivité algérienne, mais elle maintient les
roitelets qui ne tiennent leur pouvoir que d’elle et qui gouvernent pour elle. En un
mot, elle fabrique des ‘indigènes’ par un double mouvement qui les sépare de la
collectivité archaïque en leur donnant ou en leur conservant, dans la solitude de
l’individualisme libéral, une mentalité dont l’archaïsme ne peut se perpétuer qu’en
relation avec l’archaïsme de la société. Elle crée des masses mais les empêche de devenir
un prolétariat conscient en les mystifiant par la caricature de leur propre idéologie.
(Sartre 1956: 1380–81).
5. ‘L’unique bienfait du colonialisme, c’est qu’il doit se montrer intransigeant pour durer et
qu’il prépare sa perte par son intransigeance’ (Sartre 1956: 1385–86).
6. Aux colonies la vérité se montrait nue; les ‘métropoles’ la préféraient vêtue; il fallait
que l’indigène les aimât. Comme des mères, en quelque sorte. L’élite européenne
entreprit de fabriquer un indigénat d’élite; on sélectionnait des adolescents, on leur
marquait sur le front, au fer rouge, les principes de la culture occidentale, on leur
fourrait dans la bouche des baillons sonores, grands mots pâteux qui collaient aux
dents; après un bref séjour en métropole, on les renvoyait chez eux, truqués. (Sartre in
Fanon (1961)/1987: 5).
7. ‘Il n’y a pas si longtemps, la terre comptait deux milliards d’habitants, soit cinq cent
millions d’hommes et un milliard cinq cent millions d’indigènes. Les premiers
disposaient du Verbe, les autres l’empruntaient’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 5).
8. ‘les voix jaunes et noires parlaient encore de notre humanisme mais c’était pour nous
reprocher notre inhumanité’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 5).
9. ‘vous faites de nous des monstres, votre humanisme nous prétend universels et vos
pratiques racistes nous particularisent’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 6).
10. As Césaire was to say: ‘Cela signifie la parole donnée et pour la première fois depuis 1830
au peuple algérien, et l’assurance qu’il pourra librement orienter ses destinées’ (Césaire
1956: 1370).
11. une idéologie pétrifiée s’applique à considérer des hommes comme des bêtes qui
parlent. Vainement: pour leur donner des ordres, fût-ce les plus durs, les plus
insultants, il faut commencer par les reconnaître; et comme on ne peut les surveiller
sans cesse, il faut bien se résoudre à leur faire confiance: nul ne peut traiter un homme
‘comme un chien’, s’il ne le tient d’abord pour un homme. L’impossible
déshumanisation de l’opprimé se retourne et devient l’aliénation de l’oppresseur: c’est
lui, c’est lui-même qui ressuscite par son moindre geste l’humanité qu’il veut détruire;
et, comme il la nie chez les autres, il la retrouve partout comme une force ennemie.
Pour y échapper, il faut qu’il se minéralise, qu’il se donne la consistance opaque et
l’imperméabilité du roc, bref qu’il se ‘déshumanise’ à son tour. (Sartre in Memmi
(1957)/1985: 36–37).
12. ‘Ils ne connaissent, disiez-vous, que la force?  Bien sûr; d’abord ce ne sera que celle du
colon et, bientôt, que la leur, cela veut dire: la même rejaillissant sur nous comme notre
reflet vient du fond du miroir à notre rencontre’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 10).
13. Ne vous y trompez pas; par cette folle rogne, par cette bile et ce fiel, par leur désir
permanent de nous tuer, par la contracture permanente de muscles puissants qui ont
peur de se dénouer, ils sont hommes: par le colon, qui les veut hommes de peine, et
contre lui. Aveugle encore, abstraite, la haine est leur seul trésor: le Maître la provoque
parce qu’il cherche à les abêtir, il échoue à la briser parce que ses intérêts l’arrêtent à
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mi-chemin; ainsi les faux indigènes sont humains encore, par la puissance et
l’impuissance de l’oppresseur qui se transforment, chez eux, en un refus entêté de la
condition animale. (Sartre in Fanon (1961/ 1987: 12–13).
14.  See Chapter 3.
15. ‘l’Européen n’a pu se faire homme qu’en fabriquant des esclaves et des monstres’ (Sartre
in Fanon (1961)/1987: 19).
16. ‘C’est la fin, comme vous voyez: l’Europe fait eau de toute part … que nous étions les
sujets de l’histoire et que nous en sommes à présent les objets’ (Sartre in Fanon
(1961)/1987: 20).
17. Nous trouvons notre humanité en-deça de la mort et du désespoir, il la trouve au-delà
des supplices et de la mort. Nous avons été les semeurs de vent; la tempête, c’est lui.
Fils de la violence, il puise en elle à chaque instant son humanité: nous étions hommes
à ses dépens, il se fait homme aux nôtres. Un autre homme: de meilleure qualité.
(Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 17).
18. Le colonialisme refuse les droits de l’homme à des hommes qu’il a soumis par la
violence, qu’il maintient par la force dans la misère et l’ignorance, donc comme dirait
Marx, en état de ‘sous-humanité’. Dans les faits eux-mêmes, dans les institutions, dans
la nature des échanges et de la production, le racisme est inscrit; les statuts politique
et social se renforcent mutuellement puisque l’indigène est un sous-homme, la
Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme ne le concerne pas. (Sartre in Memmi
(1957)/1985: 34).
19. ‘Nos soldats, outre-mer, repoussent l’universalisme métropolitain, appliquent au genre
humain le numerus clausus: puisque nul ne peut sans crime dépouiller son semblable,
l’asservir ou le tuer, ils posent en principe que le colonisé n’est pas le semblable de
l’homme’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 11).
20. Sartre’s conception of progress and history at the end of his life were recorded in the
controversial and disputed conversations with Benny Lévy: 
Je supposais que l’évolution par l’action serait une série d’échecs d’où sortirait,
imprévu, quelque chose de positif qui était déjà contenu dans l’échec, mais ignoré de
ceux qui avaient voulu réussir. Et que ce sont ces réussites partielles, locales,
difficilement déchiffrables par les gens qui ont fait le travail, qui, d’échec en échec,
réaliseraient un progrès. C’est comme ça que j’ai toujours compris l’histoire. (Sartre
and Lévy 1991: 35).
21. Sartre had his own interpretation of pluralism in relation to universalism, which he defines
in connection with his own writing: 
J’écris, et les pensées que j’offre aux gens par écrit sont universelles. Mais elles ne
sont pas plurielles. Elles sont universelles, c’est-à-dire que chacun en les lisant formera
ces pensées, bien ou mal. Mais elles ne sont pas plurielles, en ce sens qu'elles ne sont
pas produites par une rencontre de plusieurs personnes et ne portent la marque que
de moi seul. Une pensée plurielle n’a pas d’entrée privilégiée; elle est abordée par
chacun à sa manière; elle n’a qu’un sens, bien sûr, mais que chacun produit à partir de
prémisses et de préoccupations différentes et dont chacun comprend la structure par
des exemples différents. (Sartre and Lévy 1991: 42).
22. Sartre’s view of his own historicity, at least in his last years, also encompassed the notion
of a particular intellectual and religious tradition, i.e. a certain Christian theological one
to which he belonged. As he is purported to claim, in the conversations with Benny Lévy:
‘C’est ça ma tradition, je n’en ai pas d’autre. Ni la tradition orientale, ni la tradition juive.
Elles me manquent par mon historicité’ (Sartre and Lévy 1991: 28).
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23. ‘Bref, le Tiers Monde se découvre et se parle par cette voix’ (Sartre in Fanon (1961)/1987: 7).
24. ‘Européen, je vole le livre d’un ennemi et j’en fais un moyen de guérir l’Europe’ (Sartre
in Fanon (1961)/1987: 10).
25. ‘Il eût mieux valu, peut-être, montrer le colonialiste et sa victime pareillement étranglés
par l’appareil colonial … qui, après avoir donné toute satisfaction aux colonisateurs, se
retourne contre eux et risque de les broyer’ (Sartre in Memmi (1957)/1985: 32–33).
26. Si je voyais et souhaitais les Algériens moins violents qu’ils n’étaient, je pactisais avec
les autres Français: j’étais de nouveau repris par la France. Il fallait que je voie les
Algériens comme des hommes malmenés, crucifiés par la France, qui battent contre
les Français parce que les Français sont injustes. Et moi, je suis Français, je suis injuste
comme eux, parce qu’il y a une responsabilité collective, mais, en même temps,
j’approuve et c’est là que je me distingue de la plupart des autres Français, j’approuve
ces hommes torturés de lutter contre les Français.
B. Lévy: Violence verbale, parce que autoflagellation nationale?
J-P Sartre: En partie, oui; en partie, certainement. (Sartre and Lévy 1991: 66).
27. D’abord qu’il n’y a ni bons ni mauvais colons: il y a des colonialistes. Parmi eux,
quelques-uns refusent leur réalité objective: entraînés par l’appareil colonial, ils font
tous les jours ce qu’ils condamnent en rêve et chacun de leurs actes contribue à
maintenir l’oppression; ils ne changeront rien, ne serviront à personne et trouveront
leur confort moral dans le malaise, voilà tout. (Sartre in Memmi (1957/1985: 35).
28.  See Chapter 3.
29. Jadis Européens de droit divin, nous sentions déjà notre dignité s’effriter sous les
regards américains ou soviétiques; déjà l’Europe n’était plus qu’un accident
géographique, la presqu’île que l’Asie pousse jusqu’à l’Atlantique. Au moins espérions-
nous retrouver un peu de notre grandeur dans les yeux domestiqués des Africains.
Mais il n’y a plus d’yeux domestiqués: il y a les regards sauvages et libres qui jugent
notre terre. (Sartre in Senghor 1948: x).
30. ‘L’Etre est noir, l’Etre est de feu, nous sommes accidentels et lointains, nous avons à nous
justifier de nos moeurs, de nos techniques, de notre pâleur de mal-cuits et de notre
végétation vert-de-gris.  Par ces regards tranquilles et corrosifs, nous sommes rongés
jusqu’aux os’ (Sartre in Senghor 1948: xi). Or, as one of the poems by Aimé Césaire put
it: ‘Ecoutez le monde blanc / horriblement las de son effort immense / … / Pitié pour
nos vainqueurs omniscients et naïfs’ (quoted by Sartre in Senghor 1948: xi).
31. ‘Une telle négociation impliquerait évidemment qu’on reconnaisse ce que représentent
ceux qui nous combattent: la réalité nationale algérienne’ (Sartre 1956: 1352).
32. Dès que leur guerre a commencé, ils ont aperçu cette vérité rigoureuse: nous nous
valons tous tant que nous sommes, nous avons tous profité d’eux, ils n’ont rien à
prouver, ils ne feront de traitement de faveur à personne. Un seul devoir, un seul
objectif: chasser le colonialisme par tous les moyens. Et les plus avisés d’entre nous
seraient, à la rigueur, prêts à l’admettre mais ils ne peuvent s’empêcher de voir dans
cette épreuve de force le moyen tout inhumain que des sous-hommes ont pris pour se
faire octroyer une charte d’humanité: qu’on l’accorde au plus vite et qu’ils tâchent
alors, par des entreprises pacifiques, de la mériter. Nos belles âmes sont racistes. (Sartre
in Fanon (1961)/1987: 15).
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Chapter 5
The Nation in the National 
Liberation Struggle
As we have seen, resistance to empire and to the different forms of imperialdomination, exploitation and oppression had been present, both actively and
passively, from the first stages of imperialism. It could be individual in scope or, more
often, based on a collective linked by tribal, family, religious or regional loyalties. The
process of transformation of these different movements offering sporadic, isolated,
often spontaneous, resistance to the forces of empire into broader movements capable
of mobilising the resources of an entire national community was a long one, often
taking decades to mature. It required the development of a national consciousness, a
national political leadership and a coherent strategy for conducting the struggle for
national liberation. Throughout the course of the twentieth century, such
developments were taking place all over the colonised world. While each particular
national struggle had its own characteristic features and dynamic, none can be
analysed in isolation. Just as the forces and structures of imperialism itself, whether
French, British, Portuguese or Dutch, were inextricably bound together as part of a
global economic and political process, so too was the development of national
liberation movements dependent on mutual influence and interaction, conflict as well
as cooperation, in the domain of ideas as well as on the ground. Moreover, the forces
of nationalism did not develop under the impetus of their own internal dynamic
alone. Indeed, their strengthening was often a direct consequence of the weakening of
the forces of the imperial power and, even more importantly, a consequence of the
perception of this weakness. The fall of France in 1940 and the subsequent German
occupation were decisive in this regard, as was the overrunning of both the French and
the British colonies of South-East Asia by the Japanese. The presence of German and
Allied forces in North Africa and of the British in Syria and Lebanon also supplanted
the power structure of the French, and the divisions between Vichy and the Free
French increased the impression of weakness and vulnerability. 
There were indeed divergences in theoretical analyses and ideological
formulations in this burgeoning nationalist resistance, both between the movements
of different countries and between internal forces with different perspectives. For
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some anti-imperialist nationalists, the nation already existed; it was simply a question
of reverting to the precolonial past. Others rejected nationalism altogether, choosing
to see the unity of the collective in terms of shared religion or culture. 
This chapter will examine some of the different theorisations of the nation and
the struggle for national liberation, in their evolution and as they affected some of
the countries within the orbit of the French Empire.
The Nation in the Modern World
The growth of nationalism had its origins in the countries of Europe at the dawning
of the modern age (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990). To some
extent, the nation-state can be seen as a staging post in historical developmental
terms, providing a factor of unity in the move away from feudalism’s hierarchical
organisation of local economic and political autonomy. The development of the
nation-state was instrumental in freeing the economy from petty restrictions
hindering its growth, thus allowing for the movement of goods and labour. On the
political plane, the creation of the modern nation helped to bring about a new
definition of the role of the individual and a reconfiguration of the relationship of
the individual to the wider unit of community. The nation-state assumed that one of
its functions was to serve the interests of its citizens, though obviously this required
a new definition of the rights and duties of the citizens.
The notion of the wealth of nations was destined to be a temporary one on the
route to economic development. It was an essential one nonetheless, with the nation
fulfilling the role of a major instrument for the promotion of economic growth and
prosperity, providing a protective banner under which the accumulation of riches
could take place, until such time as the economy steamed forward into the
international dimension. 
The development of imperialism, along with the consequent rivalries and wars
between the European powers, brought in further modifications to the functions and
form of the nation-state. Adjustments were made necessary by economic and political
crises, requiring the intervention of the state with new forms of organisation. 
Ultimately, the challenge of the anticolonial liberation movements was to turn
the ideology of nationalism against their colonial masters, long after it had ceased to
be a progressive force in the metropolitan heartlands. It was thus one of the
paradoxes of the nationalisms of the national liberation movements that they used
the conceptual framework of the progressive, modernist ideas developed in the
imperial countries to articulate the demand for freedom, independence, autonomy.
At the same time, these nationalisms often mobilised the full gamut of reactionary
particularisms and conservatisms to articulate their difference in opposition to the
dominant imperialist power – to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the country.
This might also include the rejection of science and reason, along with the
assumption that science and reason were essentially universal human attributes. 
In France, the development of the modern nation had taken on a particular
shape, which was to prove highly influential in those countries under its influence.
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Although the process of nation-building in France had begun under the Ancien
Régime with the breaking down of autonomous regionally based feudal authorities and
the establishment of a strong centralised, absolutist monarchy, at its apogee under
Louis XIV, it took a significant leap forward with the French Revolution and the
development of a totally new form of the nation-state, in both theory and practice.
As we have seen in Chapter 1, this new concept of the nation that came into its
own with the Revolution was uniquely political in scope. It consisted of a body of
people, linked together, not by any links to the land or ethnic ties, but by a common
political status, summed up in the notion of citizenship, in which the citizen was
defined solely in terms of an abstract, universal, political equality of rights and duties.
We have also seen how it was but a short step to the subsuming of ‘equality’ under
the more all-embracing concept of ‘uniformity’.  
The non-incorporation of difference within the political nation did not,
however, make it disappear. Instead it was relegated to a private domain, either by
the exclusion of certain differentiating factors such as religious affiliation from the
scope of public political life, leading to the development of a secular ideology of the
Republic, or through the non-inclusion of certain groups of people whose
‘difference’ did not qualify them for citizenship – notably of French women, on
grounds of gender difference, for more than a century and a half after the French
Revolution, and then of those subject peoples in the colonies, to whom the universal
rights of citizenship were not extended. 
The universalism implicit in the modern political concept of the nation was
therefore a dual-edged instrument as far as the colonised were concerned. On the one
hand, it had served to rationalise the colonial enterprise; on the other, it offered the
apparent possibility of inclusion in full citizenship to the colonised, if only the
colonising power would take its own rhetoric seriously. However, once both of these
ideological selling points had been revealed for the illusions that they were, that was
not the end of the matter. Indeed, it was at that point that the French-inspired
modernist notion of the political nation was often at its most influential, as a source
of inspiration for nationalist liberation struggles.
Of course, this was not the only form of nationalism to hold sway in France
itself. The importance of biological and ethnic ties, as well as the notion of belonging
to a particular piece of territory were to find new vigour throughout the course of
the nineteenth century, leading finally to the ideology based on the notion of ‘blood
and soil’, which eventually fired the development of national socialism, ethnic,
religious and gender-based cleansing and other manifestations of a totalitarian view
of the nation. By the end of the Second World War, nationalism was generally
burdened with some very sordid and sinister baggage, arising from a chain of events,
including the fallout from the jingoism of the Franco-Prussian war, the anti-
Semitism associated with the Dreyfus Affair in France, the mindless slaughter of the
First World War and the atrocities and obscenities of the Second World War.
Moreover, the European Left had made the eschewing of nationalism an important
part of their analysis, in which class solidarity across the national divides was seen as
a vital part of a strategy for the international working class, even though the
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internationalism of the socialist movement had been sorely tested and found
wanting, first by the expansion of empire, in which the benefits of super-exploitation
of the colonised workers and peasantry filtered through to the metropolitan working
class to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the position of different sectors
within the class hierarchy. The partaking, however meagre for some, in the benefits
of imperialism tended to undermine any potential international class solidarity
between metropolitan and non-metropolitan workers. Moreover, the strength of
what was construed as an essentially French Republicanism also militated against a
fully internationalist approach. Finally, any remnants of international solidarity that
still existed between the metropolitan workers of Europe were largely crushed by the
outbreak of the First World War and the jingoistic political reaction to it.
Internationalism and the Anticolonial Struggle 
Now, there were indeed internationalists who attempted to withstand the general
tide, such as Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and other critics of the collapse of the Second
Socialist International as a result of the war. Yet, if Lenin agreed with Luxemburg’s
description of the German Social-Democratic movement as a ‘stinking corpse’ in
1914 (Lenin (1915b)/1972, (1915c)/1972, (1917c)/1970, (1917d)/1970,
(1919a)/1977, (1920)/1971), this did not prevent him from recognising the right of
nations to self-determination (Lenin (1914)/1970) or the role of nationalist
movements in the fight against imperialism, which he saw essentially as a worldwide
revolutionary process. Although there would be progress by stages, in different
countries, Lenin considered that the revolution would only succeed as a truly
international phenomenon (Lenin (1917a)/1974; see also Marx and Engels
(1845–46)/1976, (1848)/1970), even though he had recognised the limited
possibilities of ‘socialism in one country’ (Lenin (1915a)/1970). Just as Lenin had
assumed that Russia would need to go through a bourgeois, or national democratic,
revolution first before the proletariat would proceed to the socialist revolution, so too
would the anti-imperialist struggles first have to pass through a national democratic,
bourgeois revolution before socialism became a possibility. The national democratic
revolution was thus seen as an essential phase, but not an end in itself. It was to be a
milestone on the route of the process whereby the universal proletariat would achieve
its socialist revolution. 
In this analysis, therefore, the national liberation struggles, with their own
particular nationalisms, were all part of the same universal process of world
revolution. There is no doubt that this analysis was shared by many of those engaged
in these struggles. It would be hard to exaggerate the mobilising force of the
Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of the Soviet Union as a source of inspiration
not just for the European working class, but also for the colonised, leading to the
establishment of communist parties in the colonised world. 
There is equally no doubt that not all anticolonial fighters shared this analysis.
On the one hand, there were various types of reformist nationalism, which were
content to leave the basic economic system intact, provided there could be a change
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of management, giving the indigenous bourgeoisie their share of power. Other
strands called on specific religious or cultural traditions, or new ways of thinking, to
provide the mobilising tools for ridding the country of foreign domination. Islam
was a powerful mobilising force for Muslims, who could call on a long tradition of
militancy. On another tack altogether, Gandhi and his followers developed a
specifically Indian set of principles for the struggle, which were based on long-
standing traditional ways of thinking, as well as breaking with Hindu tradition in
novel ways, notably on the question of caste.
However, even for those more inclined to accept that socialism and communism
had something to offer to the colonised workers and peasantry, there were significant
difficulties. Some of these arose from the problems that much of the European Left
had with issues arising from imperialism and colonialism. This could mean that the
benefits of subscribing to their version of a socialist/communist-inspired global
analysis could be outweighed by the patronising relations of subservience that often
marred this vision. The theoretical analysis typical of the international communist
movement that developed after the Bolshevik Revolution, especially in the 1930s,
invariably put the interests of the universal proletariat before the interests of any
specific group. Some, following the analyses of Mensheviks and some Trotskyists,
insisted that it was the most advanced, most ‘productive’ sections of the universal
proletariat who would form the vanguard of the world socialist revolution, i.e. the
most highly skilled, highly paid workers in the metropolitan countries. In a bizarre
distortion of Marx’s labour theory of value, it was sometimes claimed that these
workers were far more exploited than those in less developed industries and
countries, given the high rate of surplus value, or rate of exploitation, which their
labour in capital-intensive industries produced. Geoffrey Kay, for instance, claimed
that ‘the affluent workers of the developed countries are much more exploited than
the badly paid workers of the underdeveloped world’ (Kay 1975: 53). This was an
argument that ignored the distinction between the rate of exploitation/surplus value
and the rate of profit and, accordingly, the higher rate of profit produced from the
labour of the workers in the underdeveloped country, in spite of the lower rate of
surplus value, as Marx himself demonstrated in Volume 3 of Capital (Marx
(1894)/1974: 150–51). It also ignored the difference between the (relative) rate of
exploitation and the (absolute) volume of exploitation, a point also stressed by Marx
in Capital Volume 1 (Marx (1867)/1970: 218, note 1; see also Amin 1989: 110). 
Although there were those in the colonies who were prepared to subscribe to this
type of analysis, often with the consequence of having to put off their own claims
and demands until the time was ripe, it was nonetheless to prove increasingly galling,
especially when it was promoted through the theorising of the metropolitan parties
of the Left. In the practice of the communist parties, and particularly the French
Communist Party, the universalism of the theory increasingly came to be translated
into the prioritisation of the national interests of the Soviet Union (through the
policies of the Comintern) and, to a lesser though important extent, the national
interests of the colonising power. Although this was not always recognised or flagged
up at the time of the national liberation struggles, there was a greater or lesser degree
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of ambiguity towards the European-driven theorisation of imperialism and the
strategy and tactics of struggle, even amongst those anticolonial fighters, sympathetic
to socialism and its goals. This ambiguity was compounded by the fact that the
institutional relationship between the colonised and the international communist
movement was usually mediated through the agency of the metropolitan communist
parties (see Chapter 2) – the French Communist Party oversaw the Communist
organisations that were established in the territories colonised by France, as did the
CPGB, in the case of the British colonies, most notably in the case of the
Communist Party of India. While both communist parties adopted an anticolonialist
stance in theory, this tutelage was not helpful to the aims of the nationalists in
practice, reproducing as it did the imperialist relations of domination. Indeed, it was,
more often than not, seen as an obstacle. 
Nonetheless, the successes of communist-led nationalist movements in Asia at the
end of the Second World War were to provide a powerful boost to the cause of
national liberation inspired by socialist ideas elsewhere. The independent line
followed by the Chinese Communists (who had never experienced the tutelage of
European communism), leading eventually to the split in the international
communist movement, made of them the champions of the struggle of the colonised.
Although the origins of the Sino-Soviet split lay in the rejection by the Chinese
communists of Khrushchev’s critique of Stalin in his secret speech to the Twentieth
Congress of the Soviet Party in 1956 (Ali 1984), the charges of revisionism were soon
extended to the policy of ‘peaceful coexistence’, which was at odds with the Chinese
promotion of worldwide anti-imperialist struggle. Ostensibly about differences in
strategy and tactics in relation to the global revolution, culminating in the 25–point
letter to the Soviet Party that sealed the split in 1963, what was really at stake was the
worldwide leadership of the anti-imperialist movement.
In Vietnam, resistance was deep-rooted and well developed (Cooper 2001). It
had taken a number of forms in the early part of the twentieth century, but it was
the growth of a strong communist movement, following the foundation in 1930 of
the Indochinese Communist Party by Ho Chi Minh, which put it in the forefront of
the anticolonial struggle and made it the first to proclaim its independence at the end
of the Second World War. There is no doubt that the Vietnamese communists saw
their struggle as part of the wider international movement. Although Ho Chi Minh
used the words of the American Declaration of Independence in his own declaration
in 1945, it was to the international communist movement, and particularly the
Soviet Union and China, following the coming to power of a communist-inspired
regime in 1949, that the Vietnamese turned for support, and significant aid was
given. Support was also forthcoming from communist sympathisers within the
colonial armed forces, many of whom came from other French colonies, notably
North and West Africa. Moreover, the European Left also showed its international
solidarity – even more readily once the Americans became entangled in the conflict. 
In Laos, the nationalist movement, led by two royal princes, Souphanouvong
and Souvanna Phouma, had brought together two strands, the communist-inspired
Pathet Lao and a more liberal strand associated with Souvanna Phouma. After the
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Pathet Lao led the country to independence in 1953, Souvanna Phouma was the
leader throughout most of the period of the Vietnam War, before the Pathet Lao,
now reconstituted as the Patriotic Front, came back to power in the 1973 elections.
This was not merely a question of internal politics. Increasingly, the countries of
Indochina became embroiled as pawns on the front line of the conflicts of the Cold
War (Regaud and Lechervy 1996). In the case of Cambodia, the difficulties of this
period, together with the tensions inspired by the Sino-Soviet split, were to lead to
the development of a particularly noxious strand of xenophobic obscurantism,
ostensibly in the name of communism, with the Khmer Rouge coming to power
with policies, strategies and a general mindset quite divorced from any reference to
internationalism and intent on purging all foreigners, particularly the Vietnamese,
and class enemies from both the party organisations and the country, leading to the
physical annihilation of millions.   
Where communism appeared to form the dominant ideology of the nationalist
resistance to French imperialism in Asia, it had already been challenged and deserted
by some of those colonial intellectuals who had made the obligatory passage via the
French Communist Party. The Ivory Coast leader, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, had
already abandoned attempts to forge an alliance between his RDA (Rassemblement
démocratique africain) and the French Communist Party by 1951 and became an
increasingly vociferous anti-communist in subsequent years (Amondji 1984;
Nandjui 1995). Aimé Césaire left the Party in 1956 over the 1956 Soviet invasion of
Hungary, explaining his position in his Letter to Maurice Thorez (Césaire 1957)
before founding the PPM (Parti Progressiste et Martiniquais) in 1958. Others, such
as his fellow Martiniquan and former teacher, Gilbert Gratiant, remained with the
Party, while stressing the need to safeguard the Creole culture. René Ménil, a
collaborator of the Césaires on the review Tropiques, also stayed and continued his
critique of Negritude. Elsewhere, the younger Reunionese poet Boris Gamaleya
combined a commitment to communism with a strong sense of the particular
identity of his homeland. 
In the case of Algeria, the relation of communism to the developing nationalist
movement has been a complex one, particularly in organisational terms. The ENA
(Etoile Nord Africaine), which was the first organised modern expression of Algerian
nationalism, was in fact founded in Paris in 1924 by Abdelkader Hadj-Ali, who was
a member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party. In its origins,
the ENA was closely connected to the Communist Party. It was aimed specifically at
those Algerian workers who were working and living in France (Stora 1989). Messali
Hadj, who became its president in 1926, had also been a member of the French
Communist Party. However, under his leadership, the ENA moved away from the
Party and became increasingly transformed into a nationalist, anticolonial
organisation. In 1927, Messali Hadj was the first Algerian nationalist to formulate
the demand for independence. Ten years later, in 1937, he broke with the French
Communist Party, following the dissolution of the ENA by the Popular Front
government. Nonetheless, the movements with which he was associated, the ENA
and then the PPA (Parti du peuple algérien) from 1937, the MTLD (Mouvement
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pour le triomphe des  libertés démocratiques) from 1945 and the MNA
(Mouvement national algérien) from 1954, were all defined by a mix of elements of
Marxism with Arabo-Islamic ideology. 
The Algerian Communist Party itself was founded in 1923 as an offshoot of the
French Communist Party, eventually gaining independent status in 1936. In its
origins, it was a party whose primary membership was made up of left-wing elements
of the European population. Although the numbers of indigenous Algerians increased
after 1936, and especially after Maurice Thorez’s declaration of February 1939 to the
effect that the people of Algeria were a nation in formation, not all the European
members of the Party embraced this idea. The nature of its membership, combined
with the tutelage of the French Communist Party, was to contribute to its sidelining
in the development of the nationalist struggle, regardless of the militancy and courage
of many of its members involved in the war of liberation. Of the Europeans involved
in the PCA and sympathetic to the nationalist struggle, Henri Alleg is one of the most
well known. Alleg was actually of Anglo-Jewish origins and had left France for Algeria
in 1939, where he joined the PCA. After the Second World War, he became editor of
Alger Républicain before it was banned in 1955. His subsequent depiction of his arrest
and torture in 1957 in La Question, published by Editions de Minuit, was, along with
the torture and death of Maurice Audin, to give an important boost to the anti-war
movement (Alleg 1958; Berchadsky 1994). However, there were many others who
were actively engaged in fighting with the Front de Libération nationale (FLN),
including Henri Maillot and Maurice Laban, who were killed in the maquis in 1956,
Fernand Yveton, guillotined in 1957 for attempting to blow up the Hamma gasworks
and Raymonde Peschard, who died after being tortured and raped (Kastell 1997). The
position of the PCA on the armed struggle has been cloaked in ambiguity and
contradictory policy statements. Having condemned the insurrection at the outset
and reiterated this condemnation at the beginning of 1955, the central committee
allegedly reversed this policy after it met in secret at Bab-el-Oued on 20 June 1955,
approving the involvement of communists in the armed struggle. This policy was in
contrast with the policy of the PCF, which voted for the special powers asked for by
the Mollet government in 1956.
After independence, the Algerian Communist Party disappeared as such, but
regrouped in different forms and under different names in a semi-clandestine
existence. Algerian communists have lived in a mostly uneasy relationship with the
regime in power. When Boumedienne took power in 1965, the communists joined
with other opposition groups. He did nonetheless attempt to win their support for
his version of state socialism and programme of nationalisations, not surprisingly
since communist influence has been highest in the trade unions. Throughout the
post-independence period, communist organisations have not had any legal
recognition and communists have been subjected to various degrees of persecution.
Its oppositional stance is twofold – an opposition to both the existing power regime
and fundamentalist Islamic ideology. The Party itself has changed its name several
times – from PAGS (Le Parti de l’Avant-Garde Socialiste) to Ettahaddi, or Challenge,
in 1993, and relaunching itself in 1998 as MDS (Mouvement Démocratique et
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Social). It argues for an unashamedly modernist agenda, claiming that Algeria is still
living in the pre-modern era. Its recently deceased leader, the veteran El Hachemi
Cherif, saw history as moving forward in generally progressive fashion and described
fundamentalism as ‘a movement that is manifestly counter to the movement of history’.1
The Theorisation of the National Liberation Struggle – Frantz Fanon
In the aftermath of the Second World War, there were a number of factors that coalesced
to create a new set of conditions for the furtherance of national liberation struggles, as
well as the development of new thinking about related questions. On the historical,
geopolitical level, the perceived weakness of the European colonial powers on the one
hand, together with the emergence of the USA as an important new imperial power, the
rising star of China in the Far East and the successes of the communist-led nationalists
in Indochina all gave a boost to nationalist movements elsewhere. 
However, each developing nationalist movement had its own specific dimension
and dynamic. Each emerging nation asserted its own particular nationhood, more
often than not in the face of the denial by French colonial doctrine of the existence of
any such nationhood. Nowhere was this truer than in the case of Algeria, where it was
denied that Algeria could be a nation, on the grounds that there had not been an
autonomous Algerian state before 1830. This was an argument that had been put
forward first to justify the original conquest and then, later, to argue against the
Algerian nationalist cause. This could be interpreted in a number of different ways,
depending on the definition used to characterise the nation. However, as far as
‘Algerian’ territory was concerned, there was very little ambiguity. The boundaries had
been largely fixed under Ottoman rule and, indeed, accepted as such by the French,
when they took over. To all intents and purposes, Algeria was already a ‘nation-state’
at the time of the French conquest, even if it was one under ‘foreign’ rule. 
Paradoxically, it was the colonial power that contributed to the definition of the
Algerians as a collective, through the common juridical status imposed upon them,
which differentiated them from the French nation of citizens. Or, as Sartre put it,
‘colonial society cannot assimilate them without destroying itself; it will therefore be
necessary for them to identify as a unified collective against it. Those who are excluded
will assert their exclusion in the name of their nationhood, for it is colonialism itself
that creates the patriotism of the colonized’ (Sartre in Memmi (1957)/1985: 29).
This objective categorisation did not, of itself, lead to the development of a
nationalist movement. Nor did the subjective awareness and rejection of their
condition by the colonised necessarily lead to nationalism. It could equally remain
stalled at the level of individual revolt or collective reformism. The awakening of
nationalist consciousness entailed, in addition, the recognition of their fundamental
collective difference and the affirmation of the freedom of this collective to constitute
itself into a national subject with the power to make decisions in all aspects of their
political, economic, social and cultural existence, i.e. with political sovereignty. The
national liberation movement is born along with the realisation that this can only be
achieved by overturning the existing power relations and creating a new state.
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A key thinker to emerge at this moment of history was the young Frantz Fanon,
who had left his home in Martinique to fight with the Free French and then to study
in France, becoming a psychiatrist and moving to a post in Algeria (Macey 2001).
Fanon was to become a key theorist of the national liberation struggle, combining his
experience of racism as an Afro-Caribbean and his professional experience of the
psychological effects of colonialism with the experience derived from his commitment
to the nationalist struggle in Algeria, for which he resigned his post at a psychiatric
hospital in Blida. Fanon became not only the theorist of the Algerian Revolution in
particular, but also of national liberation struggles worldwide. When he died of
leukaemia in 1961 at the young age of thirty-six, he had written several key works,
beginning with his analysis of the psychological damage done by racism and responses
to it, with his own distinctive mix of personal and professional experience and
insights, in Peau noire, masques blancs in 1952. His involvement with the FLN was
reflected in his writings on the Algerian Revolution, particularly L’An V de la
Révolution algérienne, published in 1959. His final work, Les Damnés de la terre, was
completed only a few months before his death in 1961 and achieved worldwide
resonance at the time, particularly amongst those engaged in liberation struggles.
There has, however, also been considerable confusion around his work. On the
one hand, it was Fanon’s interpretation of the Algerian liberation struggle that provided
the prism through which many of those on the Left saw that struggle. It did not always
correspond to the realities of the Revolution. Similarly, many came to an
understanding of Fanon’s work through the prism of Sartre’s interpretation of it. Again,
care is needed to disentangle what Fanon actually said from Sartre’s gloss upon it.
There is a thread linking Fanon to some of the ideas put forward by his fellow
Martiniquan, Aimé Césaire, and the other proponents of Negritude, who had spent
their formative years as members of the French Communist Party. Like them, he
pinpoints the issue of race, he highlights the importance of culture. However, he
synthesizes his views on race, culture and the nation into a radically different
perspective, which challenges all attempts to box him into mechanistic categories and
all forms of reductionism of his thought to simplistic notions. With his predecessors,
Fanon shared an overarching universalist perspective. However, whereas theirs had
been inspired by the prospect of the victory of the universal working class and the
realisation of socialism across the globe, with Negritude a stage, or a ‘moment’, in the
dialectical march of progress, Fanon put the dialectic into a new historical
perspective, in which it is all about the forms of struggle of an entire people against
the colonial power, in which the constitution of nationalism and the national
consciousness was a necessary step in the process of taking control of their own
destiny. Necessary though it was, nationalism was, in Fanon’s view, merely a stage,
not an end in itself and the process of liberation itself paramount. His own
experience of racism, and that of others, as well as the lessons he learned from the
bitter colonial oppression and the implacable nationalist struggle in Algeria,
combined to destroy any faith in the possibility of solidarity on the part of the
international proletariat, or in the redemptive power of the working class per se, at
least as presently constituted. His universal goal was thus not so much that of the
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worldwide proletarian revolution, but the creation of a new type of human being, a
‘new man’. 
Fanon’s analysis of Negritude is a complex one. On the one hand, he sees it as a
product of the history of racial oppression, and accepts that, in its total
‘unconditional affirmation of African culture’ (Fanon (1961)/1987: 156) it is an
inevitable gut reaction to the blanket racism of the white colonialists. He does not,
however, subscribe to its logic and warns that, necessary though it has been, from a
historical point of view, this ‘racialised’ view of culture, in which ‘African’ culture is
promoted, rather than ‘national’ culture, will ultimately lead the supporters of
Negritude into a dead end.2
At the same time, he refuses to accept that Negritude is merely a moment, a
negative stage, in the overarching dialectic. Blackness is not something that should
continue to be defined totally in relation to the whites (Fanon (1952)/1975: 88–89).
Moreover, he takes issue with the Hegelian dialectic of the master and the servant,
which, for him, is not applicable to the relation between the slave master and the
black slave, where there is no reciprocity, where the master is profoundly indifferent
to the recognition of the slave, only wanting his labour (Fanon (1952)/1975: 175,
note 9), and where, ultimately, the slave, to achieve his liberation, must also become
indifferent to the master. Where, in its classic Hegelian form, the dialectic is
premised on a relation between two conscious minds, Fanon insists that, in the case
of the relation between the white master and the black colonised/slave, the new racial
dimension changes everything. In the eyes of the master, the black slave is never a
thinking, conscious being; it is only his body that is seen. Just as the master could
not care less about being recognised by the slave, so the slave in his turn will
reciprocate this indifference. It will not be a question of seeking his recognition, or
even of reversing the master–slave relation by replacing him as master. What the
colonised/slave wants is to make the master disappear, to take over his farm and eject
him from the land.    
This rejection of the European model or paradigm applies not just to the
Hegelian dialectic, but also to Freud. The Oedipus complex, Fanon says, is not
universally valid. It does not exist in the black man (Fanon (1952)/1975: 123). As
such, it is a construct of European social and cultural conditions and not a
constituent component of a human essence. 
Fanon’s starting point was the alienated individual. Racism and the
dehumanisation that was a key effect of colonialism had combined to produce this
alienation, depriving the colonised of his/her humanity and transforming them into
pure body, animal or thing. He had described this phenomenon in one of his first
writings, an essay, ‘The North African syndrome’, first published in Esprit in 1952.
These were ‘creatures starving for humanity’ (Fanon (1959)/1970: 13), ‘emptied of
substance’, reified or ‘thingified’, by the coloniser ‘calling him systematically
Mohammed’ (Fanon (1959)/1970: 24).
It was by engaging in revolutionary violence that these alienated colonised
subjects would recover their humanity and become whole human beings. Although
the problem of alienation was experienced at the individual level, the cure would
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only be effective as part of a collective struggle. Indeed, Fanon saw these most
alienated, these most wretched and exploited elements of society, the peasantry and
the lumpenproletariat, mainly the landless peasants who had been forced off the land
or drifted to the towns, as the main agency for change. The process of defeating
colonialism and the process of healing their own damaged psyches were integral to
each other. Violent revolutionary action would not only transform the colonial
landscape; it would also enable them to achieve their own transition from the animal
to the human state. 
This was not a process that was limited to the Algerian nationalist struggle for
freedom. In Fanon’s view, this particular national liberation struggle was part of the
wider struggle and had a vital role to play as the spearhead of the African revolution.
It was not an end in itself, but a moment in a dialectic of universal liberation, which
ultimately transcended politics with the emergence of a new, higher type of human
being. It was not enough to work towards becoming a man. This man would be a
new man, who would be a better man. Not only would this new man be cured from
the alienation from which he had suffered, not only would the tensions between
body and soul be reconciled, but he would also have moved to a new stage of
humanity, on to a morally superior plane, in which the betterment of all aspects of
the human condition would be the prime consideration. Or, as Fanon put it:
More precisely, it would seem that all the problems which man faces on the
subject of man can be reduced to this one question: ‘Have I not, because of
what I have done or failed to do, contributed to an impoverishment of
human reality?’  The question could also be formulated in this way: ‘Have
I at all times demanded and brought out the man that is in me?’ (Fanon
(1959)/1970: 13)
Fanon, of course, was not alone in his revolutionary humanism. His perspective is
well in tune with the humanist historicism of Sartre, in which the influence of
Nietzsche was notable,3 as well as the ideas of the early Marx and the early Lukács.
There is no doubt that Sartre and Fanon had an important reciprocal influence upon
each other. At the same time, there was a critical edge to their appreciation of each
other’s thinking. Notably, Fanon disagreed with Sartre on the relativism implicit in
the view of Negritude as a moment in a dialectic, which would be superseded by a
synthesis in a society without races (Fanon (1952)/1975: 107–8). This is to rob the
black man of his freedom and black consciousness is more than negativity: it is fully
what it is.4 However, Fanon was fully in tune with Sartre on the question of the
progress of humanity from the ‘subhuman’ stage of history to that of total human
beings, in which man would finally be realised (Sartre and Lévy 1991: 36–38). As we
have seen in Chapter 4, Sartre defended Fanon’s position on the redemptive power
of violence. 
Other key figures in the national liberation movements of the 1950s and 1960s
had very similar perspectives. Che Guevara, in particular, dwelt on the notion of the
‘new man’. For him, it was closely tied with the building of communism. As he wrote
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in ‘Socialism and Man in Cuba’ in 1965, ‘to build communism it is necessary,
simultaneous with the new material foundations, to build the new man’ (Guevara
1987: 250). The creation of the ‘new man’ was the further development of Lenin’s
argument regarding the necessity of a cultural revolution if socialism was to succeed.
For Che Guevara, it entailed all aspects of human existence, not just the
transformation of the political and economic structures. It implied a complete
rupture with the past, to create ‘a new world where everything decrepit, everything
old, everything that represents the society whose foundations have just been
destroyed will have definitely disappeared’ (Guevara 1987: 185). This would require
deliberate voluntaristic action on the part of each individual. This is what he said in
a speech, ‘Duty of Revolutionary Medical Workers’, in 1960:  
almost everything we thought and felt in that past epoch should be filed
away, and that a new type of human being should be created. And if each
one of us is his own architect of that new human type, then creating that
new type of human being – who will be the representative of the new Cuba
– will be much easier. (Guevara 1987: 125–26)
Setting out his vision of ‘What a Young Communist should be’ in 1962, the parallels
with Fanon’s basic humanism are striking: ‘every Young Communist must be
essentially human and be so human that he draws closer to humanity’s best qualities,
that he distils the best of what man is through work, study, through ongoing
solidarity with the people and with all the peoples of the world ‘(Guevara 1987:
184). In both cases, it remains a fundamentally universal vision of what humanism
was all about, entailing a belief in the progress of humanity towards the formation of
a new genus: ‘Man as a wolf, the society of wolves, is being replaced by another genus
that no longer has the desperate urge to rob his fellow man, since the exploitation of
man by man has disappeared’ (Guevara 1987: 367).5
However, for all that Fanon saw nationalism as a stage and not an end in itself,
it was still part of his fundamental originality that during the time of the nationalist
struggle it was to be the total priority, governing all aspects of social existence,
including culture and the psyche. His emphasis on the importance of culture, as well
as the impact on the individual’s mental state of oppression and the struggle against
it, marks a new departure from previous Marxist-inspired theories of imperialism
and national liberation. 
Moreover, the nationalist cause was not, in his view, subservient to the class struggle;
he saw no special, a priori, leading role for the working class at national or international
level. At the same time, unlike other nationalists who had refused to follow the socialist
route to liberation through international proletarian solidarity, he did not represent the
interests of the national bourgeoisie either. On the contrary, Fanon spoke for the most
dispossessed and oppressed sections of society, emphasizing the revolutionary potential
and needs of the peasantry and the lumpenproletariat, indeed, those who could truly be
considered the ‘wretched of the earth’. These were the people whom he saw leading the
struggle, not the vanguard of the aristocracy of the working class. 
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The new priorities that he highlighted resonated with many of the ‘wretched of
the earth’ or those speaking on their behalf across the globe. Not least of these was
his emphasis on the intrinsic importance of violence in the liberation process. No
longer seen as a means to an end, albeit a legitimate one, violence was more than a
utilitarian tool in the struggle. Indeed, it was elevated to an essential process, through
which the enslaved and the oppressed would achieve their liberation; it was given the
status of a purifying agent, needed to cleanse the oppressed from the humiliation and
defilement of colonial oppression. There was nothing inherently new in this belief in
the redemptive power of violence. It formed part of the ideological mystique of the
French Revolution. Georges Sorel had argued for a similar belief in the
reinvigorating, creative power of violent action as a weapon against bourgeois
decadence and repression (Sorel (1908)/1999), and a mystique of violence, often
linked with religious ideology, had been part of the rationalisation of war, crusades
and rebellions from time immemorial. It could also be used as an argument in
support of some of the most questionable causes, with which Fanon would certainly
have disagreed, including some of the violence taking place under the cloak of
religious fundamentalism and the ‘war on terror’.  
His influence was immense, though mainly outside the francophone world.
Indeed, his impact was probably greatest on the black populations of the
metropolitan heartlands themselves. In spite of Fanon’s own reservations, or rather
ambivalence, about using blackness as a defining category in the struggle, under the
slogan of Negritude, black consciousness or black power, he was certainly an
inspiration to the Black Power movement in the USA, offshoots of which, such as
the Black Panther Party, refused the non-violent methods adopted by the civil rights
movement during the 1950s and early 1960s, to claim the need for violence in the
affirmation of black power. Stokely Carmichael claimed Fanon as one of his ‘patron
saints’ and Eldridge Cleaver noted that ‘every brother on a rooftop could quote
Fanon’. Despite differences of analysis and approach, which were acknowledged –
not least, the significance of race as a mobilising category – the basic message taken
from Fanon was threefold: his insights into the damage done to the psyche by racism;
his insistence on the intrinsic value of violent struggle; and his belief in the necessity
of organising the lumpenproletariat as the agency of change and the potential
strength these ‘lumpen’ elements could muster if they were united. 
There was no doubting the extent of the suffering and dispossession of this so-
called lumpenproletariat in Algeria, which consisted mainly of those who had been
driven from the land into unemployment in the towns and cities. As we have already
discussed in the Introduction, the issue of land, its usurpation and reclamation, was
a key issue in the struggles for national liberation. 
The Reclaiming of Space
The clearest, indeed one might say the prime, objective of the national liberation
struggles was the reclamation of the national territory. The anticolonial struggle was
articulated first and foremost through the demand for the return of the nation’s land
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to the possession and control of the colonised from whom it had been appropriated.
It was this objective that was prioritised over all others.
Although the land issue was the key issue in all the French colonies, it assumed
the clearest expression in the case of Algeria. This was due to the fact that Algeria had
not simply been invaded and occupied by a foreign power, but had ended up actually
incorporated as an integral part of the French territory itself and had furthermore
been colonised by a massive migration of European settlers, predominantly, but not
exclusively, of French origin. The land question in Algeria was therefore to assume
an even greater importance and carry an even greater emotional weight than it did
elsewhere. As such, it plays an important role in the figures of the nationalist
discourse, including the literature that was written during and after the war of
liberation, and raises a number of problematic issues.
One of these related to the definition of what was to be counted as the national
territory. In a sense, this was a common problem for many, if not most, of the
territories colonised by European powers, the borders of which had often been
drawn, and redrawn arbitrarily or artificially, depending on administrative
convenience, the state of relations with neighbouring territories and the agreements
made with rival imperial powers, particularly at the Berlin Conference of 1885, the
Niger Convention of 1898 and the Entente Cordiale of 1904, often with scant
regard for the ethnic composition of the peoples living in those territories (Suret-
Canale 1988). Thus colonies were redefined, renamed or regrouped as part of
broader entities, such as AOF (Afrique occidentale française) or AEF (Afrique
équatoriale française), throughout the course of French colonisation. 
A nation is not, of course, simply constituted by territory, administered by a
‘national’ state body. There are also the people inhabiting that territory, as well as the
more elusive elements that give the nation its identity and the state its legitimacy.
Thus, while the land issue was relatively straightforward, these other areas have given
rise to severe ideological discord and indeed violent conflict. They will be dealt with
in the following chapter. 
Notes
1. ‘Un mouvement manifestement à contre-courant du mouvement de l’histoire’, quoted at
MDS website, at http://assoc.wanadoo.fr/mds-immigration/site.htm.
2. ‘Cette obligation historique dans laquelle se sont trouvés les hommes de culture africains
de racialiser leurs revendications, de parler davantage de culture africaine que de culture
nationale va les conduire à un cul-de-sac’ (Fanon (1961)/1987: 157).
3. See Roberts 1993: 82, on Nietzsche’s influence on thinking about the Algerian
Revolution.
4. ‘Toujours en termes de conscience, la conscience noire est immanente à elle-même. Je ne
suis pas une potentialité de quelque chose, je suis pleinement ce que je suis. Je n’ai pas à
rechercher l’universel. En mon sein nulle probabilité ne prend place. Ma conscience nègre
ne se donne pas comme manque. Elle est. Elle est adhérente à elle-même’ (Fanon
(1952)/1975: 109).
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5. This was written in 1964, just before what was known as the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution was about to be unleashed in China, putting a new slant on the whole notion
of cultural revolution and the ‘new man’. 
6. ‘Un mouvement manifestement à contre-courant du mouvement de l’histoire’, quoted at
MDS website, at http://assoc.wanadoo.fr/mds-immigration/site.htm.
7. ‘Cette obligation historique dans laquelle se sont trouvés les hommes de culture africains
de racialiser leurs revendications, de parler davantage de culture africaine que de culture
nationale va les conduire à un cul-de-sac’ (Fanon (1961)/1987: 157).
8. See Roberts 1993: 82, on Nietzsche’s influence on thinking about the Algerian
Revolution.
9. ‘Toujours en termes de conscience, la conscience noire est immanente à elle-même. Je ne
suis pas une potentialité de quelque chose, je suis pleinement ce que je suis. Je n’ai pas à
rechercher l’universel. En mon sein nulle probabilité ne prend place. Ma conscience nègre
ne se donne pas comme manque. Elle est. Elle est adhérente à elle-même’ (Fanon
(1952)/1975: 109).
10. This was written in 1964, just before what was known as the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution was about to be unleashed in China, putting a new slant on the whole notion
of cultural revolution and the ‘new man’. 
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Chapter 6
National Consciousness: History and
Culture
Nationhood and National Identity
The demarcation of a territory and the establishment of the authority of anational state in this territory represent only part of the process of constructing
the nation, which is as much to do with the subjective as with the objective factors
involved in nationhood. The cluster of elements that make up the subjective side of
nationhood are most often discussed in terms of the concept of ‘national identity’.
The notion of national identity, however, can be something of a catch-all basket into
which all sorts of notions can be thrown. While there is no doubt that it can be used
to cover many different aspects relating to the collective consciousness of a nation,
its use is somewhat limited as an explanatory tool of analysis, and even less as an
actual motive force in the development of the nation’s history. 
Indeed, the notion of national identity remains predominantly a static one, in
which the nation is presumed to be what it is. In its turn, this usually, but not
invariably, implies a degree of uniformity, in which national identity is taken to be
the same for all citizens of the nation. National identity is thus often invoked with a
conservative purpose in view: to maintain, or restore, the traditional elements that
constitute this ‘identity’. As such, it should be distinguished from the more dynamic,
mobilising concept of ‘national consciousness’, which defines the coming together of
the people as a collective subject with the common goal of a collective future project. 
This is not to say that history and the way it is interpreted and evaluated have
no role to play in constituting the national consciousness. Indeed, on the contrary,
the understanding of the relation to history is a major, if not the most important,
factor determining the way in which the nation perceives itself.
These issues were not merely academic ones for the colonised peoples engaged
in struggles for national liberation. The success of the nationalist movements was
closely connected with their ability to awaken national consciousness amongst their
populations. In this, the definition of the nation and the national identity was of
paramount importance and equally problematic in very many, if not most, of the
colonies. Sometimes the question of national identity was articulated in bald terms
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as a choice between the return to the past, to some kind of original, precolonial
model, on the one hand, or the forging of a radically new nation with a project
oriented towards the future. 
In the different context of Basque nationalism, Aurélio Arteta has expressed the
same basic choice thus: 
History is the realm of the dead; what matters is the present day. This is why
I don’t see the point of engaging in a historical debate, where, in any case,
the separatists indulge in melancholic nostalgia for something that has never
existed. Also, it is perverse to say that, as we have been in the past, so must
we remain forever. In this scenario, there would no longer be any
plurinational states and it would mean that the ‘ethnic’ or ‘geographic’
identity of ‘peoples’ is placed above any political, democratic identity.
Democracy is not defined through the notion of belonging, but by that of
election, or choice. (Le Monde, 5 March 1999)  
In the reality of the national liberation struggles, this type of simple dualistic
opposition was not at all appropriate. There was never any clear-cut choice between
returning to a past that was already constituted and constructing a new vision of the
nation. Even the past was constantly reconstituted through the work of memory and
the appropriation and re-appropriation of history by successive generations.
Moreover, the new could only be constructed on the basis of existing reality, in which
the collective strands of the national memory had an important role to play. It was
equally true that the ‘difference’, the particularity that defined the subjective view of
the nation, could not be defined solely in terms of the past. 
Nowhere was the question of nationhood more complex than in Algeria, where
the issues raised during the development of the nationalist movement are far from
being resolved today. Some of these issues have already been raised in the previous
chapter, particularly in the context of the organisation of the national territory. There
is also the question of the composition of the population occupying this territory,
whose diverse origins reflect not only a varied indigenous population, commonly
known as Berbers, but also the comings and goings of a succession of invaders and
settlers, who have come to the Maghreb lands from ancient times, including
Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Jews, Arabs bringing Islam from the East and, more
recently, Jews and Muslims, expelled from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century,
followed by a period of rule by the Ottoman Turks until 1830. Each group brought
different cultural traditions, historical myths and narratives, which, together with
significant geographical differences between the coastal communities, based in cities
or farming on the fertile plain bordering the Mediterranean, and those living in
mountainous and desert regions of the interior, led to a varied society, largely self-
governing in tribal communities, with a measure of control through the
administration in power at the time. The conquest of Algeria by France from 1830
and the subsequent introduction of a large settler population, not just from France,
but from other countries on the northern borders of the Mediterranean, not only
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made a further contribution to the ethnic diversity of the population, but also
significantly disrupted and dislocated the traditional structures of the Algerian
society and economy.  
Ethnic and regional diversity in itself is not necessarily an obstacle to national
consciousness and identity. Indeed, most modern nations have populations with
diverse origins, as well as pronounced differences between the regions. Some, such as
the United Kingdom, even incorporate several different nations within a broader
British identity, though not always without problems. Different historical narratives
and myths can complement each other to build up a hybridised version of the
nation’s history. This was undoubtedly the case in Algeria, where the burgeoning
nationalist movement could call on myths of resistance relating to the Berberist past,
such as those surrounding Jugurtha (Haddour 1999: 30–32), or the warrior queen
La Kahina, as well as the resistance of the nineteenth-century national hero,
Abdelkader. However, there was also no doubt that differences and divergences
existed, which had the effect of perpetuating the fragmentation of Algerian society,
as well as the lack of an overarching national historical narrative on which the
emerging nation could draw, not to mention the fact that a sizeable section of the
population was still prepared to work with the French, not least in the army and
related formations. 
At the same time, a number of factors were producing conditions favourable for
a national consciousness to develop. Two factors were of particular importance, both
of which were the result, direct or indirect, of French colonisation. On the one hand,
the economic and social dislocation brought about by colonialism had the effect of
taking many Algerians away from their tribal communities in the countryside and
bringing them together with people from different villages and regions in the urban
centres of Algeria, as well as, significantly, in France itself, where they realised that
what differentiated them was of far less importance than what they had in common.
Moreover, an important part of what they had in common derived from the
collective negative category into which they were placed by the French, to whom all
were, without differentiation, ‘Muslims’, ‘natives’, ‘bicots’, ‘bougnoules’ and other
derogatory epithets. 
With the new stage in the nationalist struggle launched by the establishment of
the FLN and the insurrection of 1 November 1954, the need for a more deliberate
policy of fostering national consciousness through the promotion of a national
political ideology became more urgent and required the adoption of clear-cut
choices, regarding the form and content of this ideology. 
Given the conditions that applied, it was not possible to posit a simple return to
the precolonial past, given the lack of a truly national heritage. Neither was it
possible to mobilise the nation around a modernist, political ideology alone, given
the connections of this type of ideology with the rationalisation of French
colonialism itself. To galvanise the nation and prepare it for the struggle, its specific
characteristics, in terms of ethnicity, culture and religion, were also brought into play.
Given that the French settlers also claimed to be Algerians, the Algerians themselves
could only fully assume their nationhood by appropriating those elements of their
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identity that had been pinned upon them by the colonisers to mark their difference.
In other words, they built their identity on precisely those characteristics that the
French had used against them to deny their Frenchness, and consequently citizenship
– their religion (Islam), their ethnic origins (Arab) and their language (Arabic). These
were the basic elements upon which they were mobilised to coalesce against the
French common enemy, in a reversal of the terms in the polarised, binary opposition
of coloniser and colonised. 
The promotion of the notion of Algerian national identity as ‘Arabo-Islamic’ was
a key mobilising tool throughout the period of the war and thereafter. On the one
hand, it appealed to the religious sentiments of the vast majority of the population,
as well as drawing on links with Arab nationalist struggles elsewhere in the Arab
world, notably in Egypt, where Nasser’s successful struggles against the British and
French were a major source of inspiration. It was not, however, an unproblematic
choice. Not only was the Nasserite type of secular nationalism at odds with Islamic
revivalism, thus making the Arab–Islamic couplet an unstable, contradictory and,
indeed, volatile mixture, but also other ingredients that went into the unstable
national brew did nothing to tone down the potentially explosive nature of the
recipe. The latter included elements borrowed from socialism and communism,
including the powerful notion of the ‘new man’, as part of a modernist, progressive
political agenda, in which links to the past were to be sundered in the transition to
a fundamentally new historical phase. However, there was not just the problem of
the incompatibility of some of the elements that went into the hybrid definition of
Algerian nationalism. There was also the fact that this definition fell short of
reflecting the specific realities of the Algerian nation. 
National Consciousness and History 
It was not only the official discourse of the dominant nationalist movement or the
post-independence state that provided the input into the debates about the question
of national identity. The dominant ideas were challenged by dissident forms of
expression. A developing literature also proved a potent vehicle for articulating
reflections and representations on this issue, developing characteristic images and
metaphors that gave figurative substance to the idea of the nation. Amongst these,
the national earth or soil, the sea, the age-old tree, the ancestors, ancient myths and
legends, archetypal personifications, such as the Mother or the Woman, all have had
an important part to play in bringing together a symbolic web representing the
imagined consciousness of the nation and mapping some of its fault-lines. 
A key work in this connection was Kateb Yacine’s seminal novel about the
Algerian nation, Nedjma, published in 1956. The author himself made the
connection between the mysterious female character of the title and the Algerian
nation, which had still to find, or rather construct, its ‘elusive identity’. This had as
much to do with re-evaluating the past, as projecting a vision of the new nation’s
future (Salhi 1999a, b). In this interpretation, Nedjma’s own hybridity, resulting
from the question mark hanging over her parentage and the circumstances of her
130 | Postcoloniality
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 130
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
conception and birth, involving the rape of her mother and her putative four fathers
of different ethnic origins, reflects the composite, hybrid character of the Algerian
nation itself. Salhi claims that, in the end, all the characters reject Nedjma and this
rejection should be seen as the rejection of the composite nation: 
This discourse demonstrates the characters’ failure to recognise themselves
in Nedjma, whom they reject when she represents a threat. However,
rejection of her as a woman is also a rejection of her as an image of Algeria.
This is what Kateb Yacine intended: the failure of the friends to recognise
themselves in the Nedjma of four fathers is symbolic of the Algerians’ failure
to see themselves as inheritors of the Algeria of the Romans, Arabs, Turks
and French. (Salhi 1999a: 54)
Kateb Yacine draws on many of the traditional myths and symbols, in conjuring up
the complex web of Algerian representations of its past, to include real and mythic
ancestors: 
History is at once lived and told by way of prose and parable. It is experienced
and received as already symbolic, already mythic. Since the characters hold
double roles as representative historical actors and as interpreters of that
history, they create their history even as they are living it. Motifs from the
tradition of the ancestors are continually adapted and reinterpreted to
construct a contemporary account which is at once historical, political and
parabolic. Imagery drawn from collective experience is used to evoke ideas of
historical displacement and replacement. (Salhi 1999a: 54)
Thus, Algeria is portrayed as a land of tribes, in which a real national consciousness
has not yet come to exist. At the same time, the emphasis is also on the process of
giving birth to this nation. This enterprise was fraught with ambiguities and
difficulties. On the one hand, history is always much more than ‘myth’; historical
reality is grounded in real economic, social and political processes, not to mention
the personal experiences of individuals. Kateb Yacine was well aware of the
ambiguities of returning to ancient tribal culture as a source of modern nationhood.
However, as Salhi says, this return was seen as a necessary passage: 
The ancestors, in fact, are the only force that will unite the Algerians and
overcome their disunity as separate squabbling tribes: ‘Ce n’est pas revenir
en arrière que d’honorer notre tribu, le seul lien qui nous reste pour nous
réunir et nous retrouver’ (Nedjma, p. 128). It is in the past that Algerians
will find the key to their present, the key to future success and the survival
of their country. (Salhi 1999a: 44) 
As Si Mohktar says in the novel, Algeria was not yet a nation, but rather the remnants
of decimated tribes (Kateb Yacine (1956)/1981: 128). There is no question of
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glorification of ethnic purity, limited by the closely defined boundaries of the tribe.
Rather, it is the hybridity, characteristic of the composition of the nation, which is
highlighted. The nation may thus be symbolised by the tree (Kateb Yacine
(1956)/1981: 102). However, this is not to suggest a linear evolution. Although it
stresses that the nation’s roots go back to the past, they are not restricted to the tribe,
but in fact go back beyond this, to a mixture of different elements. Just as tree stock
is strengthened and improved through hybridisation, so the national family tree has
benefited from the influx and incursions of different ethnic groups, painful though
the grafting process has been: ‘The roots of the “nation’s tree” go back far beyond the
tribe’s boundaries into the vast continent of Africa. In spite of their myth of blood
purity, the Keblout are a microcosm of Algeria in which different ethnic elements,
Berber, Arab and African, are mingled. The Algerian nation derives its vitality from
this mixing of races and traditions’ (Salhi 1999b: 44).  
This is an argument that comes close to those put forward, as has been seen, by
some on the Left, who see a beneficial side to colonialism, as a spur to improvements
and progress. However, the real input into the process of understanding how the
nation will be built is in the linking of the concepts of continuity (through the land,
but also through the ancestors) and that of hybridity, with its emphasis on the diverse
origins of the different components of the nation, not as discreet, separate elements,
but through their fusion, via the grafting process, into a new hybrid entity. The
repudiation of Nedjma is thus the rejection of a heterogeneous version of
nationhood, based on the inclusion of the legacy of all those who had made their
mark on the land, be they Berber, Roman, Arab, Turk, Jewish or French; it also
symbolises the rejection of the female half of the nation. 
The complexity of this synthetic approach has often been at odds with that of
others with a more rigid, linear view of the nation’s history. In many of these
approaches, there are two key elements: the desire or need for a return to the
precolonial past and, secondly, the notion of a watershed, or founding moment,
which may be situated in the past, as, for example, the colonial conquest, or, more
recently, in an event, such as the national revolution.
For those engaged in the national liberation struggles, there had been a clear-cut
choice, broadly speaking: on the one hand, the legitimacy of the newly independent states
could be founded on the basis of the restoration of a former, precolonial state; the other
alternative was a radical break with the past and the founding of the postcolonial state on
the basis of the fundamentally new, the act of liberation itself, the national revolution.
Both of these options were beset by problems. In the first case, as we have seen,
the existence of a precolonial state could not be taken for granted, certainly not in a
form that encompassed the whole territory and peoples that had come together to
form the new nation. In some instances, French colonisers had supplanted previous
rulers who had in their turn come from outside to assume control of the territory.
Often, there had been no overall state to administer the territory as a whole, but a
fragmented system of local fiefdoms and tribal power. 
In the second case, the problems inherent in founding the state’s legitimacy on
the national revolution itself were compounded with the passing of time. The new
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start, so full of promise, was inevitably destined to become part of history, and
indeed particular interpretations of that history, in which the elements of the new
were ossified into a worn-out rationalisation of the status quo and a blanket alibi for
the actions of an increasingly ageing generation of independence leaders.
In the case of Algeria, these problems were compounded by the adoption of an
approach to nationhood that attempted to combine the two options. On the one
hand, the history of the new nation and of the nationalist movement was deemed to
begin with the launch of the insurrection on 1 November 1954. As Benjamin Stora
has put it: 
The ‘Algerian Revolution’ was conceived by those who provided its
inspiration and leadership as the founding act of a new era. The initiators
of ‘November 1954’ … declared that they had made a total break with the
past. They had no intention, in the course of the war, of building up an
overall, unifying picture of a movement based on its precursors. They
institute the belief in the radical break separating the Algerian nation,
‘regenerated’ through revolutionary violence, from the former colonial
society. In the process, they restart the history of Algerian nationalism from
zero. (Stora 1992: 151)
At the same time, the Declaration, made by the FLN in November 1954, had as one
of its stated aims the restoration of the Algerian State. While the leaders of the
insurrection made a clean sweep of the past and initiated a new beginning, there was
also recognition of the need to muster the forces of conservatism in the cause of
national liberation. Yet the movement was also imbued with the ideology of
revolution, in which the struggle marked the beginning of a new phase in Algerian
history. As Hugh Roberts has pointed out,1 there has been widespread borrowing
from the terminology of the French Revolution to describe the Algerian historical
processes, including references to the different stages of the Revolution, though
without a general consensus as to which year or set of events these should relate to.
The title of Fanon’s L’An V de la Révolution algérienne bears further witness to this
borrowing. Roberts has also suggested that the notion of ‘stages’ has been a common
feature of Algerian political discourse concerning the Revolution, though this has
been applied in different ways. On the one hand, there has been an important
theoretical strand according to which Algeria was moving, in stages, towards
modernisation. On the other hand, the Revolution has been theorised as a process of
moving, again by stages, towards purification or ‘authenticity’. It is clear that these
two theoretical perspectives offer very different, indeed conflicting, approaches to
history, even if these differences were fudged, mainly on the grounds of political
expediency, in the Algerian context. 
There was, however, one important idea that was common to both these strands,
unlikely though this may have seemed. This was the concept of the ‘new man’, which
was seized upon to articulate the aspirations born with the Algerian Revolution to
found a new nation and a new society. It was through the notion of ‘regeneration’
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that the ‘new man’ could resonate to those inspired by secular modernism, such as
Fanon, who considered that this regeneration would come about through the
medium of revolutionary violence as a purifying force. It could also form part of the
perspective of those looking for salvation via a return to the purifying force of a
revitalised Islam. Although the notion of the ‘new man’ could thus appear to mean
all things to all men, the values attached to the notion were profoundly different
according to the political perspectives.
Fanon explicitly warned against the illusion of seeking salvation through an
impossible return to a glorious African past, at the same time as he called for a
rejection of European values as irrelevant to the struggles of the colonised (Fanon
(1961)/1987). His own thinking, of course, for all its originality, was nonetheless
based in part on the revolutionary tradition in European thought and can be seen as
its continuation. 
The notion of the ‘new man’ notoriously lends itself to a variety of political
content and has made its appearance within the ideologies of fascism and Nazism to
denote the emergence of a ‘superior’ type of human being, or Übermensch. In
Algeria, it was subsumed into the notion of a homogenised, uniform national
product of the Revolution, in which all differences would be merged in the interests
of national unity, with a single national culture, a single party and a single state. 
This notion of a homogeneous nation was flawed from the beginning. Nabile
Farès has referred to the ‘hiatus in the national consciousness’ represented by the
position of the Berber population and culture within the national body (Farès 1971:
32–33), though the cracks are manifold and were to become more marked once the
common, colonial enemy could no longer play a unifying role, or not to the same
extent in the post-independence scenario.
On the one hand, a façade of homogeneity was achieved by the denial of
difference. It was claimed, for instance, that the Berbers had been totally assimilated
with the Arabs for many centuries and that no cultural differences remained except
those that had been exacerbated by a French policy of divide and rule. On the other
hand, any remaining differences would be ironed out. This could take place as a
necessary part of the liberation struggle. Already in 1958, Krim Belkacem had written
in El Moudjahid of the Revolution as a ‘melting-pot, in which men of all walks of life
and conditions, peasants, artisans, workers, intellectuals, rich or poor are undergoing
a process of intermixing, which will lead to the birth of a new type of man’ (quoted
in Stora 1992: 162). However, this notion of the hybridisation of Algerian society was
soon replaced by a voluntaristic cultural policy with uniformity as its aim.
Moves to homogenise Algerian society and culture began in earnest under the
regime of Houari Boumedienne after 1965, with Arabisation as a key instrument of
the policy, justified as an exercise in breaking with French colonial culture. In effect,
the attempts to establish a ‘normalised’, homogeneous national culture allowed no
space for difference and even less for dissidence in the political arena. The notion of
the ‘new man’ was yet again brought into service. In Boumedienne’s definition, this
was not so much the marker of a new stage of humanity, but a return to a more
authentic version of Algerian man, a true son of the Algerian soil and the African
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past, divested of all the ideological and cultural apparel left behind by French
colonialism: ‘not a man borrowed from elsewhere, but a real man, just as he has been
fashioned by the history, geography, economy and blood of his forefathers. Refuting
the untruths spread by colonialism and highlighting evidence of the African past and
cultural presence’ (quoted from Symposium d’Alger (1969) in Stora 1992: 231).
Cultural policy as formulated by the influential figure of Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi,
minister in various capacities in both the Boumedienne and the Chadli Benjedid
periods, was seen in terms of a ‘cultural revolution’. Writing in 1973 Taleb Ibrahimi
made this explicit: ‘The cultural revolution consists of working to create a new man
in a new society, encouraging the adoption of a new way of life more in tune with
the ideals of the Revolution and geared to consolidating and furthering the success
of this revolution’ (Taleb Ibrahimi (1973)/1981: 219).
This is far removed from the hybridity of the syncretic version of the nation
favoured by Kateb Yacine, who saw the nation as the product of the many different
men and women who have left their mark on the Algerian soil, in opposition to the
single, uniform approach, on the one hand, and, on the other, the myth of the
colonial pioneer, as trailblazing ‘first man’, set out by Camus, for instance, in his
posthumous novel Le Premier Homme (Camus 1994: 256–58). In Nedjma, one of the
characters, Mourad, explicitly rejects the illusion of the ‘first man’, speaking of ‘the
world which is no longer that of the first woman, or the first man’ (Kateb Yacine
(1956)/1981: 19–20). 
Kateb Yacine quite characteristically stresses the role of women here. Indeed,
there is a strong case to be made for the actual emergence of the ‘new woman’
through the part that many Algerian women played in the War of Liberation and the
profound effect that their involvement was to have on their lives (Amrane 1991).
The choice of the female character, Nedjma, to represent the nation is also significant
in this respect. This does not seem to be of the same order as, for instance, the role
played by Marianne in the French national iconography and imagination, as symbol
of the Republic. Neither is Nedjma a mother figure, with a single lineage,
symbolising the common origin of the nation and the care of its future citizens. On
the contrary, she is a hybrid figure, of uncertain origins, with a multitude of different
roles, as daughter, wife, lover, elusive symbol, providing a complex set of links
between the nation’s hybrid past and its national future.  
This is also true of the equally fluid woman figure associated with the sea in
Mohammed Dib’s Qui se souvient de la mer (Dib (1962)/1990), though there is an
ambiguity and interchangeability here between the mother, ‘la mère’, and its
homonym of the title, ‘la mer’. The figure of the ‘mother’ is certainly very present in
Algerian fiction of the nationalist period and carries a complex set of meanings,
reflecting some of the key ambiguities and tensions of the colonial situation and
anticolonial struggle. On the one hand, the ‘Mother’ conjured up family roots and
loyalties, not least with regard to the ‘mother tongue’. At the same time, colonial
ideology portrayed France as the ‘mother country’, an ideal, spiritual home. Farida
Abu Haidar has written about this dichotomy, as articulated by Dib in another of his
novels, La Grande Maison (Dib (1952)/1996): 
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Writers, moreover, were surrounded, throughout their childhood, by images of
an absent spiritual mother (France), as well as a physically present one (their
own mother). At school, it would have been instilled into them that France, la
mère patrie, was their mother. This concept must have been a difficult one to
grasp for some of them, as is shown by Dib in La Grande Maison, where the
boy Omar cannot understand how his mother, Aïni, can be on the other side
of the Mediterranean, when she is in fact at home. (Abu Haidar 1996: 72) 
The importance of women’s role in the transmission of memory is a constant theme
of much of the fiction of this period, and particularly of the postcolonial period,
where migration became a widespread phenomenon, bringing in its train new figures
of the ‘nomad’, in which the lack of roots is experienced as displacement or loss
rather than a celebration of ‘rootlessness’. Malika Mokkedem, for instance, has
referred to her grandmother’s rejection of the idea of roots in favour of ‘des jambes
pour marcher et une mémoire’.2 Much of Leïla Sebbar’s work relates to the important
role of women in preserving and relaying the memory of the family and wider
community. In the last volume of her Shérazade trilogy, for instance, there is an old
woman in war-torn Beirut who is kept going by this duty of transmission, to pass on
the heritage, the rites and rituals, the memory she derives from her female ancestors
for the future generations of women:
The mother repeats every day, every time all three of them are together, no
one comes to visit any more, because the mother no longer invites people
like before, she repeats, and the daughter and the maid servant wait for the
prophecy: I shall die on my feet in my own house, I am my house and the
children of my children will not leave it empty, I know this as my mother
knew it, and the mother of my mother. I will not abandon my house to the
jackals, they will not loot and pillage here, if my house collapses about me,
my body buried in the ruins, covered in the silk and red carnations of the
sofa, will not allow robbers to engage in shame and dishonour and they will
flee, as if pursued by the fire of the divine judgement. The maid servant says
that she will also be dead under the stones, and the daughter promises that,
if she does not die, she will take care of the remains under the stones, the
marble, the blue and green mosaics … Only then do they drink their tea,
together, with solemnity. (Sebbar 1991: 119–20)
The telling of tales is a vital tool in this onward transmission of the folk memory,
providing continuity with a communal past, whatever the degree of fictional
creativity involved. Memory can thus be transmitted through oral or written records,
involving the direct or indirect relaying of first- or second-hand source materials and
the weaving of such material into stuff for the imagination, with a greater or lesser
input of fictional elements. The old reliance on oral transmission, written material,
monuments, images in sculpture and paint and other forms of art, has been
augmented by new ‘direct’ records, first-hand photographic, cinematic and audio
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material. Yet, as with the older forms, all this material requires interpretation and re-
appropriation by later generations, which bring their own personal imaginary and
symbolic codes to bear on it, as well as the collective ideological and cultural
frameworks of interpretation of their group or society. Whether this is done
consciously or subconsciously, the incorporation of the telling or retelling of history
into a political agenda leads inevitably to their transference to a different plane. 
Problems of Postcolonial History
These issues surrounding the question of history cannot be simply relegated to the past,
but have a crucial impact on the political choices, regarding the nature of the future
projects of the formerly colonised countries. Moreover, it is not simply a question of
acknowledging that there are different interpretations of history and leaving it at that.
This is not an option for two main reasons: first, because the way in which history is
represented actually matters. It matters because representations of history are not just
more or less believable stories or narratives of a nation’s past, but are often used to
found the legitimacy of particular political movements and institutions. Nation-states
have used history in different ways to legitimise the form, content and operating
mechanisms of their systems of power, as have groups and movements that seek to
challenge this power and replace it. Thus, there are clear political implications attached
to the different versions of history, whether these are acknowledged or not, and
therefore, if history matters, so do the particular ways in which it is represented. 
However, there is a second reason why accepting these differences along with the
assumption that they are all equally valid is also imbued with political significance.
It implies that objective knowledge of history is not possible, because historical
reality is always an ideological construction for political or other purposes, according
to the lights of the person narrating it and the language employed. According to this
perspective in its extreme version, universally valid scientific knowledge of historical
reality has become an impossibility. The political implications of this are immense.
On the one hand, it denies the possibility of any understanding of the
interconnectedness of the human species in its historical evolution. On the other
hand, it opens the floodgates to any number of particularist versions of history,
which can be pressed into the service of any cause or group of people, regardless of
the implications and dangers they may present to others. As Eric Hobsbawm has
recently argued, in a piece criticising postmodern trends in modern history:
The major immediate political danger to historiography today is ‘anti-
universalism’ or ‘my truth is as valid as yours, whatever the evidence’. This
appeals to various forms of identity group history, for which the central
issue of history is not what happened, but how it concerns the members of
a particular group. What is important to this kind of history is not rational
explanation but ‘meaning’, not what happened but what members of a
collective group defining itself against outsiders – religious, ethnic, national,
by gender, or lifestyle – feel about it. (Hobsbawm 2005)
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Of course, there are many objections to this argument and some of the others raised
by Hobsbawm in this text. It is notoriously difficult to arrive at the objective or
scientific ‘truth’ about history, given the extent of ideological interference, both
conscious and subconscious, which takes place, and the complexities of meaning
deriving from the language used in its writing. This does not necessarily mean
throwing in the towel and abandoning the search for universally valid knowledge.
However, it does entail the recognition of the difficulties that one many encounter
in this search if it is going to be successful, and the development of strategies for
overcoming them. 
Moreover, as Hobsbawm himself recognises, not all of these ‘identity group’
histories are irrational, politically motivated distortions of history. Much of the work
done has contributed to a much needed rectification of the understanding of
historical reality as experienced by subordinate groups and peoples, including the
working class, whose role has been consistently underplayed in histories written for
the dominant. In the context of imperialism and colonialism, there has certainly
been a place for the writing of history, as well as literature, that sets the record
straight in terms of revalorising and reinterpreting the precolonial past in a way that
may serve to destroy preconceptions relating to the backwardness of precolonial
societies. Indeed, some of the great political leaders of the independence generation
felt it important to turn their hand to this kind of historical writing, such as
Jawaharlal Nehru, with his Glimpses of World History and The Discovery of India
(Nehru (1934)/1989, (1945)/1989). It has also proved to be an important theme for
writers of fiction to set the record straight, to re-appropriate the historical
imagination or give voice to the forgotten and dispossessed. Assia Djebar is a prime
example of this type of writing, not just in her efforts to give voice to the silenced
women of previous generations, but also to reclaim the history of her country
(Chikhi 1997), in novels such as Les Alouettes naïves (Djebar 1967), L’Amour, la
fantasia (Djebar 1985), Ombre sultane (Djebar 1987), Loin de Médine (Djebar
1992), Vaste est la prison (Djebar 1995), or stories and essays, such as those in Femmes
d’Alger dans leur appartement (Djebar 1980).3
Given the extent of the denigration and denial of the positive achievements of
the colonised peoples prior to colonisation, it would be hardly surprising if attempts
to correct the negative portrayal did not sometimes veer into hyperbole about past
glories and a lost golden age as part of the necessary stage in the process of
rebalancing. However, there have also been theoretically sophisticated attempts to
redress the balance. Samir Amin, for instance, based his theory of the development
of capitalism on the premise of the backwardness of Europe in relation to certain
more developed non-European societies. His thesis was that capitalism could develop
more easily in the less advanced societies of feudal Europe, which exemplified
peripheral forms of what he calls the tributary mode of production, and where state
formation and ideological expression were less developed and thus represented less of
an obstacle to the growth of capitalism than in more central tributary societies. As he
says, ‘this greater flexibility of the less advanced societies seems to us to be central to
the theory of unequal development’(Amin 1989: 9). 
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Amin does not limit his theory to the development of capitalism in peripheral
Europe; he also applies it to explain the development of capitalism in Japan, seen as
peripheral to China (Amin 1989: 64). However, his theory gives a dramatic new
twist to the notion of progress, with Europe coming to the fore of historical
economic development, not because of its strengths, but because of its weakness.
Other explanations of the development of capitalism in Europe normally stress
positive factors, such as the primitive accumulation of capital, cultural and
ideological factors stemming from the Renaissance and Reformation, along with the
arguments of a more suitable or superior natural predisposition for its development,
relating to the environment, such as the climate, or the people, including racial
characteristics of temperament, morality, energy, etc. As Amin himself stressed, if his
theory has universal validity, it demolishes all Eurocentric notions of European
uniqueness (Amin 1989: 64). It also gives a new interpretation to what has been
known by some Marxists as the Asiatic mode of production, redefined by Amin as
the central form of tributary society, with European medieval feudalism as the
peripheral. Interestingly, Ibn Battutah attributed European backwardness in the
fourteenth century to the inhospitable European climate (Amin 1989: 96).
The historical development of capitalism had enormous implications for the
reconfiguration of European and global space, as discussed in the Introduction. For
Amin, this is closely related to the modern definition of Europe, which he sees as a
construct of relatively recent origin, implying a reconfiguration of history to found
Europe on its supposed origins in an ancient Greece, redefined with hindsight as the
polar, ‘civilised’ opposite to the ‘barbarism’ of Asia (see also Bernal 1987–91):
The European culture that conquered the world fashioned itself in the
course of a history that unfolded in two distinct time periods. Up until the
Renaissance, Europe belonged to a regional tributary system that included
Europeans and Arabs, Christians and Moslems. But the greater part of
Europe at that time was located at the periphery of this regional system,
whose centre was situated around the eastern end of the Mediterranean
basin. This Mediterranean system prefigures to some extent the subsequent
capitalist world system. From the Renaissance on, the capitalist world
system shifts its centre towards the shores of the Atlantic, while the
Mediterranean region becomes, in turn, the periphery. The new European
culture reconstructs itself around a myth that creates an opposition between
an alleged European geographical continuity and the world to the south of
the Mediterranean, which forms the new centre/periphery boundary. The
whole of Eurocentrism lies in this mythic construct. (Amin 1989: 10–11)4
It will be interesting to look at how this notion of centre and periphery has fared in
subsequent developments in what is termed ‘postcolonial’ theory. Suffice it to say, for
the moment, that, apart from some important exceptions, independence for the
former colonies has not brought a fundamental reversal of the centre/periphery
relation. However, in terms of perceptions of history, it was perhaps inevitable that
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more nuanced pictures of the precolonial past would emerge, as it was that the use
of the explanation of the devastation imposed by colonialism to explain all the
problems of the formerly colonised countries would recede. Increasingly, the
reclamation of their own history by the formerly colonised has entailed the calling
into question of the very model that posits the watershed of colonisation and
colonialism and its aftermath as the defining moment from which all else follows, as
by Aijaz Ahmad here:
In periodising our history in the triadic terms of precolonial, colonial and
postcolonial, the conceptual apparatus of ‘postcolonial criticism’ privileges
as primary the role of colonialism as the principle of structuration in that
history, so that all that came before colonialism becomes its own prehistory
and whatever comes after can only be lived as infinite aftermath. That may
well be how it appears to those who look at that history from the outside –
to those in other words, who look at the former colonies in Asia and Africa
from inside the advanced capitalist countries – but not to those who live
inside that history. (Ahmad 1996: 280–81)
This criticism relates equally to ‘postcolonial’ theory as to versions of colonial history and
nationalist-inspired anticolonial reworkings of that history. It will become even more
relevant in the process of current trends towards ‘normalisation’ (see Chapters 7 and 11). 
Reclaiming Culture
The notion of reclamation has also figured importantly in the domain of culture.
Potentially, this covers a very wide range of issues, fields and relations, though some
critics have adopted a fairly restrictive definition of culture. Edward Said, for
instance, differentiated culture from other types of practices, such as those connected
to economic, social or political activity. For him, it was mainly associated with those
forms of communication and creativity, designed to provide aesthetic pleasure. He
also attributed an inherent value to culture, defined as the best or most noble
elements of any particular society: 
As I use the word, ‘culture’ means two things in particular. First of all it
means all those practices, like the arts of description, communication and
representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, social and
political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose
principal aims is pleasure … Second, and almost imperceptibly, culture is a
concept that includes a refining and elevating element, each society’s
reservoir of the best that has been known and thought, as Matthew Arnold
put it in the 1860’s. (Said 1993: xii–xiii)
A broader definition of culture sees it as the medium through which the individual
relates, passively or actively, to his/her personal situation or social reality. In this
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definition, culture is implicated in all spheres of human activity. It is constituted by
practices, representations, myths, beliefs that fashion and frame the substance of our
experience, whether or not they are conscious or unconscious, acknowledged or
challenged. These individual elements generally constitute systems providing the
connectivity between the different elements of experience and activity. 
The scope of ‘culture’ can therefore extend into all spheres of life. It impinges on
the assumptions, beliefs, values and practices operating in the economic, political,
religious, judicial, artistic and intellectual domains, as well as in the customs and
habits of social living and daily life, affecting cooking and food, dressing, shopping,
leisure, family life and so on.
This does not mean, however, that culture has to be considered as a single
monolithic system. First, since the elements that constitute it are constantly evolving
and new elements are continually emerging, the stability of a cultural system is never
permanent, but only relative. Thus, if sets of beliefs, values and practices can be
grouped into more or less well-defined and relatively autonomous cultural systems,
which can be represented as different, discrete cultures, these systems remain
temporary configurations, fluid and dynamic in nature, in which the key mobilising
element is human activity. Moreover, the boundaries between these different cultures
are not impermeable. Interactions and interconnections between different cultural
systems are commonplace, on both the synchronic and the diachronic levels. The
specific, localised forms of the historical cultural heritage, constituted by the
practices of previous generations, are prime candidates for this interactivity in terms
of the new meanings with which they are invested, the new links that are drawn and
the distance that is mapped from their assumptions. 
One of the hotly debated topics of the national liberation era was the question
of a national culture and its role in the nationalist project. Fanon was particularly
concerned by this question, to which a whole chapter, ‘On National Culture’, is
devoted in Les Damnés de la terre (Fanon (1961)/1987). While it was recognised that
cultural struggles were an essential part of the nationalist struggle, there were two key
issues. First, cultural struggles on their own were not sufficient. Sooner or later, the
colonised intellectual or artist has to realise that ‘one does not prove one’s nationhood
on the basis of culture but by demonstrating it in the struggle waged by the people
against the occupation forces’ (Fanon (1961)/1987: 163). The second issue
concerned the content of this national culture. How was it to be defined? How was
the right balance to be achieved between focusing on a new national culture, based
on the values of modernity and progress, and looking towards a better future, on the
one hand, and reclaiming a lost or threatened historical culture and tradition,
suppressed by colonialism? Both projects had their own mobilising appeal and often
coexisted in an uneasy tension in the cultural policies of the nationalist parties and
post-independence states, where a factor of unity was provided by the fact that, in
both cases, the national culture was defined primarily in opposition to that imposed
by the former colonial power. The notion of a national culture, whatever its content,
also tended to assume the form of a single homogeneous entity, which was used as
the vehicle for the imposition of uniformity. This was particularly the case in Algeria,
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where, ironically, the dominant model was to a large extent a mirror image of the
dominant conception of French national identity, along with its intolerance of
difference, which had been dominant in France at least since the Third Republic.
Of course, this supposed homogeneity did not exist in fact, either in France or
in Algeria. As elsewhere, there was no single, unidimensional culture, just as there are
no unidimensional individuals in the real world. Whether the ideology was used with
a view to uniting the nation or to defining the Other (often part and parcel of the
same process), there was a simplifying tendency at work, in which the real differences
between individuals were steamrollered out of the fixed, stereotypical, collective
categories, or the multiple facets of each individual’s own self-identity were reduced
into a single, pure essence. 
In the face of the inadequacy of these notions of cultural identity, a number of
alternative models have emerged, premised on a multiplicity of different cultures or
cultural strands coexisting within a society or an individual, implying diverse
identities. Some have described this more complex view of identity in terms of a
palimpsest, where the different elements are superimposed one upon another, or
where, as Kateb Yacine describes it in Nedjma, the palimpsest absorbs the earlier signs
and meanings, ‘comme un palimpseste boit les signes anciens’ (Kateb Yacine
(1956)/1981: 70). The palimpsest is a metaphor that has often been used to describe
Assia Djebar’s work, this time in its work of uncovering and rewriting the different
layers of accretion, as Debra Kelly has pointed out (Majumdar 2002: 82). It is also a
paradigm drawn upon by Salman Rushdie, most notably in his novel, The Moor’s
Last Sigh.
Here, Rushdie has one of his characters, Flora Zogoiby, drawing up physical and
notional demarcation lines to mark out the boundaries of racial and religious
communities, in a simplistic fencing in of the essential collective identity she shares
as a member of Cochin’s Jewish community (Rushdie 1995: 70–73). This identity is
firmly fixed in the notion of a shared past, a collective historical memory. As such, it
is challenged by her son Abraham, whose eyes are focused on the future, on the
possibility of seizing his own potentialities and actualising them in a process of self-
creation. At the same time, the collective essence is itself subject to change, through
reinterpretations of the past and reconfigurations of the collective memory. What is
more, the particular collective identity in question here is just one of a mosaic of
diverse identities that formed the basis of the pluralistic vision of modern India, now
under increasing threat from communalist, fundamentalist essentialisms. 
The notion of the palimpsest, or the overpainting of one identity, replacing it
with another, only to uncover the original at some point, may be applied equally to
the reality of the individual, as well as to the reality of the city of Bombay or the
national reality of India. 
The city itself, perhaps the whole country, was a palimpsest, Under World
beneath Over World, black market beneath white; when the whole of life
was like this, when an invisible reality moved phantomwise beneath a visible
fiction, subverting all its meanings, how then could Abraham’s career have
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been any different? How could any of us have escaped that deadly layering?
How, trapped as we were in the hundred per cent fakery of the real in the
fancy-dress, weeping-Arab kitsch of the superficial, could we have
penetrated to the full, sensual truth of the lost mother below? How could
we have lived authentic lives? How could we have failed to be grotesque?
(Rushdie 1995: 184–85)
This is a picture of reality with different levels, some visible, some invisible or hidden.
In fact, what is being proposed gets away from binary oppositions altogether,
including those of fact and fiction, appearance and essence, the individual and the
collective. This is not the notion of a hybridised identity as a combination of several
elements; the pluralism here lies as much in the diversity of layers, spaces and relations
as in the processes themselves. What we have in Rushdie is a many-layered notion of
identity, in which individual selfhood is inherited through the genes and/or
manufactured either in a single or a multifaceted version by the individual her/himself
or those who manipulate him/her. In addition, the individual’s identity may be tacked
on to some collective identity/identities, although it may override them. Thus, we
have a vision of the world and the self which is full of different spaces, different layers,
some open to others, some secret, some more real than others.
Other views of identity see it in more synchronic terms, where the elements
making up a complex reality form part of an interconnecting fabric of interwoven
strands and processes. Amitav Ghosh, like Glissant, though to less negative effect (see
Chapter 7), has made particular use of the concept of weaving to articulate the global
reality of human existence in its dimensions of both time (history) and space (the
diaspora) in his novel The Circle of Reason, where he uses fictions based on the travels
and migrations of different peoples across India, Africa, the Middle East and Europe
to bring out the interweaving of different threads of human existence and history
across continents. Far from an abstract, even threadbare universalism, this textured
fabric is more like Césaire’s vision of the richness of all the particulars. 
What could it be but weaving?  Man at the loom is the finest example of
Mechanical man; a creature who makes his own world as no other can, with
his mind. The machine is man’s curse and his salvation, and no machine has
created man as much as the loom. It has created not separate worlds but
one, for it has never permitted the division of the world. The loom
recognizes no continents and no countries. It has tied the world together
with its own bloody ironies from the beginning of human time.
It has never permitted the division of reason.
Human beings have woven and traded in cloth from the time they
built their first houses and cities. Indian cloth was found in the graves of the
Pharaohs. Indian soil is strewn with cloth from China. The whole of the
ancient world hummed with the cloth trade. The Silk Route from China,
running through central Asia and Persia to the ports of the Mediterranean
and from there to the markets of Africa and Europe, bound continents
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together for more centuries than we can count. It spawned empires and
epics, cities and romances. Ibn Battuta and Marco Polo were just
journeymen following paths that had been made safe and tame over
centuries by unknown, unsung traders, armed with nothing more than
bundles of cloth. It was the hunger for Indian chintzes and calicos, brocades
and muslins that led to the foundation of the first European settlements in
India. All through these centuries cloth, in its richness and variety, bound
the Mediterranean to Asia, India to Africa, the Arab world to Europe, in
equal, bountiful trade. (Ghosh 1986: 55–56) 
This is not just fictional fancy; it is closely related to the history of cotton and other
textiles and their effect on the course of human history and the spread of global
capitalism. Moreover, Ghosh gives the precolonial world its full due, breaking with
the view that the modern history of the colonised countries began with imperialism
and colonisation.5
Thus, where differences exist, they may well be in conflict, reflecting
irreconcilable, antagonistic cleavages such as class divisions, or they may be non-
oppositional, simply coexisting without interacting much at all. Any notion of a
credible national culture is thus dependent on a concrete analysis of the elements and
processes that actually make up that culture and the relations between them. In
Algeria, problems inevitably arose when there was no recognition that differences
existed, even if they were put aside to achieve a national unity or alliance, however
temporary. The problem of a national culture in Algeria was, in fact, a reflection of
the problematic nature of the national movement, which proclaimed itself a ‘Front’
but not in the usual sense of an alliance of heterogeneous constituents to achieve a
common goal, but rather as a single homogeneous union (Harbi 1980). 
Samir Amin attributes the very notion of a distinct and invariable culture to the
mode of thinking characteristic of Eurocentrism, according to which there is only
one ‘Western’ model for the rest of the world to follow. This does not necessarily
imply a belief in the universal validity of this culture. On the contrary, Eurocentrism
presupposes the existence of discrete, fixed cultures that mould the histories of
different peoples, although it also proposes that these peoples should imitate the
Western model. According to Amin, this is a phoney universalism: 
Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon in the sense that it assumes the
existence of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical
paths of different peoples. Eurocentrism is therefore anti-universalist, since
it is not interested in seeking possible general laws of human evolution. But
it does present itself as universalist, for it claims that imitation of the
Western model by all peoples is the only solution to the challenges of our
time. (Amin 1989: vii)
It is not a simple particularism, a particular ethnocentrism, like that of any other
people; the key to its specificity lies in its pretensions to universalism and its capacity
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to impose itself on other peoples. The corollary of this position would be that non-
Western peoples are forever doomed to engage in mimicry, with the supine imitation
of an alien, but dominant, cultural model the only alternative to the furtherance of
an inevitable conflict of cultures, as set out in publications such as Samuel
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations (Huntington 1996). 
In recent years, the idea of such a clash of cultures (or indeed religions) has
become more commonly used as a factor of explanation of conflict in the world,
taking over from explanations founded in economic and political processes, deriving
directly, or indirectly, from the class struggle, as seen by the international proletariat,
or in terms of the Cold War clash of two socio-economic and political systems. The
appeal in the West of this notion of clash of cultures as an explanation of the tensions
and conflict existing in the modern world, may owe something to the need to
construct a clearly defined Other to replace the bogeyman of the former Soviet
Union. It can, however, be subject to criticism on a number of levels. 
First, the conception of culture which it implies is that of a system, with a
definite, fixed essence, closed to the influence of other cultures, as well as to the
possibility of dynamic development as a result of internal processes. The reference
back to origins or tradition takes pride of place in such a perspective, as a way of
grounding this culture. This can be taken to the extreme position whereby the
culture is considered to be organically linked to the nation. It becomes identified as
part of its ‘nature’. Cultural identity becomes a straitjacket and cultures assume the
status of entities to be defended, rather than shared (Garapon 1997). 
Secondly, it shares with other political positions that also highlight the role of
culture, such as the call for the defence of cultural diversity so important in the discourse
of Francophonie,6 an undue prioritisation of culture or religion as the main issue in the
world today and the most important arena of conflict and struggle. In such world views,
whether sincerely or cynically held, explanations based on primary economic, social and
political factors are displaced to the realm of the cultural or religious. 
Thirdly, whether as the defence of the need for cultural diversity, in which
different cultures are seen to complement and harmonise with each other, or in the
form of the notion of a clash of civilisations, where cultures are presented as not
merely different but in opposition to each other, culturalist analyses or proposals
sidestep the issues raised by the globalisation of international capitalism and, in
particular, the question of universalism. 
Amin has categorised three distinct attitudes in respect of universalism, in terms
of analysis and model solutions (Amin 1989: xi). In the first category, there are those
who see no need for universalism but claim instead the ‘right to be different’ in what
he describes as ‘culturalist praise of provincialisms’. This implies a fundamental shift
away from universal mobilising calls relating to the political rights of all humanity or
the liberation of the universal working class through the world revolution to
demands for the right to cultural difference. It is an approach that is in line with
many contemporary forms of nationalism, regionalism, religious communalism,
multiculturalist ideology and the Francophone discourse. The second category
comprises those who believe that universalism already exists; it was discovered by
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Europe and then adopted by the ‘West’ in general. It calls for all to ‘imitate the West’
as the ‘best of all possible worlds’. This is a West that is summed up in the phrase
‘marketplace plus democracy’. The last category consists of those who do not accept
that this type of utopian universalism actually contributes to an understanding of the
real nature of the global economy and political systems. In this last category of
Amin’s, we could include those who see the need to develop a better analysis of
current global realities and problems, which could have a truly universal dimension
and validity, along with appropriate global solutions, as well as those who reject
outright the possibility of universal knowledge, given the existence of irreconcilable
cultural differences, along with attempts to find global solutions through
cooperation. 
There are elements of all three approaches to be found in the political discourse
of the dominant powers in the contemporary world, as in the discourse of those who
would challenge this hegemony. 
Notes
1. At a conference held at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, on 24 July
1999.
2. This was at a conference on Francophone literature and Otherness, held on 11 and 12
March 1999 at the Waterford Institute of Technology (O’Dowd-Smyth 2001).
3. Vikram Chandra, for instance, in his monumental novel tracing the fortunes of
Europeans and Indians alike through the various stages of the imperial past, Red Earth
and Pouring Rain, also harks back to the time of Ashoka and a (literally) golden age of
trade. ‘Then there was a time of riches. A king named Ashoka did that rarest of things –
he gave up aggressive conquest and ruled for the good of all creatures. Traders went to the
empires of the West, taking goods and bringing back gold’ (Chandra 1995: 254).
4. See also his sections on the developed Arab-Islamic version of medieval metaphysics and
the peripheral Western version (Amin 1989: 40–59). ‘European feudalism, the peripheral
form of the tributary mode, gave rise to a peripheral version of tributary ideology; Islamic
metaphysics, heir to Hellenism and Eastern Christianity, constituted the fully developed
expression of the ideology’ (Amin 1989: 58).
5. He continues with his metaphor of weaving, as the essential activity in human history: 
Who knows what new horrors lie in store? It is a gory history in parts; a story of
greed and destruction. Every scrap of cloth is stained by a bloody past. But it is the
only history we have and history is hope as well as despair. And so weaving, too, is
hope; a living belief that having once made the world one and blessed it with its
diversity, it must do so again. 
Weaving is hope because it has no country, no continent.
Weaving is Reason, which makes the world go mad and makes it human. (Ghosh
1986: 57–58)
6. This is dealt with in Chapter 7.
146 | Postcoloniality
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 146
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
Chapter 7
The Battleground of Language and
the Changing Discourse of
Francophonie
The territories acquired during the various phases of France’s imperial conquestsare now largely lost to France, whether this happened in the past, as the
consequence of  inter-imperial rivalry, as in the case of its overseas territories in
Canada and most of its footholds in India, or through the struggles of the colonised
peoples themselves, as in the case of Saint-Domingue  and much of the later empire.
The military defeat of France in Indochina, following the battle of Dien Bien Phu,
and its inability to achieve victory in the Algerian War marked two particularly
bloody moments in the decolonisation process. Elsewhere in Africa, however, the
final act of decolonisation was achieved relatively peacefully (Grimal 1978; Chafer
2002). Indeed, Fanon quotes the president of the newly independent Republic of
Gabon, arriving for an official visit in Paris and proclaiming that ‘Gabon is
independent, but nothing has changed between Gabon and France, everything is the
same as before’ (Fanon (1961)/1987: 47). 
In the first flush of anticolonialism and national liberation, much was made by
those who were not so happy with the colonial status quo of the cultural imperialism
that was an integral part of colonial rule. The imposition of an alien culture, including
one of its most important elements, an alien language, was rightly denounced as part
of the system of oppression. Fanon, for instance, wrote of the way in which the
acquisition of mastery over the language of the coloniser both stemmed from and
reinforced the feeling of inferiority that the colonised came to feel towards their own
language and culture, as well as their eventual annihilation (Fanon (1952)/1975:
13–14). In the case of Creole, the inferiority of the language was internalised and
many families seeking social advancement insisted on their children speaking French,
a phenomenon illustrated in Damas’s poem ‘Hoquet’ (Damas 1937).
However, the issues surrounding the question of language were more complex
than its use as a simple tool of cultural oppression. In point of fact, the French
colonial education system had not been designed as a simple, straightforward
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linguistic and cultural indoctrination. Rather, it entailed the implementation of a
twofold policy of social and cultural assimilation for a small minority of the
colonised, through education in the French system and the French language, on the
one hand, and the marginalisation of the vast majority, by dint of their religion and
languages, on the other. As Memmi says in his Portrait du colonisé, most colonised
children did not go to school and those who did found it, in most instances, an
alienating experience (Memmi (1957)/1985: 124). This was particularly the case in
terms of language, where the learning of French was a dual-edged weapon. On the
one hand, bilingualism was a necessity for communication, culture and progress in a
colonial context; on the other, it provoked a cultural catastrophe (Memmi
(1957)/1985: 126). Memmi emphasises the specific character of bilingualism in a
colonial context. It was not the same thing as bilingualism elsewhere, since the two
cultural domains to which the languages gave access were in conflict. Their
oppositional hierarchy was reflected in the languages themselves, in which the
mother tongue was inevitably deemed inferior (Memmi (1957)/1985: 126). 
Memmi’s view of language was not a purely functional one, in which it was seen
simply as a tool for communication. It entailed much more than that: ‘Possessing
two languages is not simply a question of possessing two sets of tools, it means
belonging to two distinct psychic and cultural domains. And in this case, the two
realms symbolised and articulated through the two languages are in conflict: they are
those of the coloniser and of the colonised’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 126). In the
colonial situation, the relations of colonialism impinged on the way the language
issue was determined. This meant that bilingualism in this context could not be a
diglossia, as in other societies, in which a popular idiom coexisted with a ‘pure’, ‘high’
or ‘elite’ language while remaining part of the same psycho-cultural universe. It also
meant that bilingualism could not be seen as a key giving access to the benefits that
polyglots enjoy when they have an additional instrument of communication at their
disposal, but one that is relatively neutral, implying no emotional baggage. In fact,
according to Memmi, what it was, in fact, was a real ‘linguistic drama’ (Memmi
(1957)/1985: 127). 
This is all quite applicable to the situation in the Maghreb countries under
French colonialism, and Memmi’s analysis has to be understood as referring
primarily to the Maghreb, even though he frames it in the most general terms. Thus,
when he says, for instance, that there is no literature in the colonised’s own language
(Memmi (1957)/1985: 127), this cannot be taken to be a universal characteristic of
all colonised peoples. 
However, it remains true that his discussion of the language question did, in fact,
set the terms in which this question was to be discussed over the next few decades,
though some might say interminably, particularly as far as the question of language
choice in literature was concerned. The problem facing the (ex-)colonised writer was
posed as one of linguistic and cultural ambiguity. On the one hand, Memmi
accepted the need for a liberation and revitalisation of the colonised’s own language,
but he also recognised that those who opted to write in French might be unable to
write in their native tongue or find no audience for such writing. He spoke of the
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problems of alienation that might result from this choice, of the difficulties of
addressing their work to a predominantly French audience. Whatever the case, it was
a choice that was never unproblematic or neutral. Speaking of the French language,
he asked whether it was merely a precise and effective instrument or a magnificent
treasure chest, ‘in which are hoarded the discoveries and contributions of writers and
essayists, philosophers and scientists, heroes and adventurers, and where these
treasures of the mind and spirit of the French people become transformed into a
single mythic narrative’ (Memmi (1957)/1985: 129). Fanon had also written about
the dual aspects of language, although from a more critical perspective: technical
mastery of the syntax and morphology, on the one hand, and the adoption of the
culture associated with the language, the ‘taking on of the weight of a whole
civilisation’ (Fanon (1952)/1975: 13–14). 
However, there may, indeed, be other possibilities, and debates about language
cannot be reduced to this simple choice. For instance, when the Queen of England
makes a speech in French with a pronounced English accent, this may not necessarily
be because of unavoidable limitations or poor linguistic ability, but perhaps to make
it clear that she, and others of her background, have learned French in order to be
able to communicate in certain situations, but not in order to identify closely with
the French and assume their culture or to try to pass themselves off as French. More
than a simple tool of communication, it may also be used in such a way as to become
a marker of difference.
In Memmi’s own case, he clearly chose the French language because he saw it as
a treasure chest. In choosing to write in the French language, Memmi saw his choice
as one that encompassed a wider cultural and emotional universe. He chose to
become a French writer while at the same time recognising that this inevitably
condemned him and other writers in his position to divorce and alienation, for
colonised writers were bound, in his view, to call for their mother tongue to become
the main language (Memmi (1957)/1985: 129). Thus, he predicted that literature
written in European languages in the colonies would not survive long in conditions
of independence (Memmi (1957)/1985: 130). Fanon had taken a different view,
rejecting the view that black writers would turn against the French language, and, at
least as far as the Caribbean was concerned, agreeing with Michel Leiris that Creole
was doomed to disappear (Fanon (1952)/1975: 21). 
In this, Memmi has been proved wrong. Literature, and particularly literature in
French, developed as a key form of expression of the nationalist struggle, including the
cultural struggle against imperialism. Moreover, in the Maghreb countries and
elsewhere in the postcolonial world, not only has francophone literature survived
independence, but it has continued to flourish and represents one of the strongest
sectors of growth of literature written in French, in terms of both quantity and quality.
This development was integral to the process of regaining a voice after the
stifling of expression under colonialism, described in metaphorical terms by Fanon
as petrification. Memmi shared with Fanon the notion of the ‘petrification’ of the
colonised. In his analysis in the Portrait du colonisé, not only does this petrification
turn them into dehumanised objects, deprived of their own voice and capacity for
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action, but it also forces them to live outside time. Without freedom of action, they
cannot plan and build a future; moreover, their links to the past and their memory
of the past become more and more tenuous with the absence or disarray of the
institutions that normally preserve a community’s collective memory. They are
limited to the present, which, because of this divorce from past and future, is
impoverished and lacking in real substance (Memmi (1957)/1985). In Sartrean
terms, they become reified.
This process of petrification was graphically illustrated by Mohammed Dib in
Qui se souvient de la mer, where the inhabitants of the colonised city are literally
turned into statues of stone. As his narrator says: ‘I took a step and a ton of stones
fell upon my shoulders. Rage, humiliation. I have always despised this inert matter,
which only needs you to be distracted for a second for it to take over your form’ (Dib
(1962)/1990: 26). Reification and petrification are linked to the silencing of the
population. A rock-like silence descends. The inhabitants become incapable of
speech. All they can do is spew out stones.1 This is in stark contrast to the mounting
wave of sound coming up from the underground and the sea, symbolising the
growing nationalist movement that will eventually engulf the city. Yet the silencing
of the colonised could also be turned back upon the coloniser, when silence becomes
a tactic used to express revolt, in a relation where the master is the only one with the
right of expression. For instance, sullen silence (mutisme général) is used as a tactic by
the Algerian workers in Nedjma to defy those in positions of power over them as
representatives of the colonists’ camp (Kateb Yacine (1956)/1981: 14, 46, 50).
In the case of women, this silencing took on its own particular characteristics.
Again, Assia Djebar has focused much of her work on giving a voice, or voices, to the
many women who have formed part of this ‘monde muet’, the ‘dumb world’ of
‘generations of women, women who have been masked, not allowed to be gazed
upon or to gaze, treated as “things”’ (Djebar 1997: 377). The women themselves ‘are
seeking a language’, as a receptacle and cache for their own potential for revolt and
for life (Djebar 1997: 377).2
With the regaining of their own voice, the question of the choice of language
became a key issue of conflict and debate. For most writers, this was not a matter of
deliberate choice. They wrote in the language that came naturally to them as a
medium of literary expression as a result of their family upbringing or, more usually,
their education. In most cases, it had become normal to articulate certain types of
ideas and emotional relations through one language rather than another. When they
faced up to the options available, they had recourse to a number of arguments to
rationalise the language selected. Kateb Yacine famously referred to the French
language as one of the ‘spoils of war’, although he also turned to the use of colloquial
Arabic for his work in theatre. He was clear that his attachment to the French
language did not bind him, as an Algerian intellectual, to France, but ‘inspired an
unquenchable thirst for liberty’ (Salhi 1999a: 59). Nabile Farès has argued for writers
to make use of all the linguistic instruments they have inherited (Chikhi 1996,
1997). Malek Haddad, on the other hand, abandoned the use of French after
independence, seeing it as a ‘language of exile’ (Bekri 1986; Smail Salhi 1999). The
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poet Tahar Bekri has made the point, following Barthes, that every language is in fact
a foreign language for the creative writer, who has to create his/her own language
(Anoll and Segarra 1999: 292). 
For Assia Djebar, the language issue has been a source of ambiguity, in which the
use of French may offer the potential for education and liberation, while at the same
time acting as a factor of alienation from her maternal roots (Kelly 2004). This takes
on a further dimension, given her project to give back their voice to women who
have been silenced, when the issue of language choice becomes embroiled with the
issues surrounding the possibilities and modalities of representation. 
Anxiety regarding language issues is also a large source of inspiration for the
literary and theoretical writings of Abdelkebir Khatibi, author of La Mémoire tatouée
and Amour bilingue, amongst many other works (Khatibi 1971, 1983a, b). Khatibi
uses the tools and techniques of deconstruction to subvert the hegemonic
pretensions of the French language. He attempts to address the problem through the
‘deterritorialisation’ of the language and the promotion of an alternative way of
thinking, in which signs and nuances interact and interpenetrate across linguistic and
cultural boundaries. This new form of hybridisation or métissage is applied to the
post-independence scenario of the Maghreb countries, in Maghreb Pluriel (Khatibi
1983b), though the significance of his work extends far beyond, to include more
generally applicable themes of diasporic exile and alienation, without ultimately
resolving the tensions involved (Gontard 1981; McNeece 1993; Hiddleston 2004).
The issues raised in connection with language in the sphere of literature
represent, of course, only one aspect of this contentious question. The policies of the
newly independent states with regard to language and cultural matters have also
formed a key arena of struggle. The relationship to the French language is integral to
all the debates on this question, which also brings into play the ongoing relationship
of the former colonies to France itself, as well as to the organisations and cultural
tendencies linked to the wider notion of La Francophonie.
If most of the former colonies, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, have opted for
a continuation of the dual system operating under colonialism, where French has
remained the official language, coexisting with one or more local languages, there
have been significant exceptions to this practice, particularly in the Maghreb, where
a policy of Arabisation was instituted in all the countries concerned. 
Creole, Créolité and Creolisation
There has also been some conflict arising from the subordinate status of Creole in
the French Caribbean islands, although, as these have not attained independent
status, this has taken a different form. The demand for Creole-speaking rights,
voiced, for instance, by the Martiniquan député Camille Darsières in the National
Assembly on 3 May 1984, has led to measures to safeguard the language and include
it in the educational curriculum. In Haiti, Creole was made an official language on
the coming to power of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1990. There had been significant
work to develop a literature in Creole in Haiti, notably by the poet and playwright
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Félix Morisseau-Leroy, who died in 1998 (Guardian, 11 September 1998). This
endeavour was also taken up elsewhere in the Caribbean, most recently in
Martinique by Raphaël Confiant, although he has now abandoned writing in Creole
and reverted to French. On a more theoretical plane, the movement associated with
Confiant, together with the Martiniquan linguist Jean Bernabé and the writer
Patrick Chamoiseau, attempted to extend the defence of the Creole language into a
whole new cultural aesthetic, most notably in their manifesto Eloge de la créolité
(Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant 1989). This was a perspective that gave value
to all the different strands that made up the complex mosaic of Caribbean identity,
or, as the authors of the manifesto were to put it, ‘our primitive soup’, ‘our original
chaos’, ‘our mangrove of potentialities’ (Bernabé, Chamoiseau and Confiant 1989:
28). It highlighted the way in which Creole society had, from the beginning, formed
itself into something new, transcending the binary oppositional divide of slaves and
slave owners, and adapting to a new environment, in a cruel, but creative tension
(Braithwaite 1978).
The role of the Creole language was crucial in this process in the Caribbean,
where the silence imposed on the colonised elsewhere had taken an absolute form.
When slaves were transported from Africa and uprooted from their own cultures and
language communities, they were often literally deprived of their language and their
voice. While communication with the slave owners was usually limited to receiving
orders and there were other means to convey these one-way messages, it was also the
case that the slaves were unable to communicate with other slaves who did not speak
the same language; they could only suffer in silence or, at any rate, in the
incomprehension of others. So the creation of Creole not only served a utilitarian
purpose related to labour, but it was a real case of refinding a voice after being
condemned to silence, what Confiant has called a ‘mutisme forcé’ (Confiant 1996:
133). This lends a special character to the language, which already bears the marks
of earlier struggles.
The Martiniquan Creole movement had the ambition to transcend the
essentialising Negritude associated in the islands with Aimé Césaire (Burton and
Reno 1995), though those involved acknowledge their debt to him, referring to
Negritude as a ‘baptism, the primal act of the restoration of our dignity’, and
claiming to be ‘for ever, the sons of Aimé Césaire’ (Bernabé, Chamoiseau and
Confiant 1989: 18). Nonetheless, they break with a simple, linear notion of identity,
traceable to origins or roots in the African past, which they associate with Césaire,
although, in fact, Césaire had also attempted to reinforce ties with the African
present through his links with Senghor and others, as well as to develop links with
the American black movements. Moreover, there were also elements in Césaire’s
thought that were very sympathetic to the notion of hybridity, such as his concept of
the concrete universal (see Chapter 2).  
The Creole movement was able to build on the notion of ‘antillanité’, or a more
specific identity, which celebrated the ‘West-Indianness’, argued for by René Ménil
in 1964 (Burton and Reno 1995) and, later, by Edouard Glissant (Glissant
(1980)/1997, 1990). It is characterised by the acknowledgement of the specificity of
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the Caribbean territories and a break, not just with Negritude but also with
assimilation into France. For Glissant, it is first and foremost a case of situating these
territories where they actually are, in the Caribbean, from a geographical, economic
and cultural perspective. This means breaking with a notion of identity, characterised
by what he terms a ‘double alienation’: on the one hand, that arising from being
irreversibly ‘cut off ’ from their origins in Africa (‘coupure béante’); on the other, one
that will involve the painful, but necessary, even if improbable, ‘breaking off ’ the
relationship with the dreamland of France (‘cassure douloureuse’) (Glissant
(1980)/1997: 26). It means taking stock of the Caribbean realities, to put an end to
the illusion of a return to African roots, as well as the impossible utopia of full
assimilation within the Hexagon.
Glissant’s work developed a polemic against the universal, or ‘the same’, in other
words, the domination of the ‘West’, imposing what he termed ‘l’universel de la
transparence’ (Glissant (1980)/1997: 14) in the name of ‘le Divers’, a complex,
heterogeneous difference characteristic of the ‘annihilated peoples’ (‘peuples
néantisés’), unlike the single monolithic essence associated with Negritude, based on
the notion of the ‘authentic’ or the ‘pure’. ‘Le Divers’ is a much more fluid notion
than that of oppositional difference and one in which the processes of interaction
and métissage have become paramount. Richard Burton defines it as ‘a multiplicity of
relations, a constellation of forces held in place by a complex process of attraction
and repulsion.  In contrast to Négritude’s obsession with the ‘pure’, Antillanité makes
of le métissage, understood both culturally and, presumably, racially, a supremely
positive, indeed constitutive, principle’ (Burton and Reno 1995: 147).
There is also a negative side, which Glissant himself has described through the
metaphor of weaving. This is not to conjure up a many-textured fabric, as in the case of
other writers (see Chapter 6), but to create, through a multitude of processes and
intertwined forces, a ‘web of nothingness’, in which a people becomes trapped and unable
to move forward, in spite of a preponderance of intellectuals and educated people.3
Créolité or métissage, in the more positive conception, is understood as a process,
or rather any number of interrelating processes, in which a multiplicity of relations
and forces are at work. Identity is understood in terms of ‘relation’, open,
multidimensional, polyvalent. Again, as Burton describes it, this type of identity is
like an ‘archipelago or constellation of signifieds, none of which enjoys primacy over
the others and whose unity lies not in the fact of possessing a single source but in the
complex of gravitational forces that hold them in relation to each other’ (Burton and
Reno 1995: 148). It no longer takes single substances or essences as the building
blocks of a new hybrid entity, but highlights the processes and the multiple relations
in which the complex, heterogeneous forces at play in the diverse interrelate with
each other, in a constant movement of renewal and transformation or ‘unlimited
métissage’ as ‘a combinatoire of diverse cultural materials that can never be halted,
fixed or tied down, forever in the process of renewing and transforming itself ’
(Burton and Reno 1995: 148).  
Adopting Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between the type of thinking and
identity associated with the metaphor of the single root origin and that associated
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with the metaphor of the rhizome and its multiple offshoots (Deleuze and Guattari
1980), Glissant not only broke with the problematic of ‘roots’, but also associated
the new type of thinking with a specifically Caribbean organic metaphor, that of the
mangrove swamp. The mangrove, with its dense, tangled forests and free-floating,
intertwining and interlaced anarchic root systems, most aptly expressed the new
conception of the potentialities of a myriad multi-connected identities and
opportunities. Identity was no longer seen in binary oppositional terms, but through
a multi-relational set of processes. 
The authors of the manifesto took over much of Glissant’s perspective on
créolité. Rather than looking towards a lost past and attempting to reclaim it, the
advocates of créolité see Caribbean society and culture in its fundamental newness.
The different elements of its population in terms of racial and geographical origins,
the different cultures and languages have made a heady mix of native American,
European, African and Asian influences. However, these have not just been brought
together to form a mixture. The process of synthesis, or hybridisation, has in fact
resulted in the emergence of a society, a culture and a language that are qualitatively
new and radically different from the sum total of all the separate parts that have gone
into the brew. This phenomenon is seen in the racial hybridisation of the people
themselves, as well as the symbols of their cultural universe, where a notable example
is the merging of the Christian Virgin Mary into the pantheon of Hindu gods,
brought to the islands by East Indian indentured labourers, where she is worshipped
as a new deity, Mariémen, by both Hindus and non-Hindus. The Creole language
itself is not just a combination of elements of syntax and lexis from its component
languages. These have been transformed in the interaction to form a new language.
However, there was a tension between the view of créolité in which diversity,
pluralism and hybridity were the key features and which extended beyond the
boundaries of Antillanité to embrace all Creole societies, on the one hand, and the
defence of the Creole language against the encroachment of French, on the other.
The advocates of créolité were well aware of these dangers, including that of ossifying
the language and culture into a fossil to be preserved, and attempted various
strategies to mitigate the problem, including seeing the language as an ‘ecosystem’
(Burton and Reno 1995: 157–58). 
The view of Creole in an antagonistic relation to French was particularly strong
in Guadeloupe. Dany Bébel-Giseler’s Langue créole, force jugulée (1976) emphasised
the role of Creole as the language of resistance and the core of a repressed cultural
identity linking Guadeloupeans to their African origins and was later to describe it
as the ‘umbilical cord binding us to Africa, to others, to ourselves’ (quoted in Burton
and Reno 1995: 151). 
Those who emphasised the hybridity of the Creole language followed this logic
through to recognise that the French contribution to the hybridised language was to
be valued, just as the African one was. It was not French in itself that was to be
rejected, but its position of hegemony, its claim to universality and the right to be
the single language. Given that the islands remain part of France, the language issue
has also to be seen in this context. In fact, the influence of the créolité movement has
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been greater in terms of making the case for métissage, rather than through the use of
the Creole language and culture as mobilising tools for fighting linguistic and
cultural imperialism. As we shall see later in this chapter, there is much in this Creole
perspective that which would not sound out of place in the modern discourse of La
Francophonie or indeed in much postcolonial theory elaborated elsewhere. 
The implications of this thinking are not confined to the intellectual sphere, but
impinge directly on the definition of political outlooks and potential strategies, not
least in the definition of the nation and national identity, where it posits a new type
of nationhood, built not on homogeneous linguistic, cultural, religious or ethnic
origins, but on a heterogeneous, hybrid identity, which acknowledges all the
elements that have constituted the national body.  This has been proposed for the
very diverse populations of the Caribbean, but also forms a powerful strand of
thinking in the Maghrebian context, most notably, as we have seen, in the work of
the Algerian writer Kateb Yacine (see Chapter 6). There are also implications for the
redefinition of relations with other nations, most notably, the metropolitan power,
or the ‘West’ generally, and the implications for the choice of political strategies.  
The Battleground of Language – Algeria
In Algeria, the language question became highly politicised as a result of the
particular circumstances and influences through which it acquired its independence.
The choice of Arabic as both the official and the national language has been fraught
with problems, some of which relate to the diglossia existing between, on the one
hand, the classical, written Arabic, which was the language of sacred and learned
texts and thus restricted to a particular, educated milieu, and, on the other hand, the
specific forms of colloquial Arabic in use in Algeria as an oral, spoken language. This
particular diglossia was further complicated by the widespread use of different forms
of other languages, such as Tamazight,4 and, of course, French. Indeed, the number
of French speakers in Algeria make it the second francophone nation after France.
Moreover, as in many other countries that have experienced different cultural
influences, the usage of these different languages and dialects cannot simply be
allocated to specific regions, diverse groups of people or social classes. On the
contrary, the different linguistic influences impinge on the actual language used to
create various hybrid patterns of language use. 
During the Algerian war of liberation, this hybridity had been reflected in the
radio broadcasts by the Voice of Fighting Algeria from the end of 1956. Arabic,
Tamazight and French were all used for these broadcasts and, as Fanon has pointed
out, this was actually an important factor in consolidating and unifying the nation. 
the use of the Arab, Kabyle and French languages which, as colonialism was
obliged to recognize, was the expression of a non-racial conception, had the
advantage of developing and of strengthening the unity of the people, of
making the fighting Djurdjura area real for the Algerian patriots of Batna or
of Nemours. The fragments and splinters of acts … lost their anarchic
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character and became organized into a national and Algerian political idea,
assuming their place in an overall strategy of the reconquest of the people’s
sovereignty. The scattered acts fitted into a vast epic, and the Kabyles were
no longer ‘the men of the mountains’, but the brothers who with
Ouamrame and Krim made things difficult for the enemy troops. (Fanon
(1959)/1970: 68)
Indeed, Fanon stressed that the French language itself had become transformed
through the Algerian struggle:
The French language, a language of occupation, a vehicle of the oppressing
power, seemed doomed for eternity to judge the Algerian in a pejorative
way. Every French expression referring to the Algerian had a humiliating
content. Every French speech heard was an order, a threat or an insult. The
contact between the Algerian and the European is defined by these three
spheres. The broadcasting in French of the programmes of Fighting Algeria
was to liberate the enemy language from its historic meanings. The same
message transmitted in three different languages unified the experience and
gave it a universal dimension. The French language lost its accursed
character, revealing itself to be capable also of transmitting, for the benefit
of the nation, the messages of truth that the latter awaited. Paradoxical as it
may appear, it is the Algerian Revolution, it is the struggle of the Algerian
people, that is facilitating the spreading of the French language in the
nation. (Fanon (1959)/1970: 73)
For Fanon, this was a way of ‘exorcising’ the language. He also saw it as a way of
sowing confusion and disarray in the colonial camp, through appropriation of the
enemy’s linguistic system, particularly when French was used in the service of the
nationalist cause, as at the Soummam Conference of 1956, instead of the Arabic used
for earlier nationalist congresses.
After independence, however, the state adopted a voluntaristic policy to establish
a national language to replace the language of the colonial power. As in France, the
notion of a national language was considered essential for the unity of the nation. It
was altogether normal for the choice to be Arabic, in spite of the difficulties of
educating the nation’s children in a standardised version of the language that had not
been the ‘natural’ tongue of anyone. However, as Mohammed Miliani has said, in a
balanced analysis of the language question in contemporary Algeria, it is not the
introduction of a policy of Arabisation per se, that has caused the problems, but its
implementation, in the face of a number of serious difficulties (Miliani 2005). 
Not least of these difficulties was the extreme shortage of qualified teachers and
the need to import these and their ideologies from other countries in the Arab world.
The language thus came with an attached set of values, which were also imbued in
the children. Also, the language taught as the national language of Algeria had, in
fact, been divested of the specifically Algerian characteristics of Arabic as spoken in
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the country. Even more fundamentally, the combination of factors impinging upon
the development of the national language have run counter to the natural processes
involved in language acquisition. According to Miliani, ‘language policies have run
counter to the existing linguistic processes (assimilation, learning cultures, cross-
fertilisation), which are nonetheless natural, more complex and far from being
completed’. These processes could be seen in terms of creolisation.
Language, as a cultural manifestation (language is culture), has not escaped
unscathed from all types of manipulation (political, social or educational).
Very often decisions implying the management of languages or dialects have
not taken into consideration the parameters rooted in the social reality of
the country. Mainstreaming, as it is understood in this country, i.e. the
ironing out of all idiosyncrasies characteristic of the Algerian society, has
been on the political agenda for decades now. All decisions concerning the
management of languages, rarely their development or their promotion,
have involved the pruning of any element not concerned with the
Arab–Islamic dimension of the country. What was ignored was the richness
of the acquired heritage of centuries of contacts, tensions and commerce
with other civilisations. The language situation of the country is therefore a
tangled one, partly due to the number of dialects and languages in contact,
but mostly because of the manipulation directed towards them. Besides, the
diglossic dimension of the country (presence of a high and low variety of
Arabic: the language of the Koran along with the Algerian dialect) has added
to the complexity of the language situation, already problematic with the
presence of French–Arabic bilingualism. (Miliani 2005: 133–34)
Far from the intended effect of uniting the nation, one of the consequences of the
national language policy, the alienating effects associated with the stifling or
devaluation of the ‘natural’ or ‘mother tongue’ under colonialism, has continued in
a new form under the post-independence regimes, where the young ‘seem to be torn
between the “language of the mother” and the “language of the school”’ (Miliani
2005: 134). In an interview with Jean Du Flot for Jeune Afrique in 1967, Kateb
Yacine had referred to language as ‘another umbilical cord joining us to our mother,
that is, Algeria’ (quoted in Salhi 1999a: 60). In effect, the language policy adopted
by the state did not make full use of the potency of this natural link to reinforce
national cohesion, but followed rather the French model of constituting national
identity through the public education system, acting as the mediator of language
acquisition. The opposition of the two conceptions of language as ‘natural’ or
‘mother tongue’ on the one hand, and an acquired, socially mediated, ‘public’ set of
tools and identity system, on the other, mirrors the dual notions of nationalism of
the maternal and paternal varieties, already discussed in Chapter 1.
Language policy has also extended to the teaching of foreign languages. The
logic of the Arabisation policy had relegated French to the status of a foreign
language. However, its status was to be further reduced when English supplanted
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French as the required foreign language in April 1993 (Ager 1996), in a move that
was questioned in the Année Francophone Internationale (1994) as a possible
concession to Islamic fundamentalists. This interpretation is indicative of the extent
to which the language question had become politicised. 
As Memmi had pointed out, language is, on the one hand, a vehicle of
communication and a tool for the transmission of a certain cultural heritage, as well
as an element of that cultural heritage, a storehouse for the riches of particular
cultures. However, its capacity to serve as a key factor of national unity cannot be
taken for granted. While it is obvious that languages may have a part to play in
creating solidarity between those who belong to the same language community, it is
less likely that they will be able to achieve this in isolation from other linking factors,
particular those that relate to common interests. When a language is under threat, it
is an understandable reaction to emphasise its role as a repository of culture. In an
article entitled ‘Death Sentence’, discussing the threat to many of the world’s
languages, David Crystal quotes Oliver Wendell Holmes to the effect that ‘Every
language is a temple … in which the soul of those who speak it is enshrined’
(Guardian, 25 October 1999). However, this view of language as cultural essence,
constitutive of identity, only expresses the passive aspect of language, which is
crucially also an active, creative cultural practice. Indeed, language does not exist
apart from communication and interaction with others. As Fanon claimed, ‘speech
is to exist absolutely for the other’ (Fanon (1952)/1975: 13).
Language and Alienation
There are fundamental issues involved here relating to the nature of language.
Language is clearly a ‘given’, a part of the contingent social and cultural reality into
which one is born. There is such a thing as a ‘natural’ language, normally associated
with the mother tongue. Nonetheless, it is only partly ‘natural’, as all language has to
be acquired through a process of social interaction. This applies to the ‘mother tongue’
just as much as to other languages that can be learned, with a greater or lesser degree
of choice. For instance, in certain circumstances, bilingualism, or even
multilingualism, can be part of the ‘given’ social and cultural reality. The impact of the
‘natural’ language theory is thus tempered by the fact of (1) the social acquisition of
language; (2) the ability to acquire other languages to a high and even the same degree
of fluency; and (3) the contingency which governs the first language acquisition.
Jacques Derrida, himself the product of a complex linguistic background as a
result of his birth in a Jewish family in Algeria, discussed some of these issues at
length, notably in his book, Le Monolinguisme de l’autre (Derrida 1996). This was a
highly personal book, dealing with the problematic issues of language in the Franco-
Maghrebian context. The analysis of language as a form of alienation permeates
Derrida’s text, where he constantly returns to the aphorism, ‘Je n’ai qu’une seule
langue; ce n’est pas la mienne’ (‘I only have one language, it is not mine’).
The text is thus situated in a critical relation to the position of Khatibi, whose
alienation derives from the tensions provoked by his bilingualism. Derrida stresses
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over and over again that, unlike Khatibi, he has only one language. Yet this
monolingualism is equally the source of alienation for him, as this language is one
that is not his. Though he has no other, French is not and cannot be his mother
tongue (or natural language). This is because of his situation as a French Jew. More
precisely, Derrida locates his alienation in a historical event, the withdrawal of French
citizenship from French Jews in 1940, which entailed him being excluded from
French schooling (Derrida 1996: 33–35).  
Like Glissant, who has also written on the authority, if not authoritarianism, of
the French language (Glissant (1980)/1997), Derrida emphasises the tyranny that the
French language wielded over him. Language is seen in terms of the law; its rules and
structures are there to be obeyed. However, in the colonial context, the tyrannical
nature of the French language is reinforced and given an extra dimension through its
association with the colonial power. It is integral to the colonial apparatus. It owes its
prestige to this, as well as the fact that it is inescapable, although Derrida claims that
the authority of language is at the root of all culture and that all cultures are
constituted by the ‘unilateral imposition of a language “policy”’ (Derrida 1996: 68). 
He experiences the language as an imposition. Forced to study in French, in a
school system that did not permit him to learn Arabic or Berber (Derrida 1996: 65–66),
he is taken over by the dictates of the language and has to conform to its law. Even if he
were inclined to rebel, his questioning and challenging of the French language have to
be articulated in the language itself (Derrida 1996: 14). When he ‘surrenders’ to the
language, he internalises the law and engages in a form of self-policing. He endeavours
to attain the ultimate degree of linguistic purity, to become ‘more French than the
French’, while acknowledging the absurdity of what he is doing (Derrida 1996: 80–82).
Yet, as a Franco-Maghrebian, French could never be his mother tongue. It came
from elsewhere, along with its rules and norms and laws (Derrida 1996: 72). The
question of ‘origins’ appears to have a special importance in this perspective, which is
not restricted to language. When he refers to Hélène Cixous (‘this great French Jewish
writer of Sephardic Algeria’), he defines her according to her parents’ languages in what
amounts to a kind of linguistic determinism – on the one hand, she has inherited the
French language from her father, but, at the same time, she is also a German Ashkenazi
Jewess ‘through her “mother tongue”’ (Derrida 1996: 113–14, note). 
In this, his sympathies appear to lie with the views of the German Romantics,
as expressed for instance in Herder’s The Origin of Language, seeing language and
culture as ‘givens’ (Herder (1772)/1986; see also Heidegger 2004). Perhaps
surprisingly, this was also the view of Jean-Paul Sartre, who thought that language
was ‘imposed on each of us as a practico-inert’ (Sartre 1969: 59), in much the same
way as in the relationship between individuals and other ordered structures, such as
institutions and ideologies.
There is an institutional order which is necessarily – unless we are to believe
in God the father or an organicist mythology – the product of masses of
men constituting a social unity and which at the same time is radically
distinct from all of them, becoming an implacable demand and an
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ambiguous means of communication and non-communication between
them. Aesop once said that language is both. The same is true of
institutions. (Sartre 1969: 60; see also Sartre (1943)/1994: 412–13) 
Yet Derrida also reacts against linguistic determinism and appears to agree with
Emmanuel Lévinas, whom he quotes, that language, even when it is the mother tongue,
cannot be seen as the ‘generator or founder of meaning’ (Derrida 1996: 111, note), along
with its corollary that meanings can be translated from one language into another. This
entails a critique of the essentialising tendency, which has led to the association of certain
languages with a religious mission, a role in revealing the sacred, or with a particular world
view or mindset, as displayed by those who link rationality or modernity as a fixed
characteristic to the French language. The choice of language medium may be associated
with a particular agenda when it is associated with a set of political interests. The
politicisation of the language issue(s) has therefore to be viewed with caution, without
discounting all the multiple factors that impinge upon language practice and policy. 
However, language can never be all-embracing or all-determining. Desire,
emotions, thought even, all can exist prior to language at a preverbal level and
communication may take place without language coming into play at all, or, in a play
of words, ‘la langue qui goûte en silence, avant le mot’ (Derrida 1996: 3). Moreover,
through translation, language barriers may be transcended and the content of the
communication, verbal as well as non-verbal, communicated, regardless of the
particular language in which it is articulated. The transfer of meaning is possible
across the language barrier; discursive boundaries are not absolute but can be crossed. 
At the same time, the alienating potential of language(s) remains. For Derrida,
it is almost as though he feels doomed to experience language as an absolute form of
translation. In the absence of a mother tongue to act as a originating reference point,
all language becomes translation. Yet he also admits that this is not unique to his
particular type of monolingualism. All language, as all culture, is, potentially, the
source of alienation, since it is always the language or the culture of the other.    
The centrality of the language issue remains a characteristic feature of the way
in which relations between the components of the former French Empire continue
to be articulated. Nowhere is this more crucial than in the evolution of the
Francophone movement. The domain of La Francophonie has also been one of the
key sites for the development of ideas on the postcolonial relationship. The
remainder of this chapter looks at the way in which the ideas associated with the
Francophone movement have evolved over the course of the last forty years, in line
with wider developments associated with the relations of France with its former
colonies and their relations with each other.
The Origins of the Francophone Movement
The Francophone idea was launched in the immediate aftermath of decolonisation in
Africa and Asia. It had its origins in an intellectual movement, and was, by and large,
the brainchild of a group of intellectuals and political leaders of the newly
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independent countries, such as Senghor, Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, Habib
Bourguiba of Tunisia, Hamami Diori of Niger. The term itself first found expression
in the pages of the review Esprit in November 1962, in an issue, ‘Le français dans le
monde’, which contained contributions by many of this new political elite, as well as
artists and writers, including Kateb Yacine. Senghor set the tone, arguing for the
creation of a community based on the common French language and culture. This
notion of a Francophone community had already been defined by the geographer
Onésime Reclus (1837–1916) in his book France, Algérie et colonies (1880), but it
was only with its adoption by Senghor that it began to acquire its present
significance. 
At first sight, this might seem a response to decolonisation very much akin to
the development of the British Commonwealth movement and institutions.
However, it differed in significant respects. The Commonwealth came into being as
a result of a clear strategy to maintain institutional ties between Britain and its
former dominions, such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand, retaining the Queen
as the head of the Commonwealth, and indeed head of state in the case of these
dominions. It was primarily to provide a new constitutional framework for political
and economic relations between Britain and these countries and Britain played a
leading role within it from the outset, and continues to do so. It later evolved to
include the colonies of Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, which achieved independence
in the post-war period – countries that became known as the ‘New Commonwealth’,
a euphemism for ‘black’ to distinguish them from the ‘white’ dominions of the ‘Old
Commonwealth’. The fundamental remit of the Commonwealth remains defined by
this structural relationship, although idealistic notions of community are not absent
from it and have played a significant role at certain moments of its history. 
Unlike the Commonwealth, the notion of a Francophone community was
founded in the first instance on the basis of the common French language and
culture, whereas, for the Commonwealth, cultural considerations, while not entirely
lacking, have always been of secondary importance and have certainly never been
articulated in terms of a single common culture or even language. This is not to say
that there are no common cultural factors. Indeed, the English language plays a very
important role and sport, particularly cricket, has been a privileged site for the
celebration of commonly held values and a shared history. However, this
communality is not the basis for the institutional apparatus of the Commonwealth,
in which the role of Britain has been central to the enterprise from the beginning.
What was striking about the birth of the Francophone idea is that it came, by and
large, from the colonised themselves, although critiques have been integral to its
development from the early days (Kazadi 1991; Ager 1996). In the first years, France
had very little part to play in the development of the notion, although it was
articulated in terms of the universal humanism of French Enlightenment philosophy,
which had, as we have seen, formed a major strand in the rationalisation of French
colonial policy and practice.
One of the reasons for France’s lack of involvement was almost certainly the
failure of its earlier attempt to refound the empire on a basis that was more akin to
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the British Commonwealth (Deniau 1983). In the immediate aftermath of the
Second World War, the empire was renamed the Union française, and the relations
between the colonies and the metropole redefined in the Constitution of the Fourth
Republic, established in 1946. These measures, along with other reforms, were
widely seen as mere tinkering and as too little, too late, and did little to stem the
nationalist tide surging forward in the colonies. Like the later version of a French
Community (Communauté française), offered to the colonies as an alternative to
independence in de Gaulle’s 1958 referendum, it was an attempt to keep the ideal of
assimilation alive, to maintain the position that the future of the colonial peoples was
as part of a wider French community. Although most accepted the proposal, with the
notable exception of Sékou Touré’s Guinea, which opted for full independence, it
was not long before, one by one, the others followed suit and asked for
independence. The Community, like the earlier Union, and indeed the empire itself,
had been presented as alternatives to independence, as a means to stave off the end
of the colonial link, unlike the British Commonwealth, to which the colonies gained
accession after independence. It is hardly surprising that it would, under the
circumstances, be some years before France would be able to take any significant role
in the development of Francophonie.
It was the French language that provided the basis for the definition and ethos
of the new Francophonie. Senghor’s definition was ‘an intellectual or spiritual
community whose national, official or working language is French’ (Esprit 1962).
However, in less prosaic terms, the new Francophone community was also inspired by
an idealistic vision of the brotherhood of man, which would replace the relations of
domination between coloniser and colonised, though these were hardly alluded to.
The discourse of the founding fathers was marked by a chorus of optimistic
utterances, ranging from wishful thinking to spiritual mysticism. Senghor waxed
eloquent about ‘this integral humanism which is weaving its threads around the
globe, this symbiosis of dormant sources of energy arising from all the continents, all
the races, which are awakening to their shared warmth’ (Esprit 1962). 
In the case of Senghor, in particular, the notion was specifically cast in the
mantle of universalism, counterbalancing his own earlier promotion of Negritude
and laying himself open to the criticism that he had reduced the latter to mere
exoticism. The key factor was the notion of the universalism of the French language.5
This was not seen primarily as a practical matter, facilitating communication with
the wider world, though this was certainly part of the attraction. More than this,
French was not just seen as an ‘international’ language. It was imbued with particular
characteristics, which gave it an almost venerated status. It was linked, by association,
to the political ideals of Enlightenment philosophy, in terms of the universal Rights
of Man to freedom, liberty and equality. Or, as Xavier Deniau expressed it: ‘The
French language transcends the framework of linguistic categories to become the
mystical ferment of ideals that are specifically French and particularly that of
freedom (Deniau 1983: 9).   
For Bourguiba, speaking to the Assemblée nationale du Niger in December 1965:
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for you, as for us, the French language constitutes a special addition to our
cultural heritage, enriches our thinking, expresses our action, contributes to
the forging of our intellectual destiny and to making us into fully fledged
human beings, belonging to the community of free nations … the criteria
are above all philosophical, based on the great ideals of the France of 1789,
aspirations of Humanity going by the names of ‘liberty, dialogue, mutual
support’. (quoted in Deniau 1983: 17)  
Similarly, for Edgar Faure, Francophonie could be nothing more or less than a ‘libéro-
phonie’ (quoted by Deniau 1983: 21–s22). Speaking in 1993, the Lebanese Minister
of Culture and Higher Education was still making the link between these universal
humanist values and the French language: ‘If Lebanese maintain French as a second
language, while English is the world economic language and has become practically
universal, it is because Francophonie is a social choice: a choice for freedom, justice,
fraternity and democracy’ (quoted in Ager 1996: 27). 
Yet the claims to the special status of the French language were not just based on
its association with Enlightenment ideals. There has also been a long-standing school
of thought that situates the superiority of the language in terms of its own supposed
characteristics of clarity and rationality, based on the notion underlying Rivarol’s
well-known claim that ‘if it is not clear, then it is not French’. From here it is but a
short step to claim, as many have done, that it is the specific character of the language
itself that has contributed, or indeed generated, the quality of French thought and
culture. Georges Pompidou, for instance, claimed that ‘it was because of the French
language that France stood out in the world and was not a country like any other’
(quoted by Deniau 1983: 21). De Gaulle also proclaimed the special status and
universality of the French language: ‘France has always ploughed with passion the
furrow of intelligence and offered the entire earth a rich harvest; it is also true that
she has given the world a language that is perfectly well-suited to express the
universal character of thought’ (quoted by Deniau 1983: 21).
The claim to the universality of the French language was, in fact, beset with
difficulties. The most fundamental issue related to the contradictions between its
status as a particular language, associated with a particular nation-state and territory,
or rather territories (when one includes the wider French-speaking world), and the
role wished upon it as a vehicle of universality. Moreover, any argument in favour of
a universal role for the language had to contend with the fact that it had already been
tainted, as a result of its close association with colonisation and the mission
civilisatrice. Jaurès, for example, had advocated an important role for the Alliance
française and had stressed that ‘particularly for France, the language is the necessary
instrument for colonisation’ (quoted by Ager 1996: 12). 
There were other problems associated with the original, idealistic, universalist
discourse of the founding fathers of Francophonie. One key notion of Enlightenment
modernism, history, was strikingly absent from the discourse. On the practical level,
the reasons for this were understandable, given the roots of Francophonie in the history
of colonialism and the often violent process of decolonisation. However, there was also
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another dimension to the absence of history. Francophonie was not so much presented
as a project to be achieved, ‘a permanent cultural struggle’ along the lines envisaged by
André Malraux, but rather as an already existing community. This community was
bound together not by a shared, if conflictual, past, but rather through common
cultural and linguistic ties, which implied a wider common philosophy. As an ideal, it
was already embodied in this rather grandiose version of paradise on earth. 
It will be clear from this type of discourse that Francophonie was characterised,
in the main, by an abstract universalism, on a different plane from the economic and
political realities facing its members. This abstract nature was further compounded
by the elimination of geography as a significant element in its formulation. Habib
Bourguiba, for instance, defined Francophonie as an ideal community ‘beyond
politics or geography’ (quoted by Deniau 1983: 17). 
Furthermore, in the early stages, there was no attempt to use the Francophone
movement to establish new types of political relations between France and its former
colonies through the creation of a new institutional framework for managing those
relations. Indeed, relations with the former colonies were conducted on a strictly
bilateral basis. 
This can be explained in part through the reluctance of France herself to become
involved in the movement. This reluctance has been attributed to a desire to deflect
charges of neocolonialism on its part, as well as the fact that the perceived failures,
already mentioned, with the short-lived historical experience of the Communauté
française had no doubt made the French wary of any further attempts to recast the
empire into a new type of institutional configuration. However, explanations that are
more convincing are to be found elsewhere. The bilateral aid and cooperation policies
that France pursued allowed it to exert greater control over its relations with the African
countries in particular, in the economic, political and indeed military domains, in
accordance with its own perceived interests. Indeed, France’s involvement in Africa
following formal decolonisation did not show any evidence of disengagement, but a
very active hands-on commitment. The interests of France and Francophonie were not
to be confused. As Dennis Ager has said, ‘Africa is still central to France, if not to
Francophonie – and the distinction is worth making’ (Ager 1996: 191). 
In the absence of France, it was left to the Canadians to provide some of the
impetus for a more concrete economic, scientific and technical cooperation within a
multilateral framework, through the development of the ACCT, the Agence de
coopération culturelle et technique, now known as the Agence intergouvernementale
de la Francophonie (Mworoha 1995; Ager 1996; Majumdar 2002). 
In spite of the formal absence of France in a leadership role, its presence was nonetheless
assumed as integral to the notion of Francophonie. The linguistic and cultural ties that
supposedly bound the francophone countries together were, after all, inextricably linked to
France itself, as the source of that language and culture. While maintaining their distance
from Francophonie as such, representatives of the French state and political class recognised
and promoted the value of the French language, not just as a cultural vehicle, but also with
wider policy advantages, marking a clear distance between France, together with those in
the French-speaking orbit, and the superpower polarisation of the Cold War period.
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The Evolution of Francophonie
It was not too long before it became evident to French policymakers that there might
be some benefits to be gained from a more active participation in the development
of Francophonie, although this did not necessarily mean replacing the focus on
bilateralism. Counted as one of these benefits was the perception of Francophonie as
a means through which France could exist on the world stage independently of
Europe. Thus, the French began increasingly to take the initiative in respect of
Francophone developments, culminating in the first Francophone Summit called at
Versailles by François Mitterrand in 1986. Franco-African summits involving France
and francophone African countries had taken place since 1973 and would continue
at first annually and then biannually from 1988. In contrast, the Versailles Summit
was the first summit to be organised under the aegis of the Francophone movement.
It was followed by the Quebec Summit in 1987 and thereafter has been a regular
biannual event, although the 2001 Beirut Summit was postponed until 2002,
following the events of 11 September in New York. 
There was also prestige to be gained and prestige has always formed an
important element of French ideologies of power, as Edward Said pointed out (Said
1993: 204). Thus, if France could no longer vaunt the possession of a considerable
empire overseas, it could now take up the discourse of Francophonie to proclaim, in
what might be considered more acceptable terms, the presence of the French
language and culture ‘on all five continents’. 
The value of Francophonie as a useful counterweight to American global power
was more and more highlighted in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The battle lines
were drawn up in the domain of culture, where the defence of the French language as
a world language was promoted to counteract the threat of the spread and growth in
importance of the English language (Crystal 1997), but also the global dominance of
Americanised mass culture. Increasingly, the alarm was sounded to warn of the threat
posed by the homogenising tendencies of the influence of American consumerism in
terms of film, fashion, food and drink on the rest of the world. The French language
and culture were not only portrayed as under attack and therefore to be defended; it
was the same French language and culture that were also heralded as the weapon for
the counter-attack against the culture of Disney, Coca Cola, Levis and McDonalds.
Although the main cultural threat was that facing France itself, where the American
influence had become deeply implanted by the end of the 1980s, Francophonie was
seen to provide useful allies in this cultural struggle, which replaced to a large extent
the more direct opposition to American political and military supremacy that had
dominated Gaullist foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s. 
However, the struggle itself was to show up the basic flaw in the universalist
pretensions of the French language and culture, which were in danger of revealing
their own particularity when the fight inevitably expressed itself in terms of the
defence of the particular against the dangers of Anglo-Saxon global uniformity. 
Although the struggle was conducted in terms of a defence of culture, the real
battle lines were in fact being drawn up on the planes of the economy, finance and
politics, where France was attempting to assert global influence against the US,
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particularly in the spheres of African and Middle East policy, as well as in the conflict
over matters of control in international bodies, such as the UN and NATO. For
instance, the French engaged in unsuccessful efforts to block the selection of Kofi
Annan as UN Secretary in December 1996, against the backing of the US and
Britain. On the level of policy, differences and disputes related to Africa and the
Middle East have erupted over many years and over a variety of specific issues. For
instance, George Moose, as American Under-Secretary of State in charge of African
affairs, attempted to play down the tension between the two powers in the course of
a visit to Paris in January 1997, notably in relation to the situation in the Great Lakes
region and Zaire (Le Monde, 17 January 1997). The culmination of these battles was
to come when the differences over the crisis and impending invasion of Iraq erupted
in spectacular fashion and overt political terms in 2003, with the French refusal to
support the invasion of Iraq and the hysterical American reaction to the ‘cheese-
eating surrender monkeys’, to quote a phrase first coined by the cartoon character,
Bart Simpson, but widely taken up, along with the boycott of French produce. Until
that point, the apparent play-off had been restricted, at least as far as the spectators
were concerned, to the arena of language and culture, even though the most
important underlying issues in the fight for global influence were situated elsewhere.
The Defence of Cultural Identity
Nonetheless, the cultural struggles were not devoid of significance. In choosing to
make a stand on the question of culture, particularly in the field of the audio-visual
media with the defence of the ‘cultural exception’ at the time of the GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations as part of the Uruguay round of 1993,
a fight had been engaged, not least because the chances of winning it appeared to be
realistic ones and a victory here had great symbolic value, going beyond the actual
terms of trade (Godin and Chafer 2004). The recognition of the notion of the
‘cultural exception’ as a special case, for which the normal rules prohibiting state
subsidy were not applicable, and which allowed the establishment of quotas
favouring domestic production over imports, opened up a breach in the overarching
regulatory system of the global market, creating a space for French specificity and
influence to develop or, at the very least, to hold their ground.
This was the culmination of a period of struggle to maintain the singularity of
French culture in the face of what was portrayed as the spread of ‘Anglo-Saxon’
hegemony across the globe. During this time, the French had come to realise the
value of the francophone community as a vital resource in the defence of the French
language and culture against the domination of English. In all respects, the ‘French
way’ was promoted as the polar opposite of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’, which was a label used
to suggest a ‘non-existent, monolithic, imagined identity, represented as a united,
dominating presence’ (Ager 1996: 171). At times, this appeared to amount to a form
of paranoia, with talk of an international plot against Francophonie (Etat de la
Francophonie dans le monde 1994). Underlying the approach to the issues at stake was
a dualistic perspective, in which there was a binary opposition between two cultural
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protagonists. The French hoped to mobilise the resources of the worldwide
francophone community in a straight contest between France as the defending
champion of its universal language and, in the other corner, the rampant challenger,
Anglo-Saxon hegemony, threatening to usurp its title.
However, this was always a phoney war. Not only was the supposed challenger
unaware that the fight was on and so was oblivious, if not dismissive, of the so-called
enemy champion. It was also the case that it was becoming increasingly clear to the
French and francophone lobby that, in spite of their success in defending the
exception culturelle at the time of the GATT negotiations, there was little likelihood
that the fight would succeed in turning back the tide sweeping English to the fore as
the major international language, not to mention the universal popularity of the
icons of American popular culture. A new approach was needed, which involved
changes in the discourse of the Francophone movement. Thus, during the 1990s,
there was a series of subtle shifts. 
First, the French language began to be portrayed, not just for its universality, but
more specifically for its quality and appeal to the elites of the French-speaking world
as the ‘language of culture’, by which was meant a highbrow, intellectual culture, far
removed from the popular mass culture of the ‘Anglo-Saxons’. This approach was
notably summed up by François Mitterrand’s famous dismissal of Eurodisney in
1992 as not his ‘tasse de thé’. 
Secondly, the French language and culture, together with the Francophone
movement began to be portrayed, not just for their own inherent qualities, chief of
which had been the claim to universality, but also as the best means available for the
defence of cultural diversity. Then, Francophonie was increasingly represented not
just as the champion of the French language and culture alone, but as a major global
site for the defence of cultural and linguistic diversity worldwide. No longer was it a
case of French against English, or even French (high) culture against American
dumbing-down. Francophonie now adopted a more pluralist line, in which the right
of all languages and cultures to exist was promoted, in a celebration of
multilingualism and cultural diversity, referred to by Stélio Farandjis as
‘Francopolyphonie’ (Ager 1996: 58). This new turn had been heralded by the tone of
the Francophone Summit held in Mauritius in 1993, which proclaimed as its slogan
the need for ‘Unity in Diversity’. Commenting on this development, an article in Le
Monde was titled ‘Pour le salut de la diversité’ (Le Monde, 15 October 1993). Jacques
Toubon, as Minister for Culture and Francophonie declared:
the use of the French language which our peoples have in common  provides
us with the means to refuse the increasing uniformity of the planet which is
being accomplished in accordance with the Anglo-Saxon model under the
cover of economic liberalism … There can be no true liberty without a
respect for cultural and linguistic identities, the kind of respect that exists
within La Francophonie. (Le Monde, 15 October 1993)
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There is no doubt that this shift was also partly in response to criticism from
within Francophonie, that the emphasis on the French language obscured the real
linguistic diversity that existed in its member countries. This point had already been
taken on board at the 1989 Francophone Summit held at Dakar (Ager 1996). Not all
were in agreement, however, with this watering down of the central importance of
the French language. For some, their own linguistic identity was intimately
connected to the wider issues surrounding the status of the French language in the
world at large. These concerns in fact led a group of Quebec intellectuals to issue an
appeal to France to do its utmost to maintain the position of French, to coincide
with the Mauritius Summit (Le Monde, 15 October 1993).
However, following on from this, the language criterion for membership was
considerably watered down, particularly as the scope of Francophonie was extended
to bring in members from Eastern Europe, whose francophone credentials were fairly
tenuous. The current Charte de la Francophonie does not spell out any language
criterion for membership of the organisation. 
Yet, while the new pluralism of the Francophone discourse has its undoubted
attractions, as the steady increase in the number of its members confirms, there are,
at the same time, serious flaws in the arguments put forward and problems with its
credibility.
First, the depiction of Anglo-Saxon as a homogenised monolith of language and
culture fails to take into account many of the complex and diverse realities operating
within the English-speaking world and particularly within American society, which
also impinge on the global influence of that culture. The globalising, homogenising
effects of the economic phenomenon of the spread of the system of global capitalism
have been displaced in this discourse into another realm, the realm of culture,
submerging the very real diversity that actually operates in that culture and the
ideologies and discourses of difference (for instance, in the areas of race, gender,
sexuality) that articulate this diversity. Thus, while it is certainly true that the cultural
influence of the USA, in terms of a dominant mass popular culture, has extended to
the far reaches and hidden backwaters of the planet, along with its branded products
and lifestyle, its Hollywood characters and imaginary universe, it is equally true that
the forces subverting and challenging the dominance of this particular set of cultural
forms and values are also available for export. 
If globalisation is used as an all-embracing concept stressing the unity of the
contemporary world on the economic but also on the cultural plane, it has, at the
same time, been accompanied by the rapid and radical transformation of
communications into a planetary system that is readily accessible and instantaneous.
This communications revolution, while no doubt constituting a major driving force
propelling the planet towards uniformity, is also a potent means for the subversion
of the uniformisation process, presenting opportunities to bypass the control of
monopolies up to a point. 
It is clear that Francophonie does not have a monopoly on the defence of
pluralism and diversity. Moreover, when this discourse is taken up by France, its force
of conviction can be severely undermined by France’s own record in this connection.
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Far from encouraging diversity in its own society, France has clung to a political
ideology that posits the indivisibility of the Republic and has ruthlessly suppressed
any challenge to its national political, social and cultural identity. 
As recently as 1992, there was a heated debate in France concerning the
insertion of a language clause into the Constitution, as an amendment to Article 2,
and the wording of this clause, when ‘French is the language of the Republic’ was to
be replaced by ‘The language of the Republic is French’ (Wilcox 1994; Ager 1996).
There has been a long history of French interventionism with regard to language
policy, which is seen as a legitimate preoccupation of the state (see Chapter 1).
Notable recent attempts to control and police the use of the language through
legislation have included the Loi Toubon of 1994, making French the compulsory
language of all aspects of public life in France (Ager 1996; see also Judge 1993). In
addition, official bodies (such as the Académie française, the Haut Conseil de la
langue française, the Délégation générale à la langue française, various ministerial
departments) have been established by the state since the seventeenth century to
carry out the centralised codification and policing of the norms and rules of the
language and the control and defence of the linguistic purity of the nation’s language
usage, as well as the surveillance of linguistic borders and the repulsion of infiltration
and incursions by ‘foreign’ languages. 
The incorporation of minority and regional languages as part of the linguistic
heritage of the nation has been staunchly resisted, notably through the public
education system from the end of the nineteenth century. Schooling was a key
element in promoting and enforcing linguistic uniformity across the nation. In June
1999, Jacques Chirac refused to allow the modification of the French Constitution
that would have been necessary for France to ratify the European Charter on
Regional and Minority Languages, to which it is a signatory (Le Monde, 25 June
1999), and it is only belatedly and with singular reluctance that France has given any
sign of extending the defence of ‘cultural diversity’ to France, at least as far as the
‘regional’ languages are concerned, with the Assises Nationales des langues de France,
organised on 4 October 2003 (Le Monde, 3 October 2003). This is the same Jacques
Chirac who made a speech in Hungary in 1997 in which he appealed for a
worldwide mobilisation of what he called the ‘militants of multiculturalism’ to
safeguard the diversity of the world’s languages and cultures against their stifling by
a ‘single language’ (see www.ambafrance-cm.org/html/france/langue.htm). 
In October 2004, the parliamentary committee on the prevention of crime,
chaired by UMP (Union pour un Mouvement Populaire) député, Jacques-Alain
Bénisti, published their interim report. One of the conclusions of the Bénisti report
was that bilingualism was harmful to children from a non-French family
background. It was alleged that it not only contributed to poor performance at
school and prevented their integration, but was also a major cause of the
development of criminality. The recommendation was that families should
communicate only in French in the family home and this should be backed up by
monitoring and visits from social workers and medical personnel (www.afrik.com,
28 February 2005). 
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Given this background, it is hardly surprising if a certain cynicism is the
inevitable reaction of many to the fine rhetoric in support of cultural diversity and
linguistic pluralism.
La Francophonie Today
In a further shift at the end of the 1990s, the impetus was given to provide
Francophonie with a permanent political, institutional framework, which it had
hitherto eschewed. In line with the decisions taken at the Hanoi Francophone
Summit in 1997, an umbrella organisation, the OIF (Organisation Internationale de
la Francophonie), was established, along with the post of Secretary-General, with the
former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali as its first incumbent. Since
then, Abdou Diouf of Senegal, has taken over as the second to fill this post. While
retaining the emphasis on the cultural dimension to cooperation between its
members, it now embraced a more political agenda, which also made economic
development one of its stated goals. For instance, for the 2004 Francophone Summit
held in Ougadougou, the theme was one of ‘sustainable development’. In the current
discourse associated with the complex of Francophone organisations, there remains a
strong current of idealism, in which the goals of democracy, human rights and
fraternity remain paramount themes (Judge 1999: 3). 
Thus, while retaining a core membership drawn from the former colonies, the
new Francophonie has become a more diverse club of nations, all of which are joined
together by a desire to align themselves within the French sphere of influence, for
historical or other reasons. For France itself, the value of the club is now proved.
While certainly not the sole, or even the main, vehicle of French postcolonial and
international policy, it represents a useful adjunct as another forum through which
France may assert its influence on the world stage. 
It remains an attractive option for both old and new members, offering
countries, and indeed subregions, access to an alternative forum for lobbying and
support, material help in the form of cooperation and exchange in the educational,
cultural and technological sectors, aid with funding for specific projects and some
protection against bullying by other powerful groupings or powers. 
To a large extent, it has taken on the role of defender of the weak and powerless,
in an endeavour, which seems at times to have the mission of providing alternative
global leadership, somewhat to the Left of the United Nations, at least in terms of its
rhetoric. The tone was set by the slogan adopted for the Cotonou Francophone
Summit of 1995 and which appeared on the official French website for Francophonie:
‘Francophonie will be subversive and imaginative or it will not survive!’
(www.france.diplomatie.fr/francophonie). The promotion of Francophonie as a
radical, indeed subversive, alternative has been an essential part of its appeal. This
appeal is still, as at the beginning, largely founded on ideas and values, even though
the content has significantly changed. Thus, the importance of Francophonie as a
counter-discourse at a global level needs to be recognised. The precise form and
content of the discourse are liable to change. For instance, at the time of the Beirut
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Summit of 2002, it was made clear that Francophonie was proposing dialogue and
pluralism, in the face of the events of 11 September 2001, to avoid ‘intolerance and
isolationism’, as well as the risk of falling prey to ‘the aberrations of hegemony’.6
Huntington’s thesis of the Clash of Civilizations (Huntington 1996), which appeared
to have found favour with the American administration, was particularly rejected by
Jacques Chirac, who invited the participants to become the pioneers of the dialogue
of cultures (Le Monde, 25 October 2002). The target of this discourse was clear, if
not spelled out.
The Francophone discourse is, of course, more subtle and infinitely more attractive.
Whilst the priority that it accords to culture downplays the real divides in an
ideological level pegging that does not provide an adequate explanation of global
reality, it nonetheless stresses cultural diversity as a factor in economic and political
cooperation and development – working towards the resolution rather than the
exacerbation of conflict. Moreover, it differentiates itself from Huntington’s rather
simplistic view of civilisations as closed and homogeneous, linked to a conception of
identity as an absolute given, unchanging and non-negotiable, for which he has been
much criticised. Thus, the Francophone model promotes a conception of culture that is
open and hybrid, existing in a complex interrelation with the cultures of other societies. 
Francophonie was also officially described as a ‘postcolonial concept’ on the summit
website, further emphasising its radical potential.7 Yet, it was somehow ironic that this
happened only in 2003, when Francophonie had started out as an expression of a
postcolonial perspective, in other words, the continuation of colonial relations in a new
form. Moreover, it happened at a time, when the shift away from postcoloniality has
intensified, with the extension of the organisation and movement to countries that
have never been colonies of France, particularly those in Eastern Europe. 
As has so often been the case, Algeria has been the exception amongst the former
colonies, this time in its attitude to La Francophonie. Algeria refused to join because
of fundamental ideological disagreements with its founding rationale, i.e. the
primacy of the French language, as well as because of the political choice to keep its
distance from the former colonial power and a body whose raison d’être has appeared
to be based on the ties and relations established by colonialism. However, the very
distinctiveness of the relation between Algeria and Francophonie can also provide
insights into the way in which the body has evolved. 
Algeria, which is the country with the second largest number of francophones
after France, has been slowly moving towards a less hostile stance towards La
Francophonie. The Algerian President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, attended the 2002
Francophone Summit in Beirut at the personal invitation of the Lebanese President,
Emile Lahoud (Liberté, 23 January 2003). He also attended the 2004 Summit in
Ougadougou, at the invitation of the Burkina Faso President, Blaise Compaoré,
where he made a speech on 26 November in a closed session (www.sommet-
francophonie.org/ouga2004), although the text of his talk, in which he linked the
new agenda of the OIF to the development policies of Algeria, has been published at
the website of the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mae.dz). At the time of
writing, it does, of course, remain to be seen whether Algeria will take the plunge and
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become a member (L’Expression, 22 November 2004; Quotidien d’Oran, 27 November
2004; www.afrik.com, 26 November 2004; El Watan, 27 November 2004).     
If it does, it will not be the only body to which it turns. Algeria is learning to
play its cards skilfully, with a whole array of partnerships and alliances being
developed to counterbalance the influence of any one of them. As in the case of
France, membership of La Francophonie is rarely the sole option. Member countries
mediate their access to the wider, international sphere through a number of bodies,
including the United Nations and appropriate continent-wide or regional blocs, such
as the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League and so on. These issues
are further dealt with in Chapter 11. 
Notes
1. La ville s’était noyée dans le basalte ou plus exactement que le basalte l’avait
recouverte.  Le résultat aussi fut que les mots renoncèrent à être des paroles et se
changèrent en certaines choses qui ressemblaient à des galets avec lesquels nous
allâmes cogner partout, essayant de sonder jusqu’où allait la profondeur des strates.  Il
se propagea ainsi une musique qui ne manquait pas d’une curieuse douceur mais qui
se pouvait facilement confondre avec les pas de la taupe si l’on ne jouissait pas d’une
ouïe exercée – et même les coups de boutoir de la mer qui régnait beaucoup plus bas.
La voix devenant un sens inutile, certains d’entre nous, lorsqu’ils l’eurent constaté,
tremblèrent de rage, serrèrent les mâchoires et connurent l’impuissance.  Les murs ne
cessaient d’improviser des nœuds inextricables pendant ce temps et, sur beaucoup, de
s’enlacer sans souci de ce qu’il advenait de leurs captifs.  La colère tourna, s’égara,
revint sur ses pas dans ces boyaux et s’avéra inutile en fin de compte.  Pourtant, et c’est
le plus étonnant, nous ne voulûmes pas croire à tant de cruauté.  J’étais du nombre,
je le reconnais. 
Rentrant à la maison, durant ces journées occupées par d’interminables,
d’imprévisibles marches dans le labyrinthe, j’étais aussitôt soumis aux questions de
Nafissa et des autres femmes.  Je gardais le silence ou grognais n’importe quoi; – les
mots ne me sortaient plus.  Forcément, mon gosier n’était plus apte à former des sons
mais exclusivement des pierres.  Elles me harcelaient toutes cependant, comme elles
harcelaient les autres hommes, ne sachant pas à quoi elles s’exposaient: j’étais prêt à
vomir un torrent de pierres. (Dib (1962)/1990: 18–19).
2. A propos de l’Algérie et dans son sillage, ‘le monde muet’ serait pour moi non
seulement celui des choses (de la crevette, de l’orange, des figues …), mais aussi,
depuis des générations, celui des femmes, masquées, empêchées d’être regardées et de
regarder, traitées en ‘choses’. 
Or, dans la tourmente et de la dérive actuelles, les femmes cherchent une langue: où
déposer, cacher, faire nidifier leur puissance de rébellion et de vie dans ces alentours
qui vacillent. (Djebar 1997: 377).
3. ‘Il s’agissait de pister à force les processus multiples, les vecteurs enchevêtrés qui ont à la
fin tissé pour un peuple, lequel disposait de tant de cadres et d’individus  “formés”, la toile
de néant dans laquelle il s’englue aujourd’hui’ (Glissant (1980)/1997: 14).
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4. After much agitation over many years, the recognition of Tamazight as one of the
languages of Algeria has been grudgingly agreed, but its actual implementation was still
stalled in 2005 over the issue of whether there should be a national referendum on this
or whether it could be decided by parliament, amongst other political reasons.
5. On the universality of the French language, see Fumaroli 1992. 
6. Après les événements du 11 septembre 2001, ce dialogue est impérieux face aux
risques d’intolérance et de renfermement. Afin d’éviter les dérives hégémoniques qui
en résultent, la Francophonie se doit d’aménager un nouvel espace de concertation et
de plaider en faveur d’une approche ouverte et plurale de la culture et des civilisations.
Le dialogue est la seule possibilité de fonder une société internationale où les identités
les plus diverses s’enrichissent au profit de chacun et de l’ensemble. 
Favoriser une cohérence harmonieuse des cultures dans le cadre d'une
complémentarité partagée préviendrait l’écueil d’un modèle culturel dominant et
exclusif tendant à ravaler les cultures dites périphériques au rang de réserves
culturelles. 
(…)
Vivre ensemble et différents, vivre ensemble nos différences, c’est le pari des pays
francophones! (http://www.sommet2001.org).
7. C’est à Onésime Reclus, géographe français (1837–1916) que nous devons la première
définition de la Francophonie, comme étant ‘l’ensemble des personnes et de pays
utilisant le français à des titres divers’. 
Mais, ‘c’est après 1960 qu’elle s’est affirmée dans les faits comme dans les prises de
conscience’. Ce dernier définit également la Francophonie comme un concept post-
colonialiste qui n’a pris de l’essor qu’après l’indépendance des anciens pays colonisés.
(http://www.sommet2001.org).
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Chapter 8
The Loss of Empire: French
Perspectives
Important though the development of Francophonie has been in the postcolonialfrancophone world, it does not give the whole picture of the development of
postcolonial relations and attitudes, least of all from the point of view of French
people themselves and the different sections of the postcolonial diaspora who have
settled in metropolitan France. Neither the latter nor the populations of the
Départements et territoires d’outre-mer (DOM-TOM) (essentially the Caribbean,
Indian Ocean and Pacific island populations still under French rule) play a part in
the world of La Francophonie, except as represented through the offices of France
herself. It is, of course, well known that the French themselves do not on the whole
fully identify themselves as part of the francophone world. There is a strong
perception of a divide between France and the francophone world, continuing the
us/them distinction between coloniser/colonised, albeit in more subtle form. This
has been the cause of some considerable frustration to key figures in the Francophone
movement, not least to Senghor himself, who urged the French to sign up more
wholeheartedly to the universal ideal: ‘Negritude, Arabism, it is also you, French
people of the Hexagon!’ (Esprit 1962). 
This chapter will examine some of the other effects of the process of
decolonisation on shifts in French perceptions and attitudes towards the former
colonies, as well as the perspectives that developed to account for the ongoing
presence of France in territories across the globe. A key aspect of these is the role
played by memory and its translation into the public sphere through
commemorative events of one kind or another. This chapter will therefore look at
some of the effects of the historical processes of colonisation, decolonisation and the
ongoing relations in the postcolonial world, to examine how they have impinged on
the national collective memory. 
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Memory and Commemoration  
Over recent years, there has been a tremendous interest in France in the question of
memory, particularly in its relation to an understanding of the French national
identity and cultural heritage. This could indicate a real renewal of interest in the
past, as well as a loss of confidence in the forward-looking modernist project. It could
also be the sign of a major readjustment, involving a reconfiguring of the perceived
foundations of French national identity, and an attempt to come to terms with, or
equally to sidestep, issues arising out of the colonial past. 
The memorialisation of the past involves more than the objective study of history.
On the one hand, it implies that the past matters in certain ways that derive from the
meanings that are currently attached to it and that constitute its ideological
significance for the present time. However, as Sartre put it, it also involves the
transformation of the past, or certain features of it, into a ‘historical monument’, in
order for a particular society to assume its role in history.1 The memory of the
collective becomes the subjective prism through which the objective history is viewed.
This is not primarily about the quality or reliability of any particular memory,
such as that of individuals, who recreate an approximate version of their past, using
a variety of techniques and stashed-away snippets, as described by the narrator in
Paul Smaïl’s (pseudonym) novel Ali le magnifique: ‘Our memory wanders all over the
place:  we don’t remember anything exactly, we’re always adding new touches,
stitching the whole picture together with snippets taken from other scenarios, with
flashbacks and offcuts, fuzzy images retrieved from the dustbin of our memory’
(Smaïl 2001: 149). There is more involved in the process of constituting the
collective memory. This type of memory is a social one, in which the ideological
consensus governing the world view and belief systems of the group concerned plays
a large part in determining the form it takes (Debray 1992: 385). 
The practice of commemorating events considered to have significance in terms
of the nation’s past is a vital part of this process and has long been a major aspect of
French public life. In recent years, in addition to the annual commemorative events
marking Bastille Day on 14 July2 and Armistice Day on 11 November, there have
been a number of major commemorations, beginning with the Millennial
Anniversary of the founding of the Capetian dynasty in 1987, the Bicentenary of the
Revolution in 1989, de Gaulle’s Centenary in 1990, the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Normandy Landings in 1994, followed by those of other key events in the
Liberation, the Liberation of Paris and then the VE celebrations. In 1996, the not
entirely consensual commemoration of the 1,500th Anniversary of the Baptism of
Clovis took place and, in 1998, the rather low-profile commemoration of the 150th
Anniversary of the Abolition of Slavery (Vergès 1999). The year 2004 saw the
commemoration and celebration of further events marking joint Franco–British
endeavours: the Centenary of the Entente Cordiale, and the Sixtieth Anniversary of
the Normandy Landings. It was also the year of the Bicentenary of the Code Civil
and the founding of the First (Napoleonic) Empire. 
The same year also saw more sombre events, marking the Tenth Anniversary of
the Rwandan Genocide with ceremonies in Kigali, from which the French
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representative left rather abruptly after criticisms of France by the Rwandan
President. It was also the occasion to mark the Fiftieth Anniversary of the defeat of
Dien Bien Phu (7 May 1954) and, later in the year, the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
event for which it was a major source of inspiration, the launching of the Algerian
insurrection on 1 November 1954. It was also the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
Secession of French Indian territories to India on 21 October 1954. In 2005, there
are more occasions for celebration, including the Centenary of the victory of
secularism in France and, in Britain, the Bicentenary of the Battle of Trafalgar. 
The number of commemorations taking place obviously reflects a perceived
need. Yet what precisely is their purpose and, more to the point, what are the features
characteristic of a particular kind of discourse of commemoration? 
When we engage in activities marking personal commemorations, such as
significant birthdays or anniversaries, we are usually not just interested in finding an
excuse for a good party, but also in marking important milestones in our lives,
through which we affirm our own personal identity and consolidate our relationships
with friends and family, thus rooting ourselves in a wider social context. When a
nation-state decides to commemorate an event, a number of factors may be involved,
ranging from the need to consolidate the national identity to the reinforcement of
the legitimacy of the particular form of the state, the political system and its values.
Often it is a question of making a statement about where the state wishes to position
itself for the future, although the effect achieved may be very different from that
intended.3 It can be particularly relevant to diplomacy when the commemoration in
question involves more than one country. In these cases, the nature of the
commemoration, especially the form of the more or less official commemorative
discourse, can be significantly revealing, not only of the current state of relations
between the countries involved but also of the future direction they want this
relationship to take. It is usually less revealing of the actual event commemorated and
rarely leads to any further or deeper knowledge, but rather a reinterpretation, most
often for ideological purposes. The relationship of such a discourse to a particular
power configuration may be quite obvious and straightforward; on the other hand,
it may also be highly complex and mediated. 
In the case of France, the particular importance of commemorative events and
activities, the role of monuments, particularly those to the dead and their relation to
the national consciousness (Gaspard 1995: 21), as well as the notion of patrimoine
and the spectacular growth in museums from the 1960s – forty-three military
museums were created in the 1960s and 1970s (Stora 1992: 221) – has been well
documented and analysed, most notably in Pierre Nora’s Lieux de mémoire (Nora
1984–92). 
Indeed, France is probably unique in having a body called the Délégation aux
célébrations nationales, which is attached to the Archives de France and the Ministry
of Culture, and was set up in 1978, not to organise commemorations itself, but to
encourage, support and promote commemorative ventures organised by others
(Gasnier 1994). It does this mainly through its annual catalogues and website, which
list not only those events and individuals that are being commemorated in any
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particular year, as well as the programme of activities associated with each of them,
but also suggestions for anniversaries occurring in the following year that may be
considered worth celebrating, notably the births and deaths of political figures,
writers, artists, scientists, political events such as wars, battles and treaties, the
publication of particularly significant works, important scientific discoveries,
technical inventions and sporting feats. Moreover, they do not limit themselves to
purely ‘national’ anniversaries but include figures and events from outside the
borders of France, as well as a whole host of what might be considered purely
regional manifestations. 
Thus, in spite of a ‘hands-off ’ approach to the actual business of organising these
national celebrations, the Délégation aux célébrations nationales nonetheless
provides a fairly good guide to what may be ‘in’ or ‘out’ in any particular year, not
just by way of an examination of the lists provided, but also by a comparison of the
list of suggestions of events suitable for commemoration in the following year, with
the subsequent published programme of activities for that year. The content of the
lists also provides some insight into the problematic areas of French memory and
commemoration, particularly those linked to Vichy and collaboration, the
deportation of the Jews and the Algerian War (Gasnier 1994). For instance, it is only
since 2003 that a Journée de la mémoire de l’holocauste et de la prévention des crimes
contre l’humanité has been added to the commemorative calendar, following an
initiative by the European Education Ministers meeting in Krakow in October 2000,
concretised in Strasbourg in October 2002. The date of 27 January, chosen for this
event in France, as in other countries, has also been fairly controversial, being the
anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz in 1945 and thus not directly linked to the
persecutions undertaken on French soil by French nationals, although Jacques
Chirac initiated the acknowledgement of the crimes of the French state under Vichy
in 1995. 
Where events are celebrated, it may well be with the intention of giving
governments the opportunity to reinforce ‘une certaine idée de la France’ (Vergès
1999). Indeed, over the last few decades, in the face of a perceived crisis of national
identity, this recourse to memory has become much more than a sign of a real
renewal of interest in the past; indeed, rather more, it is an important tool in the
‘mission’ that some intellectuals have assumed to re-ground French identity on the
basis of an account of its founding national myths and origins (Gaspard 1995).
However, given the conflicting interpretations of the past characteristic of French
history and the mutually exclusive founding myths of the nation on the Left and on
the Right, the extent to which the construction of a national collective memory may
be successfully achieved often depends on the degree of superficiality, even frivolity,
required to keep at bay all factors of dissent and problematic issues that might
disturb the consensus. As far as key political commemorations are concerned, this is,
however, rarely the case. Sometimes, the disagreements and tensions arise at the very
heart of the state itself, with conflicts between its different branches, as during the
cohabitation period of 1986–88, when conflicts arose between the Elysée and
Matignon in respect of the organisation of the Capetian Millennium celebrations in
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1987 (Theis 1994), although as far as the content was concerned, harmony largely
reigned in a celebration of the long history of the French nation, its links to the past,
as well as the monarchy – no doubt assisted by the clouds of vagueness surrounding
the actual historical events of 987 and their significance. This was to be in marked
contrast to the polemics of the Bicentenary of the Revolution a few years later. 
Attempts to construct a national collective memory may also be resented by
individuals who have been touched by the events commemorated and who
endeavour to retrieve and protect their own individual memories (Edwards 2000).
There may well be conflicts between national and local interests, between the
interpretations given to the event by different political and other interest groups, and
even related to what is included or excluded from the commemoration. The
approach to the memorialisation of the Vichy period in France is highly significant
in this respect. 
At the same time, the commemoration may well inspire efforts in the form of
serious research to further objective historical knowledge of the event, thus bringing
into play a scientific or academic discourse of a wholly different order. It may also
provoke a challenge to the official discourse by way of the development of counter-
discourses on a quite different plane. 
The Bicentenary of the French Revolution was especially notable, not just for
the conflictual approaches to the commemoration of the Revolution and the
meaning to be assigned to it, but also for major challenges to the celebration itself,
spanning the whole political spectrum, from monarchists and extreme right-wing
opponents, via various types of liberal revisionists, to workers’ strikes and movements
in support of the laissés-pour-compte on the global plane. 
The clash of discourses is not the only arena for conflict. Indeed, most
commemorative activity takes on a decidedly theatrical character (Malaussena 2000),
involving a number of different genres of cultural performance and distinctive public
rituals, which can be a factor of mobilisation and political expression and an
opportunity for articulating and confronting different positions. 
The Non-commemoration of the Colonial Past
Particularly interesting, however, in the light of the multiplicity of recent
commemorations, are the non-commemorations – those events that have to all
intents and purposes been ignored, and the reasons for this. Of these, there is one
that stands out. It is the almost total boycott of the celebrations of the Bicentenary
of Haitian Independence on 1 January 2004, particularly by the former colonial
power, France. 
On the one hand, this is in line with the general reluctance to recall events
connected to France’s colonial past. The almost total silence until very recently on
the events of 17 October 1961 in Paris is a prime example, in spite of the
considerable amount of information that was published at the time (Einaudi 1991;
House 2001),4 as well as the more general amnesia relating to the Algerian War (Stora
1992). The tendency to obfuscate France’s colonial past is also a feature of scholarly
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discourse. For instance, the virtual silence that is maintained on the subject in Nora’s
Lieux de mémoire, which we have already mentioned, is highly symptomatic. Indeed,
there is only one chapter in the seven volumes making up this vast work that has
anything to do with the subject. This is Charles-Robert Ageron’s contribution in the
first volume on the Republic, dealing with the Colonial Exhibition of 1931,
‘L’Exposition coloniale de 1931. Mythe républicain ou mythe imperial?’ (Nora 1984,
Vol. 1: 561–591). 
To a great extent, then, the French obsession with memory is only one side of
the coin; the other has been an equally powerful tendency to forget (Rollot 1992).
Moreover, this has often been a deliberate policy to draw a veil over certain aspects
of the nation’s past and the misdeeds of some individuals, sometimes, but not always,
on the grounds of the need for national reconciliation and unity. For instance, de
Gaulle had been unwilling to set a date for a commemorative monument to the
Algerian War, which the Fédération Nationale des Anciens Combattants en Algérie,
Maroc et Tunisie (FNACA), the association of French veterans of that war, had asked
for (Stora 1992). It has to be said that this tendency is not peculiar to France, but
has been characteristic of other countries, including Algeria, that have political
systems largely based on a real or imagined conception of the unity of the nation.
This may sometimes involve a certain amount of rewriting of history to fit political
needs (Stora 1992). Jean-Louis Rollot, amongst others, has questioned the validity of
the argument that claims that some things are best forgotten in the name of national
reconciliation, pointing out that this collective amnesia is invariably a one-way
process for the benefit of people who have never expressed any regret or asked for
forgiveness, people whom he describes as ‘nostalgiques des causes funestes’, who
never give up sowing hatred and exclusion in their wake.5
In 1992, Jean-Pierre Rioux wrote that this was not a question of amnesia (Rioux
1992). The Algerian War had neither been unwittingly forgotten nor wilfully
repressed from the nation’s memory, though, of course, there was a deliberate policy
of censorship of images, films, books and archival records that has had its part to play
in determining the way in which memory has been transmitted.6 For Rioux, on the
contrary, the memory of the Algerian War was ‘still a bleeding wound after thirty
years’.7 What was lacking, however, was a collective, national memory of the war, and
Rioux maintained that it was still too early for this collective memory to be
constituted. According to his analysis of the time, the official silence on the Algerian
War, backed by the use of amnesty (Stora 1992: 281–83), was also because of the fact
that this war was difficult, if not impossible, to fit into the historical narrative of the
French nation as represented in the collective national memory. 
For individuals, there may be something of a general phenomenon involved,
related to the passage of time, as was witnessed in 2004 with the accounts of the D-
Day veterans, some of whom had been unable or unwilling to relate what had
happened in June 1944 because of their own personal traumas. In their case, as in
similar cases, time may indeed play a role in finally allowing these hitherto unspoken
memories to be expressed (Le Monde, 6 May 2004). One of the Algerians arrested and
subjected to police ill-treatment at the demonstration of 17 October 1961 described
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in an interview published in Le Monde (5 February 1999) why he has remained silent
about the events and why he would never apply for French nationality.8
On the collective plane, however, other factors have an important role to play.
Clearly the way in which wars and conflicts are dealt with in the national memory
depends to a very large extent on whether the nation emerged as victor or as loser,
and how the victory or loss is perceived, whether merited or unmerited. As with the
American veterans of the Vietnam War, the soldiers who returned home from Algeria
had to deal with serious ambivalence about their involvement in something that had
turned out to be worthless in the general perception (Stora 1992: 220). However, as
a proportion of the population, the French veterans of the Algerian War were far
higher in number (over two million), came from all classes, regions and sections of
society and were thus more representative of the nation at large (Stora 1992: 220,
293). The involvement of a sizeable number of harkis 9 was a further complicating
factor (Stora 1992: 261–70). 
Rioux points out that all the surveys of French public opinion since 1962 show
that the French did not consider the Algerian War to be a major event of the century
and certainly not on the scale of the two world wars. They also did not consider that
it raised ‘a real question of identity’ for the ‘communauté de métropole’, i.e. all those
who were neither pieds noirs, harkis or immigrants of Algerian origin (Rioux 1992).
Alain Resnais’s film, Muriel, was explicitly about the avoidance of the subject of
Algeria (Stora 1992: 41). Or, to put it a different way, there has been no lack of
individual memories of the war, as well as a plethora of oral and written sources,
photographic, film and sound records; what was missing was any collective
interpretation, a common ideological framework of reference, accepted by the nation
as a whole, which allowed for the sanctioned expression of the individual experience.
Just as for the events that occurred in Paris on 17 October 1961, a considerable
amount of information about the Algerian War was published and well known at the
time and since, including the use of torture. 
The amnesia could therefore be described more accurately as obfuscation and
silence concerning events that were not unknown. The opening of some of the
archives, particularly some of the secret French military archives stored at Vincennes,
and their cataloguing by the Service historique de l’armée de terre (SHAT) has made
a contribution to revisiting the period of the Algerian War (Le Monde, 5 February
1999, 30 October 2001; SHAT/Jauffret 1990, 1998). General Jacques Massu’s
‘directive générale sur la guerre subversive’, issued in March 1959, codifying the
methods of interrogation of suspects, including the ‘gégène’ (torture by electric
shock), which he claimed, on several occasions, to be the best method for rapid
gathering of information, was published in Revue historique des armées, 200,
September 1995, without its appendix, which dealt with methods of coercion and
which, according to experts, was not placed in the archives (see also Le Monde, 25
October 1995). Thus, in recent years, the so-called amnesia has finally begun to
abate, notably through a flurry of official memorial activity.
This is clearly not just the inevitable result of the passage of time, but also the
product of changes in the notion of French national identity. The activities have
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included the erection in 2002 of a memorial on the Quai Branly in Paris to those who
died for France in the Algerian War and other North African conflicts, the inauguration
of 5 December as a national day of homage to those who died, as well as a separate day
of homage to the harkis on 25 September. This followed the laying on 19 March 2002
by the Mayor of Paris, Bertrand Delanoë, of the foundation stone of a memorial to
Parisians who died in Algeria, Morocco or Tunisia in Père Lachaise Cemetery and the
unveiling of a plaque in memory of the victims of the events of 17 October in Paris. On
20 April 2004, the Mayor renamed a square in the 12th arrondissement ‘Place du 19
mars 1962’, after the date of the ceasefire in Algeria following the signing of the Accords
d’Evian (Le Nouvel Observateur, 20 April 2004). Elsewhere, and even more
controversially, commemorations in honour of the OAS (Organisation de l’armée
secrète) and other supporters of Algérie française have gathered apace, most notably with
the erection of memorials to ‘those who were shot or gave their lives in battle for the
cause of Algérie française’, such as the monument erected in Perpignan and inaugurated
on 5 July 2003 to coincide with the anniversary date of Algerian independence, or the
stele inaugurated in Marignane on 6 July 2005 to coincide with the anniversary date of
the execution in 1962 of Roger Degueldre, chief of the OAS death squad, known as
Delta commandos (Le Quotidien d’Oran, 19 June 2005; L’Humanité, 6 July 2005). 
In spite of this recent burst of commemorative activity (some officially
sanctioned, some not, but none of it without considerable controversy), it is
interesting that the Délégation aux célébrations nationales placed the Toussaint
uprising of 1954 only on a list of secondary anniversaries for 2004 (‘Autres
anniversaires signalés’ 10) and then under the rubric Terrorisme en Algérie, while the
short text referred only to ‘opérations de maintien de l’ordre’, avoiding any reference to
the Algerian War, as such, in a curious hangover from the long-standing period of
denial that it was in fact a war and not simply an internal fight against terrorism or
a peacekeeping operation (Stora 1992). 
One might have thought that sufficient time has passed since the loss in 1804
of Saint-Domingue, France’s premier colony of the time, for a cooler look to prevail
and a dispassionate position to be taken in respect of the Bicentenary of Haitian
Independence. This has, perhaps surprisingly, not proved to be the case. 
However, the fact that Haitian Independence marked a major defeat for French
colonial power cannot, by itself, explain this boycott. After all, the way in which
Dien Bien Phu was remembered in 2004 shows how even a defeat can constitute a
significant landmark in the national memory and a cause for celebration – in this
case, mainly of the heroism of the combatants, much in the same way as the disaster
of Dunkirk is celebrated in Britain. The fact that only 25 per cent of the 15,000
fighters on the French side were from metropolitan France, with the vast majority
coming from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa may also have something to do
with it, and certainly helps to explain the multiple meanings that were attached to
the event, whether it was seen as the decisive end of French power in Asia or a beacon
of hope for the liberation struggles elsewhere in the empire. 
In contrast, the Bicentenary of Haitian Independence hardly featured in the
commemorative calendar in France itself, though there were a number of events in
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Martinique. Indeed, the only event listed by the Délégation aux célébrations
nationales as taking place in mainland France was a lecture by the Haitian poet René
Depestre, ‘La France vue par un écrivain haïtien’, scheduled to take place on 20
January at the Bibliothèque nationale. On the other hand, another event scheduled
for 2004, the Bicentenary of the birth of Victor Schœlcher, French architect of the
abolition of slavery of 1848 and elected representative of the people of Martinique
in 1848 and then of Guadeloupe in 1849–50, gave rise to a large number of
ceremonies, exhibitions, conferences and cultural events.
The Particular Significance of the Bicentenary of Haitian Independence
The Bicentennial of Haiti’s Independence was organised against a background of
unrest in Haiti in January 2004. The only major international guest to attend the
ceremonies was the South African President, Thabo Mbeki. According to the reports
at the time, Mbeki may very well have regretted his participation, disrupted as his
visit was by violence and gunfire. France was represented by its ambassador and two
députés (Le Monde, 3 January 2004). 
In France, the event was largely ignored, in spite of its major significance to
France and its own history, given the central role that the former French colony of
Saint-Domingue had played in the slave trade and plantation economy, at one time
supplying two-thirds of all Europe’s tropical produce (Farmer 2004), its importance
in the rise of the French mercantile bourgeoisie and plantation owners, the
pioneering anticolonial liberation struggle that had taken place from 1791 under the
leadership of Toussaint L’Ouverture, and then, after his capture in 1802, that of Jean-
Jacques Dessalines, leading to independence in 1804, and the impact of this struggle
within the context of the French Revolution and the key political debates of the time,
as well as its subsequent significance, as a beacon of liberation for other countries in
Latin America and the Caribbean, and an enduring symbol, as the first ever black
republic, founded on a successful slave rebellion. 
What coverage there was in the French media at the time of the bicentenary was
mainly to do with the supposed unpopularity and undemocratic regime of the
Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his impending fall, as a result of an
opposition movement largely made up of thugs from the former Duvalierist regimes
of Papa Doc and Baby Doc and members of paramilitary organisations that had been
formed after an earlier coup against President Aristide in 1991, most notably Louis
Jodel Chamblain and Jean Pierre Baptiste, both of whom had in earlier years been
found guilty for their role in a massacre in the slums of Gonaïves and, in Chamblain’s
case, for the murder of a prominent supporter of Aristide, Antoine Izméry, in 1993
(Amnesty 2004; Farmer 2004). A few weeks later, Aristide was toppled and sent into
forced exile in Africa (Amnesty 2004), firstly to the Central African Republic and
then, after a brief return to the Caribbean, though to Jamaica, not Haiti, ending up
in South Africa, and thus outside the francophone orbit. 
There has been an intense debate concerning the question of Aristide himself
and the accusations of tyranny, arbitrary repression, violent rule and involvement in
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drug-dealing that have been levied against him, on the one hand, and the claims to
his sole democratic legitimacy and popular support, on the other. He was first elected
in 1990, then restored to power in 1994 with American support, following the 1991
coup, to serve out his term, before standing aside for the election in 1996 of René
Préval (the first Haitian President ever to see out his term of office), and coming back
for re-election for a second term in a landslide victory in November 2000. There
have been arguments on both sides of the divide (Dailey 2004; Farmer 2004), which
cannot be explored further here. However, the fact that the year of the Bicentenary
of Independence coincided with the toppling and subsequent ousting of Aristide
from the country on 29 February by an alliance of American and French troops
could be considered to be ironic in the extreme and a strong argument against
France’s involvement in this military endeavour. One might even have expected
shock headlines in the press: ‘France reoccupies Haiti in year of Bicentenary of
Independence!’ On the contrary, this type of connection was conspicuous mostly by
its absence in the media. For their part, the French authorities showed little apparent
concern about the possible effect that there might be on local, national or
international public opinion. 
This was, of course, in marked contrast to their position on the Iraq war – a fact
that gave rise to a spate of comment at the time, in which the Franco-American
alliance on Haiti and their willingness to cooperate as part of a UN peacekeeping
force, the MIF (Multinational Intervention Force), which also included Canadian
and Chilean troops, was portrayed as evidence of a great reconciliation, or even
France’s way of saying sorry after its opposition to the invasion of Iraq. 
The reality is that France and America have been closely linked in the ‘war on
terror’ for many, many years. When Pontecorvo’s film of the Battle of Algiers (1966)
was shown in the Pentagon just before the Iraqi invasion, this was not intended as a
lesson in how not to conduct warfare of this type; rather, it was held up as a model
of how to do it, from which lessons were to be learned. 
There was nothing new in this. The American armed forces have long been
turning to the French for guidance in conducting covert and overt military
campaigns in Asia and Latin America. They have long used Roger Trinquier’s La
Guerre moderne, published in 1961 and translated into English as Modern Warfare, a
French View of Counterinsurgency (1964), a result of experience during the wars in
Indochina, as the standard textbook on tactics for waging war and campaigns of
subversion against guerrilla forces. General Paul Aussaresses has also been an
important contact and source of guidance, mainly because of his experience in the
‘war on terror’ in Algeria, especially during the Battle of Algiers (1955–57).
Aussaresses has openly admitted to engaging in torture personally, justifying it by the
need to extract information from prisoners under interrogation in ‘real time’ so that
it could still be used effectively. He worked with the American military in the early
1960s, at the Infantry School at Fort Benning in Georgia, where his designation was
French liaison officer. He was also adviser to the Counterinsurgency Department at
the Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It was this establishment
that first began to use Trinquier’s book, Modern Warfare (Andersen 2002). It is
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claimed that this work was a key influence on the CIA-run Operation Phoenix,
which was intended as a counter-insurgency programme and used dubious methods
to achieve its aims. 
One of the US officers engaged in this programme, retired army colonel Carl
Bernard, has been quoted as saying that ‘We imitated the French army’s torturing
and killing of captured revolutionaries in Algiers in Vietnam,’ though he also says
that it did not work, mainly because of the lack of real knowledge not just of the
enemy but also of the supposed allies, and he recently warned of the dangers of
falling into what he calls ‘this attractive trap’ of using the same torture techniques as
the French in Algeria (Andersen 2002). 
Similar tactics also appear to have been used in Operation Condor, a vast
transnational counterterror and anti-subversion programme operated in Latin
America with the covert support of the US (McSherry 2001; Vazquez 2003). Once
again, the specific link has been made with French counter-insurgency concepts and
techniques (McSherry 2001). 
However, what was of even greater significance in the year of the Bicentenary of
Haitian Independence is that this collaboration between the French and the
Americans goes back at least to 1804. Like France, the United States refused to
recognise the new Republic. The success of the Haitian anticolonial struggle was
perceived as more of a threat to its own slave-holding interests than in the light of
any supposed anticolonial solidarity. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the
declaration of Haitian Independence, France pursued a policy of close alliance with
the United States and cooperated through the institution of a trade embargo and
other sanctions. 
Just as importantly and with even longer-lasting effect, both were in complete
accord on the question of reparations. This does not refer to reparations for the evils
of slavery, such as were supposed to be paid eventually with the abolition of slavery
in the USA. What was at stake here were rather the reparations demanded of the new
regime in Haiti, reparations claimed by the French for the loss of lands and, indeed,
slaves. These amounted to an indemnity payment of 150 million francs in gold (or
£10 billion, at today’s prices) (Guardian, 23 March 2004), as well as the reduction
by half of Haiti’s import and export taxes, as the price demanded by France in 1825,
in return for renouncing attempts to reclaim the colony and recognising its
independence – a sum that it took more than 100 years for Haiti to pay. It took the
US somewhat longer to give recognition to Haiti, incidentally, in 1862 (Guardian,
23 February 2004). By the end of the nineteenth century, Haiti was spending 80 per
cent of its national budget in loan and interest repayments (Guardian, 23 February
2004). Indeed, the repayments of this debt were still continuing until after the
Second World War and their impact was totally devastating on the economic
prospects of the country, which was transformed from the richest colony to the
poorest country in the western hemisphere (Farmer 2004).11 Although this is
shocking in itself, what is perhaps even more surprising and disconcerting is the fact
that, unlike other instances of reparations paid after conflicts (the reparations paid
by Germany after the First World War, or the payments made to Jewish victims of
The Loss of Empire | 185
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 185
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
the Holocaust after the Second), these were payments to be paid not by the defeated
but by those who had supposedly emerged as the victors. 
The enormity of the scandal of these payments is perhaps put into its true
perspective when compared with the financial compensation paid following the
general abolition of slavery by the Second French Republic in 1848, following the
large-scale revolts in the French Caribbean territories. Although, yet again, the
former slaves themselves did not receive any compensation for their suffering and
loss of liberty, this time it was the French state that paid the compensation,
theoretically to the colonies, though actually to the former slave owners, thereby
acknowledging its responsibility and complicity in slavery and the slave trade or,
rather, the responsibility of its predecessors, for, with the new Republican dawn,
France was deemed to have passed into the post-slavery age (Vergès 1999). 
The issue of responsibility and culpability was raised once again with the debate
following on from the introduction of a bill by the Guianese députée Christiane
Taubira-Delannon in 1998 (Proposition de loi no. 1297) to have the slave trade and
slavery recognised as crimes against humanity. During the debate in the National
Assembly, following the first reading of the bill on 18 February 1999, the disjuncture
between slavery and the Republic was highlighted in the majority discourse. This had
been a tenet of Republican thinking since the abolition. As Gambetta had pointed
out in 1881, the fundamental incompatibility between the Republic and slavery was
indeed written into the decree abolishing it in 1848, though not quite in the terms
he suggested (‘The French Republic does not permit slavery on French soil’ –
Gambetta 1910: 166). In fact, the provisional government of 1848 had pointed to
slavery being an affront to human dignity, contrary to the natural principle of law
and a flagrant violation of the Republican dogma of liberty, equality and fraternity,
as well as to the danger of serious disorder arising if abolition were delayed (Décret
de l’abolition de l’esclavage du 27 avril 1848). 
In the discussions of the 1999 bill, the view was reiterated that the Republic had
nothing to do with slavery. Thus, slavery needed to be recognised for its heinous
nature; it should be commemorated as such, in a symbolic gesture of moral and
cultural reparation to the erstwhile slaves. The then Minister for Justice, Elisabeth
Guigou, for instance, insisted on the need to fulfil a ‘devoir de mémoire’. However,
slavery was firmly relegated to the pre-Republican past and any question of paying any
material reparations dismissed as completely out of the question (Vergès 1999), even
though this had formed a major component of the bill (Clause 5). Various reasons
were advanced for dropping this clause, which did not figure in the final version, only
adopted in 2001 as Loi No. 2001–434. On a pragmatic level, the difficulties of
determining how much, to whom and how these might be paid were put forward as
insurmountable. Yet there were also more sophisticated attempts to justify the
rejection of the payment of reparations in principle. For instance, none other than
Frantz Fanon was called upon, in particular by the Ministry of Culture, to justify the
desire to move on and not allow the legacy of the past to impinge on the present day.
In what might be seen as a further sign of an attempt to put the current perceptions
of the French national identity on a new footing, in which the links with the colonial
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past are sidestepped, the words of Fanon were quoted in justification of this position:
‘Je ne suis pas l’esclave de l’esclavage qui déshumanisa mes pères – I am not the slave
of slavery which dehumanised my ancestors’ (Fanon (1952)/1975: 186). 
It is true that, in Peau noire, masques blancs, Fanon dismisses the whole idea of
demanding reparations for past enslavement, wishing neither to extract vengeance in
the name of the slaves of previous centuries, nor to burden the European with guilt
and, even less, to assuage any such guilt. As he says: 
I do not have the right, as a man of colour, to desire the crystallisation in
the White man of a feeling of guilt for the past of my race …
I have neither the right nor the desire to demand reparations for my
ancestors sold into servitude.
There is no Negro mission; there is no White Man’s burden. (Fanon
(1952)/1975: 185)
However, to use Fanon’s text as a justification for the non-payment of reparations is,
at best, a serious misunderstanding of his argument about the burden of the past or,
at worst, a cynical abuse of the superficial ambiguity of what is basically a statement
of his own existential right to freedom and refusal to be essentialised into an identity
based on the myths of Negritude. 
Yet, if Fanon was impatient with those who harked back to a glorious past, in part in
compensation for their miserable present, he was not arguing for a denial of history. On the
contrary, he was a vociferous proponent of the need to enter history and prepare for the
future, in full recognition of the fact that this opportunity had been denied to the enslaved
and the colonised, who had not been in a position to be agents of their own destiny. Thus,
when Fanon asserts his intention to turn his back on the past, he assumes that he will be
part of a community that will have won the freedom to take their future forward. 
Indeed, he makes this explicit in his last book, Les Damnés de la terre, written
shortly before his death in 1961. He writes here that: ‘Independence has certainly
given the colonised moral reparation and restored their dignity’ (Fanon (1961)/1987:
57). However, he was also fully conscious at this time that this moral reparation
would not be enough and that independence would mean an economic regression,
which could and should be countered by a form of compensation from the colonial
powers, whose wealth had been built on empire.
This European opulence is literally scandalous, for it has been built on the
backs of slaves, it has fed on the blood of slaves, it comes directly from the
soil and the subsoil of the underdeveloped world. The material well-being
and progress of Europe have been built with the sweat and the corpses of the
Negroes, the Arabs, the Indians and the Yellow races. From now on, this is
something that we are determined never to forget. (Fanon (1961)/1987: 68) 
It is equally clear that Fanon was not expecting this compensation, call it reparations,
aid or some other term, to come from governments but from the people of Europe. 
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For Aristide and his supporters, the question of reparations was not one that has
been confined to history. Whatever the form it takes, symbolic, moral or more
concretely political or financial, it has certainly been raised as a fundamental part of
the process of ‘repairing’ the wounded psyche by those critics relying on
psychoanalytical theories, such as Françoise Vergès (Vergès 1999), who also recognise
that there are indeed some wounds that are irreparable. 
Whatever the truth about the nature of Aristide the man or of his regime, it has
to be recognised that it was one of the key issues raised by him. He actually
quantified the amount due to the people of Haiti, allowing for interest and inflation,
as $21 billion, more precisely, $21,685,135,571 and 48 cents to date.12 Moreover, the
financial penalties imposed on Haiti were to continue in a new form, following the
withholding of payments agreed as loans and the blocking of aid in recent years, or
its diversion into financing the presence of American troops on its soil, leading to
Haiti sinking even further into debt (Farmer 2004). Following Aristide’s re-election
in 2000, the US froze international aid, citing the disputes over eight parliamentary
seats where the results were contested by the opposition. Loans from the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) for health, education, drinking water and road
improvement were particularly affected. Only $4 million of the $146 million agreed
in these loans had reached Haiti by 2004 (Farmer 2004). The indebtedness of Haiti
to international financial institutions and foreign governments has been estimated at
$1.134 billion, an increase from $302 million in 1980, as much as 40 per cent of
this debt having been incurred as a result of loans made to the Duvalier dictators and
their military successors (Farmer 2004). 
There is no doubt that Aristide’s claim for repayment of the sums calculated as
Haiti’s due – in a sense, reparations for the reparations – was made with absolute
seriousness and determination. The figure 21 (from the 21 billion due) had become a
potent political symbol in Haiti, with Aristide drawing up a 21–point development
programme, one point for each billion owed (Farmer 2004; Le Monde, 3 January 2004).
Moreover, in the face of demands for repayment, France and the USA were wedded in
the same determination to avoid payment (in whatever form it might take), for any such
payments would lift the lid off a cauldron of demands from all over the formerly
colonised world, not to mention the descendants of slaves in the USA itself. Indeed,
these demands have already been making themselves heard, not just in terms of political
rhetoric, but also in the legal domain. The government of Vanuatu has raised the issue
of compensation from both British and French governments for nineteenth-century
‘slave voyages’ that took islanders to Australia or Fiji to work in the sugar plantations
(Guardian, 13 April 2004). Descendants of slaves, using DNA to support their ancestry,
instigated a legal action against Lloyds of London and America tobacco giant RJ
Reynolds for the recovery of $1 billion for their part in the underwriting of the slave
vessels and profiteering from genocide (Guardian, 30 March 2004). Legal actions were
also prepared in February 2004 against the New South Wales government for
misappropriation of wages owed to Aborigines (Guardian, 13 April 2004).13
Aristide’s claims therefore posed no mere rhetorical threat. As we have seen, the
demand for reparations has already been raised and rejected in the French legislative
188 | Postcoloniality
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 188
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
assemblies and, clearly, there will be resistance to any further demands for repayment
by France. This will also be the case for the USA, which itself instituted a military
occupation of Haiti from 1915 to 1934, which brought back black corvée labour and
created a Haitian army that only ever went to war against its own citizens until it was
disbanded by Aristide in 1995 (Farmer 2004). However, France continues as in the
past to adopt a more sophisticated and subtle position, marked by various
progressive-sounding discourses (Francophonie, diversity, pluralism, human rights,
etc.). Although the military option is always there in reserve for when it is needed,
there should be no underestimating the importance of discourse and ideology as a
vehicle for maintaining France’s position in the world at large, and especially as far
as its relations with its former colonies and client states are concerned. Jacques
Chirac, like his predecessor, François Mitterrand, is keen to promote himself as
champion of the wretched of the earth, in Africa especially and, indeed, anywhere
else but France itself. To this end, he set up a committee in November 2003, the
Landau Commission, chaired by Jean-Claude Landau, Inspecteur général des
finances, and including a cross-section of civil servants, business people and activists
such as Jacques Cossart from Attac (Association pour une taxation des transactions
financières pour l’aide aux citoyens), to look into the possibility of international
taxation, amongst other options, to address the problem of global poverty (Le
Monde, 14 May 2004; Libération, 21 September 2004). Proposals included a variety
of taxes on cross-border activities, such as air and sea transport through a tax on
aviation or shipping fuel, or on capital flows across national boundaries (Guardian,
28 January 2005). However, this was a much watered-down version of the so-called
‘Tobin tax’, devised in the 1970s by the Nobel prize-winning economist, James
Tobin, which was also designed to act as a disincentive on the movement of capital
and currency for purely speculative purposes. The taxes proposed by Chirac, as
initially designed, were to be set at a minimal level – a rate of between 0.001 and
0.005 per cent of international financial transactions was suggested, enough to raise
revenue for the fight against poverty and disease, but not sufficient to have any
transforming effect on speculative practice. The terms of reference did not include
the question of reparations for actions committed by France in the past. In the event,
France has struggled to get its proposals accepted by other countries as an
international measure, with only the UK and Chile initially signing up to the air
travel taxation proposal and, at the time of writing, it remains to be seen how it will
eventually be applied (Le Monde, 4 November 2005).
These proposals to finance poverty eradication and development, mainly in the
countries of Africa, like the demands for the cancellation of debt, such as those made
by the movement Jubilee 2000, may actually obscure the issues at stake, for all their
real practical merit. For, in point of fact, the debt is the other way round. It is the
former colonial and slave-trading and owning powers that owe an enormous debt to
those they colonised and enslaved. There is thus a strong case for arguing that this is
the debt that should now be repaid, either in the form of reparations or in the form
of a global taxation that would affect individuals, companies, corporations and
financial institutions, as well as national governments. Both of these constitute
The Loss of Empire | 189
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 189
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
political demands, not an appeal to the generosity or moral conscience of the well-
off. As such, there are enormous difficulties preventing their achievement, given the
present global configuration of political power. There is no doubt that, in the
interests of justice, the latter option would be preferable, since it would take account
of the continuing process of exploitation and the long-term effects of capital
accumulation in the ‘North’. At the same time, it would be even more difficult to
achieve politically. 
In the course of 2005, Chirac’s proposals, along with the high-profile efforts of
Tony Blair and Gordon Brown to extract a commitment from their European
partners to meet the target figure of 0.7 per cent of national income for development
aid by 2015, inevitably raised anew questions about the relations of Europe with
Africa. Not least amongst these questions was the impact of the colonial past on
present-day issues and relations, and how this colonial past is dealt with in terms of
commemoration, as well as through the teaching of history in schools and
universities. For both Britain and France, the two most important former European
colonial powers, these questions again came to the fore, with a renewed significance,
sparking off a number of new, if muted, debates.  
Britain’s low-key celebrations of VE Day, along with Tony Blair’s absence from
the commemoration event in Moscow, were not the only instances of political
controversy in response to the sixtieth anniversary of 8 May 1945.  In the relations
between France and Algeria, this date figured as a crucial reminder of another set of
events, which took place in the eastern Algerian town of Setif and a number of other
towns that day.
In 1945, after the turmoil of war, Algeria remained a French colony, with a large
population of European settlers, totally nearly one million people, some of whose
families had lived in Algeria for several generations. They were nonetheless a
minority, outnumbered nine to one by the majority Muslim population. It was this
minority that had stifled even the most modest attempts at reform to give a limited
number of Algerians some political rights. This was in spite of the growth of a
nationalist movement, consisting of a number of different strands, ranging from
reformists’ demands for equality as an integral part of France, via the reforming
Islamists’ demands for recognition of their own religious and cultural specificity, to
a fully-fledged independence movement, seeking to blend nationalism with a
socialist agenda.
The nationalists had seen all their demands rebuffed. Many had fought
alongside the French in the First World War, and more recently, along with the Free
French in the Second. Even after the ousting of the Vichy administration from
Algeria following the Allied landings of 1942, they were told to be patient, that
politics would have to wait for the end of the war. Yet, when the reform proposals
finally came through from de Gaulle’s provisional government in 1944, they were
essentially nothing more than a rehash of the proposals put forward by the Popular
Front government of Léon Blum in 1936 and his Minister of State for Algerian
Affairs, Maurice Viollette, and thus known as the Blum–Viollette proposals. In
effect, the proposed reforms would have meant extending French citizenship and
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thus political rights to a small group of those considered to be ‘meritorious
Algerians’, in other words, those who had served France in a military or
administrative capacity, and those who had acquired a certain level of French
education. At most, it amounted to about 60,000 people. Yet the Algerians had seen
the collapse of what had hitherto been perceived as a mighty military and political
power with the fall of France in 1940 and then the warring between the Vichy and
the Free French factions. They knew that France was not invincible.
Thus, with nationalist organisation proceeding apace in the towns and
countryside, the demonstrations called to celebrate the victory of the Allies in Europe,
and particularly the liberation of France, were seen, if not as a provocation, then as an
ideal opportunity to counter with demonstrations for the liberation of Algerians.
It was in Setif that things came to a head most dramatically, with Algerian
demonstrators defying the order not to show the national flag, and the outbreak of
a bloody confrontation, in which demonstrators and French armed forces personnel
were killed, before the violence spilled over to a generalised bloodbath, leading in its
turn to a brutal and systematic repression, with arrests, bombardments and summary
executions. Estimates of numbers killed have varied, with Algerian nationalists
claiming 45,000 dead. 
The flashpoint of Setif meant that it was thereafter destined to enter history as
one of the key founding myths of the national revolution, kept alive in the national
memory as the point of no return from which the armed struggle launched in 1954
was inevitable. The massacres of Setif were stamped upon the memory of the new
post-war generation, which would come to age through the experience of the
Algerian War. The football team of the town of Guelma have traditionally worn a
black strip in memory of those massacred on 8 May 1945 and in its aftermath, and
continue to do so. Against the significance of the events of 8 May 1945 for Algerians,
the French have hitherto maintained a silence with regard to Setif. Thus, it caused
something of a stir in Algeria, when a number of public figures, including the French
Ambassador in Algiers, Hubert Colin de Verdière, and the then Foreign Minister,
Michel Barnier, proceeded to break this silence and express some form of regret for
what had happened sixty years ago.
In a sense, this could be seen as the French equivalent of Queen Elizabeth’s
expression of regret, though no apology, for the 1919 Jallianwallah Bagh massacre in
Amritsar, during her visit to the city in 1997. It took place in the context of measures
to improve relations between France and Algeria, summed up in President Chirac’s
recent offer of a pact of friendship, inspired to a large extent by French worries that
their influence was diminishing in Algeria, to the benefit of other powers, notably
the Americans. 
These expressions of regret by the two former colonial powers have greatly
differing significance, given their different historical experience of both colonialism
and decolonisation, as well as the different trajectories of their postcolonial relations.
Yet it is also clear that in both cases there was more to this than an attempt to make
their peace with their former colonies, to put relations on a new footing and make a
fresh start, drawing a line under the colonial period.
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Significantly, in both cases, there have also been measures to validate the colonial
endeavours. During his tour of African countries, the British Chancellor, Gordon
Brown, regaled all who would listen with a list of the achievements of British
imperialists. In line with much of recent British revisionist history of empire, he openly
proclaimed that Britain had nothing to be ashamed of and much to be proud of. 
In France, meanwhile, in spite of gestures in relation to Setif and the measures
we have already noted, including the passing of a law in 2001 to decree slavery and
the slave trade a crime against humanity and the proposed commemoration of the
slave trade with an annual day of remembrance, now fixed as 10 May, a similar
process is also at work to emphasise the positive elements of French imperialism.
Most notably, this was codified in a new law, passed on 23 February 2005 at the
instigation of members of the majority party, the UMP, to recognise the contribution
and honour the memory of the harkis and others who fought alongside the French
in the Algerian War and other colonial wars and to provide financial aid and other
assistance for the members of this community, most of whom now reside in France.14
While there was certainly a case to be made that the harkis were treated shamefully
by the French, following the peace with the FLN, and many were abandoned to their
fate as the French left the country, this was not taken on board by this law. The really
remarkable part of this text was, in fact, the section dealing with the teaching of the
history of French colonialism. Article 4 required that ‘academic research programmes
devote to the history of the French presence overseas and particularly in North Africa
the attention it deserves’. Quite how this was to be achieved was another matter.
However, more tendentiously, this article continued with the following statement:
‘The school curriculum recognises the positive role of the French presence overseas,
particularly in North Africa, and gives due prominence to the history and the
sacrifices of those members of the French Armed Forces who originated in those
lands, to which they are entitled.’
This provoked some outcry amongst French historians, including the veteran
opponent of the Algerian War, Pierre Vidal-Naquet, who attacked this law on the
grounds that it gave official backing to a revisionist version of French colonial
history, particularly that of Algérie française, and renewed legitimacy to such
discredited organisations as the OAS (see also Liauzu 2005 and widespread debate in
the French press). It also provoked stinging criticism in Algeria, beginning with the
General Secretary of the FLN, Abdelaziz Belkhadem (Liberté, 13 June 2005) and
most notably by President Bouteflika, who spoke out passionately against the law on
a number of occasions, accusing it of ‘negationism’ and ‘revisionism’, most notably
in a speech delivered in Setif on 25 August 2005 (El Watan, 30 November 2005).
There was also severe criticism from other parts of the francophone world, notably
Martinique, where it was attacked by the independence supporter Alfred Marie-
Jeanne, as well as Césaire’s successor as Mayor of Fort-de France, Serge Letchimy, and
the writers Patrick Chamoiseau and Edouard Glissant, amongst many others,
following the failure of the socialists’ attempt to have it repealed (Le Nouvel
Observateur, 4 December 2005). Aimé Césaire himself expressed his opposition,
refusing to meet the Interior Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, during his visit to
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Martinique, planned for 5 December (Le Monde, 15 December 2005). Attempts by
the Minister for War Veterans, Hamlaoui Mekachera, himself a harki veteran, to
designate the matter as an issue between French people, ‘un problème franco-
français’ (Le Nouvel Observateur, 16 September 2005), did little to address the
questions raised. With the controversy showing no signs of dying down, President
Chirac was prompted to set up a commission to try to defuse the tensions it had
raised and ultimately took action to revoke the controversial clause in January 2006. 
These developments seem to be acting as harbingers for a new, state-led, official,
approach to the imperial past, on both sides of the Channel, in contrast to those who
have argued recently that it is time to draw a line under the past, that postcolonialism
and its various theories have now outlived any usefulness they might have had and
that there is a need to move on to a new, ‘normalised’ phase in relations between the
former colonial powers and the erstwhile colonies. All the signs are that it was
perhaps too soon to write off the myths of colonial ideology, at least as long as the
representatives of state are endeavouring to breathe new life into old imperialist
dogma, whether or not this goes under the halo of saintly charity or civilised justice.
This chapter has highlighted some aspects of the role played in French national
memory by the loss of the first French colony to achieve its independence, as well as
the impact of the loss of one of the last, Algeria. The very different place that India
occupies in the French postcolonial memory will be dealt with in Chapter 11.
Notes
1. ‘Si les sociétés humaines sont historiques, cela ne provient pas simplement de ce qu’elles
ont un passé, mais de ce qu’elles le reprennent à titre de monument’ (Sartre (1943)1994:
545).
2. The celebration of Bastille Day has not been uninterrupted.  It was discontinued for more
than fifty years after its first institution as France’s national day, until it was reinstated
upon a proposal from Raspail in July 1880.
3. Laurent Greilsamer, talking about Steven Spielberg’s project to build a video archive of
the testimony of Holocaust survivors, to leave a documentary heritage for future
generations, says: ‘le propre de la mémoire n’est pas uniquement de célébrer le passé. La
mémoire est un outil qui nourrit l’imaginaire.’ However, the interpretation of this archive
will be open to these future generations; all the memorialist can decide is what is to be
recorded for posterity, not the meaning that will be given to it: ‘Le réalisateur américain
tourne en réalité le dos au passé. Complètement, définitivement. Il délaisse la mémoire
d’hier et ses vecteurs traditionnels pour construire une mémoire pour demain’ (Le Monde,
7 April 1995).
4. Edgard Pisani’s (non-)recollections are particularly instructive (Einaudi 1991), as are the
instances of false memory syndrome, particularly the confusion of October 1961 with the
events of Charonne in February 1962, which had eight victims and has always been
commemorated by the Left ever since (Einaudi 1991; Stora 1992: 78–79). 
5. ‘Nécessité de la réconciliation nationale? Singulier besoin d’oubli et de pardon, toujours
à sens unique, au bénéfice de gens qui n’expriment souvent aucun regret et ne demandent
aucun pardon’ (Rollot 1992: 1).
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6. See Stora 1992: 271–73, on the question of the archives. There was no shortage of print
(e.g. Colette Jeanson and Francis Jeanson’s L’Algérie hors la loi, Henri Alleg’s La Question)
or audio-visual material available (films by René Vautier – Algérie en flammes 1959,
Techniquement simple 1971, La Caravette, Avoir vingt ans dans les Aurès; the documentary
by Yves Courrier and Philippe Mounier, La Guerre d’Algérie 1970–71; Alain Resnais’s
Muriel; Robert Enrico’s La Belle Vie; Jacques Davila’s Certaines nouvelles; Mohamed
Lakhdar-Hamina’s Vent des Aurès 1967; Yves Boisset’s RAS; Gilles Behat’s Le Vent de la
Toussaint), even if some of it was temporarily censored, such as Jean-Luc Godard’s Le Petit
Soldat (banned from 1960 to 1963), Gillo Pontecorvo’s La Bataille d’Alger, made in 1966
but given a certificate by the censor in 1970, or Philippe Durand’s Lecteur Postal 89098.
7. ‘il ne faut pas laisser dire que la guerre d’Algérie, vue de France, serait depuis 1962 un
point aveugle de la mémoire, que l’amnésie ou le refoulement, la censure ou la page
blanche seraient son lot. Tout au contraire, son souvenir saigne depuis trente ans, vigilant,
démembré et même, parfois, prolixe’ (Rioux 1992: v).
8. Toute cette histoire est inscrite définitivement. Je n’en ai jamais parlé ni à ma femme
qui est française, parce que je ne veux pas qu’elle le prenne pour elle, ni à mes enfants
parce que ça ne sert à rien de leur transmettre des horreurs. Mais ces événements ont
fait que je n’ai jamais demandé la nationalité française. A l’époque, j’étais soi-disant
français. Mais je me sentais algérien parce qu’on me traitait de ‘bicot’. (Amar K.
interviewed by Philippe Bernard).
9. The harkis were Algerian auxiliaries who fought alongside the French army during the
Algerian War. 
10. See the website of Délégation aux célébrations nationales at http://www.culture.gouv.fr/
culture/actualites/celebrations2004/autresanni.htm, retrieved 8 June 2004.
11. See the entry on ‘Indépendance d’Haiti’ on the website of Délégation aux célébrations
nationales at http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/actualites/celebrations2004/haiti.htm,
retrieved 8 June 2004.
12. See Paul Farmer’s analysis of the collapse of the Aristide regime (Farmer 2004) and the
debate to which it gave rise in subsequent issues of the London Review of Books.
13. On the attempt to settle claims for compensation in a more or less equitable manner, see
Richard Adams’s account of the process that has taken place in New Zealand (Guardian,
16 April 2004).
14. The text of the law may be consulted at http://66.249.93.104/search?q=cache:mls-
5gRI_OEJ:www.admi.net/jo/20050224/DEFX0300218L.html+23+fevrier+2005&hl=en. 
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Chapter 9
The Postcolonial State: Problems of
Development 
It is now forty years or more since France formally relinquished the major part ofher empire. In most cases, however, independence has not brought the new
nations the rewards and results that were anticipated. The development of national
liberation movements had given rise to a number of serious debates and problematic
issues throughout the period of the national independence struggles. These were not
resolved with the coming of independence to many of the French colonies at the
beginning of the 1960s, although the debates in the ideological sphere necessarily
took on a new shape in response to the changed circumstances. Nationalism on its
own or when coupled with versions of socialist ideology has proved unable to deal
with the problems besetting the former colonies, not least of which have been the
economic difficulties and failure to achieve minimum standards of prosperity. The
evolution of some of these unresolved issues was also framed by the tensions
operating between the nation, on the one hand, and international forces and
pressures, on the other.
This was a scenario that Fanon had already commented on in Les Damnés de la
terre, where he wrote: 
nationalism, this magnificent hymn which roused the masses to struggle
against their oppressors, will collapse in the wake of independence.
Nationalism is not a political doctrine, it is not a programme. If you really
wish to avoid the country slipping backwards, stalling and falling apart,
there has to be a rapid transition from national consciousness to political
consciousness. The nation has no existence apart from through a
programme drawn up by a revolutionary leadership and adopted with
lucidity and enthusiasm by the masses. There is a constant need to situate
the national effort within the general context of the underdeveloped
countries. (Fanon (1961)/1987: 146)
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Here, in a nutshell, are encapsulated some of the key post-independence issues:
the difficulties and importance of economic development; the need to transcend
nationalism as a political ideology; the need for a fundamental change in culture at
the popular level for development to take place; the importance of the transnational
or international perspective. 
Debates in the first decades following independence focused on the choice of
economic model and the consequent choice of alignment or non-alignment with the
capitalist or the socialist camp. Once the first flush of optimism had begun to
dissipate, much ink was also expended on political questions, which have ranged
from the foundations of the legitimacy of the postcolonial state and the particular
forms it should take, including the congruence between the state apparatus and the
nation, along with its often problematic definition, to relations between the state and
the military forces. The question of democracy or democratisation has also been a
major preoccupation, often via external prompting. Furthermore, in terms of
international relations, debates have begun on the future of the nation-state itself,
with the emergence of concepts such as supranationalism and transnationalism. At
the heart of all these debates is the key question of the relationship between the
former colonies and the erstwhile metropolitan power and its redefinition. All of this
is clouded and reconfigured by the changing figures of global power play and the
involvement of new actors on the scene.
Economic Models
The most important question facing the newly independent states was the choice of
economic development model. Unsurprisingly, given the weak state of their
economies, most of the former colonies opted for a voluntaristic policy of
development, from top down, in which the intervention and control of the state was
to have a role of paramount importance. How great the degree of state control was
to be varied according to the circumstances and choices of individual countries. In
some countries, the role of private enterprise initiatives was quite developed, often in
collaboration with the former colonial power, whereas in others a more socialist-type
approach was adopted, in which the state was to provide the primary economic
impetus. Algeria, for instance, figured amongst the latter, with a Soviet-inspired
model involving investment in state-run heavy industry and the nationalisation of
agricultural land. The whole development was premised on developing industries
that would provide a boost to further industrial development, the so-called
‘industrialising industries’ model (Perroux 1963; Adamson 2005).   
Those countries, like Algeria, that followed this route, very quickly found
themselves falling into the trap of escalating indebtedness, as a result of the cost of
buying in the machinery and technology needed to equip this type of industrial
development and the lack of sufficient self-generated finance capital. The problems
were further compounded by the need to engage with international trade on terms
that were inequitable and decided by other more powerful countries and interests.
Thus, the processes governing the operation and development of the international
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economy, both on a systemic macroeconomic level and on the level of particular
economic, productive and commercial practices, most often led to divergence from
and contradiction with the development policies of individual nation-states. 
In the years following independence, it became clear to many that
decolonisation had been restricted to the sometimes limited wresting of political
control from the colonial national powers. The economic relations, which had
assumed an intrinsically international dimension, were mostly left intact. In time,
this led to the hypothesis that decolonisation was ultimately driven by the needs of
the international economy, rather than by the political struggles of the colonised
alone. Just as slavery outgrew its economic raison d’être and became unprofitable, so
colonial relations and forms of management characteristic of imperialism in its
heyday had become an expensive straitjacket, preventing further development of the
international economy. 
This hypothesis, that economic globalisation required decolonisation,
contributes to an explanation of the failure, by and large, of the new nation-states to
escape the domination of the most powerful forces in the international economy, but
also the failure in terms of nation-building. The post-independence nation-state
found itself unable to harness the economic resources of the country and its
population for effective development. The forces that had created the success of the
nation-state in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe (particularly its role in
facilitating and protecting economic development) were no longer operative in the
world of the multinational firm and international finance capital.
For the formerly colonised peoples, the problems resulting from the growth of
global capitalism did not diminish with decolonisation and postcolonial
independence. Moreover, these problems were compounded when the support
systems provided by the former Soviet Union and its allies collapsed, along with the
demise of the Soviet Union itself, following 1989. Thus, by 1999, the inequalities of
wealth and living standards across the globe had grown in dramatic fashion, rather
than diminishing. According to the United Nations’ annual human development
report, the combined wealth of the world’s three richest families (those of Bill Gates,
the Waltons of WalMart and the Sultan of Brunei), amounting to 135 billion dollars,
was greater than the annual income of 600 million people in the least developed
countries. Over the previous four years, the wealth of the world’s 200 richest people
doubled to more than one trillion dollars ($1,000 billion). At the same time, 1.3
billion people were living on less than a dollar a day. Thirty years previously, the gap
between the richest fifth of the world’s people and the poorest fifth stood at 30:1. By
1990, it had widened to 60:1. By 1999, it had grown to 74:1. In terms of
consumption, the richest fifth accounted for 86 per cent and the bottom fifth for 1
per cent. 75 per cent of the world’s telephone lines and 88 per cent of Internet users
were in the West, with just 17 per cent of population (Guardian, 12 July 1999).
The imposition of the drastic ‘cures’ prescribed by the international financial
institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, with the
proclaimed intention of bringing the state-subsidised economies of the former
colonies back to economic, free-marketeering health, through combinations of ill-
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prepared privatisations and the cutting back of basic public services, in fact further
intensified the problems and plunged the peoples of these countries deeper into
impoverishment, without any safety net. These ‘structural adjustment programmes’
were often the price to be paid for further funding to service the ongoing debt.
Indeed, the final decades of the twentieth century saw the triumphalist rampaging of
so-called free-market liberalism, with a vain trumpeting of the worldwide victory of
capitalism, in a situation where the constraints (as well as the opportunities for
capital) of the globalised economy, and in particular the globalisation of financial
markets, had not been fully understood.
Much has been written about ‘globalisation’ over the last few decades. It was
presented as a major new development in the economic, social and political
organisation of the world. In fact, what was happening from the end of the 1980s
represented a further phase in a process of expansion of global capitalism that had
begun several centuries earlier. There were various attempts to analyse the novelty of
the phenomenon of globalisation. Anthony Giddens, for instance, in his 1999 Reith
Lectures, claimed that the quantitative development of world trade, combined with
the loss of political sovereignty by nation-states and the full globalisation of financial
markets, made possible through electronic transfer, amounted not just to a new
development, but to a revolutionary transformation affecting the political,
technological, cultural and economic spheres (Observer, 11 April 1999). Two factors
that he cites as particularly responsible for this ‘revolutionary’ change were
developments in the sphere of instantaneous communications and the move towards
women’s equality. Both seem inadequate explanations of any fundamental newness.
The communications revolution and the creation of the global village had already
been analysed by people like Marshall McLuhan in the 1960s (McLuhan 1964,
McLuhan and Fiore 1967), even though further developments in new media and
their potentialities have been realised since then. As for the ‘revolutionary’ change in
women’s position, this would come as a surprise to most women across the globe.
What was new, however, was the elimination of the ideological challenge to
global capitalism as a result of the changes affecting the former Soviet Union and the
Soviet bloc, on the one hand, and the overt conversion of the Chinese communists
to the capitalist way, on the other. For a number of years, global capitalism has been
able to portray itself as the only show in town.
While, in their initial euphoria, some commentators were able to portray this as
the triumph of the West, most considered analyses, including that of Giddens, have
highlighted the contradictory tendencies at work in the process of globalisation. On
the one hand, it has meant a decrease in the power of nation-states to control their
own economies, at the same time as it has led to the revival of local cultural identities
as a response to globalising tendencies. The global spread of capitalism has not
harmonised the situation of the world’s peoples. On the contrary, as Giddens himself
pointed out, in the first of his Reith Lectures, entitled ‘New World Without End’:
‘The share of the poorest fifth of the world’s population in global income has dropped
from 2.3 per cent to 1.4 per cent over the past ten years. The proportion taken by the
richest fifth, on the other hand, has risen (Observer, 11 April 1999). These
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discrepancies concern not merely the levels of income but also the working and living
conditions, including differences in terms of safety and environmental standards and
regulations, quality of housing, access to education, health care, pensions and social
insurance provision, physical security, leisure and cultural opportunities. 
The instant dissemination of information and opinion through the global media
has certainly had a homogenising effect, on the one hand, at the same time as it has
hampered ideological and cultural control. Most significantly, the very processes at
work in globalisation themselves create the means, the media, the ideas and
institutions for their own subversion. This is particularly true at the ideological level,
where the inherent contradictions are readily discernible. Thus, the ideology of
global economic liberalism can easily be revealed to be at odds with the realities of
protectionism associated with powerful economic powers and trading blocs, as with
the restrictions on the free movement of labour, the authoritarian forms of the
political state in individual countries and the dirigisme of international institutions.
Increasingly and inextricably, the globalisation of capital creates its own global
counterculture. Resistance movements have not only developed on the local level but
have increasingly come together on the global plane to protest against and challenge
the hegemony of the rich, industrial nations, at meetings of the G7/G8 or the World
Trade Organisation, in Seattle in 1999, Genoa in 2001 or Evian and Geneva in
2003, as well as with the establishment of events such as the World Social Forum,
which has been meeting since 2000 (Guardian, 28 January 2003, 23 January 2004,
26 January 2005). 
In addition, global capital has had to contend with the competition from rising
economic powers. Whereas developments such as the outsourcing of production to
take advantage of cheap labour and the lack of regulation in terms of working
conditions and safety standards represent nothing new, there have nonetheless been
significant new trends. The inclusion of services in this outsourcing (in
communications, health care, finance, tourism, etc.) represents one such
development, as does the high level of technology becoming available in countries
such as India, previously perceived as ‘backward’. The cultural sphere is also no
longer characterised by one-way traffic from the West. Increasingly, cultural imports
from the former colonies are finding their way into the mainstream of American and
European societies, extending beyond the confines of the communities resulting
from large-scale migrations in previous years. The increasing Hispanic influence in
the US, along with the productions of Chinese and Indian cinema, are just some of
the examples one could quote here. Indeed, the rise of China, in particular, as a
world economic power has been spectacular over the last decade. Its economy
entered a qualitatively new phase with its direct investment in American and
European economies, leading to the acquisition of major Western companies such as
IBM’s personal computer business and the interest in acquiring a stake in the British
motor vehicle industry, through MG Rover (Guardian, 23 February 2005). 
How have these developments been reflected in the francophone world? 
Within the context of Francophonie, the focus has been to a very large extent on
the domain of culture. Economic concerns have traditionally been relegated to a
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secondary position, although, as we have seen, the theme of sustainable
development, chosen for the Francophone Summit in Ougadougou in 2004, marked
something of a new departure. 
The pursuit of bilateral policies between France and Africa has meant that, in
the relations between France and her former colonies, it has largely been business as
usual. France has attempted to secure preferential terms for its former African
colonies in association agreements with the European Union. In return, these
countries remain within the franc zone and are happy to purchase French arms, in
return for a degree of paternalistic protection, often for highly corrupt, authoritarian
regimes (Chipman 1989; Andereggen 1994). Those who challenge this cosy
arrangement quickly feel the sharp end of France’s instruments of power. This was
the case for Ahmed Sékou Touré when he chose independence, rather than
autonomy, for Guinea in 1958 and de Gaulle responded by the immediate
withdrawal of all French personnel, equipment and aid, wreaking havoc on the
administrative and economic structures of the new state. The recent stand-off
between France and the Gbagbo regime in the Ivory Coast has been largely
influenced by the same mentality (Libération, 9 November 2004; Le Monde, 16
December 2004).
Problems of Nationalist Discourse
While all of the former colonies have to come to grips with serious economic
difficulties and a failure of development really to take off, the handful of former
colonies that had eschewed the umbrella of French protectionism, under the impulse
of a nationalist discourse of rupture, were also to face a crisis of confidence in the
power of their dominant nationalist ideology to deliver development. 
This is notably so in the case of Algeria, where the armed liberation struggle was
launched in 1954 under the banner of nationalism and where nationalism remains
the official ideology of the state (Stora 2001). In the presidential election campaign
of 2004, nationalism remained a powerful rallying call for the candidates. The
incumbent and successful candidate, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, fought his
campaign on the need for national reconciliation. However, Louisa Hanoune, of the
Parti des Travailleurs, also repeatedly stressed the need for national unity as well as
the indivisibility of the nation (Quotidien d’Oran, 24 March 2004). 
While the form of the nationalist discourse has remained fairly stable, there have
nonetheless been significant changes in its content, some of which reflect the change
in its role, from tool of the national liberation struggle to official ideology of the
post-independence state. Moreover, some of the contradictions and debates that have
been evident from the beginning continue to emerge from time to time and raise
important questions for the future of the country, not least for the vital question of
its economic and social development. Increasingly, the question is being raised of the
effectiveness of the nation-state and the appropriateness of the nationalist discourse
to deal with the real problems of inequality, domination and exploitation, the
primary causes of which lie in global economic relations of production.
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A number of factors came into play when the political structures of the newly
independent countries were being shaped. On the one hand, the influence of the political
culture of the metropolitan power remained highly significant at the same time as other
influences and models, such as those of the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
countries, as well as those of other countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. On the other
hand, there was also a clear strand of thinking that sought to prioritise a more ‘authentic’,
‘indigenous’ form of political organisation, to construct forms of state power that would be
specifically oriented to the historical and cultural traditions of the countries concerned.
The actual structures that came into being were, for the most part, a result of a
variable mix of theoretical considerations and practical political contingencies.
Among the most important determining factors were the immediate background to
independence and the conditions in which that independence had been achieved. In
particular, where this had been the result of a long and bitter armed struggle, as in
the case of Algeria, the role that the Liberation Army had played in that struggle
would be reflected in the relations that would henceforth prevail between the
political structures and the armed forces.
Even where this had not been the case and independence had been achieved on
a more consensual basis, the nationalism underpinning anticolonial movements in
the colonies would be a key factor in defining the new states, one of whose prime
tasks was seen as embodying the will of the nation. How far the states were able to
express this will in any meaningful manner is a question to be explored. Where
independence had been conceded by France without conflict, a particular kind of
political class had emerged in the former colonies that owed its position in large part
to French patronage and protection.
The influence of French Jacobin ideology must not be underestimated. The
French Republic, expressing the sovereign will of the nation, proved a ready model
for the new states, along with a well-embedded tradition of state dirigisme. Indeed,
the new states had to look no further than France itself for a model of effective state
power and strong presidential leadership, inspired by an ideal of the unanimity of the
nation’s citizens rallying to the one national voice articulated through the leader. De
Gaulle had, at the time of his return to power in 1958, insisted on a new constitution
forged along these lines, in which political differences were relegated to the sidelines
as a factor of weakness in the unity of the nation. 
In a very real sense, national unity and the construction of nationhood were
undoubtedly seen as priorities. Where opposition to French rule had indeed proved
a unifying factor, there were many other forces pulling the new nations apart. It was
the exception, rather than the rule, that the new countries formed already existing,
quasi-natural, real geographical, historical, cultural or ethnic entities in their own
right. Often their boundaries had been created in an arbitrary, artificial manner,
according to imperial rivalries and colonial administrative convenience and concerns.
One of the overriding concerns was therefore to bring together an often diverse and
diffuse population under the authority of a ‘national’ state. 
Clearly, we are no longer living in the same political climate as in the heyday of
the national liberation struggles. The certainties of the nationalist movements are a
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thing of the past and no longer is it appropriate for identity to be defined in terms
of a common enemy. Already in 1971, Nabile Farès felt the need to point out that
this type of self-definition was passé. In Un Passager de l’Occident, he wrote: ‘The
one-time pretensions of Algeria (and the Algerians) to define itself in relation to its
Other (France and the French) are now over. Algeria needs to identify with itself.
And to achieve that, it does need not to go running after the country of which it was
a colony at a given moment of its history’ (Farès 1971: 70). 
For an alternative, positive, national identity, the state that enjoyed sufficient
authority and legitimacy could build upon a forward-looking national project of
development. Where the state was in a position of weakness, the obvious recourse was to
a model of the nation relying on ethnic and historical associations. In Algeria’s case, the
choice was to be for a compromise, in which a modernist political project was rationalised
in terms of an identity – the Arab–Islamic identity, based on ethnic and religious ties.
However, increasingly, as Hugh Roberts has pointed out, attempts by the state to
promote support in the name of national unity and uniformity have been replaced by a
political manipulation of opposition, in which different parties are allocated specific
mobilising functions, in a sophisticated version of the politics of ‘divide and rule’:
As the state’s economic policy had shifted to the right, the state’s political
strategy in relation to the society changed from the intermittent
mobilisation of support to the continuous mobilisation of opposition. The
advent of ‘divide and rule’ as the watchword in ruling circles signified the
evaporation of the nationalist idea as the source of the state’s orientation and
raison d’être. (Roberts 2003: 355)
This was not a strategy that was limited to Algeria. 
Legitimacy of the Postcolonial State
In 1999, Mike Phillips raised some of these same issues in connection with the new
Eastern European states that had emerged from the collapse of Soviet communism.
He talked of an argument he had with a Czech professor who claimed that ‘the rights
of citizenship in the East would always be conditional on historical and ethnic
associations’. Phillips claimed that Eastern Europeans could not understand the
notion of a citizenship divorced from ethnicity. Given the weakness of the state in
Eastern European countries, in terms of authority and legitimacy or ‘prestige with
their own citizens’, ‘their only mechanism for sustaining consent is a model of
belonging and exclusion based on ethnicity’.
He contrasted these states with those of Western Europe, which had now
achieved ‘a high degree of cohesiveness and cultural self-confidence’ and were used
to obtaining consent through citizenship. The post-communist states, on the other
hand, were ‘just emerging from far-reaching isolation, have next to no experience of
multi-lateral co-operation, and a memory of hierarchical soviet control’. In these
circumstances, the post-communists ‘view formal regulation as a starting point for
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negotiation. In this world the political system turns on personal rather than
institutional power. And part of the cultural capital in the East is a moralising,
historicising language largely abandoned in the West’ (Guardian, 10 April 1999). 
Much of this could equally well apply to the former colonies, whose reliance on
liberation struggle nationalist credentials for legitimising state power now looks
increasingly threadbare. 
In Algeria, not only did the key date of 1 November 1954 provide the myth for
the founding of the nation. It also provided the basis for the legitimacy of the FLN
as single party and ultimately for the state that came into being at independence.
Indeed, the process went even further by giving sole historical legitimacy to the
original core of founders, the ‘chefs historiques’ (‘historical leaders’), by dint of their
having been the first to launch the insurrection. Indeed, this principle has proved
astonishingly resilient, even after the collapse of the FLN state as such from the end
of the 1980s. 
The role of the war of independence in bestowing historical legitimacy on the
political leadership also extended to the army, which, because of its war record, could
also claim to provide the natural rulers of Algeria, either directly (as in the case of
Colonel Houari Boumedienne – effective head of state from 1965 to 1978 – and
General Liamine Zeroual – President from 1994 to 1998) or through endorsement
of particular civilian politicians, including the current President, Abdelaziz
Bouteflika. The fact that all presidential candidates in the election of 1999 had to
have proven credentials in the liberation struggle, with all non-veterans disqualified,
amply bears this out. Four qualifying candidates were in fact barred from these
elections, including Mahfoud Nahnah of Hamas, who was barred from standing by
the Constitutional Council, because he was not a proven moudjahidin during the war
of independence. Louisa Hanoune and Noureddine Boukrouh were also barred
(Guardian, 8 April 1999). The special role of the army has been recognised, even by
opponents of the regime, such as Hocine Aït Ahmed of the FFS (Front des Forces
Socialistes), who stated in an interview: ‘We are not against the army; we need a
strong army, but there has to be a progressive transfer of power to civilian
institutions’ (Le Monde, 19 February 1999). 
The army had, of course, had a decisive role to play not only in providing
political leadership but also in the cancellation of the second round of the elections
in 1991, and the stalling of the move to multiparty democracy, in the face of a likely
victory by the Islamists, leading to a decade of bloody violence and civil conflict.
Some sections of the army nonetheless saw the need for the political rulers to have a
legitimacy through the ballot box as a necessary precondition for the resolution of
the political and economic problems of the country and in order to attract outside
investment. The need for transparency in the electoral process thus became the
declared position of the powerful army Chief of Staff, General Mohamed Lamari, at
the time of the 1999 presidential elections (Le Monde, 19 February 1999). Since
then, the relationship between the army and the civil power, under the leadership of
President Bouteflika, has gradually evolved, with what appears to be a shift in the
balance of power. The culmination of this process to date has been the ‘retirement’
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of Lamari and his replacement by General Gaïd Salah (Quotidien d’Oran, 4 August,
17 November 2004).
Other former French colonies in Africa have had similarly close relationships
between the civil power and the military, although they have lacked the veneer of
legitimacy bestowed upon the Algerian leadership by the war of liberation. This has
often been with the overt support of France, which also provided significant support
for the military dictator Colonel Mobutu in the former Belgian Congo, as it has for
authoritarian civil regimes with little real basis for claiming legitimacy to govern.
There have, however, been a number of challenges to these cosy arrangements
since the end of the 1980s.  
Challenges and Realignments
One of the most important challenges, particularly in the case of Algeria, has come
from political movements and ideologies basing themselves on Islam (Addi 1992;
Entelis 1997; Roy 2004). This is not an entirely new development. The roots of
political Islam go way back into history. However, the forms that it is now taking
have developed their own character and momentum. Its position in relation to the
nation-state is one of its key defining features. Another is its concentration on
questions of politics, ideology and culture and its comparative neglect of questions
relating to economic and development issues. The basic realities of the world
economy are not challenged in any way.
On the one hand, political Islam has links with the resistance to colonialism,
which couched itself in religious terms in many instances. The writings of Jamal ad-
Din al-Afghani against British imperialism in the nineteenth century were particularly
influential. Abdelkader’s struggle against the French conquest of Algeria took
inspiration from his own Sufi beliefs. The reforming, modernising religious movement
around the Association of Algerian Ulama, founded by Abdelhamid Ben Badis in
1931, was a significant spur to growing anticolonial resistance in the early part of the
twentieth century. It saw education and cultural activities as a vital part in the
regeneration of society (Roberts 2003). Moreover, Islam was to figure as a key element
in the framing of FLN ideology, although this was not widely appreciated outside
Algeria, where contemporary knowledge of the Algerian struggle was to a large extent
relayed through the writings of Fanon and other anticolonial activists, who stressed the
modern, secular elements of the movement, rather than its religious content.  
In more recent times, political Islam has reconfigured itself not just in
opposition to the former colonial powers and, in more general terms, the ‘West’, but
also in specific opposition to what it perceives as the secular nationalism of the
anticolonial movements and post-independence states (Roy 1992; Carlier 1995;
Roberts 2003). Its anti-modernist opposition to Western influence and defence of
tradition and doctrinal purity have been able to achieve great resonance, given the
evident failings of post-independence regimes, particularly the failure to deal with
basic issues of poverty. As a vehicle of critique, with a discourse based on abstract
notions, such as truth, freedom, equality and justice, it has proved extremely potent.
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When it comes to presenting a positive programme for taking the nation forward, it
has been less effective (Mernissi 1993; Roberts 2003). 
Although Islamist political movements operate within the confines of the
nation-state, as the arena for contesting power, they also represent, on the one hand,
a retreat into the sub-national, with the family group, governed by religious practice,
promoted to the basic unit of society. On the other, their perspective transcends the
limits of the secularly determined nation-state, by an appeal to the supranational
authority of the wider Muslim community, or umma. 
Women who are perceived to have succumbed to Western influence have been
particularly targeted by those who support a fundamentalist political Islam. A
Western style of dress or knowledge, use or predilection for a European language has
been sufficient to provoke murderous attacks. The legal position of women within
the family and the more general question of women’s rights have been determined in
relation to the Islamist lobby for what is claimed to be a strict application of Shariah
law. While many of these ideas have been contested by Muslims who put forward an
alternative interpretation of the Koran and the role of women in Islam, there is no
doubt that the dominant strand has so far been constituted by those who seek to
curtail women’s rights. As we shall see, the state in Algeria has trodden an ambiguous
path on this matter (Gadant 1995). 
It has to be said that this specific targeting of women for domination and
oppression, in one form or another, is characteristic of many of the religious
movements that have sprung up to articulate the frustrations of men in situations
where they feel unjustly deprived of their right to power. The anti-women focus of
the Hindutva movement in India, associated with the defence of Hinduism
considered to be under siege from Islam, is a prime example here. There have been
attempts to revive the glorification of the practice of widow-burning, or suttee,
following the self-immolation of the teenage widow Roop Kanwar in Rajasthan in
1987 (Sen 2001). Important figures in Indian Hinduism, including the
Shankaracharya, or chief priest, at Puri, one of the most important figures in Indian
Hinduism, have spoken out in support of this practice. Since then, there have been
other reported cases, one of the latest in 2002 in a village in Madhya Pradesh. 
Tariq Ramadan has pointed out that repressive application of Shariah law, in
terms of harsh punishments without due legal process, is particularly targeted against
women: ‘the application of the sharia today is used by repressive powers to abuse
women, the poor and political opponents within a quasi-legal vacuum’ (Guardian,
30 March 2005). He also points out that this ‘strict and visible display of
punishment’ is often carried out in ‘opposition to “the west”’, on the ‘basis of a
simplistic reasoning that stipulates that “the less western, the more Islamic”’ and that
it is often the result of ‘being obsessed by the formalistic application of severe
punishments in the name of frustration or feelings of alienation perpetuated by the
domination of the west’ (Guardian, 30 March 2005).
Challenges to the relevance of the nation-state to the modern world have come
from diverse quarters, although it is too soon to consign it to obsolescence, given the
role it continues to play in ordering and controlling the real economic, social,
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political, cultural forces and relations that impinge on people’s lives. However, there
is no doubt that realignments are taking place, with shifts in approach and new
alliances stemming from a rethinking of possibilities and, in their turn, contributing
to the creation of new scenarios. 
In Algeria, it would appear that the challenge by political Islam has been seen
off, at least for the time being. This has also entailed a reconfiguration, to some
extent, of the dominant nationalist ideology. 
A number of commentators, including Bachir Medjahed writing in the
Quotidien d’Oran (4 August 2004), have described this process as ‘a new national
order’ coming into being as a result of the presidential elections, which took place in
April 2004. According to this analysis, one of the new elements is the emergence of
a strong presidency, constructing a broad national unity, and, in effect, bringing all
political forces under its wing, while taking over all the levers of power. In effect, the
new presidential alliance is deemed to be taking over the erstwhile role of the single
party, FLN, absorbing actual, as well as potential, sources of opposition, in terms of
political parties and movements, trade unions, media, with a greater or lesser degree
of willingness on their part. Increasingly, President Bouteflika, with his 85 per cent
majority, is looking like a providential leader in the Gaullist mode, not only through
his call for national unity in the name of national reconciliation, but also in his
appreciation of the role of the different political forces in achieving this unity. In the
campaign speech he gave at Bouira on 22 March 2004, he stressed (as de Gaulle had
done in his famous speech at Bayeux in 1946 (de Gaulle 1970)) how the goal of
national unity was above the particular interests and differences represented by
individuals and political parties and could only be achieved through a
reconfiguration of the political landscape. Significantly, this reconfiguration entailed
the restoration of a special political role for the FLN, which, Bouteflika insisted,
could not be considered as a party like any other but was a national political organ,
representing the entire nation. As such, it could not be appropriated by any
particular individual or faction. This did not mean, however, that he was proposing
a return to the single-party system. Rather, political pluralism was not to be enacted
in such a way as to promote division and dissension, but all organisations, political
and social, provided that they saw themselves as part of the heritage of the national
revolution, part of the ‘revolutionary family’, could be, and should be, brought
together under the presidential banner. Thus, he proclaimed that he spoke to the
nation ‘in the name of the FLN, the RND, the HMS, in the name of all the mass
organisations (peasants, workers, women), of civil society, of the victims of terrorism
and the revolutionary family (moudjahidin, the families of moudjahidin and the
children of chouhada (martyrs of the Revolution)’ (Quotidien d’Oran, 23 March
2004).1 Since then, the President has indeed accepted the invitation to become what
he claims will be the ‘Honorary’ President of the FLN (Quotidien d’Oran, 2 February
2005), though it remains to be seen how far this reconfiguration of Algerian
nationalism really marks a fundamentally new phase in Algerian politics.
Certainly, there has been no lack of sceptical political comment. Some have seen
Bouteflika’s huge majority as a reflection, on the one hand, of an over-reliance on the
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‘leader’, not as the sign of a mature democracy. Others have pointed to the weariness
of the population after over a decade of violence and unrest, seeing Bouteflika
essentially as a balancing act, keeping the peace between the different parties, but
incapable of taking the nation forward. Kamel Daoud, in an editorial just before the
presidential election of 8 April, expressed this cynical view of a nation that has
become stuck in an impasse: 
In Algeria, the 8 April will merely be followed by the 9 April. There will still
be the same torpor, which passes as our nationhood. There will still be the
same land, where, in the guise of the strong nation, they try to plant new
housing. There will still be the same self-doubt, about ourselves and our
own, which binds us together in the guise of belonging to a community and
a people. Bouteflika or somebody else, it doesn’t matter. No one will be
willing to wield the knife and carry out the drastic surgery needed to cut out
the blockages which are condemning the country to a state of static
equilibrium rather than the thrill of conquest … in other words, this is a
utilitarian nationalism. (Quotidien d’Oran, 24 March 2004)  
There are others who hold a less sceptical view of the prospects of moving forward.
In any event, what is clear is that in order to break out of the impasse, there will have
to be serious changes, not least in the prevailing culture. 
Development and Culture
The importance of culture in relation to nationalism and nationhood has already
been discussed in Chapter 6. Here, it is a question of its role in the development
process, not as a superficial, optional ‘extra’ – the icing on the cake, as it were – but
as a crucial primary element that has to be taken into account in planning to achieve
development. In order to be able to determine the parameters of any future
development plan, to assess the means and resources available and to understand the
difficulties and obstacles that will present themselves, it is clearly essential to have a
profound knowledge of the concrete socio-economic and political conditions
operating in the current society, as well as the historical processes that have shaped
this present reality. It is also clear that this knowledge needs to extend to the relevant
cultural factors.
The successful implementation of any development plan will, of course, also rely
on a vision of a better future, which will inevitably involve theoretical and political
choices, in terms of both the goals chosen and the means selected to bring them to
fruition. There may very well be a warranted degree of scepticism with regard to fine
words and rhetoric. Yet, without the vision, largely expressed through the ideologies
and discourses articulated by a political leadership, there will be no mobilisation of
the human resources essential to the project. The rhetoric on its own will obviously
not be enough. Equally necessary is a strategy to bring about the cultural
development of the people involved, as appropriate to the particular development
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model chosen. This will involve people signing up to the particular goals and
methods for achieving them, which they cannot do unless they are convinced of their
value and have a sense of ownership. It will also mean the transformation of
behaviour, attitudes and ways of doing thing in terms of the technology used, the
knowledge acquired, management and labour practices, as well as professional, social
and personal relations (Saad 2005). There will almost certainly be particular cultural
obstacles to change. How they are identified and dealt with largely depends on the
political choices adopted. 
Where debates have focused on culture in the years following decolonisation,
they have tended to articulate a number of oversimplified oppositions, such as
Western versus non-Western, modernity versus tradition, universalism versus
particularism. The choice is presented as one between two antagonistic cultural
systems, rather than between different cultural practices. The opposing cultures are
constituted by their opponents as a ‘bloc’ to be resisted. For the West, this has meant
the construction of representations of ‘other’ cultures, in the guise of orientalism,
communism and, most recently, Islam. Reciprocally, Western culture is often viewed
as a monolithic bloc, moreover, one that has had pretensions to universality for the
last three centuries or so, aided and abetted by its association with the development
of modernity on the scientific, economic and technological planes. 2
This association has sometimes led, and often inappropriately, to a displacement
of resistance to the cultural plane. The defence of cultural diversity, not least through
the organs and efforts of La Francophonie, has often been the main response to the
process of globalisation, even though the latter is primarily and essentially an
economic and financial development. While there is undoubtedly a legitimate place
for efforts to safeguard different cultural practices and phenomena and ensure that
they have the space to develop with a sufficient degree of autonomy, the proponents
of cultural diversity have tended to assume an essentialist, static conception of
culture, in which the cultures tend to become fixed in the past, with a tendency for
tradition to become the keystone, leading to ossification and stultification. 
This view of cultures as distinct from each other, homogeneous and closed has
become incorporated into a certain brand of political discourse that highlights the
existence of irreconcilable cultural differences. Not only are these differences set in
stone, as part of monolithic cultural systems, with no meaningful interaction
possible between each other, but also they are considered to lead inexorably to
conflict, not just on the cultural plane, but in the sphere of politics (Huntington
1996). This approach not only discounts the dynamic aspects of cultural practices
and the mutual influences that different cultural practices can have upon each other,
the ‘inter-cultural’, it also – paradoxically, given the way it attributes political effects
to cultural causes – ignores the actual cultural practices and processes that operate on
the political plane, commonly defined as political culture.
One of the key aspects, indeed the most crucial aspect, defining a national
political culture is the way in which the citizen relates or aspires to relate to the state.
It assumes its whole significance in the context of plans for development, which aim
to involve the whole nation in their formulation and implementation. Yet, in many
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of the post-independence former colonies, the lack of such involvement has been a
noticeable feature, linked to their exclusion in many cases from any active relation of
citizenship with regard to the state. 
The pressures on these regimes to ‘democratise’, characteristic of initiatives by
so-called ‘donor’ states and international financial institutions in the 1990s, were
usually rationalised in terms of simplistic analyses of the reasons for their lack of
political accountability. The failings of the regimes were often presented in terms of
personal lust for power or corruption. At the time when Tony Blair’s Commission for
Africa was delivering its report, the same discourse was apparent and corruption was
presented as one of the major factors for lack of progress in development terms, even
if the responsibility for stopping it was not limited to the Africans themselves
(Guardian, 12 March 2005). Thus, in spite of the new subtleties, it comes from the
same roots as the crude old racially inspired explanations of endemic laziness,
criminality, violence and so on that were brought into play both during and after
colonialism as such. Sometimes the political difficulties have been put down to the
fundamental cultural ‘Otherness’ of the people concerned. However, rarely have the
problems of post-independence political culture been subjected to serious analysis. 
Structural factors on the level of the economy itself may have a part to play in
facilitating or obstructing the participation of the population in political life in their
capacity as citizens. Where conditions of general economic collapse or scarcity apply
and people are excluded from participation in economic life, their involvement as
citizens will also be affected. However, in countries such as Algeria, endowed with
natural resources, such as oil and gas, producing vast revenues for the state with little
requirement of labour, the autonomy resulting from the development of a rentier
state, not dependent on taxation of its population, may also lead to a divorce
between the state and its political institutions, on the one hand, and the citizens, who
count for little in economic terms, on the other. 
External economic factors also have their role to play. The lack of control by the
post-independence states over their own economies because of the international
systemic structures that predominate, their indebtedness and subjection to the grip
of international financial institutions, the unfair terms of trade in world markets –
all of these lead to a further depreciation of the political capital of these states. 
Moreover, some of the difficulties have arisen as a result of the particular policies
of post-independence governments. If the measure of women’s emancipation is taken
as a key measure of social progress, then it has to be said that much remains to be
achieved on this score. If women are still not playing their full part as citizens in
Algeria, for instance, this is largely due to the timidity of successive regimes, bowing
to the pressures of religious and social conservatism to embody their subordinate,
minor status in the legislative codes of the country, in spite of the formal assertion of
the equality of men and women in the Constitution. Although the reform of the
Family Code, instituted in 1984 and enshrining women’s inferior status through
their effective definition as minors, under the guardianship of a male family member
(Lalami-Fatès 1996; Lloyd 2005), was promised by the successful candidate in the
2004 presidential election campaign (Liberté, 22 March 2004), there has still been
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some reluctance to go too far too quickly and a desire not to rock the boat in the face
of perceived or actual resistance. Attempts to have the Code revoked by the women’s
movement resulted in some modification and tinkering in 2005, but no radical
repeal, under perceived pressure to placate the traditional Islamic lobby (Quotidien
d’Oran, 12 January 2005; Liberté, 7 and 28 February 2005). 
It has, though, proved increasingly difficult to justify the status quo. The past
record of women’s involvement in the war of liberation has been a powerful
argument for full recognition of women’s rights, in spite of the reluctance of the
political establishment to take on the traditional conservatism upholding family
values, as one of the factors of cohesion of the Algerian nation in their struggle
against French colonialism (Touati 1996). Moreover, their present role in society is
currently evolving rapidly. As a result of the education policies of successive regimes,
tremendous progress has been made in female education at all levels of the system.
As yet, however, the promotion of women employed in the formal sector, at any rate,
is lagging far behind, though there are indications of some improvement. In 1989,
fewer than one in twenty women in the active population had a job in Algeria. This
was lower than comparable figures for the neighbouring Maghrebian countries,
Morocco and Tunisia (Touati 1996; Lloyd 2005). By 2000, figures suggested that
there were 13.9 per cent of employed women in the active population (Barka 2005),
and Boutheina Cheriet, the minister in charge of the family and women’s affairs,
claimed in 2003 that women constituted 18 per cent of the labour force in the
formal sector (Liberté, 29 April 2003). 
The importance of this question lies not just in the area of justice and equal
human rights; it also concerns the role that women have to play in the development
process. There is now a considerable body of evidence that the significant
involvement of women in a project of sustainable development is one of the main
factors contributing to the likelihood of its success. On the general level, there is, of
course, the scandalous waste of human resources, when women, who constitute more
than half of the earth’s population, are denied proper access to decent health care,
education, training and employment and are refused equal rights and practically
excluded from public life. More specifically, however, women play a vital role in
certain fields of activity, for which they often bear full, or the main, responsibility:
for instance, domestic, household work, the provision and management of food, fuel
and water resources, childcare, agricultural and horticultural work. 
It is now recognised that the three ‘pillars’ of sustainable development – the
protection of the environment, economic well-being and social justice – can only be
achieved if women’s role is fully taken into account in any development strategy
(Heinrich Böll Foundation 2002). 
The protection of the environment requires in-depth understanding of the ways
in which women make use of natural resources and the knowledge they already
possess in this area. It also requires a specific awareness of the different ways in which
the degradation of the environment affects men and women, as well as a recognition
of their rights and specific responsibilities in planning and managing these matters
(Heinrich Böll Foundation 2002). 
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The economic well-being of a society depends of making full use of all the
available human resources, both male and female. At the present time, it has been
estimated that women make up 70 per cent of the earth’s population living in
absolute poverty, in a world in which a majority of families rely on a single woman
to head the household and provide for its members. Women are twice as likely to live
in poverty as men (Department for International Development (UK) 2000). 
It follows that, if the eradication of poverty is to be made a reality, there has to
be a focus on improving the economic situation of women, through measures to
improve the organisation of the labour market and ensure equality of wages, access
to education, health care and credit facilities (Heinrich Böll Foundation 2002). For
instance, a study of the main Indian banks has shown that only 11 per cent of its
clients taking out loans are women; in Zaire, the proportion is only 14 per cent
(Heinrich Böll Foundation 2002). Research by the World Bank in Kenya has
estimated that, if girls had the same opportunities to attend school as boys, then
there would be an increase in food production of the order of 9–22 per cent and this
figure would rise to 25 per cent if there were universal primary education (Heinrich
Böll Foundation 2002). 
Moreover, the inequality and discrimination that exist on the legal and political
planes constitute a major obstacle to the involvement of women in social and public
spheres and have clear repercussions on the social conditions that are needed to
ensure the success of any strategy of sustainable development (see Department for
International Development (UK) 2000; UNIFEM 2000). 
Any improvements in the position of women imply a voluntaristic policy on the
part of the institutions of state. However, this alone is not enough; there also has to
be a profound transformation of values and practices on the level of culture, which
only occurs when there is movement from the grass roots, as well as from the top,
and the two achieve some kind of positive symbiosis, as much in the formulation of
objectives as in the choice of means to bring them to fruition. There is no need to
sign up to an essentialist view of women’s nature to believe that women’s own role in
cultural transformation is crucial. It may be convenient, and even refreshing, to
indulge in some of the more benign conceptions of women’s influence for the good
of humanity, such as that expressed by Ali Mazrui here:
The fate of humanity may indeed depend upon creative communication
and androgynization of the command structure.  Those social movements
which enhance contact and communication and those which seek to expand
the role of women may turn out to be the most critical of them all.  A
greater role for women is needed in the struggle to tame the sovereign state,
civilize capitalism, and humanize communication.  
To the question ‘what is civilization ?’ it may one day be possible to
answer ‘humane communication in a truly androgynized world. (Mazrui
1990: 63)
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It is certainly better than a belief in women as essentially inferior, weak and
subordinate, or even as the source of all evil. However, it is certainly not necessary,
or even helpful, to subscribe to idealisations of women’s feminine nature to
understand the negative consequences for the development of society as a whole of
women’s inferiority and exclusion.
The 1979 United Nations Convention on discrimination against women requires
governments that have signed up to it to institute full equality for women in
constitutional and juridical terms. At the same time, it contains a clause (5a)
according to which member states will modify the systems and models of socio-
cultural behaviour of men and women in order to achieve the eradication of prejudice
and customs, or any other type of practice, based on the supposed inferiority or
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotypical roles for men and women.
This is the Convention to which Algeria became a signatory in 1997, subject to
the proviso that Koranic law would have primacy if there were any conflict between
the two. This was in line with the approach adopted since independence, which has
consisted in finding a compromise, a middle way between improving women’s status,
on the one hand, and respecting traditional family and social structures and
attitudes, on the other. The conclusion of the 1999 report of the Algerian
government on the application of the Convention is still very much along these lines. 
In spite of this, there has been significant progress in a number of areas. In
August 2001, the number of women appointed to positions as juges d’instruction
increased from fifteen to 137, out of a total of 404, and several women have been
appointed as judges. Most major political parties now have a women’s section. Family
planning programmes have been implemented, leading to a fall in fertility rate (per
woman) from 6.7 in 1980 to 3.5 in 1998, according to the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) statistics. Moreover, the number of women
active in the labour force has continued to grow, from 36 per cent in 1997 (United
Nations 2000), although, as we have seen, they remain in a minority position as a
proportion of the overall workforce in the formal sector. 
In the political sector, there has been little progress. Women members of the
legislative assembly accounted for only 3.8 per cent of seats in January 2000, as
reported in the UNIFEM biennial report, Progress of the World’s Women 2000
(UNIFEM 2000), and there has only ever been a smattering of women in
government. It is significant that, to counter reaction to the lack of real progress on
the Family Code, President Bouteflika urged Algerian women to get involved in
politics as the way forward (Quotidien d’Oran, 9 March 2005). It has to be said that
there are few countries in the world that can lay claim to a much better record on
women’s participation in political life. In terms of equal opportunities and
representation, politics appears to be the last area in which progress is made.3
Education is also a highly significant area for a country like Algeria. Since
independence, the indicators show that enormous progress has been made in female
education. The female illiteracy rate went down from 76 per cent in 1980 to 46 per
cent in 2000 (United Nations 2000); in 2002, only 14 per cent of girls aged fifteen
to twenty-four years old were illiterate (UNIFEM 2000). Yet, if the number of girls
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attending secondary school is now higher than that of boys (in the ratio of 104 to
100), these figures only represented 60 per cent of girls in the same age group in
1999/2000 (UNIFEM 2000). Moreover, these particular figures do not tell the
whole story. It is not just a question of the number of girls continuing their studies
to university level, or even the number of women on the teaching staff, even though,
here again, remarkable progress has been made. They need to be seen in the light of
other statistics, such as those relating to failure and dropout rates in education, the
distribution of men and women and the respective rates of promotion at all levels in
the work sphere. There are also qualitative factors that need to be taken into account,
particularly the content of the curriculum and how it addresses questions relating to
differences between the sexes, teaching and research methods and the types of courses
on offer. Equally important are the choice of career, the structures of the educational
institutions and workplaces and the roles attributed to men and women in the
relevant hierarchies. Last but by no means least, the sociocultural and ideological
context has to be taken into account, along with such matters as the question of
access to the organs of intellectual debate and the media of information and
representation. The disparity that exists between the high level of schooling of
Algerian girls and their subsequent lower level of participation in all levels of
economic, social and public life raises the question of how the transition between
education and the wider society is effected and how it can be improved. 
Condorcet, Fourier and others have claimed that the stage of progress reached
by a human society can be gauged by the manner in which women are treated. This
is not just a measure of that development, however; cultural change in respect of
women may also be seen as a necessary condition of that development taking place
at all. The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, took this line in a statement on 5
June 2002, in which he said that ‘there is no doubt that any society which does not
put at its heart the full participation of women is doomed to failure’ (Heinrich Böll
Foundation 2002). 
There have been indications of a willingness to face up to some of these
problems. In Algeria, there have been attempts to sort out some of the issues relating
to a deficit of citizenship. The diversity of the nation’s population, in terms of ethnic
and historical origins, is beginning to be recognised. Negotiations over the grievances
of the Kabyle population are replacing confrontation and repression, and the Berber
language, Tamazight, has been reluctantly recognised, although its precise status is
still not yet determined and it is unlikely to achieve full official status as one of the
nation’s languages. 
However, it is also acknowledged that the resolution of some of the issues
requires initiatives and programmes transcending the national frontiers. Some of
these issues will be dealt with in Chapter 11.
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Notes
1. FLN, Front de Libération nationale; RND, Rassemblement national démocratique;
HMS, Harraket Moujtamaa es Silm.
2. There are a number of instances where countries such as nineteenth-century Egypt under
Muhammad Ali or Japan, which opted for modernisation of its economy from 1868
while safeguarding Japanese culture, have attempted to have one without the other, the
technology without the culture (Mazrui 1990: 4–5). 
3. One notable exception is the National Assembly of Wales, where, since 2003, complete
parity between men and women has been achieved and there is a majority of women in
the executive. This has come about because of the specific voluntaristic measures adopted.
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Chapter 10
The Other Within
The discussion of postcoloniality has so far focused on the evolution of relationsbetween France and its former colonies and the discourses, ideologies, debates
and institutions through which they have been articulated. This chapter will now
look at further aspects of the ways in which the ideas and debates around issues of
concern to the former French colonies and to their relationship with France have
evolved since the period of the anticolonial struggles and independence. A major part
of the emphasis will be on the diasporic communities from the former colonies, now
settled in France, as, in a sense, they have the position on the front line, where some
of the key points of tension have flared up, including, notably, the ongoing series of
affairs, mobilisation and legislation around the issue of the headscarf in France. In
their turn, these have served to focus the debates that form the basis of this chapter.
It will also look at those other areas of relevance to people living in territories that,
while far-flung across the globe, still constitute part of France and thus remain
effectively colonies, the DOM-TOM. 
Both of these cases may be considered to come under the rubric of the
postcolonial defined as a situation, ideology or discourse in which colonisation still
has an ongoing effect and is a primary factor of significance to present-day
conditions and debates, and the understanding of those realities and issues. In both
cases, the issues raised revolve around the concept of ‘otherness’ or ‘alterity’, in a
context in which this difference is denied but nonetheless used as a marker. 
Alterity and Difference
We have seen how the Republican world view prioritises the unity of the nation,
made up of a union of equal citizens. We have also seen how the notion of political
equality, in which individual differences were confined to the domain of the private,
came to be merged, during the course of the nineteenth century, with a conception
of cultural sameness, which brought elements that had been restricted to the private
domain into the public, political sphere. The consequence of this process of fusion
of unity with identity in the French discourse has been to squeeze the notion of
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difference out of the Republican discourse altogether and thus allow it no place in
any legitimising discourse of the political status quo. 
Yet the elimination of difference in ideological terms did not mean its
elimination in reality. Both within the nation and without, difference remained a key
category and, if it could not be articulated within the Republican discourse, it
nonetheless found its expression elsewhere. 
Pre-Revolutionary thinking had clearly prioritised the notion of difference in its
hierarchical construct of feudalism and its embryonic view of what differentiated
France and the French from other political entities. Remnants of this world view
were to persist well into the modern period. Furthermore, the nineteenth century
was to see the development of ideas that had their roots in the Ancien Régime, but
which assumed new forms with the aid of pseudo-scientific credentials, culminating
in more or less sophisticated ideological systems founded on the notions of national
or racial superiority. It was also to see the emergence of new currents of thought
challenging the dominant ideology of formal political equality, through the
emergence of Marxism and other political theories stressing the difference and
indeed the radical oppositions of class. Indeed, Marxism represents the founding of
an entire theoretical system on the dialectical principle of contradiction. In time, this
was to lead to the incorporation of difference as a positive constituent of other
counter-discourses, such as anticolonialism and anti-racism, as well as the subsequent
positive theorisation of gender difference in feminism. 
In the French context, however, the Republican discourse emerged triumphant
at the end of the nineteenth century after a long and bitter struggle against the forces
of anti-Republicanism, which were to continue to pose a serious, if intermittent,
threat to the Republic well into the twentieth century. No doubt the need to do
battle for the Republic had contributed to its radical pre-eminence and the lesser
purchase of more radical ideologies, such as Marxism, which were only to become a
serious force in France at a much later period. 
Given that the political theory of Republicanism did not allow the space within
which to accommodate difference, where did the very real differences that
characterised the relation of France to its colonial others find their expression?  If it
could not be within the domain of political theory, these differences were nonetheless
articulated, but primarily in the domains of art, anthropology and religion and
mainly through the element of the visual. 
Thus the whole artistic, literary and intellectual production that goes under the
heading of orientalism (Said 1978) came into being, forming a counterbalancing
weight to the undifferentiating discourse of Republicanism, or, to use another
metaphor, the other side of the Republican coin. The foundation of orientalism was
the basic distinction between us – the European, the Westerner – and them – the
non-European, the oriental. In this relation between European and non-European,
it is the European who was the subject and the non-European the object: subject and
object of knowledge; subject and object of power; subject and object of judgement;
subject and object of representation. Underlying all these possible relations was the
primordial relation of the subject and object of the gaze (see Chapter 4). 
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Orientalism was, of course, just one form of the relation to the non-European
Other, which could range from extremes of sophistication and intellectual credibility,
sometimes linked with real positive contributions to knowledge and culture, to the
dregs of a straightforward crude racism. It was, however, the one that allowed the
greatest flourishing to the articulation of the gaze. 
All forms of the relation were defined by the fundamental inequality between
the subject and object. In all cases, the subject was deemed to be the holder of some
superior knowledge, power, insight or representational capacity. The European
studied the native, educated him, ruled him, judged him and depicted him or her.
Imperialism did not countenance the reverse procedure, where the European could
be made the object to the native subject. 
What is more, the inequality of the relation was reinforced through its
definition as an absolute opposition. The native Other was not just any other; the
Other was viewed as diametrically opposite to the Western subject. In this relation,
all the positive qualities were embodied in the subject, all the negative ones in the
object. Yet, for this relation to fulfil its function in bolstering the superiority of the
Westerner, there also needed to be a mutual dependency; the Westerner could not
exist without his Other. One way through which this was expressed was the process
of self-definition of the West itself, which situated its identity, at least partially, in
its negative definition vis-à-vis its native Other. A Westerner was defined as a non-
native, an anti-native, i.e. negatively according to what he/she was not, rather than
what he/she was. W.B. Yeats, for instance, was haunted by Leo the African, whom
he saw as his anti-self (see also Maalouf 1986). In addition to articulating
European superiority, this problematic has also been used to explain the decadence
and decline of Europe, when, instead of asserting its rejection of the anti-self, the
West acts as a mirror for all that comes from the East, as in Oswald Spengler’s
Decline of the West (Spengler (1918)/1922), which was so influential upon André
Malraux and his version of the same problematic in The Temptation of the West
(Malraux 1926).
In broad terms, it is possible to trace three major historical approaches to the
conceptualisation of the Other. 
The first, typical of the orientalist world view, arises from an ethnic, racial or
gender-based notion, based on the exclusion of the Other from a common grouping
and linked to a particularist world view. We shall see that one of the most serious
disadvantages of this view of the Other is its vulnerability to the contingencies of
relativism. Ultimately its special pleading for particular favours or special treatment
can rebound against those who propound it and today’s Other may turn the tables
tomorrow to exclude the excluder in his turn. It is dependent on other means outside
ideology to reinforce the superiority or dominance of the one over the Other. 
The second broad type of conceptualisation of the Other is linked to a
universalist world view. As such, it avoids the relativism of the first broadly defined
approach. However, it leads to two different conceptual dilemmas, in which, on the
one hand, alienation becomes inescapable for the individual, who can only escape
abstraction by defining him/herself in relation to the gaze of the Other, according to
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some, or as part of a social process, in which economic, social, political and cultural
realities also have a key role in constituting self-identity. 
On the other hand, there is the constant temptation to subvert the universalist
discourse through the back door, as it were. In its typical French form, this is what
happens when language and its associated culture come into play as primary
determinants, as markers of difference of the Other. The universalist discourse was,
in fact, even more fundamentally flawed, not least because the universal was defined
in terms that took the European male as the universal norm. As such, the non-
European and the female were inevitably defined in a negative relation to this norm. 
The third type of approach attempts to define the Other in terms of economic
position, the only Other that fundamentally matters being the class Other (Balibar
& Wallerstein 1988). This approach is typical of the Marxist class analysis of
differential economic relations of production and the fundamental contradiction
between capital and labour. An essential element of this relation is its dynamic. The
opposites are intimately bound together in a reciprocal relation, characterised by
Marx and others as a unity of opposites. Neither side can exist without the other. Yet
the contradiction, which is the fundamental part of the relation, is the force that will
tear it apart and allow a new relation to emerge. In this definition, Marxism
represents a theoretical critique of Republicanism (in its French form) from a left-
wing perspective. However, in practice, French Marxism has taken pains to ground
itself in Republicanism. The reasons for this are mainly historical and have much to
do with the ongoing battles for the Republic in nineteenth- and twentieth-century
France, polarising the nation into pro- or anti-Republican camps. 
Of these different approaches, it was the second that was pressed into service to
determine the official line on how immigrants settling in France were to be treated.
It was assumed that the French way was universally valid, that all newcomers could
be, and should be, assimilated into French society. Just as for all other French
citizens, there were a number of institutions that had as their mission the
manufacturing of this so-called universal, homogeneous citizen, notably the
education system and compulsory military service. From the end of the nineteenth
century, these had mostly managed to achieve their objective of assimilating new
settlers in France (largely immigrants and refugees from other European countries)
and turning them into French men and women over the course of two generations
(Noiriel 1988; Hargreaves 1995; Tribalat 1996; MacMaster 1997).
When migrants from the colonies began to settle in metropolitan France,
starting with demobbed soldiers from both world wars, followed by workers to fill
the need for labour after the Second World War, they were first seen as temporary
manpower. However, once family regroupment began to take place and more or less
permanent settlement became the norm, the issue of how to deal with this
phenomenon became highly politicised (Wihtol de Wenden 1988). 
Officially, the policy remained what it had been for previous immigrant groups
– assimilation into French society. However, the politicisation of the issue of
immigration, particularly from the Maghreb countries and particularly from Algeria,
resulted in a greater degree of ambivalence than had been the case for the Italians or
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the Poles, for instance. Moreover, with the oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent
difficulties for the French economy, the need for manpower to meet the labour
shortage was drastically reduced and the more or less open-door policy for migrants
put into sharp reverse. From then on, the debate raged on a number of fronts, with
the rise of the extreme-right National Front premised on the exploitation of the
political capital arising from immigration. A variety of pseudo-scientific theories
were bandied about, such as the famous seuil de tolérance (tolerance threshold),
positing a proportion of immigrants in society that could not be exceeded without
straining the capacity of the French society to accommodate them (Silverman 1992).
Needless to say, the figure was inevitably an arbitrary one. 
The question of whether it was possible to integrate the non-European
immigrants at all was increasingly posed, with endless variations on the theme of how
this assimilation, integration or, simply, insertion, could be achieved. Very often,
these debates were solely about how best to describe this process; the terms in which
they were conducted were essentially limited to terminological wrangling. 
One thing, however, was not a cause for disagreement. At the fundamental level,
these debates and political scaremongering were about people who were perceived as
Others. At the same time, their difference was not allowed to be officially
acknowledged. Even the collection of statistical material based upon ethnic or
religious categories was not permitted. This led to a bizarre set of contradictions that
still inform controversies and conflicts today (Beaud and Noiriel 2004). 
Not least among these contradictions was that between the opposition to the
recognition of differences on the internal, national plane, i.e. within France itself,
and the growing tendency of France to take the leadership on the external,
international plane, within the francophone world and elsewhere, for a policy based
on the defence of diversity (see Chapter 7). 
Within France, the debate became polarised during the course of the 1980s and
early 1990s between those who continued to argue for the assimilationist policy and
the safeguard of the indivisible Republic, on the one hand, and those who
championed ‘le droit à la différence’ – the right to difference. This was an argument
that split the French Left down the middle. For the supporters of the extreme Right,
things were presented in a more clear-cut manner, in which ethnicity came to the
fore. The Other was defined by two factors: skin colour and religion. Bruno Mégret,
for instance, of the Front National, had two criteria to define ‘Frenchness’: the first
was whiteness; the second was Christianity or even Catholicism (Taguieff 1997). 
Supporters of assimilation on the Left, however, opposing the right to difference,
argued that the recognition of difference would amount to discrimination (of both
the negative and the positive kinds) and undermine the equality of citizenship. This
argument did not deal with the actual discrimination and inequality that existed in
fact and which was lived, not as a right, but as a burden. 
On the other hand, amongst supporters of the right to difference on the Left
were many who saw this as the natural culmination of a real policy of equality, for
which the effective recognition of the right to difference (national, cultural, religious,
etc.) was a necessary but not sufficient condition. It was clear that the abstract,
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universal citizen was not found in reality as a complete human individual. Indeed,
Etienne Balibar went so far as to say that this notion of an abstract universal being,
without differentiating qualities was more appropriate to the non-citizen, rather than
to the citizen. In 1992, he posed the following question: 
Is a political community based solely on the equality of its members
possible, if by equality is meant the setting aside of all ‘differences’ that
characterise individuals and connect them to a particular group of people
and if the basis of this equality is the universality of ‘human rights’ alone?
In other terms, can the citizen be an indeterminate person, a person ‘with
no characteristics or qualities’? This is a definition that seems rather to apply
to the non-citizen (for instance, the proletarian). (Balibar 1992: 113–14)
Balibar thus proposed doing away with the homme/citoyen (person/citizen)
dichotomy in favour of a notion of citizenship that would take on board the full
gamut of real difference – ‘a citizenship, overdetermined by anthropological
difference’ (Balibar 1992: 145). 
In this interpretation, the ‘right to difference’ is viewed as an end in itself, a
defining category of the political value system. Other interpretations saw this
supposed right as a ‘means’, a tool in the furtherance of a broader objective. As such,
it was a right that could simply be asserted in the line of a programme of action, or
else made the substance of a demand. One of the significant actions in this respect
was the so-called Marche des Beurs, the actual title of which was the March for
Equality and Against Racism (Bouamama 1994). On the one hand, this action could
be, and was, seen as a dramatic assertion of the right to difference. In the autumn of
1983, young people, mainly descendants of families of North African origin from the
Lyons area, carried out a three-month-long march of protest, starting out from
Marseilles and arriving in Paris on 3 December. The march was a recognition of the
need for specific action on the part of the victims of discrimination and racism whose
problems and concerns were not dealt with (or not dealt with adequately) by other
organisations. At the same time, the overriding aim of the protest was to achieve
equality of treatment and eliminate the differential treatment of the ‘Beurs’. 
The organisations that developed as a result of this type of action, such as SOS-
Racisme in 1984 (Désir 1985) or France-Plus in 1985 (Wihtol de Wenden and
Leveau 2001), were often portrayed as typical of the two contradictory positions in
the debate. Yet these differences have been greatly exaggerated and the complexities
of the issues involved masked by their deceptive representation in terms of an
oversimplified polarisation. 
The French Way Versus ‘Anglo-Saxon’ Communitarianism
It has often been the case that the defence of the French Republican integrationist
model has been conducted in terms of a threat from ‘Anglo-Saxon communitarianism’,
a danger to which the supporters of the ‘right to difference’ are considered vulnerable. 
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It is hard to see what the ‘Anglo-Saxon communitarian model’ really represents
in French discourse, apart from an ideological construct. After all, in no real sense do
so-called ethnic minorities have any formalised rights in either the USA or Great
Britain. There is no such category of ethnic minority or national minority in
constitutional terms, with the arguable exception of the arrangements relative to
power-sharing in Northern Ireland, although this is determined by the political
parties’ share of the vote rather than by the category of religious communities. The
most that can be said is that there is a recognition of the specific characteristics of the
situation of certain minority groups and that there have been some limited efforts to
alleviate some of the effects of the discrimination from which they suffer. While these
efforts have been almost entirely focused on achieving equality of treatment, for
instance, through anti-discriminatory legislation, there has also been an extremely
limited use of positive discrimination or positive action programmes in both
countries, though always highly contested, in pursuit of the same goal, i.e. equality,
not privilege. There has certainly been nothing like the quota system,
institutionalised in India, for example, through which places in the civil service or
higher education are reserved for the so-called scheduled castes, previously known as
‘untouchables’. The only area where quotas have played a significant role has been in
the area of immigration policy, where the rationale was not one of positive
discrimination, but more the management of restricted access. Moreover, it has to be
said that any acknowledgement of the specific problems faced by the unofficial
ethnic minority groups and any measures to alleviate the problems caused by racist
discrimination have only been obtained after significant battles and mobilisation on
the part of the groups concerned. 
In France, the few isolated instances of ‘positive discrimination’, notably the
appointment in January 2004 of Aïssa Dermouche as Prefect, indeed, as a ‘Muslim
Prefect’, to use the words of the then Home Minister, Nicolas Sarkozy, have
remained just that, isolated instances and not the outcome of any real policy. Nicolas
Sarkozy, one of the few politicians to favour the use of positive discrimination was
rapped on the knuckles by the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration in its annual report for
2003 (Libération, 26 January 2004). Again, there were those who claimed it was
merely a matter of semantics. Indeed, one might argue that one of the few real
instances of positive discrimination to be instituted has concerned, not any
‘postcolonial’ minority, but the island population of Corsica, with the agreement
between the public shipping company SNCM (Société Nationale Maritime Corse
Méditerranée) and the Corsican trade union, STC (Syndicat des Travailleurs Corses),
to give preference to Corsicans when hiring new workers. Although not overtly
portrayed as positive discrimination, this ‘préférence insulaire’ has also been highly
contested in the name of ‘Republican values’ by French trade unions opposed to
‘communitarianism’ (Libération, 21 September 2004), and debates and actions
around this issue continue to take place.  
At the same time, there have been clear signs of some change in approach in
France, or at least an awareness that something needs to be done. In 2002, at a
meeting of the Haut Conseil à l’Intégration, the then Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre
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Raffarin, spoke of a France that ‘holds hybridity (métissage) dear to its heart’ (Le
Monde, 25 October 2002). The use of the term ‘positive discrimination’ has so far
been anathema to most members of the political establishment, with President
Chirac insisting that it was not convenable as a method of bringing about integration
(Libération, 5 October 2004). Yet the establishment in 2004 of a Haute Autorité de
lutte contre les discriminations et pour l’égalité, following the report of the Stasi
Commission on laïcité, published in December 2003, appeared to have taken
something of a step in this direction, though, as we shall see, this was not the main
outcome of the report. In what seems to be a belated attempt to address the problem
with a body along the lines of the British Commission for Racial Equality,
established in 1976 as a result of the amalgamation of the Race Relations Board, set
up in 1965, with the Community Relations Commission, the Haute Autorité
appears to have the mission, not just of taking up instances of discrimination and
acting against them, but also taking positive initiatives and making
recommendations to prevent and eradicate discrimination. Whether or not these
amount to ‘positive discrimination’ appears to depend on whether the quantitative
concept of ‘quotas’ comes into the frame, which, as we have seen in Chapter 1,
caused such trouble in the case of the ‘parity’ of political representation for women.
Proposals for action framed in more qualitative and thus, arguably, more vague terms
were far more acceptable. Thus, in the course of 2004, we saw the then Prime
Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, using the term ‘mobilisation positive’, the head of the
Haut conseil à l’intégration, Blandine Kriegel, talking of a ‘politique positive’, others
using the expression ‘mesures correctives’ and Sarkozy himself resorting to ‘volontarisme
républicain’ to avoid the dreaded term ‘positive discrimination’ (Libération, 5 October
2004). 
The same arguments surfaced as in the debate on parity between the sexes. On
the one hand, those in favour of parity had argued that political representative bodies
should accurately reflect the composition of the nation. Their opponents had
recourse to the standard response that the universal French Republic was constituted
by non-differentiated citizens. Yet again, the influence of the Anglo-Saxon example
was deemed pernicious. 
In point of fact, there is very little basis in reality for the linking together of
Britain and the USA on this issue, although the use of the terminology ‘Anglo-Saxon’
implies that the one model applies in both cases. In fact, issues relating to race are
grounded in a very different history and politics in the two countries and this has
impinged to a very great extent on the way in which they are played out at the
present time. 
Indeed, there is much more in common between France and Britain in terms of
their colonial history, the nature, scale and timing of the immigration from their
former colonies and the economic, social and political scenarios that have arisen as a
result. Any analysis of the situation on the ground will show that the situation of
groups or individuals of non-European origin, whether in France or in Britain,
highlights far more similarities than differences in their situation, in terms of
employment situations, patterns of housing, racial discrimination and harassment,
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both individual and institutionalised, and the existence of an extreme right-wing
politics feeding on issues of race. Moreover, those differences that have existed
between the two countries as a result of certain historical factors relating to different
experiences of colonisation and decolonisation, as well as questions concerning
nationality and citizenship status, have either diminished or are in the process of
disappearing with the passing of time and the renewal of the generations. For
instance, the exclusion of non-French nationals from voting rights meant the
disenfranchisement of foreign residents from involvement in mainstream political
life in the 1960s and 1970s in a way that was not the case in Britain, where
immigrants coming from Commonwealth countries (and Ireland) had been able to
vote from the time of their arrival and residence in Britain. 
In spite of their involvement in mainstream British politics, or even in a large
measure because of it, immigrants to Britain from the former colonies soon became
aware that they needed to develop their own political means of expression and
organisation to address the issues of specific concern to themselves. It is no doubt
because of this autonomous mobilisation that they were able to make some degree of
progress, which in fact put them ahead of their counterparts in France. It appeared
at the time and well into the 1990s that there was a time lag and that France would
in fact follow the British example in due course. This has appeared to be the case, in
terms of the acceptance of a certain level of ‘multiculturalism’. In the media, for
instance, black faces have long been confined to minor, secondary roles in France
(Neath 2004). It is only recently, following the report of the CSA (Conseil Supérieur
de l’Audiovisul) published in 2000 on the extremely low level of representation of
‘visible minorities’ on French television and action subsequently taken by Catherine
Tasca, as Minister of Culture and Communication, in response to this report, that a
recognition of the need to ‘reflect the diversity of French society’ has been
incorporated into the policy documents of the audio-visual channels. It was only at
the beginning of 2004 that Marc Tessier, president of France Télévisions, appointed
a ‘Monsieur Intégration’ and launched a series of initiatives designed, as he said at
the time, ‘to encourage the development of talented people, able, for instance, to
present the main news bulletin’ (Libération, 5 October 2004). Sébastien Folin
became the first black weatherman on TF1 in 2002, showing perhaps how things
had moved on since the mid-1980s, when Rachid Arab only lasted two weeks as a
news presenter at the time (www.Afrik.com 13 February 2002). Given that Trevor
McDonald has presented the mainstream news in Britain since the mid-1970s and
Moira Stewart since 1981, and many other black journalists have followed in their
footsteps since, the hypothesis of a time lag appears to be borne out, at least as far as
the audio-visual media are concerned. 
It is, however, becoming increasingly apparent that there is far more than an
historical time lag involved here. Events over the last decade have shown that France
is not necessarily going to follow the same path. The original headscarf affair and its
sequels have been enlightening in this respect. When the affair first broke in October
1989, with the exclusion of three girls from their school in Creil in the Paris suburbs
for wearing what was described as an Islamic headscarf (hijab) or, more emotively
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and quite inaccurately, a ‘veil’, it seemed that this was an incident of the same type
as those that had occurred in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, when there were a
number of conflicts involving school uniform issues, such as the wearing of trousers
to school by Muslim girls, or around the ban on Sikh bus conductors wearing their
turbans instead of the uniform cap, for instance in Manchester in 1967 and
Wolverhampton in 1969 (BBC News, 9 April 1969, www.bbc.co.uk). There were
also campaigns for the right to wear turbans in the fire and police service, as well as
in lieu of motorcycle helmets (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/318934.stm). At the
time, these disputes, controversial though they proved, had been resolved through
compromises of one kind or another, mainly at the local level. The issues had been
defused without blowing up into serious national political issues.  
In France, however, the issue did not go away but evolved into a multi-faceted
crisis at the national level, which has rumbled on, with intermittent explosions, since
1989 (Silverman 1992; Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995). The headscarf has
become the symbol of a challenge to laïcité, the particularly French version of
secularism, in its bastion, the public school system. On the surface, the impassioned
debates around the issue have been about drawing demarcation lines between
religion and the public education system (as the agent of the secular state), between
the public and the private, personal spheres. For some, it has simply been a clear-cut
case of the defence of French Republicanism and all that it stands for. Many who
consider themselves progressives and of the Left have seen the ban on the wearing of
headscarves as a step to defend the rights of women against what they see as an
unwelcome religious tyranny, which, far more than a simple dress code, entails the
subordination and oppression of women. Unlike comparable issues in Britain twenty
or thirty years ago, the issue has not simply been to make the Other conform,
although there is no doubt that this gut suspicion and fear of the Other, which
constitutes a major element of most racist attitudes, has also been an important
underlying factor. As in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, health and safety issues have
also been invoked. The distinctiveness of the issue in France, however, is based on its
association, in ideological terms, with universal Republicanism, secularism and the
rights of women. The first schoolgirls were excluded because the head teacher of their
school claimed that the wearing of the headscarf constituted a form of religious
proselytism, which violated the school Republican space, as one from which religion
was supposedly excluded. As a number of people have pointed out, this neutrality
had never been absolute. The school calendar has traditionally been arranged around
the Christian religious calendar. There has always been some element of compromise
on the issue of secularism, not with religion in general, but with the Catholic Church
in particular. From the beginning, one day per week was set aside to allow
schoolchildren to have religious instruction in the catechism. Moreover, Catholic
religious personnel have been allowed access to school premises. 
An early attempt to defuse the affair was made by the then Socialist Education
Minister, Lionel Jospin, who overruled the initial expulsions and referred the matter
to the Council of State, which endorsed his position in their ruling of 27 November
1989 that the headscarf was not, in itself, an ostentatious religious symbol (Barkat
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2004). However, with the return of the Right to government, the Bayrou Circular,
which the Minister of Education, François Bayrou, put out in 1994, formalised a ban
on all ostentatious signs of religious belief, but made it clear that it was not directed
against Christian and Jewish symbols. This gave a licence to school heads to indulge
in a further wave of expulsions, though many of these were subsequently overturned.
This was not, however, a case of Left versus Right, or even of different strategies to
cope with the rise of the extreme Right National Front, although this certainly
played a part in keeping the issue on the boil. 
In effect, a cloud of ambiguity shrouded the issue for the next ten years, with the
various parties in the disputes pushing to test the boundaries of their position, in an
ongoing, simmering stand-off. It was partly in the name of putting an end to the
ambiguity and confusion that the new law was enacted. It was not, however, the
result of compromise and discussion, but rather a reassertion of the primacy of
‘French’ Republican values. It was imposed, not negotiated. It was also the
recognition, though not the acceptance, of the fact that the policy of assimilation had
not worked. The whole debate around the law has been couched or cloaked in
ideology. Fundamentally, it was an attempt to put a line under the issue by
demonstrating who was in charge and that challenges and resistance would not be
tolerated. It was an effort to settle the issue once and for all. 
The process was set in motion, with the creation of a committee in June 2003,
chaired by Bernard Stasi, which reported at the end of the year (Gemie 2004).
Jacques Chirac greeted the publication of the report with a major televised speech on
17 December 2003 on the subject of ‘laïcité’, in which he asked the legislature to pass
a law banning the wearing of ‘ostentatious’ signs of religious identity, singling out
what he called the ‘voile islamique’, as well as the Jewish Kippa or a ‘cross of manifestly
excessive dimensions’. As the main outcome of the Stasi Commission, the 2004 law,
enforcing laïcité in public schools from the beginning of the 2004–5 school year,
was, in effect, particularly focused in both its inspiration and its application on the
wearing of the hijab, or Islamic headscarf, by Muslim girls. This was demonstrated
quite clearly by a documentary film, The Headmaster and the Headscarves, made by
Infocus Productions and screened on BBC2 on 29 March 2005, when it showed that
only Muslim girls were targeted for inspection at the school gates. 
What was actually at stake was not secularism per se, but the issue of difference
and the use of religious ideology and symbolism as a tool of resistance. Although the
events of 11 September 2001 and its aftermath had significantly increased the
tensions surrounding this issue, related to the fear of Islamic terrorism and measures
taken to combat it, it would be short-sighted not to see that the roots of these
tensions go back much further in time in the case of France. They have to be
unearthed in the precise forms of the Algerian liberation struggle and the role that
Algerian women played in that conflict, when the issue of the veil became highly
politicised. On the one hand, the French pursued a policy of trying to win over
Algerian women on issues concerned with women’s rights and attempted an
educational and propaganda onslaught to persuade women not to wear the veil,
including the use of force when more gentle tactics did not succeed, though a
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significant number of Algerian women were in fact recruited to perform social,
educational, health and military work on behalf of the French (Seferdjeli 2004). At
the same time, many Algerian women took to wearing the veil as a sign of their
resistance to French occupation (Fanon (1959)/1970). There was also a practical
element to this: the veil was sometimes used to conceal the transportation of arms
and bombs and sometimes the moudjahidate would dress in European style to merge
unveiled in the European quarters.
This is an illustration of the enduring power of representations and notions that
have come into being in an earlier epoch to resurface at a later stage. Although
perceptions of the ‘Others’ of imperialism may take on new forms in changed
historical circumstances, there remain significant strata of accretions that consciously
or subconsciously impinge on the way they are represented and handled. The
imagery and rhetoric of the crusades, as well as the ideological paraphernalia
associated with slavery, are profoundly embedded in the European psyche and there
is no doubt of their influence on later forms of oppression and the way it is
articulated. In addition to these key ideological vestiges and imprints on the modern
European mind, there are also those that are peculiar to the specifically French
trauma of the Algerian War, which can still have such an influence on modern-day
manifestations of racism.  
A re-examination of the French rejection of the ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ may also
throw some light on these issues. For, although it is true that race issues in Britain
and the USA are characterised by considerable differences, there is nonetheless one
aspect in which developments in the US have been enormously influential on black
people in Britain. This was the development of the struggle for civil rights and then
black power and the forms this took in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, there is a strong
case for arguing that, when France dug in its heels against the ‘Anglo-Saxon model’
it was not because it wanted to avoid the establishment of ‘ghettos’ on the outskirts
of French cities. These existed anyway. It was because it wanted to stamp out the
possibility of resistance developing on the same scale as in the US and Britain. That
this was not about to happen would be graphically illustrated by the serious riots in
the banlieues that came to a head in November 2005.
We shall return to these events shortly. However, there is another dimension to
the headscarf affair(s) that has not been sufficiently explored so far. This is the
association with the problematic of vision and visibility that underpins much, if not
most, of the dominant French approach to the Other, and the way in which the
Other tends to be represented in the symbolic imaginary universe.
The Visibility of Difference  
The importance of vision and the gaze in defining the status of the Other has already
been touched upon in Chapter 4. It is a key component of the orientalist problematic,
as of more general relations involving a powerful, determining subject (individual or
collective) and a powerless, subordinate object (again individual or collective). Indeed,
one might see the ultimate ‘voyeur’ in conceptions of God as all-seeing, but invisible.
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In present-day France, its most everyday manifestation as far as the diasporic
communities are concerned is the basic definition of immigrants and their
descendants from the former colonies as the ‘visible’ minorities. It is because they
look different that they are marked out. Their different bodily appearance is what
defines them in popular discourse, their skin colour, the shape of their facial features,
the characteristics of their hair. Other features are also added, such as the type of
clothing worn. Even such things as smells and noisy behaviour become linked in the
popular imagination to these Others, as picked up for populist effect by Jacques
Chirac in his now notorious comments on ‘le bruit’ and ‘l’odeur’, amongst other
derogatory references to immigrants in a party meeting at Orléans on 19 June 1991
(Le Monde, 21 June 1991). However, it is noticeable that the visual and indeed
bodily characteristics predominate in the way the Other is defined.1 Fanon has
analysed in depth the importance of the body in the constitution and definition of
the black man, which he sees as fraught with difficulty and negativity.2 Moreover, it
is often assumed that these Others are themselves responsible for their visibility, that
they deliberately ‘flaunt their differences’ (Bancel and Blanchard 1997: 29). 
Visibility and vision can assume many different guises. In its most extreme form,
that of surveillance, vision is used as a deliberate controlling strategy, as notably
proposed by Jeremy Bentham in his design of the ‘all-seeing’ Panopticon for the
institutional control not just of prisoners but also workers, hospital patients, school
students and so on, allowing the observer to observe and control without being seen
(Bentham (1787)/1995). As Michel Foucault pointed out in Surveiller et punir
(Foucault 1975), drawing out the implications of ‘Panopticism’, it was the visibility
itself and the inmate’s awareness of it that was the essential factor in the control. The
system is designed in such a way that the inmate may be seen at all times, yet the
inspector viewing him/her cannot be seen. Moreover, it is an essential part of this
system that the inspector does not have to constantly view the inmate. The
important thing is that the inmate never knows whether (s)he is actually been viewed
at any particular moment and yet is always aware that (s)he might be. This becomes
what Foucault has called the ‘automatic functioning of power’, where the effects of
the surveillance are ongoing even where it is actually only carried out intermittently.
It is thus the creation and sustaining of the power relation that matters, not the actual
exercise of power by any particular individual. 
Applied to the imperial power relation, surveillance has been defined thus:
‘Surveillance – One of the most powerful strategies of imperial dominance is that of
surveillance, or observation, because it implies a viewer with an elevated vantage
point, it suggests the power to process and understand that which is seen, and it
objectifies and interpellates the colonized subject in a way that fixes its identity in
relation to the surveyor’ (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 1995a: 227). It is not
necessary for the viewing to be continuous. It is the overarching condition in which
the viewing is always possible but never reciprocal that frames the relation. 
While this is certainly helpful as a general outline of a problematic, it does,
however, need to be refined in a number of important ways. First, there are situations
and practices in which the viewing is quite overt and may indeed be ostentatious, as
The Other Within | 227
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 227
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
in the case of orientalist art and its more modern variants. Secondly, the viewed
object does not always exist in passivity, but may engage in his or her own action to
subvert the gaze and transform it. Finally, implicated in the voyeurism may not just
be patterns of surveillance for purposes of control but also the complex processes
associated with desire.
The Image of Difference
While the Republican universalist discourse allows no space for difference, it comes
into its own in the representations of various art forms and media, as well as in the
iconography of religion, whether these representations take on the form of idealised
exotica or the more humdrum negative stereotypes depicted in the media of everyday
life, where criminality and violence are the themes of predilection (Beaud and Noiriel
2004). Central to the depiction of difference is its attachment to the body. The
characteristic dualism that continues to haunt French ways of thinking and
representation situates difference in the corporeal, the fleshly, as opposed to the
abstract rationality of the universalist domain of the things of the mind. It is not
surprising that the key image of orientalist art is not just the exotic Other, but the
oriental female Other – the woman in the harem.3 These are images in which the
body is highlighted as the key element in the composition. Moreover, these are rarely
nudes; the depiction of bodies as masked or veiled, only the better to reveal, by
suggestion, the flesh beneath, is a crucial part of this imagery. Its resilience today is
shown by modern variants on the theme – in photography, fashion, television and
cinema. This is a theme that Leila Sebbar has developed in many of her novels,
particularly Shérazade (Sebbar 1982).
There is a sense in which the images of schoolgirls clad in the headscarf fall
within this same tradition and indeed it is significant that it is the girls who have
been singled out as the symbols of difference. However, the effect generally produced
is not of the oriental woman. The titillating effect of the oriental image of the veiled
woman is absent from these portrayals. This is not the land of exotica, this is the
public school system, custodian of the values of the French Republic, where such
blatant images of difference have no place. There has been a perceived overstepping
of the mark, of the boundaries between the private religious sphere, on the one hand,
and the world of the secular ideal, where the Word holds sway, on the other. 
This may be the perception; the reality is more complex. For the Word has been
brought into service, to demarcate these individuals as different, and doubly different
because of their origins from amongst the formerly colonised (whether defined as
national, racial, ethnic or simply historical difference) and because of their gender. This
is a vivid illustration of the concept of the ‘corps d’exception’ – the definition of a group
of people by their ‘difference’ and their exclusion from the possibility of assuming their
subjectivity as citizens (Barkat 1999). Their difference is situated at the most basic bodily
level. Yet the women concerned are condemned, not for their clothing, their masking of
their bodies, but for their assertion, their appropriation, of their difference, their
defiance and their resistance to the dominant power that claims hegemony over them. 
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However, there is more to this than the dialectic between the viewer and the
viewed and the subversion of the gaze, which has been discussed in Chapter 4. It is
now time to bring in another element, just as important to the business of vision.
This is the image. The image and the gaze do not exist in a static relation; there is a
dynamic of reciprocity between the two. As Régis Debray has pointed out:
there is not, on the one hand, the image, a unique, inert, stable material,
and, on the other hand, the gaze, coming like a mobile sunray to light up
the page of an open book. To gaze is not to receive but to order the visible,
to organise experience. The image draws its meaning from the gaze, as does
writing from reading, and this meaning is not speculative but practical.
(Debray 1992: 40–41) 
This is not just to account for the effect produced by the gaze. Debray has also
explored the active effect of the image. In former times, the image was considered to
produce real effects on the viewer and this is still the case today, particularly with
regard to pornography and television, as well as being a characteristic feature of
certain types of religious or political fanaticism. In such cases, the active effectiveness
of certain images is enhanced when these images are viewed not by individuals alone,
but through the collective gaze – the ‘oeil collectif ’ – which is also described as the
shared subconscious – the ‘inconscient partagé’. This collective visual representation
of the world is subject to modifications in forms, codes and representational
techniques at different moments in history. It is also characteristic of a way of relating
to the world that does not involve thought as such. As Debray puts it: ‘the invisible
codes of the visible, which define with extreme naivety and for each age a certain
state of the world, or, in other words, a culture. Or how the vision that the world
presents of itself to those who look without thinking (Debray 1992: 11).
In this view, then, relating to the world in visual terms is linked to the notion of
naivety; it is characteristic of non-reflective thinking or, using a more evolutionary,
hierarchical frame, of pre-reflective or pre-conceptual thought. This is akin to
Althusser’s view of the visual as the characteristic mode of ideology, rather than of
knowledge per se (Althusser 1965). As such, visual perception is sometimes seen as
second-rate, on a lower level than rational thinking. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the visual really comes into its own in the
religious sphere, particularly with the importance of iconography in Christian
Catholicism. In Protestantism, on the other hand, there was a significant opposition
to visual imagery in religion and the church. Indeed, the degree of hostility to
iconography and idolatry was in direct proportion to the radicality of the critique of
the established church, particularly in its Puritan, Quaker and Nonconformist
strands. Given this hostility to imagery in much of Protestant theology and the fact
that Protestantism triumphed over Catholicism in Britain and thence to much of the
English-speaking world, it is not inconceivable that it may have had a part to play in
the different relations that operate in respect of the visual and the gaze and their
associated metaphors in the anglophone and francophone discourses. 
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However, although Debray has some interesting things to say in respect of the
visual relation and the image, his positing of a clear divide between the Puritan
preachers of the Word in the north and the Mediterranean devotees of the image in
the south rather neglects the cleavages and different world views that have existed
within each of these societies. In particular, it fails to give due importance to the
fundamental contradiction that exists in the French collective between, on the one
hand, the Word of the Republic, with its abstract egalitarian universalism and, on the
other, the visual problematic that dominates the representation of relations with the
Other within.4
Leaving theological questions aside, the so-called headscarf affairs and the
responses of the French state are only incidentally about the enforcement of
secularism within the public education system and far more to do with the way in
which the Other is defined in France and the response that this provokes. The
wearing of a headscarf as a sign of revolt, whether or not it implies the acceptance of
the religious and political ideology associated with it, may be seen as an inadequate
response to the inequalities and inequities faced by those concerned, on a number of
grounds. However, the counter-response by the French state and associated
institutions represented a far more serious danger. Not only did it fail to address the
real problems at stake here, but it also reinforced the very problematic that is at the
heart of the cause of the problem.
It is against this background that one has to set the riots of November 2005,
which began in Clichy-sous-Bois, quickly spread throughout the banlieues of the
major French cities and ultimately exposed the threadbare nature of the French
Republican universalist ideology in its relation to the postcolonial diaspora living in
France. Whilst the particular spark was given by the electrocution of two young men
in an electricity substation, where they had taken refuge from the police, the root
causes were the long-standing discrimination and harassment experienced by young
people in the banlieues on a daily basis. The tensions had come to a head following a
spate of measures directed against this sector of the population and singling them out
in what could be interpreted as a series of provocations. Not only did the law banning
the wearing of the headscarf in schools appear to be deliberately targeting Muslim
girls; the subsequent law of 23 February 2005, making the questioning of the positive
nature of colonialism an offence, added to the humiliation of the postcolonial
diasporic communities (see Chapter 8). The most important fuel for the forthcoming
conflagration was, however, undoubtedly provided by Nicolas Sarkozy, who had once
again been reinstated as Interior Minister. Not only did he institute the intensification
of a policy of police repression and deportation of illegal residents to meet his
unrealistically high fixed targets (including numbers of young people who had never
lived anywhere but France but who found themselves technically without the correct
papers), but he also deployed what seemed to be deliberately provocative language to
single out in his pronouncements those he termed ‘la racaille’, or scum, who needed
to be power-cleansed out of the suburbs, or ‘nettoyés au Karcher’.
Indeed, it can be argued that it was Sarkozy himself who deliberately put an end
to the fiction of universal equality. Moreover, some, such as Piotr Smolar (Le Monde,
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15 November 2005), have argued that this is fully in line with his conception of
France, which, unlike the traditional Republican emphasis on the unity and
indivisibility of the nation, stresses instead the importance of individuals as the basic
unit of society, with all their real and inevitable differences and conflicting interests.
While Sarkozy presents this as a pragmatic realism, a view of France as it actually is
rather than a utopian vision, there is also no doubt that it is in line with the type of
free-enterprise economic and social model he favours for France within the context
of the global economy.
The events of November 2005 have certainly exposed the real differences
existing within France to the world at large. The existence of large communities
living in what have effectively amounted to ghettos in the suburbs surrounding the
large towns and cities points to a clear-cut divide between these people and the
mainstream white population of France. The reality of their differentiation, whether
this is expressed in terms of their appearance, racial characteristics, national origin or
religion, can no longer be denied. Indeed, there has been no shortage of politicians
and other public figures eager to attribute the problems faced by the suburban youth
to their exotic difference. The permanent secretary of the Académie française and
expert on the Soviet Union, Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, came up with what might
have been considered the most outlandish explanation, blaming it all on what she
claimed was the widespread practice of polygamy amongst African families in the
Paris suburbs (Libération, 9 November 2005), if her ‘analysis’ had not also been taken
up by such as Gérard Larcher, a Minister of Employment, as well as Bernard Accoyer,
the president of the majority UMP group in the Assemblée nationale (Le Monde, 16
November 2005). Indeed, on 10 November, speaking on France 2, Nicolas Sarkozy
himself had blamed the difficulties faced by the young people of the banlieues on
polygamy, amongst other cultural practices (Libération, 17 November 2005).
The differentiation has also taken the form of spatial segregation, in which
certain parts of France have been designated as ‘off-limits’ to certain sectors of the
population. Just as the suburban ghettos have been described as ‘zones de non-droit’,
so too are the ‘beaux quartiers’ cordoned off from the inhabitants of the banlieues.
These lines of demarcation reproduce in a postcolonial setting the former clear
boundaries dividing the colonies and the colonised peoples from the metropolitan
colonial power and the colonists, much in the same way as the colonial cities were
divided into a European quarter and a ‘native’ quarter, whether it be the Arab kasbah,
the black town or the slave quarters of the plantation.
While the riots can easily be understood as the almost inevitable outcome of
many years of accumulated exasperation and resentment, a spontaneous combustion
sparked by specific events that signified the final straw, it is also instructive to look at
the form they took. While there were those who attempted to make the connection
between the rioters and militant, political Islam (and the tear-gassing of the mosque
in Clichy-sous-Bois has to be seen in this context), in point of fact, there was no
religious content to the revolt. What is significant is that, in the absence of a clear
political strategy, there was nonetheless an almost instinctual recourse to those actions
that would give the highest visibility in the media to the rioters and their grievances.
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Torching their own neighbourhoods may make little sense in the light of rational
political objectives. However, the sight of flaming cars ablaze night after night on
French TV screens provided a literally eye-catching statement that could no longer be
ignored, focusing the attention of the media on those whose ‘visibility’ was itself part
of the problem. The difference was that this time it was the young people themselves
who were taking the initiative, for once determining how they were going to be seen.  
It appears clear that a major rethink of the nature and scope of Republican
universalism in France and its relation to the particular is on the cards. At the time
of writing, there was lack of clear agreement by the state authorities on how to tackle
the issues. The Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, was clinging to the
traditional Republican view of the nation, while Sarkozy has proposed a variety of
seemingly contradictory initiatives. His apparent belief in positive discrimination is
tempered by the fact that it is only ever envisaged for a meritorious, privileged
minority from within the ranks of the Others, thus reinforcing the outsider status of
the majority. The only apparent area of consensus is on the need for the authority of
the state to be reasserted and public order restored. The terms in which this has been
done to date have been highly significant. The declaration of a state of emergency
and the use of a law dating from 1955, originally framed to deal with public order
issues arising from the Algerian War, to permit the declaration of localised curfews,
would seem astonishingly politically inept if it were not designed to convey a precise
message, in the strongest possible terms, as to who was in charge in France and who
the ‘outsiders’ or ‘Others’ were. 
The issues raised by the crisis of the secular Republican model are not, however,
going to be easily put to rest. However, it is time now to move on to another category
of ‘Others within’, some of whom have been described by Raphaël Confiant as living
in a state of ‘postcolonialism without independence’.
Postcolonialism without Independence: the DOM-TOM
The populations of the DOM-TOM (Départements et territoires d’outre-mer)
represent the other major category of people who have a status of difference within
the overall orbit of the French state (Aldrich & Connell 1992; Aldrich 1993). The
DOM-TOM currently include the Overseas Departments of Martinique and
Guadeloupe in the Caribbean, Guiana on the South American mainland, La
Réunion in the Indian Ocean, along with a number of Overseas Territories, dotted
around the Pacific, Indian and Antarctic Oceans, notably New Caledonia and
French Polynesia, and two collectivités territoriales, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, off the
coast of Newfoundland, and Mayotte, in the Indian Ocean – what some have
referred to as the ‘confetti of empire’. Although some of the territories included here
are counted amongst the oldest of the French colonies (les vieilles colonies), they have
not, unlike most of the former French empire, achieved independence. The TOM
enjoy a greater degree of autonomy, while remaining under the overarching French
umbrella. New Caledonia, in particular, is on course for further transfer of power
away from France. 
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Since 2003, there has been a change in the official terminology used to refer to the
DOM-TOM. The DOM are now DROM (Département et région d’outre-mer) and the
TOM are COM (Collectivité d’Outre-Mer), though within the last category, there is a
further division between the Collectivité d’Outre-Mer départementale (Mayotte) and the
Collectivité d’Outre-Mer territoriale (Saint Pierre-et-Miquelon). French Polynesia and
New Caledonia are now both POM (Pays d’Outre-Mer), though Polynesia is a
Collectivité d’Outre-Mer and New Caledonia a Collectivité Spécifique until 2014, when
a local referendum is supposed to decide on the question of independence. In a further
twist, all of the above are PTOM, or Pays et Territoires d’Outre-Mer, of the European
Union (see http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/francophonie/dom-tom.htm).
The problems and issues of the DOM-TOM also vary, with the presence to a
greater or lesser extent of a sizeable proportion in the population of European settlers
and their descendants constituting a major political factor in some cases. Their
strategic importance to France also varies. For many years, the use of the French
Pacific territories for nuclear tests was a source of great controversy, culminating in
the affair of the Rainbow Warrior in 1985. The protest ship was blown up by French
secret service agents in New Zealand waters to prevent its sailing to the testing
ground at Mururoa. The tests were later halted after much local and international
outcry. The siting of space facilities in Guiana has been less controversial and has no
doubt been beneficial to France’s broader objectives of maintaining its prestige and
status as a major world power. 
However, it is the issues raised by the Caribbean island territories that are
perhaps most relevant here, given that it was in the Caribbean that the first struggles
against French colonialism were successfully waged and that there has been no lack
of powerful advocates against colonialism in the years since. And yet Martinique,
Guadeloupe and Guiana, like La Réunion in the Indian Ocean, remain attached to
France, as integral parts of its territory. Why should this be so and can it be
considered a successful application of the doctrine of assimilation?
The crucial step was the decision to opt for the départementalisation of 1946. In
effect, this amounted to a choice to go down the path of ‘equality’ rather than
‘independence’. 
The willingness of France to maintain a presence in the Caribbean is
characteristically linked to its perceived global interests and the importance of
prestige on the international plane. Given the cost in terms of subsidies, there is no
doubt that the priority is not any economic benefit, as in the earlier stages, when the
sugar islands of the Caribbean contributed massively to the French economy. With
the decline of the sugar industry and the problems faced by other sectors, which, in
addition to the difficulties arising from the way in which the world trade system is
organised, also face the extra problem of higher wage expectations than for other
Caribbean producers as a result of the connection with France, the end result has
been the development of heavily subsidised economies and societies in the Caribbean
territories, in which the dependency on France has become almost total. 
If the continuation of the French connection makes sense for France in terms of
its wider global strategy, the question remains as to whether it is in the interests of
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the Caribbean territories themselves and how their populations perceive their present
and future relations with France. 
There is no doubt that there have been significant expressions of resistance and
revolt at various stages in the relationship, culminating in demands for
independence. Aimé Césaire, himself, for many years the major political figure in
Martiniquan politics, has been one of the most eloquent opponents of colonialism.
Yet it was also Césaire who brought in the départementalisation policy. There is no
doubt that this was seen as one way to bring about the end of colonialism, by
becoming full members of the French nation, just like any other département. In
some ways, the history of the islands had predisposed them to favour this solution.
As we have seen, the effects of the French Revolution had been dramatic in the
Caribbean islands and summoned up the vision of a France synonymous with the
principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, in direct opposition to the reactionary,
colonial France, synonymous with the slave trade and colonial slavery, which
reasserted its power in the colonies. 
This dichotomy came to be articulated through the notion of the ‘two Frances’,
representing, on the one hand, the best, most noble, progressive aspects of its
ideology and, on the other, the bloody, racist repression of imperialist France at its
worst. In this scenario, the triumph of the Second Republic, along with the abolition
of slavery and the introduction of universal manhood suffrage, was seen as the
triumph of the ‘good France’, as the subsequent setbacks under Louis Napoleon were
seen as the reassertion of the ‘bad France’. 
This division into the two Frances, however unrealistic it may have been, was
also reinforced by the position of the Békés, the whites who had settled on the islands
from the earliest periods of slavery, and who were more inclined to defend their own
interests, as plantation owners and one-time slave owners, than to subscribe to the
ideals of the French Republic. Indeed, many had seen British rule preferable to the
abolition of slavery (James (1938)/1980; Geggus 1982). Amongst the rest of the
island population, these attitudes reinforced the notion of a divide between the ‘bad
France’ associated with the local white planters and the happy land of the ‘good
France’ of the Republic, far, far away, which through the establishment of the Third
Republic in the 1870s brought back into effect the formal rights of French
citizenship for all male adults in the old colonies, enabling them to participate in
French national, as well as the subsequent local, elections, in line with the
inhabitants of mainland France. At the same time, a number of factors ensured that
their status remained that of a colony. With notable exceptions, such as Gaston
Monnerville, from 1932, the majority of elected representatives were chosen from
the white, or partially white, inhabitants. Moreover, the existence of a colonial
governor ensured direct French control over the islands’ affairs. This arrangement
suited the Békés, as it ensured some opportunity for influence and manipulation of
policy at local level, as well as their ongoing control of the local economy (Burton
and Reno 1995: 3). 
The problematic of the two Frances was brought into play once more in the
Second World War with the triumph of the (good) Free French, which included so
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many Caribbean volunteers, over the (bad) supporters of Vichy. This was, in some
respects, a continuation of the so-called impôt du sang, or blood tax, whereby, in the
absence of any formal requirement for the islands’ inhabitants to do military service,
they nonetheless demonstrated their loyalty to France. It was, however, also a clear
case of taking sides, with the ‘good France’ of de Gaulle and against the ‘bad France’
of the Vichyite Governor Admiral Robert. 
The support for the full integration of the former colonies as départements of
France has also to be seen in this light. In opting for this solution to the problem of
colonialism in 1946, Aimé Césaire, newly elected as député as well as mayor of Fort-
de-France, along with Léopold Bissol, a Guianese député, and Raymond Vergès, from
La Réunion, hoped to build on the wartime alliance with the Free French to become
fully integrated into the ‘French family’. The scenario was one in which the
ideological weapons provided by the ‘good France’ would be used against the ‘bad
France’, perceived as the colonial enemy. It was a challenge to end colonialism from
within the French hegemony. 
Unsurprisingly, it was from the Békés that the main opposition came to the
départementalisation of 1946. In fact, however, this was not such a radical
transformation, as had been feared, or hoped. Already, the colonies had been
declared ‘partie intégrante’ of France in the French Constitution of 1795 (Burton and
Reno 1995). Moreover, even after départementalisation, the Caribbean départements
remained differentiated from those of mainland France in a number of ways. On the
one hand, this difference has been perceived as insufficient equality, and major
struggles were necessary to extend the full and equal application of French legislation
to the DOM, particularly in the fields of social security and the minimum wage
(Burton and Reno 1995: 4). On the other hand, there was also a concern that the
specific needs of the islands could not be catered for by one-size-fits-all legislation.
The DOM were clearly not the same as any other département of France in a number
of respects. However, their new constitutional status did not allow recognition of this
fact and put obstacles in the way of differential treatment, even where appropriate.    
There is no doubt that the hoped-for benefits of integration as a French
department have not materialised to the extent that may have been envisaged in
1946. The most serious consequence has been the catastrophic decline of the
economy, with corresponding social collapse. The old sugar-based economy went
into rapid collapse, unable to compete with the European sugar-beet industry.  There
is now little production of any significance, and what there is is largely
uncompetitive on world markets, given the high labour costs in line with
expectations of French rates. The islands survive on imports from France, from
which practically everything, including basic foodstuffs, is brought. This is made
possible, in its turn, by the injection of French subsidies, increasing the dependency
of the population, many of whom are unable to find employment and rely on social
welfare benefits. Investment has been largely speculative in character, with the
promotion and development of retail, leisure and tourist facilities that have severely
damaged the environment in many cases and have led to great resentment of what is
known as the bétonisation of the islands (Burton and Reno 1995).  
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Even so, there is nowadays very little popular support for independence and not
all the economic and social problems can be attributed to départementalisation.
Indeed, the political life of the islands is marked by a high level of apathy, with
massive abstention rates from electoral politics (Burton and Reno 1995: 14). In spite
of the ravages suffered by the economy, the undoubted material benefits of the
association with France are there for all to see. The overall standard of living is
extremely high in comparison with other islands in the Caribbean, such as Saint
Lucia, and particularly the dire situation of a country like Haiti. Car ownership, in
particular, per head of population is higher than in France itself (Confiant 1996).
This has, on the one hand, encouraged some feeling of superiority amongst the
inhabitants, who are proud of their link with France and consider themselves French.
The high levels of emigration to metropolitan France, estimated at 400,000 or so and
thus surpassing the population of Martinique, have also reinforced these ties, with
constant movement back and forth across the Atlantic (Anselin 1990). At the same
time, there is also a simmering feeling of resentment at the dependency that is the
corollary and a distinct sense of alienation, characteristic of the state of mind
expressed by the islanders. All of this is well recognised. 
In January 2000, Patrick Chamoiseau, along with Gérard Delver, Edouard
Glissant and Bertène Juminer, published a ‘Manifesto to provide a new start for the
DOM’, in which they described this alienation in these terms:
Departmentalisation has undeniably set in motion processes of
modernisation, raising the standard of living, general improvement of
conditions of existence and social relations, but it has also been perverted
into a syndrome of generalised welfare benefits, increased dependency and
an anaesthetisation of the population which took deeper and deeper hold,
the more the transfer of public money increased in volume. (Chamoiseau et
al. 2000)  
On 3 May 2000, Raphaël Confiant gave a talk at the French Institute in London, in
which he described the relation to France as one of a woman to a man, where the
woman is entirely kept. The man (France) may eventually want a divorce. If so, the
woman will then have to work to earn her own living, but, until then, she will be
happy to stay in this situation of total dependence.
Whether one feels inclined to reject this rather old-fashioned view of
relationships as a suitable metaphor for this ‘postcoloniality without independence’
or not, there is no doubt that there is little real independent political control over
decision-making, either in respect of internal, local policy or with regard to relations
with neighbours or as part of the wider world. On the international stage, the DOM
are represented only through France, which has consistently vetoed their
classification as colonies at the United Nations, with the support of other former
colonies, including Senegal under Senghor. They are part of Europe, by dint of being
part of France, and yet have no voice of their own in determining European policy.
Relations with their Caribbean neighbours are still undeveloped, in spite of attempts
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to forge closer ties with the Caricom trading partners, ironically by France becoming
a member of this body. It remains easier to travel between Martinique and France
than locally within the Caribbean. Even within the world of La Francophonie, they
are seriously under-represented. 
There is some support for full independence, and greater support for more
regional autonomy. The Martiniquan nationalist and President of the Conseil
Régional de Martinique, Alfred Marie-Jeanne, has campaigned along these lines,
along with the representatives of Guadeloupe and Guiana. Earlier nationalist
movements, such as the OJAM (Organisation de la jeunesse anticolonialiste de la
Martinique), created in 1962, were quickly repressed.5 However, to a certain extent,
there appears to have been a transfer of political energy into the cultural domain.
Indeed, since 1946, it has been the importance of cultural difference that has been
highlighted rather than the grounds for national independence. Césaire and other
Caribbean thinkers, while warning of the dangers of ‘cultural genocide’,6 have
accepted that the political battle has to be waged on the terrain of equality,
substantial not formal, within the framework of the French nation. 
The Caribbean territories have thus become something of an ‘exception’ within
the overall contours of the anticolonial struggles and there is a certain irony in the
fact that two of the great thinkers of the anticolonial national liberation struggles,
Césaire and Fanon, who had such an impact elsewhere in the world, did not put their
theories to the test on their home soil. In Césaire’s case, it is notable that his most
important writings denouncing colonialism were produced after
départementalisation, yet one would be hard-pressed to find any specific analysis or
strategy for the Caribbean in texts such as the Discourse on Colonialism, published in
1955. Although there was palpable disappointment with the outcome of
assimilation, there is no suggestion of going back on that choice, and Césaire’s
political strategy remained limited to seeking further reforms to improve the
economic and social situation of the population. His disillusion comes through,
nonetheless, in his poetry, where he notably described Martinique as an ‘absurdly
botched version of paradise’ (‘une version du paradis absurdement ratée’) (Césaire
1982).   
The development of theories of créolité and creolisation (see Chapter 7) has also
had an impact, albeit more limited, in the political sphere, where they have
contributed to the development of a new perspective on the position of the
Caribbean territories in the world. In this conception, borders are fluid; relations of
interaction extend to the international plane, where they take place between different
peoples, cultures and ideas. 
In the ‘Manifeste pour refonder les DOM’, mentioned above, it is made clear
that the issues that concern the Caribbean territories cannot be resolved through the
bilateral relationship with France alone. Just as there is a global dimension to the
problems, so too are the options available for their solution global in scope. ‘The
world, and not only France, is on our horizon,’ the authors proclaimed. ‘It was
through départementalisation that France gave us access to her world. We ourselves
must now gain access to the world’s horizons’ (Chamoiseau et al. 2000). However,
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there was nothing utopian about this text. Instead, the key approach was
characterised by realism, combined with a recognition of the importance of synthesis
and inclusivity and a desire to face up to the very specific situation of the Caribbean
territories.
At the same time, a redefinition of the relationship to the land has also been
characteristic of this type of thinking. Where alienation and exile from the ancestral
lands of Africa had formed the dominant paradigm in the past, the new thinking
emphasises the importance of acknowledging organic ties to the soil of the Caribbean
territories, within an ecological perspective that respects the unity and
interdependence of all aspects of the environment and its living organisms. This is in
stark contrast to the exploitation of men and nature characteristic of the plantation
economy and also a response to the effects of bétonisation. 
There is, of course, a certain irony that this should be so in what are, in reality,
some of the last colonies of France.
Notes
1. As Nicolas Bancel and Pascal Blanchard have put it: ‘Cet aspect de la  “visibilité” des
immigrés issus de l’ex-Empire colonial français reste profondément ancré dans la société
française contemporaine’ (Bancel and Blanchard 1997: 29, note 26).
2. ‘Dans le monde blanc, l’homme de couleur rencontre des difficultés dans l’élaboration de
son schéma corporel. La connaissance du corps est une activité uniquement négatrice.
C’est une connaissance en troisième personne’ (Fanon (1952)/1975: 89).
3. In fact, the harem was normally confined to a small urban elite and did not represent the
reality of the situation of most ‘oriental’ women (Clancy-Smith and Gray-Ware Metcalf
1993).
4. ‘L’image est produit de son temps mais aussi révélateur des non-dits d’une société, de ses
fantasmes, de ses phobies. Elle rend possible une reconstitution du contexte mental dans
lequel s’inscrit sa relation à l’Autre’ (Bancel and Blanchard 1997: 9).
5. Their manifesto appears as an appendix in Confiant 1996: 313–16.
6. Speech by Césaire in the Assemblée nationale, February 1978.
238 | Postcoloniality
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 238




After examining various aspects of the long history of France’s relationships withher erstwhile or present colonies, the point has been reached where we need to
pose the question of what the specifically French dimension to postcoloniality might
be or, indeed, whether there is a French dimension to postcoloniality. At the heart of
these questions is the matter of the continuing relevance of postcoloniality as an
influence on these relationships, as a factor of explanation of some of the issues on
the present agenda or as part of any strategy for the future.
Postcolonialism and the New ‘New World Order’
There is a general consensus in the world today regarding the existence of
unacceptable poverty and inequality. While there is no general agreement on the
causes of this great global divide between the affluent, ‘developed’ countries and the
wretched, ‘underdeveloped’ countries, there are few coherent explanations on offer
that do not situate its origins in the history of imperialism. According to this type of
explanation, the causes of the present lamentable state of many of the poorest, most
indebted countries of the planet lie in their former status as colonies or semi-colonies
of the world’s imperial powers. To contest this is to discount the fact that the single
shared characteristic of all those countries worst affected today is their historical
status as former colonies. 
There is no shortage of people today who will argue that imperialism was, on
the whole, a good thing, beneficial to the territories and peoples concerned, bringing
in its train peace, prosperity and, most importantly, development. Niall Ferguson has
made this case for the British Empire (Ferguson 2003). Even the British Chancellor,
Gordon Brown, campaigning for measures to bring an end to poverty during his tour
of Africa in January 2005, sang to the same hymn-sheet. It was time, he said, to stop
apologising for Britain’s colonial history. The British should be proud of those who
had formed the backbone of the British Empire, which had been ‘open, outward and
international’ (Guardian, 27 January 2005). He repeated these views in an interview
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on BBC Newsnight on 14 March 2005, when he stressed it was time to put forward
the positive virtues of British values (The Times, 15 March 2005). This is in contrast
to recently reported remarks by Jacques Chirac, who is reported to have responded
angrily to criticism of Africans taking their children out of school to work in the
fields with a reminder of the realities of French colonialism (Libération, 21
September 2004). We have seen, however, in Chapter 8, that, at the instigation of
members of his own political movement, a law normalising the revisionist
revalorisation of colonialism was passed in February 2005, provoking considerable
controversy. For the apologists of empire, the corollary of their position is that it was
not imperialism or colonialism that contributed to the current problems, but the
ending of empire; it was the accession to independence that arrested the
development process, thus leading to underdevelopment. 
The links between imperialism and development, along with the ambiguities
and contradictions that arise, have already been discussed in Chapter 2. Any theory
that emphasises ‘development’ as the primary process at work in empire risks elision
into an apologia for imperialism and colonialism. The impetus for the historical
spread of global capitalism needs to be sought elsewhere, in the grasping of the
opportunities for making profits and super-profits. Viewed in this light, it becomes
clear that it is not underdevelopment that is the prime issue but super-exploitation.
In other words, it is because of super-exploitation on the part of the imperialist
economic powers that global capitalism has produced the effects it has, not because
of underdevelopment on the part of the formerly colonised, aided and abetted by the
failings of the post-independence regimes. Arguing otherwise is an attempt to shift
responsibility from the perpetrators to the victims. 
Moreover, revisionist theories of imperialism tend to prioritise the political
benefits of empire. The peace and order brought by the imperial administration and
juridical system are highlighted. ‘Development’ is often seen primarily in educational,
moral or cultural terms and the primacy of the economic processes at work is
obscured. If, on the contrary, the analysis grounds itself in these economic processes,
it produces an account of their continuity into the present age, whereby the same
fundamental operations of capital accumulation and extraction of super-profits
operate within a framework that continues to be dominated by the hegemony of
finance capital, with the addition of the further opportunities generated by unequal
trade and by the servicing of debts incurred in a development process largely based on
importing technology, as well as the trading in arms to shore up post-independence
regimes in confrontations with real or imagined internal or external enemies. 
One of the positive features of a postcolonial framework of analysis is thus to
stress this continuity in a world where the formal end of colonialism has not
diminished the overall economic, political and cultural hegemony of the ‘North’ or
the ‘West’ or the G7/G8 countries over the rest of the world, where, on the contrary,
this hegemony has adapted to new circumstances and gone from strength to strength
to become all-pervasive. The underlying binary divide between those who mainly
benefit from the current global economic system and those who mainly suffer its
undesirable consequences is still fundamental, in spite of the challenges by some
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former colonies or semi-colonies in Asia and Latin America that are increasingly
moving into stronger economic positions and demanding their share of the cake.
Moreover, although power has become increasingly concentrated in the hands of the
United States, the former European colonial powers still have important roles to play
in maintaining the systemic hegemony of global capitalism, as well as in carving out
for themselves particular spheres of influence. 
The picture is, of course, further complicated by the alliances that are forged
between nations and groups of nations on either side of the divide, bringing in
diverse regimes as junior partners in this globalised system. France, however, more
than any other of the former European colonial powers, has consistently maintained
a policy of consolidation and strengthening its influence in key parts of its former
empire, notably in Africa. It has done this with ever-increasing sophistication,
employing the full gamut of representations and discourses to convince the formerly
colonised world of the benefits and attractions of remaining within the French orbit,
whilst remaining ready to intervene with more crude political or military means if
the situation appears to warrant it. Its recent involvement in the Ivory Coast is a case
in point, or, at least, this is how it has been perceived. Indeed, in an interview
published in Le Parisien, the Ivory Coast President, Laurent Gbagbo, compared the
intervention of troops participating in Operation Licorne to that of the Soviet tanks
in Prague in 1968, claiming that this was how things worked in the cosiness of the
French fold (Le Monde, 16 December 2004).1
France has used its colonial history and relationships to support its attempts to go
it alone, often in partial defiance of American interests, as with its nuclear policy and
its various challenges to the dominance of American mass culture. France has also
contrived to maintain, and indeed extend, an independent sphere of influence in
Africa and the Middle East, particularly with its pro-Arab policy, including its
nuanced opposition to the war in Iraq in 2004. To some extent, this was facilitated by
the little interest which America has shown hitherto in Africa, though this now
appears to be in the process of changing, as also with American efforts to encourage
the formation of a new Middle Eastern grouping, linked by adherence to the
‘democratic way’. There is also clear evidence of keen American interest in Algeria in
particular, formerly considered the chasse gardée of France, but now seen as a linchpin
of American policy to create the ‘grand Moyen-Orient’ not only because of its oil, but
also because of the role it might play in collaboration on security issues, with joint
military exercises with NATO already under way (Roberts 2003; Guardian, 3 March
2003; Quotidien d’Oran, 14 April, 11 November, 1 December 2004). 
The relation with France continues, of course, to play an important role. After
a shaky start with the new regime of President Bouteflika in 1999, when French
criticism of the election was dismissed with outrage by Bouteflika as evidence that
Paris still wished to exert a ‘form of protectorate’ over Algeria (Le Monde, 30 July
1999), France has gone out of its way to attempt to mend relations and set them on
a new footing.
France has also not been slow to stretch out a hand to the former African colonies
of other European powers, notably those of Britain, which have been made very
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welcome for some years now at the Franco-African summits that have taken place since
1973. Rivalry between the spheres of influence of Francophonie and Anglophonie has
also operated elsewhere in the world, even in the South Pacific, as in the case of the
territory formerly known as the New Hebrides, and jointly administered as an Anglo-
French condominium until its independence in 1980 (Ager 1996).
Indeed, France has appeared more than ready to impinge on the British sphere
of influence, for instance, with its invitation to President Robert Mugabe of
Zimbabwe to join the 22nd Franco-African summit in Paris in February 2003, in
apparent defiance of the sanctions and travel ban imposed on his regime by the
European Union, the United States and the Commonwealth (Le Monde, 20 February
2003). The re-emergence of rivalries between the former colonial powers may well
presage future developments. 
There is certainly evidence that France is taking unilateral action or seeking
alliances from within continental Europe to plough a different furrow and not follow
Britain’s lead in wishing to stay in the slipstream of American foreign policy. The
United States, in its turn, has felt under no obligation to respect the spheres of
influence of the former European colonial powers, and has become increasingly
interventionist in recent years. Following the trauma of its failed intervention in
Vietnam, there had been something of a moratorium, during which it had been
content, by and large, to exert its domination through client, puppet regimes and,
indeed, to remain wary of direct military involvement in other countries. Of course,
this reluctance to take military action had not extended to its own backyard in
Central and South America, where it was heavily involved in covert or semi-
clandestine operations, such as its support for the Contras in Nicaragua and the
Pinochet regime in Chile, or overt actions, such as the invasion of Grenada in 1983.
In the case of Grenada, a former British colony and member of the British
Commonwealth, Ronald Reagan was prepared to put his alliance with Britain and
special relationship with Margaret Thatcher in jeopardy by going ahead with this
action without consultation or regard for the Queen’s position of sovereignty with
regard to the island. Moreover, from the beginning of the 1990s, America has
become increasingly ready to contemplate direct military intervention further afield
to protect or develop its economic and political interests, beginning with the first
Gulf War in 1991.
Another consequence of the further developments undergone by global
capitalism, is that ‘North’ and ‘South’ can no longer, if they ever could, be considered
as monolithic blocs facing each other across a single clear divide. The cracks and
divisions between the powers that collectively constitute the North, whilst never
entirely absent, have begun seriously to undermine the whole edifice constructed
upon the major global alliances. Similarly, the uneven development of global
capitalism within the countries that could formally be considered part of the ‘South’,
or the ‘majority world’, has dramatically changed the picture, with new and changing
alliances the order of the day.
Postcolonial analysis has tended not to take these developments fully on board,
although its stress on the continuity of the postcolonial relation has also been
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tempered by an emphasis on the evolution of that relation into new and changing
forms, in what some would see as an overstating of the extent to which
contradictions have been eliminated. To take into account the actual complexities of
the power shifts and increasing, if uneven, involvement of the ‘majority world’
countries in the systemic functioning of global capitalism, a more complex analysis
is needed. At the same time, any such analysis also needs to determine where the
fault-lines currently fall between those who profit from such a system and those
whose sufferings are largely due to it. 
As well as an analysis of the economic relations, labour and trading issues,
operations of international finance and so on that this would require, but which is
outside the scope of this book, the importance of looking more deeply into the type
of thinking that is dominant at the present time should not be neglected. This relates
not just to theoretical analyses of the problems and their possible solutions but also
to the use of ideology, by which is meant here credible representations for the
rationalisation of the status quo or future enterprises and ventures. 
Before moving on to a discussion of some of these theoretical issues, it will
probably be useful to sum up the various stages in the development of postcoloniality
to arrive at a clearer understanding of the present situation. 
Since decolonisation, the configuration of international relations between the
different powers has been subject to a series of important modifications. The
predominance of the former great European powers, with their system of ad hoc
bilateral treaties and alliances, was replaced with the emergence of the two
superpowers in the wake of the Second World War along with their rival camps and
allies. This meant that the period of decolonisation was closely overlain and
interwoven with the ongoing confrontation between the Soviet bloc and the
American-led alliance NATO.
However, even at the height of the polarisation of the conflict between the two
blocs (Korean War, Cuban Missile Crisis, Cold War, Vietnam War), often played out
through proxies in the former European colonies, it was never the only show in town.
All over the globe, new multilateral alliances were being forged. Moreover, the
polarity of the Cold War was never absolute, and the international communist
movement was already showing signs of fission with the Sino-Soviet split in 1961. 
At the global level, major international institutions came into being, not least of
these being the United Nations itself, with its institutional structures reflecting the
balance of global forces at the end of the Second World War, but also the so-called
Bretton Woods international financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. It was also the time for the emergence of new regional
groupings, including the Arab League in 1944, the OAS (Organisation of American
States) in 1948 and the beginning of the process of European construction from
1952, as well as military alliances, such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
The formal ending of the British and French Empires contributed to this process
with the expansion of the British Commonwealth (formerly comprised of the old
Dominions of Canada, Australia, etc.) to the ‘new Commonwealth’ countries and
the more gradual growth of La Francophonie in the French sphere of influence. In the
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process or wake of decolonisation, further groupings were initiated, notably the
Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, the Organisation of African Unity (now the
African Union) in 1963, ASEAN (Association of South East Asian Nations) in 1967,
UAM (Union of the Arab Maghreb) in 1989 and many others.
In the immediate aftermath of decolonisation, it became customary to articulate
the divisions on the basis of the concepts of the First, Second and Third Worlds. The
notion of the Third World, ‘Tiers-Monde’, appeared first in French, before being
taken up in English. Its first use is generally credited to Alfred Sauvy in an article of
L’Observateur of 14 August 1952, in which he made the specific connection with the
Third Estate – ‘ce Tiers-Monde, ignoré, exploité, méprisé, comme le Tiers-Etat’, as in the
Abbé Sieyès’s pamphlet of 1789. The terms ‘First World’ and ‘Second World’
appeared much later (1967 and 1974, respectively) and then in English. 
The reasoning behind this threefold division always appeared confused and
confusing. On the one hand, it took the old division of French Ancien Régime society
into three estates (the aristocracy, the clergy and the rest, grouped into the third
estate) and superimposed thereon the clash of the different socio-economic models
and power blocs represented by capitalism and communism. The result was a hybrid
in which, in some versions at least, the First World represented the capitalist West,
the Second the communist East and the third, broadly speaking, the formerly
colonised or newly independent countries. 
In effect, the division of the world along these lines was an ideological construct
that could not possibly satisfy anyone, except possibly some denizens of the First
World, who could wallow in their supposed superiority, and some supporters of
Third Worldism. For the latter, the attraction lay in the justification it provided for
their demands for the Third World to come into its own and achieve parity with the
others, in some new version of the French Revolution. 
The notion of the Third World has also been linked to the category of the ‘non-
aligned’ countries. The Non-Aligned Movement, which emerged from the 1955
Bandung Conference of twenty-nine African and Asian countries, was formally
established at its first conference, held in 1961 in Belgrade. The Yugoslavian leader, Tito,
was one of its main instigators, along with Nehru, Nkrumah, Sukarno and Nasser. The
idea was to encourage and support close cooperation between these countries,
particularly as far as their development agenda was concerned, while avoiding the pitfalls
of too close an alliance with one or other of the superpowers. The structures of the
movement, which still meets every three years, were deliberately kept vague, in order to
avoid infiltration and undue influence by the superpowers. In reality, however, many of
these countries were allied, to a greater or lesser extent, to one or other of the blocs,
which went out of their way to court them. Much of the work of the Non-Aligned
Movement has traditionally been carried out at the United Nations, which, during the
Cold War period, was not ineffective in maintaining some kind of balance between the
two power blocs and keeping a watching brief over the (former) colonies.
Many in the so-called ‘Third World’, however, rejected this categorisation as
demeaning and not in correspondence with their real potential economic and
political power. In many ways, it seemed to reinforce the tendencies of the former
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colonial powers to dominate their former colonial possessions, albeit in new forms,
collectively categorised as neocolonialism, most notably by Kwame Nkrumah in his
book Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (Nkrumah 1965). Yet, for all its
difficulties, the notion of the Third World did reflect at least the perceived need for
the countries concerned to come together and cooperate in the face of the common
problems they faced, in a process that transcended the old bilateral forms of
domination and subservience characteristic of colonialism. To an extent, therefore,
there was some counterweight to offset the continuing of the colonial relations under
new forms. In reality, the support of the Soviet bloc, and later the Chinese
communists, was of much more substantial help in terms of material and ideological
support. Most of the former French colonies, however, particularly those in sub-
Saharan Africa, with the singular exception of Sékou Touré’s Guinea, were content to
remain within the bilateral fold and relied heavily on French paternalistic patronage.
The configuration of global forces was dramatically changed by the collapse of
Soviet power at the end of the 1980s. On the one hand, this led to the growing
hegemony of US power worldwide, although, again, this was never absolute. The last
two decades of the twentieth century were dominated by the assertion of American
power throughout the globe and attempts to stamp the triumph of capitalism
indelibly on the weaker economies of the world through the mechanisms of the
international financial institutions. Nonetheless, however great the power of the
United States during this period, other new forces were already emerging that would
eventually challenge the existence of a single pole of dominance. The rise of new
capitalist powers, not least the so-called Asian tigers, began to challenge the
economic pre-eminence of the West. Moreover, new blocs, such as the enlarged and
reconfigured European Union, came into being to counterbalance American power,
not just on the economic front, but also potentially on the political front.
During this period, France pursued its own policies, in its own way and using
those instruments available to it: cosy paternalism or outright military interventionism
in its bilateral relations, struggles for influence and leadership in Europe, growing
recognition of the potential of the Francophone movement and willingness to be
involved. Increasingly, France has put itself forward as the champion of the wretched
of the earth, presenting an alternative that is often couched in terms to the Left of
the other options. In many ways, it is a position that is largely based on rhetoric, a
rhetoric that has been associated with the vision of the ‘good France’. Thus, de Gaulle
could claim in his New Year message for 1968 that ‘the objectives of our action are
related to each other and, because they are French, correspond to the interests of
humanity’. In his presidential inauguration address of 21 May 1981, François
Mitterrand also spoke of  ‘a France standing for justice and solidarity, governed by
the desire to live in peace with everyone, [which] may act as a beacon for the progress
of the human race’ (www.elysee.fr/instit/invests.htm). 
The power of its rhetoric and its real effect in the world cannot, however, be
denied. It is significant that, following France’s support for the Palestinian cause and,
specifically, its assistance to the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, over his last years,
the only flag flown at his funeral at Ramallah, apart from the Palestinian national
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flag, was the French tricolour, which was explicitly (re)claimed as the symbol of
revolt and freedom (Quotidien d’Oran, 17 November 2004). 
For the post-independence countries, this period was not a happy one on the
whole, with a decline in their economic performance, a decrease in revenue from
trade, growing indebtedness and loss of control over their own policies, with
measures imposed on them from outside. The dawning of the new millennium,
closely followed by the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001,
marked the inauguration of a further new phase in international relations. 
On the one hand, the USA became even more determined to exert its global
hegemony, with the launching of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in the name of the
fight against terror. Yet again, the old dualism characteristic of relations between the
imperial powers and those being subjugated has assumed a new form, though
drawing on the same basic model that has been adapted from the dawn of the global
capitalist age. The notions of an international law applicable on the same terms to all
nations is once again challenged by the notion of the restriction of this law to a
particular category of nation or state, with those considered to be beyond the pale no
longer covered by the terms of international conventions and treaties. The idea that
there are some ‘terrorists’ to whom the normal internationally accepted standards of
human rights and war conventions need not apply can be traced back to the earlier
beliefs that the heathen are not covered by the accepted norms of Christendom and
that the barbarians can be subject to any treatment decided by the ‘civilised’. 
John Stuart Mill had already ridiculed the idea that international law should be
applied to all:
There is a great difference between the case in which the nations concerned
are of the same, or something like the same, degree of civilization, and that
in which one of the parties to the situation is of a high, and the other of a
very low, grade of social improvement. To suppose that the same
international customs, and the same rules of international morality, can
obtain between one civilized nation and another and between civilized
nations and barbarians is a grave error, and one which no statesman can fall
into, however it may be that those who, from a safe and unresponsible
position criticize statesmen ... To characterize any conduct towards the
barbarous people as a violation of the Law of Nations, only shows that he
who so speaks has never considered the subject. (John Stuart Mill, ‘A Few
Words on Non-Intervention’, in Dissertations and Discussions, Vol. 3,
London, 1867, pp. 153–58, quoted by Mazrui 1990: 19)
At the same time, new tendencies began to emerge. Amongst these was the growing
realisation that something had to be done about the plight of the world’s poor if the
global system was to continue to function. Thus, the early years of the Third
Millennium have seen a number of initiatives, ranging from non-governmental
campaigns to cancel the debt of the world’s poorest countries (Jubilee 2000) to
government-sponsored initiatives, such as Britain for Africa. France’s contribution to
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this process has been to continue to work through the organisations of Francophonie,
as well as to investigate new methods of financing aid, notably through international
taxation (see Chapter 8). In all of this, there has been a certain amount of possibly
healthy rivalry for influence as prime benefactor of Africa’s neediest states. There has
been much promotional coverage and star-studded publicity for these initiatives.
At the same time, and largely unannounced in the Western press, the African
countries themselves have been getting together and putting together their own
initiatives for dealing with the problems they face. One of the most significant of
these initiatives in recent times has been the setting up of NEPAD (New Partnership
for Africa’s Development) by the African Union. The five initiating heads of state of
Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa were given a mandate to develop
a strategic framework for development, which was formally adopted at the 37th
Summit of what was then still the Organisation for African Unity in 2001. 
It stresses as its primary objectives: (1) to eradicate poverty; (2) to place African
countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and
development; (3) to halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalisation process
and enhance its full and beneficial integration into the global economy; and (4) to
accelerate the empowerment of women (http://www.nepad.org). To achieve these
goals, it has laid down a number of principles that are intended to guide the strategy.
First among these is that of ‘good governance’, posited as ‘a basic requirement for
peace, security and sustainable political and socio-economic development’. To
achieve this good governance, a number of principles and novel practices have been
proposed, such as the monitoring and evaluation on a reciprocal basis, in a type of
peer assessment, of progress made in improving the quality and transparency of
government and administration, as well as the fight against corruption. 
Absolutely central to the strategy is the idea of ‘African ownership and
leadership’, the full use of all African resources and the participation of all Africans,
as well as Africa-wide cooperation in the effort to achieve development, in which the
transformation of the ‘unequal partnership between Africa and the developed world’
does not just constitute an objective in its own right, but is also an integral part of
the process (http://www.nepad.org). The reclamation of the right and responsibility
for self-evaluation is a crucial part of the aim to take back control from the ‘donor’
nations and international financial institutions. Twenty-four African countries
signed up to the MAEP (Mécanisme africain d’évaluation par les pairs), set up in
March 2003. Of these, four countries (Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius and Rwanda) were
due to be appraised at the beginning of 2005, and Algeria at the end of the year
(Quotidien d’Oran, 17 November 2004).
The initiative to set up NEPAD appears to have inspired a number of new
groupings, often on the basis of specific alliances to achieve particular pragmatic
goals linked to development, on a bilateral or regional sub-grouping basis, such as
the South Africa–Algeria Binational Commission and the South Africa–Algeria
Business Forum. These new associations are concrete evidence of the expression of a
new determination for African countries to take back the reins and regain control of
their own development in partnership with their neighbours. 
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Given the immensity of the problems, the extent of the obstacles posed by the
world economic and political order and its inbuilt inequality and exploitation, the
scale of indebtedness, the material shortages, the lack of infrastructure, the
prevalence of disease and armed conflict, together with an entrenched culture of
profiteering by unaccountable leaders and the extent and intensity of previous
disappointments, it remains to be seen whether a turning point has indeed been
reached and, if it has, whether such efforts will be allowed to make progress happen
without being stymied from either within or without. 
There is, however, considerable evidence that these developments are marking a
new phase, or at any rate a new discourse, a new will to bring in this new phase,
which is, in any event, a necessary, if not sufficient, condition of its coming into
being in reality. The assertion that ‘where there is a will, there is a way’ may not
always be founded on fact; however, where there is no will, there is certainly never
going to be a way.
Not only are the new approaches and initiatives a sign of a new pragmatism, a
determination to employ those means that are likely to prove effective in kick-
starting the process of development and making eclectic choices from a variety of
possibilities, but they may also be described in terms of a process of ‘normalisation’,
or the beginnings of a process to move towards normalisation. 
Normalisation and Order
By normalisation is meant a shift away from the parameters of the colonial or
postcolonial relations, in which the status of the post-independence states is
determined in relation to their former status as colonies. It means engaging with
other countries, including the former colonial power, without the colonial history
being the primary factor defining the terms of the relationship, whether this has been
to make colonialism the cause of current ills or to lock coloniser and colonised in a
never-ending regurgitation of old sores or disabling dependency.
One of the effects of these developments has been to ensure that the
opportunities for alliances and cooperation are now greater than they have ever been
for the post-independence states. Increasingly, they are realising the advantages of
playing the field, rather than tying themselves too closely to any particular ally or
patron. Those countries involved in the NEPAD initiative do not rule out
cooperation with initiatives coming from elsewhere. Indeed, these opportunities
have been welcomed so long as they are in line with the basic principles of African
self-development (Quotidien d’Oran, 1 December 2004). Algeria has become adept
at taking advantage of all the possibilities open to it over the last few years and is
consequently courted by France and the US, while it is increasingly active within the
African continent, the Arab world and the Maghreb. Investment has been sought
and obtained from a wide variety of countries outside the postcolonial orbit of
previous years. China, Turkey, Japan all have an important role to play and plans
have been announced for the Indian steel magnate, Lakshmi Mittal, to take over
much of the former state-owned steel industry (Liberté, 20 December 2004). 
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Normalisation in this sense, then, implies finding a new basis for international
relations that is not founded on the previous colonial order. It seems opportune at
this point to look a little more closely at the concept of ‘order’ and the role it has
played in global capitalist imperialism.
It has already appeared as part of the rationale for imperialism put forward by
the imperialist powers, which were wont to portray their colonial endeavours as
bringing ‘order’, in economic, political, social and cultural terms, to the benighted
regions of the globe. However, it has also played an important, though less discussed,
part in anticolonial discourse. 
First, it plays a part in the analysis of the colonial period itself, which is seen as
an aberration, a departure from normality, a disturbance of the proper balance of
things, a disruption or a state of disorder. Fanon, for instance, spoke of Europe’s
‘disorder’, its ‘mad rush to the abyss’.2 For Césaire, it was the relations between Europe
and the non-European peoples that were marked by disorder and abnormality. He saw
the end of colonialism as the premise of a return to order. Speaking of the importance
of the 1955 Bandung Conference, he made it clear that it was not Europe or
European civilisation that was condemned at this event, it was the ‘intolerable form
that, in the name of Europe, some people thought they had to impose on the relations
that should normally be in place between Europe and the non-European peoples’. The
Bandung Conference marked the moment when it was made clear to Europe that ‘the
time of European imperialism was over and that, for the greater good of civilisation,
it was necessary for Europe to return to the common order’.3 This was not posited as
a return to some golden age in the past. For Césaire, it implied a return to a normal
state of affairs, how things should be in the proper order of things. 
As we have seen in Chapter 3, Césaire was well aware that the process by which it
would be achieved would be characterised by disorder, even the violent whirlwind of
revolution. For Fanon too, there had to be a process of disorder. ‘Decolonisation’, he
said, ‘which proposed changing the order of the world, is, as you can see, a programme
of absolute disorder’ (Fanon (1961)/1987: 25). This may mean violence or disruption
of traditional social divisions and cultural practices, as for instance with the
participation of women in militant activity of one type or another. However, not all
anticolonial fighters have seen the process of liberation as necessarily entailing disorder.
The struggle itself may create its own kind of order, or discipline, as M’hamed Férid
Ghazi remarked, in connection with women and old people participating in the
nationalist demonstrations (Ghazi 1956).4 Indeed, some advocates of the Gandhian
theory of non-violence, satyagraha, have seen the struggle itself as the articulation of
order or discipline. This was in stark contrast to the perceived lack of order on the part
of the British Raj. When asked what he thought about Western civilisation by a British
journalist in 1931, Gandhi famously replied that ‘I think it would be a good idea’
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/society_culture/multicultural/). 
As for the objectives of the anticolonial struggles, the notion of a return to order
or a movement forward to establish a new order had figured high up on the agenda.
Moves to establish a new order have often taken the shape of a future utopia or ideal
society, whether this be one based on socialism or communism, secular nationalism
The French Dimension? | 249
Majumdar text3  8/5/07  19:33  Page 249
This open access library edition is supported by Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale.
or Islamic law, or indeed a neo-conservative paradise, in which the all-embracing
powers of the state are used to ‘roll back the state’. 
Fine though some of these ideal societies may sound, there is a conceptual
problem that is common to them all. All are based on a conception of the world that
implies that there will be an end to struggle, an end to contradiction. Whether this
be in the form of the classless society, the stateless society, the conflict-free society, all
imply the end of history as a dynamic process based on struggle and a static
conception of the new order. 
This is where the problem arises, for, in fact, ongoing critique and struggle will
always be a vital part of any new order. There can be no once-and-for-all new order
that will make everything right for all time. New problems will arise, which will
require new solutions. There will be a constant need to challenge the status quo, to
carry out new analyses, to redefine and adjust goals and objectives in the light of new
circumstances and developments. New strategies for dealing with problems will be
required. The new order will never be in stasis, but will present a number of
interacting dynamic, dialectical processes, offering the potential for new ways forward,
as well as the risk of regression. Rather than seeing this as the unavoidable failure of
utopian solutions or as an inevitable source of disappointment and disillusion leading
to inactivity and resignation, there is a more positive way of seeing how this opens up
opportunities to engage with history in a more responsible, critical and mature way. 
Returning to the issue of ‘normalisation’, it is time now to sum up how far one
can describe the relations between France and her former empire as still characterised
by postcolonialism, and how far they can now be seen as ‘normalised’ in the sense
used above. What is clear is that there is no single paradigm, but rather a number of
different patterns, ranging from ongoing colonial relations in the case of the DOM
and to a lesser extent the TOM, via the continuation of colonial-type relations
between France and many of her former sub-Saharan African colonies, to the
enduring vestiges of paradigms and attitudes deriving from colonialism in the case of
the postcolonial diaspora living in France.
There are undoubted moves on the part of some former colonies, notably
Algeria, to move away from the postcolonial framework. All this suggests that the
transition away from postcoloniality may be under way, but these countries are still
on the cusp of change and it will be some time before the transition will be complete.
Indeed, there is a strong case that, so long as development remains the major issue
for the former colonies, postcoloniality will remain a significant factor of analysis,
though not necessarily a helpful element of any solution. 
This transitional configuration may be viewed as an underlying set of processes:
the ongoing processes associated with global capitalist imperialism are the most
fundamental determinants; then the specific dynamics of the relations with the
former colonial powers come into play; overlying these are the new processes and
relations creating links and potentialities outside and on top of the former frame.
It remains to consider the discourses, ideologies and theories currently available for
use in this transitional period and to articulate the relations which exist at the present
time between France and her former colonies, as well as their role in relation to change.
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Postcolonial Theory and the Francophone World
There appears to have been considerable resistance to postcolonial theory in the
francophone world. The theoretical production of the anglophone world in this area
has often met with indifference in French-speaking countries, and especially in France
itself. Jean-Marc Moura has claimed that the reasons for this are, on the one hand, the
political or ideological tenor of much of the debate in postcolonial theory, coupled with
the fact of its ‘Anglo-Saxon’ origins (see also Britton and Syrotinski 2001; Moura 2003:
191).5 However, if one takes a broader view, it will be seen that Francophone work in
this area has often been at the forefront of what might come under the umbrella of
postcolonial theory. One only has to look at the contribution to this theory by writers
such as Césaire, Fanon and Memmi, all products of French colonialism, as well as the
fact that French theorists such as Lacan, Derrida and Foucault are generally considered
to be central to the writings of many postcolonial critics.
Some of this reluctance has no doubt stemmed from a general unwillingness to
engage with theories or models that derive from the English-speaking or ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ world. There are nonetheless inherent problems with much of what passes as
‘postcolonial theory’ that could diminish its appeal.
These include the limitations of the field covered by this theory, the object of
which is usually restricted to the field of literature and ‘cultural studies’. Yet, at the
same time, the parameters set by its designation as ‘postcolonial’ necessarily imply a
close connection to the objective historical realities normally associated with
‘colonialism’ and its effects. This is not the study of literature or culture in a vacuum,
but one that posits its rootedness in the real historical conditions that have impinged
on it. Thus, there may also be problems with the way in which these objective
conditions are reflected or represented in the theory, not least in the term
‘postcolonial’ itself. 
One of these problems is the ongoing assumption common to much of this
theorising that the former colonies continue to exist in a binary relation with the
former colonising power. In other words, it assumes that the parameters of colonialism
continue to operate, albeit in a different form. The fact that a critique of binarism
often forms a substantial part of ‘postcolonial theory’ does not necessarily detract
from this. Although such critiques posit the change of the relation’s form from a
confrontational, oppositional one to a hybridised interaction between more equal
partners, they continue to posit a relation based on the same two terms, the (now
former) coloniser and colonised.
Not only is much of what passes as ‘postcolonial theory’ in fact ‘colonial theory’,
discussing and analysing the parameters of the colonial relation, as expressed in the
literature and other cultural forms of the colonial period, chronologically defined.
Even when the object of theory is post-independence literature or culture, it tends to
apply what is, in reality, an updated version of the colonial model. 
Moreover, the fact that the main development of postcolonial theory has been
the work of intellectuals in the former settler colonies of the anglophone world,
notably Australia, the United States and Canada, requires some explanation. Part of
the reason may very well lie in the ambiguities of the situation of such intellectuals,
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some of whom resent, or have an inferiority complex in relation to, the ‘mother
country’, as well as some sense of guilt at their own situation as part of the colonising
community, responsible for the subordination, ousting or extermination of the
peoples indigenous to those lands or the enslavement and forcible transportation of
other peoples. The contradictions that these circumstances may present to people of
good will may well inspire a desire to reconfigure the parameters of the relationship
between centre and periphery, to give themselves a more adequate role, as well as to
reformulate the relationship between coloniser and colonised in terms that are easier
to identify with. 
At the same time, many of those working within the problematic of ‘postcolonial
theory’ have their origins in the former colonies, but now form part of the
postcolonial diaspora, through migration to the former metropolitan heartlands or
the white settler colonies. For these, the problems that have to be addressed relate to
the ambiguities attached not just to their objective situation as part of two
antagonistic worlds but also to their subjective identities. It is no surprise that
questions relating to hybridity, voice and representation have come to the fore. 
The view of reality obtaining in the world view characteristic of postcolonialist
discourse implies a number of elements, some of which are at odds with each other.
On the one hand, it implies a comprehensive view of a multi-centred globalised
capitalism, in which the old divisions of the colonial period no longer hold sway;
indeed, it also tends to deny or attenuate these divisions retrospectively. At the same
time, it elevates a specific phase of global capitalist imperialism, colonialism, into the
whole or, at any rate, the main element of its view of history. Yet this is a view of
history that is extraordinarily static. It allows for no new dynamic to replace the
dynamic of struggle between coloniser and colonised. Thus, it is not only the end of
conflict but also the end of progress and, indeed, of any movement forward. 
There are clearly some theories, ideologies or value systems that tend to reinforce
the status quo, whereas others are more helpful in mobilising the human and other
resources necessary for change. I believe that there are two problematic areas that
deserve particular attention. These relate, on the one hand, to issues surrounding the
notion of hybridity and, on the other hand, those associated with questions of voice
and representation. 
Hybridity and Creolisation
It has indeed become one of the key tenets of postcolonial theory to emphasise the
hybridity and heterogeneity of modern cultures. In essence, both the theorisation of
Francophonie and the development of theories of créolité and créolisation represent
attempts to move away from the notion of a binary divide, particularly as far as the
relationship between France and its former colonies is concerned. Hybridity is, of
course, not a modern concept.  Indeed, it has played a role in a certain liberal
tradition of openness and tolerance at least since Montaigne, who described the
‘honnête homme’ as ‘a hybrid man’ (‘un homme mêlé’) (Montaigne 1962: 964).
Edward Said also stressed the hybridity and heterogeneity of all cultures (Said
1993: xxix), not just in the postcolonial world, but also in the colonial period: ‘To
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ignore or otherwise discount the overlapping experience of Westerners and Orientals,
the interdependence of cultural terrain in which colonizer and colonized coexisted
and battled each other through projections as well as rival geographies, narratives,
and histories, is to miss what is essential about the world in the past century’ (Said
1993: xxii–xxiii). Moreover, he stressed that what he called this ‘interdependence of
cultural terrain’ was not a recent phenomenon, but was set in motion by the
processes of imperialism, which by 1914 saw 85 per cent of the earth’s surface under
the colonial domination (in one form or another) of the Western powers. Now, while
Said stressed that this globalisation united the world in a single, interacting whole on
a scale never seen before (Said 1993: 7), he is also clear, following Fanon, that this
process was part and parcel of imperialism and cannot be separated from the
Manichaean division that characterised the hegemony of the imperial powers. 
Yet much of the postcolonial theorising about hybridisation, in spite of its real
insights, nonetheless explicitly downplays the historical polarisation of the experience
of colonisation and slavery, as well as the ongoing effects of its legacy in the present
global divide. The following quotation from an essay by Michael Dash on Jacques-
Stephen Alexis and Wilson Harris is given as just one, but an early, example of this
tendency. The essay has valid and important things to say about the process of survival
and the power of a counterculture of the imagination, as well as the emergence of an
aesthetic based on literary, rather than political, values. However, referring to the
engagement of ‘Third World’ writers with history, involving either a ‘continuous and
desperate protest’ or the retreat into cynicism, he says:
such attitudes to the continuum of history left out of account a significant
and positive part of the history of the Third World. It made it difficult to
see beyond the tragedy of circumstance to the complex processes of survival
which the autochthonous as well as the transplanted cultures in the New
World underwent. Such an investigation of the process of adaptation and
survival in the oppressed cultures of the New World could well change the
vision of the past which froze the New World writer in the prison of protest
and reveal the colonial legacy as a positive and civilising force in spite of the
brutality and privation which cloud this historical period …
Of what importance can the conception of such an ‘inner corrective’
on history be to the contemporary writer? It means fundamentally that in
the same way he can circumvent the ironies of history so can he avoid the
negativity of pure protest.  What can emerge is a literature of renascence –
a literary aesthetic and reality based on the fragile emergence of the Third
World personality from the privations of history. (M. Dash, ‘Marvellous
realism. The way out of négritude’, Caribbean Studies, 13:4, 1974 in
Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 1995b: 199–200)
Whatever the other intentions of the author here, there is a clear implication that the
history of empire needs to be rewritten in a way that seeks to transcend its negative
aspects and reveal it in a positive light. There are clear resonances with the thought
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of Glissant. Yet, unlike some who have seized on theories of hybridity and
hybridisation, créolité and créolisation to argue in favour of the end of resistance,
Glissant’s notion of an open-ended set of relations is not the prelude to the
acceptance of Western hegemony, but goes hand in hand with a new conception of
what resistance might be.
Although this is sometimes framed in somewhat obscure terms, it could be
argued that this has been done deliberately. For, in the face of what Glissant has
referred to as ‘l’universel de la transparence’, he proclaims the right to ‘opaqueness’ on
behalf of the ‘annihilated peoples’, who meet the West’s imposition of universal
knowledge with the ‘multiplicité sourde du Divers’.6
On the one hand, this is a cultural resistance through writing and other art
forms that takes as its basis the silence to which the ‘annihilated peoples’ have been
doomed by the hegemony of the Same.7 While this silence can be turned back on the
perpetrators and used as a weapon against their domination, there comes a point for
the writer when he wants to escape from this ‘obscure web where silence finds its
expression’ (Glissant (1980)/1997: 15). He wants to go beyond what he calls the ‘cri’,
the cry of complaint, the negative reaction to oppression, to forge a ‘parole’, to
articulate the collective voice of a people emerging from silence.8 This will entail a
positive opening up to the world, becoming attuned to its rhythms, assuming the
‘Relation’, i.e. the Relation between the Same, the norms of universalist ‘Western’
thought, and the Diverse, the diversity of emerging peoples.9 This is an attempt to
find a new way forward, abandoning the futile search to become the Same by
attempting to follow the path of assimilation, as well as remaining stuck, wallowing,
in the fixed particularity of individual difference.
However, this is not just a new poetics. It extends beyond this to a revalorisation
of the different forms of resistance that have operated historically in the Caribbean.
Confiant takes up this theme, contrasting the different forms of ‘silent and
multifarious resistance that has taken place on the margins of the omnipotence of the
plantation’, in which the people themselves have engaged and which are contrasted
with the more overt, spectacular types of revolutionary action and revolt, linked to
organised political action, of the type favoured by Césaire and the old anticolonialist
intellectual Left, following the example of Toussaint L’Ouverture or Lenin,10 when
they have not simply looked to assimilation with France. 
The people have always engaged in real or metaphorical forms of marronnage,
often unspectacular stratagems to circumvent authority, survival strategies ranging
from growing their own vegetables in their own, often hidden, plots and organising
parallel economic activities outside the plantation economy, to the more direct
resistance of the runaway slaves and present-day forms of dogged and often inventive
resistance, in which authority is not taken head on but is undermined by any number
of forms of silent, disguised subversion, often engaged in on an individual basis.11
We have seen that Glissant’s ‘identité de la relation’ is underpinned by what
remains the axiomatic assertion of a fundamental divide between the Same and the
Diverse, or the West and the ‘annihilated peoples’. An appreciation of the processes
of métissage or hybridisation does not of itself invalidate an analysis of the real
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divisions operating on the global plane or the need to oppose them. However, there
is always an inherent tendency within this approach to veer towards the acceptance
of the power relations and accommodation with them in the name of realism. There
is the danger that resistance becomes ineffectual and tokenistic. 
These notions have not been confined to the Caribbean. Indeed, there are many
instances of the phenomenon of métissage or hybridisation in the Mediterranean
world, as between the Maghreb and Europe in particular.12 It is a question of the
ideological value that is attributed to them, as in the case of Afrique Latine in the
1920s and 1930s, and the selectivity of an approach that highlights a common
Mediterranean culture, for instance, giving it higher priority than other elements
that are not primarily to do with identity issues. For, in any analysis of global political
and economic realities, the Mediterranean must figure as one of the key dividing
lines: between North and South, West and East, rich and poor, those who control
global capitalism and those who are controlled by it. The notion of the two shores –
‘les deux rives’ – is not to be dismissed lightly. 
There is no doubt that there is real fluidity of movements, through migrations,
travel, intellectual exchanges, as well as through the operation of the global forces of
the capitalist economy, involving economic production, financial dealings and
transactions, advertising in the global marketplace, cultural globalisation, all of
which involve interactions and encounters, leading to the emergence of hybrid
forms. However, the importance of such hybridity should not be overestimated at the
cost of an analysis of the real power relations that continue to operate on the
economic, social, political, military and cultural planes, reproducing and indeed
intensifying the binary divide that is the mark of the relations between those who
control the forces of global capitalism and those who are controlled by it.
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, we heard much about the death
of ideology. However, it appears, on the contrary, that ideology is very much alive
and kicking and, in accordance with one of the key characteristics of ideology,
assuming the mantle of common sense or natural truth. When used as an absolute
principle, with assumed moral value, rather than as a tool of analysis, theories of the
processes involved in the creation of hybrid forms can become something of a
misplaced crusade. For there is nothing inherently superior about a hybrid or
creolised entity. Value is a matter to be added by a moral or political agenda and will
depend on the particular context and set of circumstances. 
It is often the case that notions of hybridity have been assumed within an
ideological stance, which would have us believe that there are no fundamental
differences and oppositions any more, that everything is on a par, of equal value, and
that the divisions between ‘us’ and ‘them’ are no longer credible, if they ever were.
The history of the colonial period is rewritten to emphasise mutual influences and
interactions and to downplay the binary dialectic of opposites as a figure of the
colonial relations of domination and struggle. 
At the same time, this has involved a new emphasis on resistance by the
colonised to the colonising powers to mitigate the one-sided nature of the
domination. This in itself is no bad thing; resistance had indeed been an ongoing
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phenomenon in a variety of forms and re-evaluation here is no doubt long overdue.
However, what is somewhat suspect is, first, the customary restriction of this process
of re-evaluation to the cultural domain, whilst instances of political or military
resistance are not highlighted in the same way. Indeed, there is often an implicit, or
explicit, critique of the problematic of the anticolonial liberation struggles and the
binary oppositions that underpinned them. 
The corollary of this is that this cultural resistance is thereby elevated to the
status of prime factor in the colonial/postcolonial relationship in a move that
inevitably downplays the ongoing reality of colonial/postcolonial domination and
exploitation. It is all very well to conclude that colonial society was as profoundly
affected by the colonial experience as were the colonised. The reality of the
experience was, however, quite strikingly different for each of the sides and this
remains the case in the present divided world. The emphasis on two-way influence
inevitably downplays the reality of the power relations involved, as does the one-
sided glorification of resistance to imperialism, which misses the point of the reality
of empire and its ongoing survival in new forms and with new protagonists.
In a sense, some of the problems of this approach are related to the object of
postcolonial studies, which has tended to concentrate on one extreme of what is a
wide spectrum of very different experience. At one end of this spectrum, it takes as
its object developments relating to some of the most fluid sections of global society,
in which reality is characterised for large numbers of individuals by their experience
of transient, migratory phenomena and a complex existence based on fluctuation,
interaction and a heady cultural brew of heterogeneous elements and relations. At
the other end, there are the modern-day, largely ignored wretched of the earth,
existing in societies that are often locked in a mostly repetitive cycle of grinding
poverty and exploitation and for whom the binary divide is still very much the
defining factor. For these societies, which may not even have reached modernity,
some of the wildest fancies of the postcolonial and the postmodern have little to
offer, to say the least. 
These two poles appear to reflect a new duality of the ‘postcolonial’ experience:
on the one hand, the mobility that is characteristic of those who belong to the mobile
diaspora, for whom theories associated with hybridity and métissage may indeed have
much to offer as part of an explanatory theory of their own cultural experience; on
the other hand, the immobility that is characteristic of the vast majority stuck in
poverty, squalor and disease, and for whom manipulation of crude identity politics
is often the basic fare on offer. 
In both cases, history appears to have come to a standstill. It is a world in stasis,
where real possibilities of struggle to bring about change are discounted and
discredited. Yet the idealised visions of a hybridised world, like the rhetoric of
Francophone discourse, come up against two stark realities: on the one hand, the real
consequences of the global divide on the lives of the people of the ‘majority world’;
on the other, the barriers that are erected in the ‘minority world’. These include not
just the concrete barriers set up at external frontiers to keep out those who attempt
to flee from poverty and persecution, but also the internal barriers operating within
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societies to maintain distinctions of class, caste, religion, race, gender and culture,
and which are shored up by institutions, ideologies and political movements, not just
of the extreme Rght, but also by the mainstream political consensus. 
Representation and Voice
None of the above is intended as a critique of theories of hybridity and hybridisation
per se; it is a case of the ideological uses and abuses to which they may be put. This
is also apparent in the case of certain ‘theoretical’ excesses that attempt to deny even
the possibility of a voice to those who are exploited and oppressed. 
On the one hand, an uncritical adoption of hybridity as an all-embracing,
organising principle of the colonial/postcolonial world leads inexorably to the denial
of a voice of their own to the most oppressed, who are presumed incapable of existing
in an autonomous sphere. They are doomed not to exclusion but to inescapable
inclusion within the interrelations of hybridity, where self-expression is conceived in
terms of imitating the ideas and behaviour of those who are most powerful. Although
hybridity is seen as the possibility of reciprocal interaction and influence, the realities
of the balance of power preclude this in all but the most exceptional cases. Where the
theorists of national liberation saw the re-appropriation of the voice of the enslaved
and the colonised as a necessary step in the struggle, this has become a problematic
area in postcolonial theory, inevitably linked to problems and issues surrounding the
question of representation and the right to representation.  
One of the most extreme articulations of these issues has been through the
controversy provoked by the issue of the ‘subaltern’ voice and, in particular, an essay by
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak ?’ (Spivak 1988), where it was
not even a question of the right to a voice but its very possibility for those who are
categorised as ‘subaltern’. Spivak took as her example an Indian widow attempting to
commit suttee and discussed whether this could be interpreted as an attempt at self-
representation. Her conclusion was that her position as subaltern excluded her from the
hegemonic discourse as a discursive subject, where she could only be defined as Other,
object of the discourse. It is this that defines her status as subaltern. As such, the
subaltern is condemned to silence. For her to gain a voice, she would have to lose her
subaltern status by joining, if it were possible, those elites who shared in the hegemonic
culture, albeit as junior partners, for ever deprived of an ‘authentic’ voice and doomed
to mimicry of the hegemonic discourse, behaviour and culture. 
Spivak has claimed that she has been grossly misinterpreted over this essay,
particularly by critics who chose to argue that her position denied absolutely any
possibility of voice to the subaltern, whereas her case is that the subaltern who speaks
is no longer subaltern. The fact remains that in her theory hegemonic discourse is all-
encompassing and no space is allowed for dissident discourse. Even those critics, like
Homi Bhabha (Bhabha 1994), who argue that mimicry of the dominant discourse
may have a subversive, transformational effect on that discourse and even, possibly,
on the relations existing between the dominant and the dominated are not proposing
a theory of effective resistance, since the dominated will stay for ever blocked in the
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hegemonic relation, whatever tinkering may take place at the level of discourse.
Indeed, it is a step backwards compared with Fanon’s interpretation and rejection of
the Hegelian dialectic of the master and the servant, which he rejected as irrelevant
to the struggle of the colonised for their own autonomous space.  
For all the insights that subsequent theorists, working in the anglophone or the
francophone world, and even in France itself, may have had into the actual workings
of hegemonic power systems and discourses and their deconstruction on the
theoretical plane, both during the colonial period and thereafter, there is little here
that is going to be of much help to those wishing to develop meaningful strategies 
of change. 
Before we conclude, we shall make a short detour back into history to discuss
the very different place that India has occupied in the French postcolonial memory,
not least for the light we believe this will throw on current French strategy and
discourse within the francophone world and further afield, in a situation where it has
similarly to assume that of a subordinate, junior partner.
India without the English
French perceptions of India have been profoundly marked by the history of rivalry
with the British for control of the country and the early relegation of French
aspirations to a very minor, subordinate role in its colonisation. When the French
lost out to the British in the battle for hegemony in India in 1763, they were left with
only the handful of trading posts, famously enumerated in the song recorded in 1957
by Juliette Greco, which, for all its suggestiveness of the woman who had ‘un
Chandernagor de classe’, ‘deux Yanaon ronds et frais’, ‘le Karikal mal luné’, ‘un petit
Mahé secret’, ‘le Pondichéry facile’, is a lament for their loss.13 Of these, Chandernagore
had been the most important commercially, although Pondicherry had come to
assume greater importance as the administrative capital of French India and today
appears to have retained far more signs of the French presence in terms of
architectural and cultural residues. This presence was maintained until 1949, with
the formal transfer of the territories in 1954 to the new Republic of India. Most were
then grouped in the Union Territory of Pondicherry, in spite of the geographical
separation of its constituent parts. Chandernagore, however, was an exception,
opting to become part of the Indian state of West Bengal. 
The existence of the French enclaves throughout the time of the British presence
in India gave France a quite original position, not least through the deliberate
exploitation of the mobilising power of their ideology of ‘liberty, equality and
fraternity’ to influence the Indians to rise up against the British overlords. This was
a process that went back to the time of the French Revolution, and even before, and
there is no doubt that some Indians found these ideas appealing. However, once the
possibility of France becoming the major colonial power had been excluded, the
French presence became a residual, marginalised one in relation to the dominant
British rule. On the one hand, it inspired a certain resentful nostalgia for what might
have been in much of the writing of the colonial period, most notably in Pierre Loti’s
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L’Inde (sans les Anglais) (1903/1992), which was translated soon after and published
in 1906, not only in an English but also in a Bengali version, translated by
Jyotirindranath Tagore, brother of the Bengali writer and Nobel prize-winner
Rabindranath, and published in Calcutta.14 For the subversive uses to which the
French presence could be put were also an important part of the picture. Thus the
French enclaves provided a sanctuary for Indians involved in the independence
struggle, notably Aurobindo Ghosh, who sought refuge in Chandernagore in 1910
before settling in Pondicherry and founding the ashram to which he gave his name.
There was a thriving French-language press in Chandernagore and a French-
language paper, Le Petit Bengali, was published from 1880. This provided an outlet
for much anticolonial material published in the first half of the twentieth century. 
The tendency to portray India as the absolute Other of the Western, as
represented by the British, has been characteristic of French readings of India.
Without the constraints of official colonial policy to contend with, the dominant
French view of India has been an extreme form of orientalism, without the accretions
of assimilationism typical of much of French colonial policy elsewhere. In 1967,
Louis Malle was still portraying India in this way, with his series of films, Phantom
India, recalling with its title Loti’s Fantôme d’Orient (1892/1990). The fundamental
problematic of Malle’s view of India was the orientalist gaze, which he assumed fully
despite the discomfort and malaise that it provoked. It was the gaze of the Western
outsider, looking at an Other, who not only was represented as the West’s absolute
antithesis but was stated to be intrinsically unknowable. As Malle said in an
interview with Philip French, ‘India was impossible to understand for a foreigner –
it was so opaque’ (French 1993: 90). India is thus presented as the absolute Other:
‘Everything in India – their way of life, relationships, family structure, spiritual needs
– is so opposed to what we in the West are used to and take for granted, that living
there constantly provokes your mind, and your heart’ (French 1993: 91).
The experience of India had a profound effect on Malle himself, which he
likened to being ‘brainwashed’: ‘India was the perfect tabula rasa: it was just like
starting from scratch’ (French 1993: 91). In particular, the rational approach is
dismissed as totally inapplicable to India. Malle tried this way: 
I also met a number of Westernised intellectuals and artists and, like a good
Frenchman, I tried to understand Indian culture and Indian religions
rationally. Of course, in a matter of days I realised how silly it was. Indians
have such a completely different approach to everything – for instance, how
they deal with death. The Indian way is the opposite of our Judaeo-
Christian tradition. (French 1993: 91)
He then rejected it in favour of an approach that was content to just observe from
the outside, accepting the status of the film-maker as that of the ultimate voyeur.
When his cameraman Etienne Becker complained that the objects of their gaze were
looking at them and asked Malle to tell them not to look, Malle refused, noting that
they had every right to look at them since they were the ones who were the intruders:
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And Etienne said, ‘But they’re all looking at me, it’s not right, tell them not
to look.’ I said, ‘Why should I tell them not to look at us since we’re
intruders. First, I don’t speak their language; just a few of them speak a little
English. We’re the intruders, disturbing them. They don’t know what we’re
doing, so it’s perfectly normal that they look at us. To tell them not to look
at us, it’s the beginning of mise-en-scène.’ It’s what I resent about so many
documentaries where film-makers arrive from somewhere and start by
telling the people, ‘Pretend we are not here.’ It is the basic lie of most
documentaries, this naive mise-en-scène, the beginning of distortion of the
truth. Very quickly I realised that these looks at the camera were both
disturbing and true, and we should never pretend we weren’t intruders. So
we kept working that way. (French 1993: 93)
Although he accepts the right of the observed to return the gaze in their turn, none
of this questions the right of the observer to direct his gaze on the people concerned
in the first place. In a number of cases, the objects of the gaze, particularly the village
women in the fields at the beginning of the film, are manifestly uncomfortable with
it and regard it as an imposition, although Malle claims that he did not film when
people did not want them to or, at least, when they were able to get the message
across the assumed absolute communication gap. 
As with Loti and others, Malle steps outside the frame of the relation of the major
colonising nation to the colonised, to adopt the position of the third person, that of
the French in India. It is emphasised at different points in the film that not only had
India remained untouched by the experience of British colonisation under the Raj,
except for a minority elite and political class, whose views were dismissed as irrelevant
to India’s needs, but the English, as ever, had failed to understand its essence. 
When divested of its romantic mysticism, the French perspective on India can
emerge as a model for the current Francophone discourse, where the French, or
Francophone, way is presented as a subversive alternative to the dominant American
hegemony. This had already happened to some extent in relation to French colonial
involvement in Indochina, where the French involvement in a triangulated relationship
with the United States, which took over their role as dominant colonial power, allowed
them to appear less tainted and even to take the side of the underdog. In their role as
former, now subordinate, colonial power, France was well placed to play the role of honest
broker in the Vietnam peace negotiations, which took place in Paris from 1968 to 1973.  
Within France, on the other hand, there has been some soul-searching about the
role of France on the global plane. This is often described in terms of a malaise, as
by Jon Henley (Guardian, 27 March 1999), who writes of the malaise as ‘a growing
doubt about France’s place in the global order, a fear that in a technologising,
Anglicising, homogenising world, as Europe merges into a single economic and
political bloc and Anglo-American culture sweeps the planet, France may not be able
to remain France. It is stuck, the anxiety is, in its glorious past.’ So he quotes the
political scientist, Pierre Birnbaum, also analysing the problem in terms of a failure
to modernise (‘Our problem is that we have not found the way to modernise while
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preserving our imagined community’), as well as Jean Baudrillard, who makes clear
the alternative mission of France (‘We want to be an alternative, to show that if
nobody resists America any more, at least we will. But because we are not sure what
model to embody, we tend to offer simply inertia’). 
Things appear to have moved on since then and France offers a number of
different models adapted to different constituencies. At home, there is little sign of
relaxation of the dominant mode of Republican secularism, which continues to
promote an unyielding homogeneity and has been reinforced by the 2004 law on
secularism in education (see Chapter 10) outlawing Muslim headscarves and other
visible religious signs or apparel in public schools. On the world stage, France has
continued to present itself as the champion of other, alternative, solutions, in which
to challenge, at least through its discourse, American power on the world stage. The
discourse of ‘multipolarity’, in which France argues against the hegemony of a single
planetary superpower, has been revitalised through the rhetoric and actions of
Jacques Chirac, taking up de Gaulle’s mantle in this respect. At the same time, in
Africa, France continues to pursue a special relationship in what it regards as its
prime area of influence in the world today, along with the Arab world.   
The French Ideology
To sum up, we shall return to the specific arena of the francophone world, where, as we
have seen, the French discourse associated with Francophonie, with multipolarity and the
defence of diversity on the global plane, can have considerable appeal, not least through
its subversive pretensions. France, particularly under the presidency of Jacques Chirac,
has appeared to grasp the significance of the new developments and to have found a way
of turning them to its own advantage. Again, this is above all a question of finding the
right rhetoric, the right discourse, using buzzwords such as ‘multipolarity’ to reflect the
new scenario and the mood it has evoked, or rather reinventing the Gaullist discourse
of the 1960s and giving it new clothes. The promotion of multipolarity in the world
may be light years away from the universalist rhetoric of the colonial and immediate
postcolonial period. In essence, however, it serves the same function, which is to
promote and preserve the influence and global power of France in the modern world.
As we have seen in Chapter 7, the attractions are there for the former French colonies,
as well as for countries that have no colonial connection, such as those countries in
Eastern Europe that have been under the domination of a single power bloc for too long
not to appreciate the benefits of having several baskets in which to place their eggs.
However, the impact of this ‘French ideology’ is limited, first by the fact of its own
contradictions and, secondly, by the fact that it remains a discourse. 
The contradictions have evolved over the course of time, along with the content
of the discourse, to fit in with changing circumstances and strategies. At the present
time, the main contradiction remains the discrepancy between the message of
pluralism and diversity that has gone out to the wider world, and the determined
defence of a supposed universal homogeneity at home in the Hexagon or in the
DOM-TOM. 
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As a discourse, it suffers from the obvious disadvantages of being precisely that,
a discourse. As such, it has no pretensions to the status of theory and does not claim
to provide any instruments to further knowledge and understanding of the facts and
underlying processes pertaining to the present reality or any strategies for change. It
can and does propose a vision and a framework for a certain type of international
relations, in which idealism ranks highly. However, its real force is in its capacity for
self-representation as a vehicle of subversion of the hegemonic discourse of the US
and its allies. It is largely through the force of its discourse and the associated
credibility and prestige it maintains in the world at large that France has the capacity
to punch above its weight on the international scene. 
Can we therefore conclude that there is a specific French dimension to
postcoloniality?
Clearly, the specific history of France’s role in the process of global capitalist
imperialism has left its mark in the modern world on its former colonies and on
France itself. In particular, the way in which the relations between the metropole and
the colonies were articulated in colonial policy and ideology, as well as the
rationalisations of the whole enterprise, has been marked by characteristic forms and
features quite peculiar to the French sphere. So, at this level, there clearly has been and
continues to be a specifically French dimension to postcoloniality, notwithstanding
the underlying processes that are global in nature and scope and the characteristics
common to the various imperial undertakings and the challenges to them. 
However, this specificity does not just derive from past history. It is also a
demarcating feature in terms of the ways in which France and its former colonies
have found new ways of articulating their relations in the postcolonial world today.
There is also a very specific dimension to the problematic areas where the effects of
postcoloniality are at their most conflictual, most notably those concerning the
postcolonial diaspora within metropolitan France itself.
As for the future, any prognosis is necessarily speculative in nature. What we have
seen as the beginnings of the transition away from postcoloniality may develop at a
quicker or slower pace. However, there are two factors that seem to be reasonably certain. 
One is that development will undoubtedly remain the primary issue for the
foreseeable future as far as the majority of the former French colonies are concerned.
Given the global nature of the underlying processes involved, as well as the necessity for
solutions with, at least in part, a global dimension, there is likely to be a dilution of the
particular relations that have their roots in the history of the French Empire. Solutions
are likely to come from an intensification of efforts at the level of the local economies
and societies, as well as through greater regional cooperation and action at the level of
the basic structures of the global economy and power structures. All of this means that
there will probably be a tendency for the French dimension to be marginalised.  
The other factor is that France will almost certainly do everything in its power to
avoid this marginalisation. While the ongoing development of the ideological armoury
is certainly on the cards, it is not possible to predict what other means may be brought
into play. It is reasonable, however, to conclude that it is highly unlikely that the French
dimension to postcoloniality will fade into insignificance in the near future.  
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Notes
1. ‘C’est la même chose dans le giron français: il y a un Etat qui ne marche pas comme on
voudrait qu’il marche, alors on envoie des blindés faire un tour. Je ne peux pas accepter
cela! L’Afrique ne peut pas accepter cela longtemps’ (Laurent Gbagbo, quoted in Le
Monde, 16 December 2004).
2. ‘L’Europe a acquis une telle vitesse folle, désordonnée, qu’elle échappe aujourd’hui à tout
conducteur, à toute raison et qu’elle va dans un vertige effroyable vers des abîmes, dont il
vaut mieux le plus rapidement s’éloigner’ (Fanon (1961)/1987: 236).
3. pas un des hommes réunis à Bandoeng qui ne fût conscient de l’immense importance
de l’Europe dans l’histoire de l’humanité et de la richesse de sa contribution aux
progrès de la civilisation. Ce qui a été condamné à Bandoeng, ça n’a pas été la
civilisation européenne, ça a été la forme intolérable qu’au nom de l’Europe certains
hommes ont cru devoir donner aux relations qui devaient normalement s’instaurer
entre l’Europe et les peuples non européens.
Eh bien, si un événement mérite le nom d’historique, c’est bien celui-là … Pour
bien en comprendre la portée, je vous demande de réfléchir à ces deux dates: en 1885,
l’Europe se réunissait à Berlin pour se partager le monde; en 1955, soixante-dix ans
plus tard, le monde s’est réuni à Bandoeng pour signifier à l’Europe que le temps de
l’empire européen est fini et d’avoir pour le plus grand bien de la civilisation, à rentrer
dans l’ordre commun. (Césaire 1956: 1367–68).
4. ‘L’ordre était parfaitement observé. Ces femmes et ces vieillards, longtemps habitués au
désordre, apprenaient la discipline. De bonne grâce, ils s’y soumettaient; le nationalisme,
en quelques mois, les avait habitués à l’ordre, et avait ouvert leur esprit sur le monde
moderne’ (Ghazi 1956: 1357).
5. ‘Ni la francophonie littéraire ni la théorie postcoloniale ne sont des notions claires en
France, l’une parce qu’elle a été engagée dans trop de débats idéologiques, la seconde en
raison d’une origine anglo-saxonne assez récente qui ne lui a pas encore permis de
s’acclimater dans notre recherche universitaire’ (Moura 1999: 1).
6. Car la tentative d’approcher une réalité tant de fois occultée ne s’ordonne pas tout de
suite autour d’une série de clartés.  Nous réclamons le droit à l’opacité.  Par quoi notre
tension pour tout dru exister rejoint le drame planétaire de la Relation: l’élan des
peuples néantisés qui opposent aujourd’hui à l’universel de la transparence, imposé
par l’Occident, une multiplicité sourde du Divers. (Glissant (1980)/1997: 14).
7. ‘nous sommes en marge, nous nous taisons. Mais tout ce mouvement fait un boucan de
silences dans nos têtes’ (Glissant (1980)/1997: 15).
8. ‘Quitter le cri, forger la parole. Ce n’est pas renoncer à l’imaginaire ni aux puissances
souterraines, c’est armer une durée nouvelle, ancrée aux émergences des peuples’ (Glissant
(1980)/1997: 28).
9. ‘Du cri fixe d’ici, déroule une parole aride, difficile. Accorde ta voix à la durée du monde.
Sors de la peau de ton cri. Entre en peau du monde par tes pores. Soleil à vif ’ (Glissant
(1980)/1997: 27).
10. ‘la résistance ouverte, spectaculaire, à la révolte de type Spartacus ou à la Révolution de
type Toussaint-Louverture ou Lénine’ (Confiant 1996: 147; see also p.148 and Bernabé,
Chamoiseau and Confiant 1989: 55).
11. ‘un marronnage quotidien obstiné, silencieux, masqué mais inébranlable de l'espèce de
chape de plomb qui pèse sur la Martinique depuis trois cent cinquante ans’ (Confiant
1996: 171).
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12. To quote just one example from the first editorial by Nadia Khouri-Dagher in Yasmina,
a magazine for Maghrebian women: ‘Nous savons aujourd’hui que nous pouvons
appartenir, socialement et affectivement, à la fois à deux univers qui ne sont opposés que
pour ceux qui connaissent mal l’un des deux’ (Le Monde, 17 October 2002). 
13. Elle avait, elle avait le Pondichéry acceuillant.
Aussitôt, aussitôt c’est à un nouveau touriste
Qu’elle fit voir son comptoir, sa flore, sa géographie.
Pas question, dans ces conditions,
De revoir un jour les Comptoirs de l’Inde. (Juliette Greco, Chandernagor, recorded
by Fontana 1957).
14. See also Farrère (1935)/1992; Droit 1989; Clément 1993; Assayag 1999; Airault 2000.
For an extensive bibliography of such material, see Granger et al. 2002. 
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